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ABSTRACT
Since the Internet was made publicly accessible, it has become increasingly popular and
its deployment has been broad and global thereby facilitating a range of available online
services such as Electronic Mail (email), news or bulletins, Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
and World Wide Web (WWW). Progressively, other online services such as telephony,
video conference, video on demand, Interactive Television (ITV) and Geographic
Information System (GIS) have been integrated with the Internet and become publicly
available.

Presently, Internet broadband communication services incorporating both wired and
wireless network technologies has seen the emergence of the concept of a digital
community which has been growing and expanding rapidly around the world. Internet
and the ever expanding online services to the wider digital community has raised the
issue of security of these services during usage. Most local councils throughout Western
Australia have resorted to delivering online services such as library, online payments
and email accessibility. The provision and usage of these services have inherent security
risks. Consequently, this study investigated the concept of a secure digital community in
the secure provision and usage of these online services in selected local councils in
Western Australia (WA).
After an extensive review of existing literature, information security frameworks were
derived from the adaptation of various resources, such as the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C:
Internet Technology Security benchmark which was used as the main template. In
addition, this template was enhanced into a framework model by incorporating other
benchmarks such as NIST, CIS, ISSAF as well as other sources of information. These
included information security related books, related ICT network and security websites
such as CERT, CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI, Juniper, MS, NESSUS and NMAP together
with journals and personal interviews. The proposed information security frameworks
were developed to enhance the level of security strength of the email and online web
systems as well as to increase the level of confidence in the system security within the
selected local councils in WA. All the investigative studies were based upon the
available selected local councils’ data and the associated analyses of the results as
obtained from the testing software. In addition, the interpretive multiple-case study
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principles were used during the investigation to achieve or fulfil the purpose of this
study. The findings from this study were then abstracted for use in a framework and
made available for use as a model for possible adaptation and implementation to other
similarly structured councils or organisations.
As a result, the study confirmed that the proposed information security frameworks
have the capability and potential to improve the level of security strength. In addition,
the level of satisfaction and confidence of council staff of the selected local councils in
WA in the system security would also be increased due to the application of these
frameworks.
Although these information security frameworks may be recommended as practical and
supporting tools for local councils, the findings from this study were specific only to the
selected local councils used in this study. Further research using other councils, may be
necessary in order for the information security frameworks to be adopted within a wider
range of councils or organisations in WA or elsewhere.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the research

In the preceding decades, a number of nations worldwide have increasingly availed
themselves of advances in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT),
particularly in Internet technologies as a key business component in various
organisations (Al-Mashari, 2007; Steyaert, 2000). This is mainly due to the
pervasiveness, popularity and usage diversity of the Internet. These factors have
prompted various public and private organisations to adjust their business strategies in
the achievement of their goals (Teece, 2010). The advent of Internet technologies, as a
component of ICT tools, has enabled most government and commercial organisations to
adjust to the change of making a worldwide business presence through its powerful
capabilities (Reddick, 2005; Shan & Wang, 2009).

Additionally, ICT has been considered as an information competence tool as it provides
information and related services, and supports interaction and cooperation among the
users (Pazalos et al., 2010). The increasing availability of high speed Internet broadband
communications infrastructure is an enabler of communication. Distribution of
information and knowledge for both government and non-government sectors have
become highly interactive and dynamic as a characteristic of the global digital
community (Gillett et al., 2004; Ishida, 2003; Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul &
Valli, 2011a, b, c; Ortiz & Tapia, 2008a, b; Pazalos et al., 2010; Tanabe et al., 2002;
Tapia et al., 2006).

According to Intel Corporation (2005a, b, c), a “digital community” is a connected
community or social networking entity which uses the Internet communication and
computing infrastructure to provide flexible and innovative services to respond to users’
demands (Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c). Therefore, most
significant cities around the world have made large investments of money for the
development of large network infrastructures to facilitate high-speed connections for the
online service of their local public and private organisations (Gillett et al., 2004; Ishida,
2003; Ortiz & Tapia, 2008a, b; Pazalos et al., 2010; Tanabe et al., 2002; Tapia et al.,
2006).
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Specifically, government organisations have engaged the above mentioned technologies
in providing additional Information Technology (IT)-based development facilitators to
commence and supply online information and services to their residences (in the case of
local government councils) and partnerships (Al-Mashari, 2007; Shan & Wang, 2009;
Torres et al., 2005). This facilitation may enhance a level of service satisfaction, ease of
access, correctness, confidentiality, effectiveness within governments and partnerships,
provide rapid and better services delivery, promote their recent products and services,
and diminish service costs (Abie et al., 2004; Al-Mashari, 2007; Hirwade, 2010). As a
result, their residences and partnerships may have increased and better electronic
communication with their local and national governments and increase the knowledge
of the general populace (Shan & Wang, 2009).

The values aforementioned produce a suitable background to this research as they
present the potential benefits to engage in research that may be useful for broader
implementation scope or practitioners in similar or dissimilar circumstances and
societies. These benefits include the developed approaches and methods as
recommendations for future revisions or improvements for successfully operating their
correlated initiatives in an efficient manner. This research therefore commenced with
the intention of analysing three reported case studies of electronic systems in
government organisations for cyber security. The particular emphasis was on email and
online web systems in order to investigate and reveal the factors which have impacted
upon these systems and their security. An additional aim of the research was to search
for solutions to provide performance efficiency for these systems.

1.2 Background to the statement of the problem

The amount of users employing online services via Internet technologies have been
increasing recently (Australian Communications and Media Auhtority, 2008; Phiri &
Agbinya, 2006). Most countries have been utilising online services in recent decades
and attempting to find an effective method to deal with the security and privacy of their
users (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003; Paul et al., 2011; Phiri & Agbinya,
2006). Nevertheless, Internet users are continually at risk, as they may have a credible
chance of being attacked and are easily vulnerable to outside attackers or hackers
(Farahmand et al., 2003; Farahmand et al., 2005).
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Consequently, this may impact directly or indirectly on the current unsecured network
communications for the security and privacy of the users or service providers. This may
result in increased prevention and protection costs in terms of maintenance, upgrades
and performance issues for the providers.

With the continual development of new technology in ICT, the Internet has currently
become one of the quickest growing global network technologies (Al-Ahmad & AlKaabi, 2008). However, its usage comes with major concerns in security, trust and
privacy for public and private organisations, as it relates directly to the online exchange
of personal, organisational or financial data or information (Kim et al., 2006;
Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c). Therefore, a well-secured
network system is considered a good solution for preventing and protecting unexpected
attacks, and to enhance privacy and security for the assurance of a degree of
confidentiality in Internet usage (Hwang et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2006).

Particularly, the World Wide Web (WWW) and email are the most well-known Internet
technologies that are being used in most councils in Western Australia (WA)
(Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c; WALGA, 2010a).
Nevertheless, there are other Internet related or convergence technologies that have
been employed in several councils in WA such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP),
Voice over Wireless Local Area Network (VoWLAN), wireless LAN, Geographic
Information System (GIS), Global Positioning System (GPS) and digital radio
(Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c; personal communications with
the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).

These technologies provide services such as online payment, online library services,
security patrol, digital surveillance, telephony (VoIP), online GIS and Internet café to
local government employees, residents and community groups. As the digital
community concept starts to develop, Internet related services will be more widely
available to the public. Electronic voting, electronic polling, electronic health and
Internet radio are all examples of services to the digital community.

In addition, security is one of the most important factors for the digital community as it
must ensure confidentiality and privacy of users’ information over the Internet (Intel
Corporation, 2005a, b, c; Limwiriyakul, 2009; Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011a, b, c).
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Therefore, this research is aimed to analyse and test the security of common Internet
technologies which are currently in use at the selected local councils in WA. In this
research, the email and online web systems were tested in the selected councils.
Furthermore, this research provided recommendations to the selected councils. These
included the creation of the developed information security frameworks and analyses of
security weaknesses for the email and online web systems, as well as recommendations
related to the security weaknesses and steps required to reduce risks to all users.

There were several known ICT security risks related to incidents that had occurred to
the various councils’ systems. These risks were indentified based on work done by the
network administrators over the past seven years at the local councils in WA. Elicitation
of these threats was centered on several private discussions with other IT managerial
and IT operational staff from various local councils in WA (personal communications
with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Email spamming, online
web hacking and wireless hijacking were some of the examples of the incidents that
were encountered and communicated during those exchanges.

Additionally, one of the common key issues that emerged from the discussions with the
IT managerial and IT operational staff was that the security breaches occurred as a
result of the general lack of security awareness and apathy by the IT managerial and IT
operational staff.

Thus, three research questions were addressed in order to investigate possible solutions
to the problems that were uncovered. These research questions were enumerated as:

i.

has the current system been implemented securely in a way that meets the
national and international security standards?;

ii.

how the developed information security frameworks can potentially improve a
level of security strength for the use of the email and online web systems in the
three selected councils in WA?; and

iii.

how the developed information security frameworks can be employed to
incorporate functionalities of the current systems at the selected WA local
councils?
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The research examined the level of security in the deployment of the email and online
web systems in the selected local councils in WA by adapting the Open Source Security
Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) 2.2 Section C: Internet technology security
as a security testing benchmark and model (Herzog, 2006). According to personal
communications with Professor Dr. Craig Valli (2007), the OSSTMM is a solid
information security framework and moreover, it is freely avalible on the Internet unlike
the proprietary International Standard Organization (ISO) standard. Consequently, the
OSSTMM 2.2 Section C was chosen as a security testing benchmark for this research.

In addition, other open source information security standards including The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Center for Internet Security (CIS) and
The Information Systems Security Assessment Framework (ISSAF) were also utilised
in conjunction with the OSSTMM methodology.

Other resources included information security related books, journals, personal
interviews as well as information bulletins from Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT), CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI Software, Juniper, Microsoft (MS), NESSUS,
Network Mapper (NMAP) and related ICT network and security websites.

1.3 Contributions of the research

The developed information security frameworks for the security of the email and online
web systems were generated for the selected councils by examining, and expanding
upon preliminary research into the WA councils’ ICT services (personal
communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007). This earlier research
contributed to identification of potential risks in the email and online web systems.

Security approaches were employed to data handling and information particularly in the
areas of email, network, web and database security techniques in order to deal with the
councils’ complex data sets with a view to enhancing administration.

The IT operational staff at the selected councils had limited usage and awareness of
cyber security software commonly used in the industry by system administrators, in
particular NMAP version 5.0 and GFI LANguard version 9.0. This research served to
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extend awareness of the usage nuances for these tools through advanced techniques,
thereby extending the knowledge base for the IT operational staff in this area.

The innovation in this research lies in the realistic application of the applied security
techniques. The implementation of these techniques also served to generate confidence
in the selected councils’ IT managerial and IT operational staff in developing and
maintaining systems in unsecured environments especially in relation to the email and
online web systems.

Several investigations were conducted to verify the feasibility of the developed
information security frameworks. Real-time data was used to generate the email and
online web systems testing results (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6 for details of the way in
which data was allocated to the developed information security frameworks and for
testing of each of the selected councils respectively).

All the security testing and analysis for both these systems were carried out using actual
and real-time data. Consequently, the developed information security frameworks may
readily be applied in the actual email and online web systems.

The developed information security frameworks provided an alternative security
pathway for possible adoption by the selected councils. The research provided a means
of enhancing the planning and operations of the councils’ ICT systems and its
compliance with the current ICT policies. Results from this research were considered to
be good examples of security based implementations of the email and online web
systems within the selected councils according to the councils own IT operational staff.

In addition, the IT operational staff in the selected councils considered the security
recommendations from the developed information security frameworks for future audits
and tests within the existing councils as well as for other councils and/or organisations
for external validity.
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1.4 Thesis structure

The remainder of this thesis is organised into six chapters. Each chapter begins with an
introduction and ends with a summary and conclusions.

Chapter 2, which contains the discussion of the existing literature, is organised into six
subsections: studies on the demand and use of Internet technologies related services in
WA, studies on general risks analysis associated with the online services deployment,
studies on the standard online services systems testing, studies on the email system,
studies on the online web system and finally the conclusion of the chapter. Each of the
six aspects presents an overview and discussion of current literature and integrates the
conclusions drawn from previous research.

Chapter 3 presents the research methodology and the developed information security
frameworks. The research methods are presented within seven subsections: the
background to the research method, the interpretive multiple-case study principles,
research design and procedures, research materials, the theoretical frameworks and
conceptual adaptations, the limitations to the research and a brief summary of the
chapter. The materials used in the research described are the architecture, configuration
codes and vulnerability of internal border routers, firewalls, switches, Intrusion
Detection System/Intrusion Prevention System (IDS/IPS), email, database and online
web servers datasets. The software packages used, namely NMAP version 5.0 and GFI
LANguard version 9.0 are also detailed here.

Additionally, details of the data analysis procedures, materials, components and
working processes of the developed information security frameworks are provided in
this chapter.

Chapter 4 is the beginning of discussion of the data selections and collections. It also
provides detailed testing procedures as carried out at the first selected council. This is
followed by some background information, recordings of the pre-interview consultation,
document review, interview investigation, existing architecture discovery, email system
testing analysis, online web system testing analysis and recommendations. The last part
of the chapter contains the related discussions on the research topic.
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Chapter 5 focuses exclusively on the second selected council. It describes a similar
process to that of Chapter 4, in terms of considering the available data, conducting
testings and presenting, analysing and evaluating the email and online systems testing
results.

Chapter 6 contains the investigation and discussion of the third selected council. It
follows along the lines of enquiry as Chapters 4 and 5, in terms of examining the
available data, performing testings and demonstrating, analysing and assessing the
email and online systems testing results.

Chapter 7 includes a discussion on the findings from this research, together with a
section on the seven common issues discovered from Chapters 4, 5 and 6 as well as
another section on the identification of the limitations of this research.

Chapter 8 contains a summary of the key issues and conclusions of this research, with
reference to the findings presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It also includes
recommendations borne out from this research and offers suggestions for future
research directions.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This literature review is based around the examination of the security issues of the
common Internet related technologies currently deployed at the selected local councils
in WA. In this chapter, the literature reviewed relates to: (1) studies on the demand and
use of Internet technology related services in WA; (2) studies on general risks analyses
associated with the online services deployment; (3) studies on the standard online
services systems testing; (4) studies on the email system; (5) studies on the online web
system; and (6) the conclusion of the chapter.

Overall, the selection of the literature reviewed was based on the relevance to the first
five points as enunciated and all the reviews were therefore from the associated panel of
experts in these specified areas. The selection method could therefore be considered a
semblance of the Delphi technique (McDonald et al., 2009).

2.1 The demand and use of Internet technologies related services in WA

There are 141 local councils in WA which make up approximately 23 percent of the
total of all local councils in Australia. Some local councils voluntarily share resources
in order to provide better services to their residents and users through a collaborative
initiative (Limwiriyakul, 2009; Stanton, 2004).

Findings released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) show that the number of
WA households with access to a home computer has increased correspondingly since
1998 from 44 percent, to 81 percent in 2009 (ABS, 2009). Apparently, the number of
WA households with Internet access has also grown from 15 percent in 1998 to 75
percent in 2009 (ABS, 2009).

Furthermore, at the end of 2009, the number of WA households with broadband Internet
access has risen to 64 percent while the number of WA households with dial-up Internet
access has dropped to only 10 percent (ABS, 2009).
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According to other research released by the ABS between 2004 and 2005,
approximately 48 percent of businesses employ electronic lodgements with government
organisations via the Internet or online services. Approximately 30 percent of
businesses utilise online payment systems as the most common online activity to make
payments via the Internet to government organisations (ABS, 2006; Limwiriyakul,
2009).

These studies indicate that Internet availability and usage have been increasing, and the
demand for government agencies to provide electronic lodgements or online payment
services such as fees, rates, licence renewals and infringements payments has been
growing as well.

In 2007, according to the Western Australian Local Government Association WALGA
(2007), 132 of the 141 total local councils in WA have their own website in WA
(Limwiriyakul, 2009). Currently, all local councils in WA have developed their own
websites for the public to gain online access to the available online information and
services (WALGA, 2010b). Online library services via a third-party service provider
such as the State Library in WA make up the largest portion of the most common online
services being used. These services are followed by, Internet access services for general
purpose usage and online payment services via a third-party service provider such as
Australia Post, which make up the second and the third largest portions of the most
common online services accessed respectively.

Figure 2.1 summarises the available online services and Internet related technologies
provided by the local councils in WA (Limwiriyakul, 2009).
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Figure 2.1. The available online services and Internet related technologies provided by
the 132 local councils in WA

The use of email, online web, online library, online GIS and online GPS systems are the
five major online services systems provided by the local councils in WA (personal
communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Details
of these services are described below.

2.1.1 The email system

Since its inception, email usage has become one of the most common methods of
electronic communication in the world as well as in Australia today (Australian
Communications and Media Auhtority, 2008; Fadia, 2006). This is due to the fact that it
is easier to use, is faster, inexpensive, reliable and easier to manage or filter as
compared to traditional mail. It increasingly has become part of all businesses means for
exchange of information.

All WA councils have their own email address available to its residents or anyone for
inter-staff communication. Many of the councils also have their own email service
available to their staff for intra-staff communication (Limwiriyakul, 2009).
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2.1.2 The online web system

The online web system covers online information and online payment services. There
are 105 WA councils who provide Internet and online access to their residents and
others. The online access provides for the councils’ general and specific information,
often replacing and extending paper based information. There are 72 councils out of
these 105 which provide online payment systems that fully rely on third-party payment
services such as BPOINT (Commonwealth Bank of Australia, n.d.) and POSTbillpay
(Australia Post, n.d.).

Furthermore, there are nine WA councils who have their own online payment systems
which provide online payment services to residents. Some examples of the councils who
provide these services include the City of Joondalup, the City of Mandurah, the City of
Melville, the City of Perth, the City of South Perth, the City of Swan and the town of
Vincent. These online payment systems are provided either through third-party
application software or in-house application software that is developed and managed
internally.

2.1.3 The online library system

There are 114 WA councils who provide an online library system using a third-party
service provider such as the State Library in WA. However, there are 26 WA councils
who provide their own online library services direct to residents via the Internet. The
City of Albany, the City of Armadale, the City of Joondalup and the City of Melville
are some examples where this is done.

The online library system allows anyone to do catalogue searches such as author, title
and subject. It also allows a library member to reserve, request or check the availability
of the required books, Compact Discs (CDs) or other materials. Network enabled online
public access catalogue (NetOpac) is one of the more popular online library applications
being used in some of the libraries of the WA councils.
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2.1.4 The online GIS

GIS is being used at some of the WA councils to provide a wide range of spatial and
mapping services which include data capture, map production and GPS technologies.
There are several WA councils which provide a useful online interactive mapping
system to its residents or anyone to view street trees, properties, plans and aerial photos
via the web. The City of Armadale, the City of Cockburn, the City of Melville, the City
of Swan and the Town of Victoria Park are some of the WA councils who provide this
online GIS service.

IntraMaps is one of the most popular online GIS application software packages being
used at all the above mentioned WA councils. IntraMaps was developed by the Digital
Mapping Solutions (DMS) and runs on either MS Windows Servers 2003 or 2008.
IntraMaps supports various spatial data formats such as MS and Oracle spatials (DMS,
n.d.).

2.1.5 The online GPS

Presently, GPS technology is being widely used in navigation and positional tools. With
the combination of GPS and the Internet, GPS tracking or monitoring has been made
possible.

For example, the online vehicle GPS tracking software is a tool which has the benefit of
increasing the productivity, safety and security to council services such as bin collection
and security patrol. The City of Melville has merged its GPS technology services with
its ICT system in order to provide an online GPS service for its security patrol vehicles.
This online GPS system allows for online monitoring of the activity of the vehicles in
real-time.

Nevertheless, the objective of this research was to place emphasis on the email and
online web systems as they provide a good test case study for the investigation. This is
due to the fact that these two selected systems are the main online services used within
the local councils in WA.
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In terms of business criticality, email and online web systems can be considered as
important online services due to their inherent popularity as well as functionality. Email
communication has largely superseded fax and traditional mail communication due to
its efficiency and cost benefits. As such email communication has become fundamental
to business operations in most organisations. Data communicated via email has the
added benefit of security as there is no consequent need to shred sensitive information
as would be the case for hardcopy communications. All WA councils utilise email
services for communication between their staff, residential and other organisations.

Furthermore, online web systems (static, dynamic and payment) also play a critical role
in terms of providing services to several WA councils’ residential and other
organisations. Councils provide these various online web services in the form of online
tendering, online web information, online feedback forms, online rate payments and
online voting. These services are critical to their large business operations and provide a
level of data security as they are robust enough to protect against interruption of
services and loss of any sensitive data.

In addition, the email system is deployed in all local councils in WA whereas the online
web system including the online payment services may be adopted in all major local
councils in WA in the near future as a distinct possibility. Consequently, the findings
from these two systems may be used as a guideline for other councils or organisations
for further consideration, adaptation and implementation.

2.2 The studies on general risks analysis associated with the online services
deployment

Several local councils in WA provide online payment services by utilising a 128 bit
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technology over Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS) (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009). Rates, fees, licence renewals, invoices, infringements are specific
examples of these payment services.
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Nevertheless, the significant missing part from the SSL transaction is a method for the
resident to confirm his/her identity as a valid user to the council while using the online
services (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009).

Furthermore, there is no method for the council to ensure the legitimacy of the identity
of the resident. Even though SSL provides a secure communication channel, it does not
provide a way to verify the uniqueness of each resident when dealing with the online
services (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009; Secure Computing Corporation, 2006).

In terms of the number of perceived risks to the three selected councils, the followings
are some examples of the past security concerns which occurred between the year 2006
and 2009:

 In the year 2007, Council A’s email system was subjected to a flood of
spamming incidents. These occurrences caused significant problems in terms of
the accumulation of massive amounts of junk mail and a consequent reduction in
internet speed. As a result, two Symantec spam filtering servers were deployed
into their email system (personal communications with Council A, 2008);
 Council C experienced a similar incident of email spamming in the year 2008.
These occurrences caused Council C’s IT staff a lot of time and effort to manage
the issue which also consequently led them to deploy an external spam filtering
system to filter their email network traffic (personal communications with
Council C, 2009); and
 In the year 2009, the frontend web server (IIS 6.0) of Council B was
compromised due to the fact that the server had not installed the most up-to-date
patches (personal communications with Council B, 2009).

In addition, various local councils in WA have deployed wireless network technologies
to provide the online services that facilitate real-time online access to the councils’
information systems, such as Internet access, surveillance cameras and mobile
computing (personal communications with the local councils in WA, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009).
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Nonetheless, the nature of a wireless network technology is less secure than a wired
network technology or a conventional technology counterpart (Australian Government:
Attorney-General's Department, 2006; Limwiriyakul, 2009; Stanford University
Residential Computing, 2007). Therefore, a wireless network technology may introduce
a new level of potential risks during online access to services (Limwiriyakul, 2009).

There are several potential risks and threats associated with the online services usage
such as viruses, hackers, Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS), fake websites, identity theft or online Identity (ID) theft and data integrity.
Furthermore, Domain Name Server (DNS) vulnerability is another potential risk where
an intruder gains control of the DNS, to do phishing and farming attacks thereby
misleading all other users of the DNS (Fontana, 2007). The following lists some
examples of services and their associated risks specific to the online services provided
by the local councils in WA:

1) Data integrity: This includes data loss and data corruption that may be caused by
virus infected emails or through intruders who infiltrate the database of a
council;
2) DoS and DDoS: These denial of services are usually caused when the website,
firewall, database, library and online payment systems of a council are affected
by severe interruptions or delays as experienced by both the staff and residents
of the council;
3) Data security: The councils’ databases contain personal information relating to
the staff and residents that may be stolen, intercepted or exploited by an intruder
using spyware or other mechanism and which may or may not be detected;
4) Misuse of resources: The council library and community centres may be at risk
through the general misuse of the online services by the staff, residents and the
public such as the possible unauthorised browsing of pornography, racism,
strong violence and crime websites; and
5) System penetration security risks: The councils may be at risk from infected
Internet download files or executables containing potential viruses that may
compromise the information systems.
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Consequently, it is essential for the local councils in WA to apply a powerful ICT
security strategy in order to shield their systems from intrusion, corruption and
exploitation of information. The ICT security should be performed through wellarticulated policies and procedures and technical solutions for the staff including
training, controlling, monitoring and enforcement (Allen et al., 2007).

Risk assessment typically refers to a security analysis carried out through interviews
and research which includes business, legal and industry specific criteria. Security
testing is a project-oriented risk assessment of systems and networks through the
application of a professional analysis on a security examination where penetration is
habitually utilised to validate false positives and false negatives (Herzog, 2006).

Table 2.1 illustrates the potential threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or
contingencies and policy recommendations of the online services provided by the local
councils in WA. (L represents low, M represents medium and H represents high). The
following summary has been adapted from Whitman and Mattord (2007, pp. 57-59).

Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA

Threats

Assets

Impacts

Countermeasures or
contingencies

Policy recommendations

1. Brute
force and
dictionary
attacks

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems and
information
reputation

M

Security education for user

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

System passwords change
frequency
Strong system password policy
Control and encryption of all
communication ports by the
councils’ IT teams
Filter/disable unnecessary ports
and protocols on the Internet
gateway firewall
Audit trail software to show
logins and failed logins
Use of encryption technology to
protect all transmitted and
stored information

Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to brute force and
dictionary attacks
Backup media stored in
an external location
Regularly update the
software, patches of all
online systems
Using encryption
technology to protect
information in all online
systems
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued)

Threats

Assets

Impacts

Countermeasures or
contingencies

Policy recommendations

2.
DoS/DDoS
attacks

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems and

M/H

Security education for user

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Filter/disable unnecessary ports
and protocols on the Internet
gateway firewall
Guidelines on regular backups
of critical data to be issued,
audited and verified

information
reputation

Software and hardware
configurations to be controlled
by the councils’ IT teams only
Control and encryption of all
communication ports by the
councils’ IT teams

3. Dust and
temperature
damage

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems

L/M

Email, online
web, online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems

Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to DoS attacks
Backup media stored in
an external location

Security education for user

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Check/clean all online IT
systems and devices/equipment
to ensure there is no dust
Install air condition controls and
dust filtering systems or
position the equipment to take
advantage of the prevailing
environmental conditions

H

Removal of any IT
equipments is to be
authorised by the
councils’ IT teams

Regular patching of all the
applications and OS software of
all the online services

Insure all assets

4. Electrical
power fail
/unstable/
surge

Random audits of both
software and hardware are
to be conducted

All ICT configurations are
to be controlled by the
councils’ IT teams

Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to dust contamination
Backup media stored in
an external location
Regular maintenance on
air conditioning and
filtering systems or
environmental area

Security education for user

All assets must be insured

Backup all software and
configurations files of all online
systems and store in different offsite locations

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Check/monitoring/test
Uninterruptible Power
Supply/Uninterruptible Power
Source (UPS) or surge protector
on regular basis
Insure all assets

Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to electrical power
failure
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued)
Threats

Assets

Impacts

5. Eavesdropping
attacks

Email, online
web, online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems

M/H

Countermeasures or
contingencies

Policy recommendations

Security education for user

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Control and encryption of all
communication ports by the
councils’ IT teams
Filter/disable unnecessary ports
and protocols on the Internet
gateway firewall

Regularly update the
software, patches of all
online systems
Using encryption
technology to protect
information in all online
systems
Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to eavesdropping
attacks

6. Fires,
flooding,
earthquake
or any other
natural
hazards/
disasters

Email, online
web, online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems and
information
reputation

H

Security education for user

All assets must be insured

Backup all software and
configuration files of all online
systems and store in different offsite locations

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Permanently mark all online
systems equipment as council
property retrieval message
Contingency plan in place in case
of emergency
Insure all assets

All councils’ assets must be
clearly labelled as the
council property and
audited twice a year
Regularly check drains,
water pipes, for fire hazards
or earthquake proofing.
Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to natural
hazards/disasters
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued)

Threats

Assets

Impacts

Countermeasures or
contingencies

Policy recommendations

7. Hacker
attacks

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems and

M/H

Security education for user

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Filter/disable unnecessary ports
and protocol on the Internet
gateway firewall
Install IDS/IPS at the Internet
gateway system
Guidelines on regular backups
of critical data to be issued,
audited and verified

information
reputation

Software and hardware
configurations to be controlled
by the councils’ IT teams only
Control and encryption of all
communication ports by the
councils’ IT teams
Patching all applications and
Operating System (OS) software
of all online services systems
regularly

Physical and software
measures are to be used
on all online systems to
minimise modification
and unauthorised access
Random audits of both
software and hardware are
to be conducted
Removal of any IT
equipments is to be
authorised by the
councils’ IT teams
Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to hacker attacks
Using encryption
technology to protect
information in all online
systems
Deploy IDS/IPS
Backup media stored in
an external location
All ICT configurations are
to be controlled by the
councils’ IT teams

8.
Interference
and
jamming
and attacks

Online GPS
system and
information
reputation

M/H

Security education for user
Implement filtering/detecting
system to monitor or detect any
strong interference signals

Staff to undertake security
education on induction
Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to jamming and
interference attacks
Regularly review and
update the facilities policy
and GPS usage devices
policy
Backup media stored in
an external location
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued)

Threats

Assets

Impacts

Countermeasures or
contingencies

Policy recommendations

9. Internal
theft of
online
systems
devices/
equipments
at the
selected
councils’
premises

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems and

M/H

Security education for user

All assets must be insured

Lock up all laptops when not in
use

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Background/identity checks
conducted on staff/contractors

Random audits of both
software and hardware are
to be conducted

Access controls within the
company buildings

information
reputation

Permanently mark all online
systems equipment as council
property retrieval message
Regular audits of hardware by
the councils’ IT teams

Removal of any IT
equipments is to be
authorised by the
councils’ IT teams
All councils’ assets must
be clearly labelled as the
council property and
audited twice a year
Background/identity
checks will be conducted
on staffs/contractors
Physical and software
measures are to be used
on all systems to
minimise modification
and unauthorised access
All ICT configurations
are to be controlled by the
councils’ IT teams

10.
Malicious
active code
attacks

11. Social
engineering
attacks

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems

M

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems

L/M

Enable filtering features on the
councils’ firewalls systems to
filter/limit Java applets and
Active X objects
Minimise the number of users
access to Java applets or Active
X objects on all councils’ online
services systems
Security education for user
Background/identity checks
conducted on staffs/contractors
The councils’ IT staff are not
permitted to give out
information to unauthorised
personnel
Restrict/minimise access to
confidential information
regarding all online services
systems

Staff to undertake security
education on induction
Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to malicious active
code attacks
Staff to undertake security
education on induction
Only authorised personnel
to access security
information
Regularly review and
ensure that the insurance
policy covers replacement
due to social engineering
attacks
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Table 2.1 A summary of threats, assets, impacts, countermeasures or contingencies and
policy recommendations for the online services of the local councils in WA (continued)

Threats

Assets

Impacts

Countermeasures or
contingencies

Policy recommendations

12. Staff
damage

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems

H

Security education for user

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Email,
online web,
online
library,
online GIS,
online GPS
systems

H

13. Virus,
malware
and worm
introduction
through
Internet
usage

Backup all software and
configuration files of all online
systems and store in different
off-site locations

Automatic malware, virus and
worm and protection software
used and automatically updated

All assets must be insured
Regularly update the
policy

Staff to undertake security
education on induction

Guidelines on regular backups
of critical data to be issued,
audited and verified

Physical and software
measures are to be used
on all online systems to
minimise modification
and unauthorised access

Software and hardware
configurations to be controlled
by the councils’ IT teams only

Random audits of both
software and hardware are
to be conducted

Control and encryption of all
communication ports by the
councils’ IT teams

Removal of any IT
equipments is to be
authorised by the
councils’ IT teams

Security education for user

Patching all applications and OS
software of all online services
systems regularly

Backup media stored in
an external location
All ICT configurations
are to be controlled by the
councils’ IT teams

(Source: Adapted from Whitman & Mattord, 2007, pp. 57-59)

2.3 The standard online services systems testing

This research specifically examined the level of security of the email and online web
systems that are presently employed at the selected councils. Adaptations from various
testing techniques, open source information security standards, guidelines and
recommendations from recognised organisations have been utilised.

An example of the IT security testing techniques was the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C:
Internet technology security as a main testing benchmark methodology model. The IT
testing techniques from other sources included NIST, CIS, ISSAF combined with
related ICT network and security websites such as CERT, CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI,
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Juniper, MS, NESSUS and NMAP. Other testing information was compiled from
related books and journals and personal interviews were also used as a source of
information gathering.

In addition, there were several testing techniques covering a range of different security
categorisations of ICT. Examples of the security objects were email systems, DoS,
firewall systems, web applications, intrusion detection systems, port scanning, password
cracking, Internet border router systems, system fingerprinting and vulnerability.
Details of these testing techniques are provided in Table 2.2 which has been adapted
from Herzog (2006, pp. 49-67).

Table 2.2 A summary of the common testing techniques

Testing
techniques

Descriptions

Sample tasks and expected results utilised in
the testing process

1. Email system
testing

Email system specification
details together with any
weaknesses that may cause
information leakage such as
email server types, footers,
encryption techniques, Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) server paths and
bounced mails.

Investigate email headers, read receipts and
bounced mails for the email server trails

This DoS and DDoS testing is
to ensure that the network and
server system is capable of
handling the several types
DoS attacks such as ping of
death, teardrop, SYN flooding
and the User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) flooding
(Fadia, 2006).

Examine the exposure restrictions of systems to
distrusted networks

Firewalls are deployed to
control and manage the flow
of the network traffic between
internal networks, the
Demilitarised Zone (DMZ)
servers and the Internet based
on the security policies of the
organisations. It utilises ACLs
to allow or deny network
packets. The objective of
firewall testing is to guarantee
that only authorised network
traffic is allowed to gain
access into the network, and
all other traffic be denied.

Indicate information on the firewalls as services
and system as well as the features performed on
the firewalls

2. DoS and
DDoS testing

3. Firewall
testing

Examine email spoofing for an internal connect,
egression, and internal and external relaying

Investigate the extent of load bearing of server and
network for hits and traffic
Inspect detail of weaknesses in the online
availability including identification of any single
points of failure
Inspect detail of DoS vulnerable systems testings

Outline of the network security policy by Access
Control Lists (ACLs)
Test ACLs against the network security policy or
against the "Deny All" rule
Verify that the firewalls actively filter local
network traffic
Verify that the firewalls perform address spoof
detection
Validate Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and
UDP scanning to server logs
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Table 2.2 A summary of the common testing techniques (continued)

Testing
techniques

Descriptions

Sample tasks and expected results utilised in
the testing process

4. Internet
application
testing

The purpose of this Internet
application testing is to search
for “security bugs” in clientserver applications of the
systems, ability to defend
against any internal or external
threats.

Decompose the binary codes where accessible

Note: This testing was not
conducted due to time
constraints.

Locate potential brute force password guessing
access points in the client-server applications
Find legitimate login credentials with password
grinding if possible
Trace the authentication system using spoofed
tokens
Assemble sensitive information with Man-In-theMiddle attacks
Insert excess/fake information with sessionhijacking techniques
Collect excessive information with a direct
Uniform Resource Locator (URL), direct
instruction, action sequence jumping and/or page
skipping

5. IDS testing

The focus of this IDS testing
is on the IDS performance and
sensitivity.

Inspect any packets and protocols which were not
scanned by the IDS
Examine a list of IDS false positives and missed
alarms
Investigate the IDS architecture and a list of
unmonitored paths into the network
Investigate the IDS sensitivity, the reaction time
and the IDS performance under a heavy load

6. Password
cracking testing

This password cracking
testing technique is a process
to check for password
validation and strength by
deploying automated
password-testing tools.
Note: This testing was not
conducted due to time
constraints.

6. Port scanning
testing

It is the invasive probing of
the network and transport
level of the system ports.
Various network port scanning
tools are employed to gather
and check the information of
the network system.

Execute automated dictionary and brute force
attacks on the password file where applicable
Execute automated password crackers on
encrypted files such as Portable Document Format
(PDF) or MS Word documents
Obtain the password file containing usernames
and passwords using smbpasswd for Unix systems
and Sam._ for Windows NT systems
Examine the list of systems and documents that
are potentially vulnerable to crack
Inspect details of open, closed or filtered ports
Inspect Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of all live
systems
Inspect the internal system network addressing
Examine the list of discovered tunnelled and
encapsulated protocols
Investigate the list of discovered routing protocols
supported
Inspect the active services and the network map

25
Table 2.2 A summary of the common testing techniques (continued)

Testing
techniques

Descriptions

Sample tasks and expected results utilised in
the testing process

7. Internet border
router testing

The action of this Internet
border router testing technique
is to protect, control and filter
the network traffic flow for
both the Intranet and the
Internet is based on the
security policy. It runs ACLs
to facilitate the permission or
blockage of the network traffic
packets.

Examine the router type and its specified features

The purpose of this system
fingerprinting testing
technique is to test system
responses.

Verify the patch level

8. System
fingerprinting
testing

Verify that the router is implementing the address
spoof detection
Check and confirm which router provides
Network Address Translation (NAT)
Check the ACLs against the written security policy
or the "Deny All" rule
Check the router outbound capabilities from the
inside

Verify the type of the OS
Verify the type of the system
Verify the system enumeration
Verify internal system network addressing

9. Vulnerability
testing

Various automated tools have
been deployed in this
vulnerability testing
technique.

Determine feasible DoS vulnerabilities
Determine loops and holes of the systems

(Source: Adapted from Herzog, 2006, pp. 49-67)

Although the focus of this research was on the email and online web systems only, it
was necessary to utilise firewall, IDS/IPS, Internet border router, port scanning, system
fingerprinting and vulnerability testing techniques as they are all related and required
for as part of comprehensive testing of these systems. Nevertheless, DoS and DDoS
techniques were not fully covered in the review as this type of testing was not
conducted in the current research due to the possible interruption to the councils’
network systems and the associated disruption to normal business operations.

In addition, a review of both the Internet application itself and password integrity tests
were not conducted as they were deemed to be out of the scope of this research.

2.4 Studies on the email system

This section is divided into two subsections, which include email vulnerabilities and
risks as well as a general description of the email system testing
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2.4.1 Types of email vulnerabilities and risks

The email vulnerabilities and risks in terms of attack techniques frequently used by
hackers are described in this section. This is followed by detailing the testing of each
stage such as network surveying and its architecture, Internet border router, firewall,
IDS, switches review, services and system identification, port scanning, vulnerabilities,
spoofing, vendor security benchmark auditing and security policy reviews. The email
system is one of the most common targets that attackers aim at and it includes both the
email system and the email clients.

Typically, an email system consists of email server(s) and its network infrastructure
such as firewall and IDS. All of these devices have vulnerabilities that can be protected
through the use of proper configuration. Furthermore, potential risks can be minimised
by simply designing and applying a good security practice policy. Table 2.3 displays a
summary of the common methods of attacks to the email system.

Table 2.3 A summary of the common methods of attacks to the email system

Attacking techniques

Descriptions

Email bomber

Massive emails generated which can be the same or different messages from
an individual sender or a group of senders.

Email spamming

Any unwanted advertisements for services or products which were included
in an email message.

Email sniffing and
spoofing

A way of intercepting email traffic using a network sniffer tool which
allows the attacker to capture all the email contents.

Email scam

Fraud or unwanted email that usually claims the prospect of a bargain or
something for nothing.

Email phishing

Emails which were created to collect (phish) personal information (identity
theft) such as usernames, passwords, credit card and bank account.

Email borne viruses

Emails that have an attached virus, worm or Trojan.

Buffer overflows

By sending a long HELO command or long email names in MAIL or RCPT
commands to the target email server can create a buffer overflow and
possibly interrupt the email system (Basta & Halton, 2008).

DoS

This attack may crash or destabilise the target email server by attempting to
open multiple connections to the server (SMTP flooding).

Third-party mail relay

Or open relay is a target email server which receives email from an
unknown sender. Then sending it on to recipient(s) which are not users of
the email system (Stewart, 2003).
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2.4.2 A general description of the email system testing

The email system testing can be categorised into five stages as described briefly in the
following.

1) Network surveying: This network surveying stage is utilised to gather
information relating to the council’s email system such as network architecture,
email server, reverse proxy server and spam blocker. In addition, both identified
issues and recommendations are included as part of the information gathering.
2) Email system’s infrastructure (Internet border router, firewall, IDS/IPS and
switches) review: This email system’s infrastructure stage is used to collect
specifications and configuration codes of the email system infrastructure devices.
3) Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing: This
services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing stage
is employed to audit and review the email server, the spam blocker appliance and
the reverse proxy server (if any) on services, system identifications, patching
status, TCP and UDP ports and possible vulnerabilities.
4) Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark on the email server application
software: Spoofing testing covers the testing on internal connectivity, internal
and external relaying on the email system of the council. In terms of vendor
security benchmark on the email server application software, it benchmarks
against the council’s email application software using open source benchmark
guideline such as the CIS benchmark for MS Exchange 2007 for Windows
Server 2003 version 1.0. In addition, any modifications to the benchmark made
to suit the council’s email system.
5) Email security policy reviews: This email security policy reviews stage is
concerned with a review of the related email information security policy
including the technical policy that is in current use at the council.

2.5 Studies on the online web system

The two subsections in this section include the types of online web vulnerabilities and
risks and a general description of the online web system testing.
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2.5.1 Types of online web vulnerabilities and risks

Tracy et al. (2007, p. ES-1) states that “web servers are often the most targeted and
attacked hosts on organizations’ networks”. It follows therefore that public web servers
such as the online web servers, frontend web servers, application web servers will be
even more targeted. A summary of specific security risks, threats and vulnerabilities on
the common web servers is shown in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 A summary of the common online web’s attack/threat techniques

Attack/threat techniques

Descriptions

Web pilfering

Attackers search through web pages for key flaws and vulnerabilities
manually or with automated tools (Scambray et al., 2001).

DoS

Attackers may directly or indirectly attack web servers or the supporting
network infrastructure such as firewalls or routers. This may result in
denying or interrupting customers or users accessing its services.

Input validation (injection)

These intrusions include Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Structured Query Language
(SQL) and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) injections.
Attackers target sensitive information of web applications which
normally provide links to its supported backend database servers. This
can cause loss of confidential data, open the data to manipulation (insert,
delete, update), or interrupt the use of the database application.

Interception

Attackers may intercept transmissions of unencrypted information
between the web server and the browser. The information may include
sensitive data such as login names and passwords.

Exploiting software

Attackers may take advantage of software bugs in the web server
platform. Some examples are the security holes in Internet Information
Services (IIS), Apache Tomcat, Active Server Page (ASP) and
Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) applications. This may allow attackers
access to private files or folders in the web server.

Buffer overflows

“Attackers use buffer overflows to corrupt the execution stack of a web
application” (The Open Web Application Security Project or OWASP,
2009, p. 2). This can also cause interruption to web servers and can
create significant risks to users mainly centred around the manipulation
of the system applications and data.

Web authentication threats

Examples are username/password threats, username enumeration,
password guessing and eavesdropping (Scambray et al., 2006). This can
lead to identity theft.

Web authorisation threats

Fingerprinting authorisation and both attacking ACLs and tokens are
classic examples of web application threats (Scambray et al., 2006). This
can lead to part or full control of the compromised web application and
its backend system.

Web services vulnerabilities

This includes attacking Extensible Markup Language (XML) web
services including Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Web
Services Description Language (WSDL) and Universal Description,
Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) for vulnerabilities.
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2.5.2 A general description of the online web system testing

The online web system testing can be classified into five stages as depicted briefly in
the following.

1) Network surveying: This network surveying stage is used to gather information
relating to the council’s online web system such as network architecture, web
server(s), application server(s), backend database server(s) and Content
Management System (CMS) server(s) (if they exist). In addition, both identified
issues and recommendations are also included.
2) Online web system’s infrastructure (Internet border router, firewall, IDS/IPS
and switches) review: This online web system’s infrastructure review stage is
employed to collect specifications and configuration codes of the online web
system infrastructure devices.
3) Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing: This
services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing stage
is deployed to audit and review the related servers such web, application,
backend database and CMS server(s) (if they exist) to audit on services, system
identifications, patching status, TCP and UDP ports and feasible vulnerabilities.
4) Vendor security benchmark online backend database server: This vendor
security benchmark online backend database server stage is utilised to do
benchmark test against the council’s online backend database application
software employing open source benchmark guideline such as the CIS – security
configuration benchmark for MS SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0. In addition,
details of modifications to the benchmark made to suit the council’s online
backend database server.
5) Online web system security policy reviews: This online web system security
policy reviews stage is used to review the current related online web system
including the online payment system security policy of the selected councils.
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2.6 Summary

Findings from the literature review point to a need for a process of enhancing the level
of security for common Internet technologies in a comprehensive way as it appears
there is possibly no facility for this in the local councils in WA. It is also apparent from
the number of personal interviews with the local councils in WA during the period 2005
to 2009 with respect to improving the level and strength of security in Internet
technologies such as the email and online web systems; this has not been achieved to
any significant level of satisfaction. Consequently, further research studies into these
aspects may be warranted as they may serve to expand general knowledge in this area
and increase the level of confidence in the security of these objects.

In relation to the face-to-face formal interviews, all the three IT managers from the
selected councils were agreed that there was a need of enhancing the level of security of
their email and online web systems. For examples, Council A’s IT manager had a strong
concern about their current online payment system particularly in security of their SQL
database servers (personal communications with Council A, 2007, 2008, 2009). Council
B’s IT manager was also concern on their online in-house payment system particularly
in security setting on the frontend payment web server (personal communications with
Council B, 2009). Furthermore, both the IT manager and system administrator of
Council C were seriously concern about security of their newly deployed online
payment system (Epathway) (personal communications with Council C, 2009, 2010).

In addition, it is feasible that this research may serve as a framework on which to base
security testing for similarly structured organisations using the email and online web
systems. The uncovering of the deficiency in the level of security is exactly the novelty
in this research, as there has been no efficient set of criteria that address the potential
risks that may occur while using the email and online web systems as used by the local
councils in WA. Therefore, an investigation undertaken through the use of well-known
software may prove beneficial in testing the developed information security frameworks
at the selected local councils in WA. The details on the method and materials utilised in
this research are presented in Chapter 3.
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As a result, it may provide the useful and practical information security frameworks as a
guide or model that may enhance the level of security in the councils’ systems in terms
of planning, monitoring, controlling, managing and implementation.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPED
INFORMATION SECURITY FRAMEWORKS

This chapter aims to present the interpretive multiple-case study principles, as well as
the research method and techniques applied in this research. It also defines the scope
and limitations of the research design. A description of how this research was
implemented is presented in seven subsections. Firstly, the background to the research
method is detailed to demonstrate how the research method was derived in Section 3.1.
The following Section 3.2 deals with introducing the interpretive multiple-case study
principles wherein the seven principles of case study research are described. The
subsequent Section 3.3 is concerned with research design and procedures. It covers the
reasons for selecting the organisations, data sources, research analysis process, data
collection and analyses. Research materials including primary and secondary data
sources and open-source and propriety software are also covered in Section 3.4. This is
followed by a review of the theoretical frameworks and conceptual adaptations in
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 examines the limitations to the research and a brief summary of
the chapter is finally presented in Section 3.7.

3.1 Background to the research method used in the research

Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of certain behaviours and the
reasons that control them. It relies on rationales behind a range of aspects of behaviour
and focuses on samples, and categorises data into patterns for organising and reporting
results (Cacho-Elizondo & Loussaïef, 2009). The most common qualitative research
method in Information Systems (IS) research is the case study method (Alavi &
Carlson, 1992; Myers, 2009; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

According to Klein & Myers (1999, p. 68), “IS research can be classified as interpretive
if it is assumed that our knowledge of reality is gained only through social constructions
such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, tools, and other
artefacts”.
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Similarly, another quotation states that “interpretive researchers start out with the
assumption that access to reality is only through social constructions such as language,
consciousness and shared meanings” (Limwiriyakul, 2009, pp. 132-133; Myers, 1997,
p. 2). Interpretive research method in IS is declared by Walsham (1993, pp. 4-5) as
“aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the IS, and the process whereby
the IS influences and is influenced by the context”.

In general, such interpretive research concentrates on the entire complexity of human
sense making, since the incident becomes manifest in which there are no requirements
for pre-identified dependent and independent variables (Glanz, 2003; Kaplan &
Maxwell, 1994; Klein & Myers, 2001).

Myers and Walsham (1998) classified the interpretive research approach into three
categories as positivist, interpretive and critical. Similarly, Guba and Lincoln (1994)
clarified this research approach into four types, namely positivist, post-positivist,
constructivist and critical. This research applied Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991)’s
framework in order to decide whether the research categorisation was positivist,
interpretive or critical. The positivist approach is used to determine the prior fixed
relationships within phenomena examined by employing structured techniques. It assists
researchers to do theory testing and enhance understanding in predictive occurrences.
Propositions’ evidence, scientific measurement of variables, hypotheses testing and the
inferences of phenomena depiction retrieved from a sample to a population, are some
examples of the positivist category Guba & Lincoln (1994).

Interpretive approach supposes that people generate and correlate their thoughts by
interrelation with others around the world. Furthermore, it is suitable for natural setting
studies that have social interactions between researchers and people to learn from the
background of their actions and attempt to understand the ideas and feelings of target
subjects or an understanding of the subjective or people experience. Therefore, it
supports researchers in the complete understanding of phenomena through the meanings
that people allocate to them (Berger & Kellner, 1981; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Neuman,
1997).
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The critical category of research is used to assess the status quo by revealing the history,
the beliefs and the contradictions of existing social systems for the purpose of
facilitating their liberation. Critical evidence towards assumptions on organisations and
IS, and a dialectical analysis are samples of the critical category (Guba & Lincoln,
1994).

Given the previous definitions and precepts, this research followed on from a traditional
theoretical background to generate a theoretical formulation or a phenomenal
interpretation as a construct in the form of a framework. In addition, there was an
emphasis on the "subjective" as justification for the research. Multiple-case studies are
classically included in the interpretive study and as a result it was the main research
method used in this research.

Interpretive multiple-case studies were selected in order to validate the findings, as they
were not simply a consequence of the unconventional behaviour of a specific case
(Miles & Huberman, 1984). Thus the selection of the various independent local councils
served to enhance critical, social and organisational understandings, which were linked
to the ICT adjustment and/or implementation in all organisations. Conducting and
depicting common implications in the test cases physically allowed for logical
replication in other environments in order to obtain external validation. The reason for
using multiple-case studies was because multiple experiments inherently have the
capability to strengthen research findings (Benbasat et al., 1987; Limwiriyakul, 2009;
Williamson, et al., 2002).

Furthermore, it allowed the researcher to examine a particular phenomenon in diverse
settings and conduct cross-case analysis and comparison (Limwiriyakul, 2009;
Williamson, et al., 2002). Therefore, the research method adopted in this research after a
detailed examination of related research methods was to conduct interpretive multiplecase studies (Benbasat & Weber, 1996; Cavaye, 1996; Davis et al., 1992; Klein &
Myers, 1999; Lee, 1989; Walsham, 1995) in the selected local councils in WA during
the period between July 2009 and September 2010. Three designated local councils
were selected for this research. It is believed that this selection was sufficient to achieve
the objectives of this research due to the extensiveness of the data collection and
collation, and subsequent analyses stages.
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The majority of data collection techniques used in this research was semi-structured
interviews, participant observation, group discussion and documentation analyses.
These appropriate and qualitative tools were used to increase the richness and reliability
of the case study.

In addition, two developed information security frameworks for the email and online
web systems were implemented for the initial testing of each selected test case.
Nevertheless, further testing should be developed according to individual organisational
constraints, as each of the test cases was an independent research with decided
individuality.

3.2 Seven principles for the interpretive multiple-case studies

Klein and Myers (1999) proposed a set of seven principles for conducting and
evaluating interpretive case studies in IS research based on hermeneutic orientation.
This may assist the researchers and may be used as a guide to gain understanding of the
fundamental ideas of interpretive study. Based on their suggestion, the researchers
should figure out how and what principles are suited for their research conditions. These
seven principles were adopted to formulate the research design as follows:
 The fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle;
 The principle of contextualisation;
 The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects;
 The principle of abstraction and generalisation;
 The principle of dialogical reasoning;
 The principle of multiple interpretations; and
 The principle of suspicion.
The use of these seven principles may enhance the validity and clarity of the research.
Details of these seven principles and how they applied to this research are outlined in
the following sections.
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3.2.1 The fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle

This principle recommends that subjective or people understanding is attained by
considering the partial and entire meaning of their actions (Klein & Myers, 1999). Klein
and Myers (1999, p. 71) stated that “the process of interpretation moves from a
precursory understanding of the parts to the whole and from a global understanding of
the whole context back to an improved understanding of each part”. Therefore, the
research method in each case study necessitates being the partial and total understanding
of the subjective or people experience, namely the performance and management of the
IT managerial and IT operational staff incorporated with the current ICT system
security patterns or policies of the selected councils in WA. This requirement provides a
better understanding of the interchange patterns of each part as a whole depiction.

Additionally, Klein and Myers (1999, p. 73) suggest that “during repeated cycles of the
hermeneutic circle, all of the suggested principles can be applied iteratively, forming a
complex web of interpretations”. Consequently, this research deployed several stages of
data analysis with the use of several analysis tools to facilitate the iterations.

In addition, this research is proposed to be interpretive research as it works on the
contextual and is limited within the selected councils in WA. There are several
significant factors that have an effect on the performance and management of the IT
managerial and IT operational staff within the selected councils.

These include a wide range from hard technical issues such as network surveying,
internetwork infrastructure review, services and system identification, port scanning and
vulnerability testing, and vendor security benchmark auditing, through to soft social
issues such as performance and management style, and ICT system security policy
enforcement. Thus, there has to be consideration of all issues individually together with
a combination into one piece in order to achieve an understanding of the total problem
situation.

3.2.2 The principle of contextualisation

This principle relates to the critical explanation of the social and historical background
or the context of the research setting. It describes how the circumstances have been
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developed and occurred (Klein & Myers, 1999). In this research, the concept of a digital
community or ICT including system security threats and risks is related to this principle
as it intensely describes the situation background that occurs within the selected
councils.

Additionally, this research collects security policy documents, personal interviews and
computer data as research artefacts in order to produce an intensive understanding of the
contexts that arise within the selected councils. Consequently, these may lead it to be a
more crucial and concentrated consideration of the research circumstances particularly
on the social and historical background in each of the selected councils.

3.2.3 The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects

This principle relates to the association between the researchers and the subjects as it
necessitates that the researchers place themselves and the research subjects within a
historical context. The researchers examine and interpret the interaction of the research
subjects and data in order to produce the facts, documents or artefacts. Generally, the
researchers need to consider carefully their actions as they may influence and affect the
subjects while conducting the research (Klein & Myers, 1999). Nevertheless, the impact
of this interaction for this research was reduced, as it did not relate directly to human
subjects. Consequently, it may eliminate the feasibility of Hawthorne effects (Mayo,
1933) by the subjects.

In addition, this research utilised both primary and secondary data sources to obtain the
results and findings. Furthermore, it employed the accredited software to analyse the
primary data from each selected council (see Section 3.3.2 for further detail on the data
analysis procedures).

The interviews, as one of the primary data sources, and documentation, as the secondary
data source, from each selected council were used to compare and support in the
analysis of the empirical data obtained from the software. This was deemed to be a good
opportunity to assist the researchers in adjusting the interpretation in order to gain a
better and clear understanding on the research subjects and/or data.
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3.2.4 The principle of abstraction and generalisation

Klein and Myers (1999, p. 72) stated that this principle “requires relating the
idiographic details by the data interpretation through the application of principles one
and two to theoretical, general concepts that describe the nature of human understanding
and social action”.

Furthermore, they suggested that theory and its formation including concepts, contents,
frameworks and processes play an essential role in interpretive research to receive
abstraction and generalisation from the findings. Therefore, the analysis in each case or
council may display comprehensively how the developed information security
frameworks had been adopted and implemented as the practical models are the
significant issues in the interpretation. The in-depth information in each case may be
disclosed by the interpretation that associated with theory and its general concepts. The
case may be employed to simplify the concepts from theory (Klein & Myers, 1999).

3.2.5 The principle of dialogical reasoning

This principle requires the sensitivity of the researchers to deal with the feasible
contradictions among the theoretical preconceptions, which lead the research design and
the actual findings (Klein & Myers, 1999). This may be revised and done several times
in the cycle of the research process to enhance the understanding of each subsequence
stage in the research process. While conducting the data analysis procedures, the
outcomes from some of the analyses were different from the theoretical preconceptions.
As a result, several tests were required to be repeated in order to investigate and clarify
the differences.

3.2.6 The principle of multiple interpretations

This principle requires sensitivity from the researchers to observe and investigate the
potential dissimilarities or contradictions in interpretations in conjunction with the
reasons from different participants in the research setting (Klein & Myers, 1999). Each
participant may understand and interpret in a variety of ways of thought even if they
confront the same situations or problems.
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This principle was applied to this research by comparing and evaluating the interview
data and the data obtained from the software that effectively present the differentiation
between the recognition and actuality of the circumstances. In the same council,
employees may have different viewpoints on a situation or problem, which is based
upon their individual theoretical perspective. This perspective may have an influence on
their interpretations in a situation or problem in which it may depict or guide towards
any potential conclusions, ideas or even generate principles or fundamentals.

For instance, the IT operational staff may have different visions of the circumstances in
comparison with the IT managerial staff. Nevertheless, when investigating and
presenting the findings to the council both of the viewpoints were collated into the
statement.

3.2.7 The principle of suspicion

This principle requires the sensitivity about the probable biases and systematic
distortion from the researchers in narration and data gathered from the participants
(Klein & Myers, 1999). This principle may relate to the various sources of context
which may lead to be regarded with suspicion such as personal biases, personal
opinions or comments that may influence other people's thoughts, and/or infer
inaccuracy or unreliability of data.

Even though, this research conducted the interviews from the IT managerial and IT
operational staff, it did not have any inherent suspicions due to the nature of the
research. The interview data obtained from each council were merely the minor
components with respect to the use of software in data analysis, which was the major
component in this research. Therefore, the findings attained from the software may be
claimed to be unbiased and/or accurate data.

In conclusion, this research deployed both quantitative and qualitative methods in order
to enhance validity and reliability of the research findings. The use of these methods
may generate a better and solid understanding of the research context under the
investigation (Cavaye, 1996). The document review as the quantitative method was
utilised to validate and triangulate the findings derived from the use of software and
interviews as the qualitative method.
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According to Cavaye (1996), there is no preset amount of cases that is required to be
studied. Consequently, three to five councils would be deemed sufficient for this
purpose. Thus, for this research, it was decided to select three councils as these
particular councils have the potential to provide useful and appropriate data and
information for subsequent testings and analyses.

3.3 Case study research design and procedures

3.3.1 Selection of local councils in WA

The case studies were selected from a number of local councils. The selection was
limited to WA because of the accessibility to the organisations. Two of the main
attributes within each of the case studies were the various Internet services such as
WWW, email, GIS, GPS, VoIP and wireless LAN provided, and in-house network
infrastructure of the organisations. Accordingly, the selected councils were deemed
suitable in that they would provide sufficient and relevant data for testing and analysis
and subsequent interpretation and evaluation of the results.

In addition, the selected councils were willing to provide real-time data, due to the fact
that they would in-turn derive some benefits in the way of a measure of their security
robustness and tightening through the post evaluation recommendations.

Furthermore, there was an element of trust and confidence in the researcher as a result
of previous work done by the researcher for the selected councils.

3.3.2 Data analysis procedures

This research specifically examined the level of security of the email system that is
currently deployed at the selected councils in WA. Various testing techniques such as
open source information security standards, guidelines and recommendations from
recognised organisations, were adapted for the purposes of this research. Some of these
techniques were derived from sources such as the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C: Internet
technology security and which was specifically used as a model for benchmark testing.
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Other information security standard resources include CIS, ISSAF, NIST together with
a host of information from other media such as WWW, journals, books and personal
interviews integrated with information from CERT, CheckPoint, Cisco, GFI, Juniper,
MS, NESSUS, NMAP and related ICT network and security websites.

The two data analysis procedures employed for testing purposes were for the email and
online web systems. Each data analysis procedure consisted of five stages, which
covered (1) network surveying; (2) internetwork infrastructure review; (3) services and
system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing; (4) vendor security
benchmark auditing; and (5) security policy review.

The data analysis framework procedures for the email and online web systems were
exactly the same except for Stage 4. The email system analysis procedure contained
both vendor security benchmark auditing and email spoofing testing (Figure 3.1),
whereas the online web system analysis procedure tested only the backend database
server of each of the selected councils (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.1. Data analysis framework: A stage module diagram for the analysis of the
email system
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Figure 3.2. Data analysis framework: A stage module diagram for the analysis of the
online web system

Details of each of the five stages of data analysis procedures for both the email and
online web systems are explained below.

Stage 1: Network surveying

There were two sets of network surveying stages for each of the selected councils. Each
network surveying stage consisted of specific internetwork data and information
collection related to either the email or online web systems collected from each of the
selected councils through the use of the following three artefacts:
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 Overall network diagram for the internetwork link, the DMZ infrastructure
connectivity of the related email or online web systems;
 Configuration codes of all internetwork devices such as the Internet border
router, the Internet firewall(s), the DMZ’s switch(s), the reverse proxy server and
the related email or online web systems; and
 Device specifications of all internetwork devices, namely the Internet border
router, the Internet firewall(s), the DMZ’s switch(s), the reverse proxy server and
the related email or online web systems.

The network surveying stage for the email system collected information on
specifications of the email server(s) and the spam blocker appliance(s). Conversely, the
network surveying stage for the online web system collected information from the static
web and application servers. Information from the CMS (if applicable) and the backend
database system were also collected in this network surveying stage.

All the public IP addresses of the network of the selected councils were concealed
through the use of alias names to prevent any potential security risks. These
designations were as follows:

 “A” represents subnetwork group 1;
 “B” represents subnetwork group 2;
 “C” represents subnetwork group 3; and
 “D” represents subnetwork group 4.

Stage 2: Internetwork infrastructure review

This internetwork infrastructure stage involves a review of the related specification and
configuration codes data collection of the internetwork infrastructure devices for both
the email and online web systems at the selected councils. The devices included the
Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall(s), the DMZ switch(s) for all selected
councils and the reverse proxy server for Council C only. This information was securely
recorded on a workstation and later analysed for the purposes of this research only.
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Stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing

In this third testing stage, a network scanning technique was used for all three testing
steps (services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing). Both
NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning tools were used for scanning the email
and online web systems. These software applications are well known and widely used in
the network industry. NMAP is a free open source application whereas GFI LANguard
is a commercial application.

NMAP with GUI standard (open source Zenmap version 5.0) for MS Windows XP
version was run. The slow comprehensive scan option was used in the test in order to
collect as much information as possible from the email and online web systems relating
to TCP, UDP ports, vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware. In
addition, GFI LANguard version 9.0 with the full scan option was run in order to fully
test and gather the target email and online web systems information.

The services and system identification were categorised into two groups. These were the
system information policy results and the system patching status results. The system
information policy results was further summarised into three groups. These groups were
the services, the password policy and the security audit policy. Additionally, the system
patching status results were categorised into two groups. These groups were the missing
service packs and the missing patches.

The port scanning testing on the target servers of both the email and online web systems
were run with the following options:

 Full comprehensive scan in NMAP testing of all TCP and UDP ports; and
 Comprehensive scan in GFI LANguard testing on all TCP and UDP ports.

Stage 4: Vendor security benchmark auditing

The email system testing involved two steps which included the general email spoofing
testing and vendor security auditing as follows:
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 Email spoofing testing: This step was adapted from an email spoofing template
from the OSSTMM 2.2 Section C: Internet technology security as a guideline.
The purpose of this email spoofing testing was to discover generally whether the
email server was secured against any spoofing attacks; and
 Email vendor security auditing: This specific auditing was modified to suit the
email application server system of each of the selected councils. However, as
each of the selected councils used the same template from CIS Benchmark for
Exchange 2007 for Windows Server 2003 version 1.0 – Recommended Security
Setting for Exchange Controls, there was no need for further adaptation.

On the other hand, there was only one testing step carried out for the online web system
as shown in Figure 3.2: Testing stage 4. This fourth testing stage was the vendor
(database) security benchmark auditing on the backend database server of the selected
councils. The database auditing template was designed to suit the application platform
of the backend database in each of the selected councils.

However, as each of the selected councils deployed the Security Configuration
Benchmark for MS SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0 from CIS, the database auditing
template was the same for all.

Stage 5: Email and online web systems security policy review

The purpose of this email and online web systems security policy review stage was to
review the IT security policy in relation to the email and online web systems. This email
and online web systems security policy review stage included the investigation of the
security related to the internetwork infrastructure and its devices, the email server(s), the
backend database server(s) and the web server(s).

Furthermore, this review covered an information security policy in general for the
overall enterprise and technical security policy particularly on issue-specific and
systems-specific security policies of the email and online web systems in each of the
selected councils.
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3.4 Research materials

The sources of data and materials utilised in this research are described below.

3.4.1 Primary data

The primary data was made up of interviews and testing analysis as presented below in
details.

3.4.1.1 Interviews

Several semi-structured interviews were conducted with the IT managerial staff (IT
managers) and the IT operational staff (application, database, network, system,
telecommunication and web administrators).

The IT managerial staff were selected for this exercise as the responsibility of the
decision making rested with them. This responsibility included advising the IT
operational staff and providing direction for the protection of the organisations’ ICT
systems. It also included the potential to support IS implementations and managerial
judgement to enforce organisation policy for the success of the organisation (Pinto &
Slevin, 1989; Robey, 1979).

The inclusion of the IT managerial staff for the interviews was important as they were
also responsible for the following activities associated with the security testing:

 “Coordinating the development and maintenance of the organisation’s
information security policies, standards and procedures;
 Ensuring the establishment of, and compliance with, consistent security
evaluation process for departments throughout the organisation; and
 Participating in developing processes for decision-making and prioritisation of
system for security testing” (Wack et al., 2003, pp. 2-4).
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In addition to the IT managerial staff, the IT operational staff were selected as key
stakeholders because of their day to day responsibilities such as network and system
monitoring and maintenance. Their responsibilities included the implementation of the
network and system securities and guidelines derived from the organisation policy for
the utilisation of the IT system. It was considered important to include them in the
interviews, as their security practices would facilitate better understanding of any
security issues faced by the selected councils.

Semi-guided interviews were deployed as an outline for open-ended answers. These
were carried out in two steps with the IT managerial and IT operational staff at each of
the selected councils. These interviews formed an initial baseline prior to the analysis of
the data. The initial baseline interview was to establish the level of security policies for
the email and online web systems technologies and the associated enforcement by the
key stakeholders. The testing analysis interviews with post-interview reporting were
designed to obtain the feedbacks or comments on the findings of the initial testing
analyses with the aim of suggestions for further improvements.

Additionally, no interviews were conducted with general end-users due to time
constraints as well as the fact that such an exercise would be beyond the scope and
reach of the charted research.

3.4.1.2 Testing analysis

There were two data gathering phases to obtain security data and information of the
email and online web systems for the testing at each of the selected councils. This was
to identify any potential security vulnerabilities or risks at these sites. Additional details
were discussed and provided in Section 3.3.2.

3.4.2 Secondary data

The secondary data was made up of the document review. This review was a detailed
inspection of all existing information, network diagrams and related IT security policies,
and procedures documentation in both paper-based and electronic-based formats was
done as permitted by each of the selected councils.
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These documentations were used for analysis and comparison with particular
references, for the internetwork infrastructure, system details and security policy of both
the email and online web systems at each of the selected councils. They were later used
as suitable guidelines for these councils in the reporting stages of the research.

3.4.3 Software

The software used to test both the email and online web systems were NMAP, GFI
LANguard and Telnet. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard are well-known network
scanning tools, which are powerful and widely used by IT security professionals. In
addition, both NMAP and GFI LANguard use different algorithms for testing the
network and extracting system information such as hardware, software, service(s),
patch(s), port(s) and vulnerability(s) (personal communications with Professor Dr. Craig
Valli and Dr. Andrew Woodward, 2008, 2009), thereby complementing each other.

3.4.3.1 NMAP

NMAP is the open source software available freely from the Internet. NMAP with GUI
standard called Zenmap version 5.0 for MS Windows XP version was used. In order to
obtain as much information as possible from the email and online web systems’ servers,
the slow comprehensive scan option was used in all tests. This option returned all
relevant information about TCP, UDP ports, vulnerabilities, patches, services, software
and hardware (Lyon, 2009).

3.4.3.2 GFI LANguard

GFI LANguard version 9.0 is the commercial software that was deployed in all of the
tests. The full scan option of GFI LANguard was used in order to fully test and collect
the email and online web systems information. The software collected TCP, UDP ports,
vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware information. It also provided
the vulnerability information which assisted in the analysis of both the email and online
web systems (GFI, 2009).
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3.4.3.3 Telnet

MS Telnet software was employed to test against the email system for spoofing of email
at each of the selected councils. This was conducted by telnetting to port 25 (SMTP)
and manually probing the systems.

3.5 Conceptual framework

Figure 3.3 is the conceptual framework for each interpretive case study within the
selected local councils in WA. This conceptual framework demonstrated a process as
well as some techniques to collect and analyse data from a variety of sources. The use
of interviews, document review and systems testing results and analyses provided a
context for the examination and interpretation of the level of security information from
a variety of perspectives, and was used to generate the report details of the testing
analyses back to the selected councils.

Figure 3.3. A conceptual framework for the processes involved in the audit of any case
study
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There were five main procedures in the conceptual framework and details are as below.

1) Document review of the selected local councils in WA: This procedure related to
the review of the current internetwork diagrams, the specifications and the
configuration codes of internetwork devices, the policy documentations and the
literature relating to the use of the email and online web systems in the selected
councils.
2) Interviews with the selected local councils in WA: This procedure focused on the
interviews of the IT managerial and IT operational staff regarding and relating to
the use of the email and online web systems in the selected councils.
3) Analysis of testing results: This procedure involved the use of three network
application analysis tools to investigate the email and online web systems for
further assessment. These tools were NMAP, GFI LANguard and Telnet.
4) Reporting details of the testing analysis back to the selected local councils in
WA: This procedure was about the findings from the testing analysis of the email
and online web systems that were reported back to the selected councils for
further assessment, consideration and implementation.
5) Post-interview analysis: This procedure involved the post-interview analysis of
the IT managerial and IT operational staff about their perceptions and thoughts
about the findings from both the email and online web system testing analyses.

3.6 Limitations of the research

There were two major factors that limited the research. A common criticism of case
study methodology is that its dependence on a single case renders it insufficient and
incompetent of providing a generalising conclusion (Hamel et al., 1993; Myers, 2000;
Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1984, 1993, 1994). However, this limitation was offset as the findings
were replicated from the multiple-case studies. Due to the extensiveness of data
collection and collation and its subsequent analysis, it is believed that three to four case
studies may provide a good logical model of information security frameworks for local
councils in WA. Although the selected councils needed to have had reasonable Internet
infrastructure and related technologies installed, this situation may not be applicable to
small regional councils/shires.
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However, the information security frameworks developed as results of this research,
provide recommendations which may be adopted by any other councils and/or
organisations for their information security implementation.

Another limitation of this research was that the selected councils have moderately been
alerted to the existing security problems of their email and online web systems. As a
result, it would probably have introduced some bias into the selection and subsequent
assessment of the cases.

3.7 Summary

This chapter described the research method, background and the developed information
security frameworks for the email and online web systems deployed in this research.
Klein and Myers (1999)’s principles of interpretive multiple-case studies was the design
model used for conducting this research.

Case study research design and procedures were served to integrate a proper alternative
of qualitative techniques to raise the prosperity, validity and reliability of the research.
Research materials were then explained in detail in Section 3.4. An outline of the
possible limitations in case study research design and procedures, together with a
strategy to minimise these weaknesses have also been provided.

Accordingly, the research method deployed in this research was adopted and applied
into each case which can be leaded to the results and fidings to the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: A
CASE STUDY OF COUNCIL A

This chapter aims to illustrate the results and findings from Council A’s email and
online web systems investigated in the research. It consists of five subsections as (1)
background information; (2) methodology; (3) CouncilA’s email system results; (4)
Council A’s online web system results; and (5) analysis and discusion.

4.1 Background information

Council A is a WA local government council which has its own IT department.
Currently, the council’s main computer network is located at the external host Internet
Service Provider (ISP) location which is connected to all the council sites including
central and remote sites via fibre optic, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Asymmetric
Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) connections. The council is connected to the outside
world or the Internet through the external ISP via a fibre optic connection. The network
architecture of Council A is identified as star topology architecture. All the council’s IT
service systems such as email, Intranet, property, GIS, financial and online web systems
are located at the external host site. In addition, all the IT systems including both email
and online web systems are managed by its own internal IT staff members.

Council A’s email system has over 1,000 mailboxes which serve mainly its staff as well
as the councillors and external contractors. MS Exchange 2007 is used by the council as
an email application server whereas MS Outlook 2007 is used as the email client and
personal information management tool. Furthermore, webmail or the web-based email
(OWA – Outlook Web Access) feature is available to its staff for accessing the
mailboxes externally from the web.

In terms of the online web system services, the council provides general information,
mailing lists and online community groups to its residents and interested persons. In
addition, the council provides online payment services to its registered residents and it
uses a third-party software called “Epathway” (Infor, 2009) for its online payment
system.
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4.2 Methodology

This subsection aims to provide the details on methodology utilised in this research. It is
categorised into six parts: (1) pre-interview consultation; (2) document review; (3)
interview investigation; (4) existing architecture discovery; (5) email system testing;
and (6) online web system testing.

4.2.1 Pre-interview consultation

Firstly, there was an initial open-ended meeting between the researcher, the principal
supervisor and the council’s IT manager in order to determine the scope of the project.
As a result, all involved parties agreed that both email and online web systems would be
audited in order to determine any potential risks and recommendation solutions.

The council agreed to an overall time frame of six months which included an estimate
of three months for each report produced. Furthermore, the IT manager stipulated that
this project was to be undertaken at no cost to the council and the council could end or
abort this project at anytime as desired. It was also agreed that two reports with
recommendations would be presented and distributed to the council in succession which
were email and online web systems respectively.

4.2.2 Document review

Two types of related documents, which were specification documents hardware and
software and the council policy documents were available.

Several documents relating to Council A’s email and online web systems were
collected. For example, configuration codes and specifications of the Internet border
router, the IDS/IPS, the Internet border switch, the DMZ switch, the internal switch, the
firewalls, the email server, the spam blocker appliances, the web servers and the
backend database server. In addition, copies of the DMZ internetwork and overall
network diagrams were collected.

55
In terms of IT security in relation to the email and online web systems, it was advised
that both the enterprise information security and technical (both issue-specific and
systems-specific) security policies were non-existent. Currently, Council A has the
internet usage policy for a library community access to the internet (see Appendix A24).

4.2.3 Interview investigation

Several interviews were conducted with the three stakeholder groups as follows:

 The IT manager of Council A;
 The council’s IT operational staff (network, application and telecommunication
administrators); and
 The council’s external IT staff (database administrator).

The face-to-face interview with the IT manager was used to obtain a general overview
of Council A’s overall network and services, particularly with regards to the email and
online web systems. The scope of the project was discussed including any possible
potential risk issues overall, while conducting the project.

Several ongoing interviews were conducted with the network, the Epathway
application, the telecommunication and the database administrators. Several interview
techniques were used such as face-to-face, telephone and email.

The interviews carried out with the council’s network administrator and the
telecommunication administrator were mainly related to discussions of the council
infrastructure and its network connectivity which includes the firewalls, the Internet
border router, the IDS/IPS, the switch, the virus protection system, the email server, the
Active Directory (AD) and the DNS. In addition, the related configuration codes of all
the related devices were discussed.
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In terms of the web, application and database servers, there were several testing
analyses and interviews conducted with the online payment application (Epathway) and
the external database administrators. These testings covered the configurations of the
council’s online payment system servers which are the frontend web server, the
application server and the backend database server.

4.2.4 Existing architecture discovery

This section details the discovery of the existing architecture and structural operation
relating to the email and online web systems of Council A.

4.2.4.1 The existing email system architecture of Council A

The email system of Council A has one email server and one spam blocker appliance.
Both devices are connected together within the council’s network infrastructure at the
data centre which is located at the council’s ISP. The email server resides in the internal
network while the spam blocker appliance is located in the DMZ area.

In terms of the infrastructure devices, the council has one Internet border router, one
firewall, and three switches.

Figure 4.1 demonstrates the email system related devices connectivity and allowed
email protocols in a high level network diagram.
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Figure 4.1. A current high level network diagram for the email system of Council A

In addition, two related email protocols, HTTPS and SMTP are allowed in the network.
Both protocols provide typical email and secured webmail (HTTPS) services
respectively to the council’s staff. In terms of webmail, the current email server (MS
Exchange 2007) is configured to support the Client Access Server (CAS) form via MS
Outlook Web App/Outlook Web Access (OWA). Other CAS forms such as MS Outlook
Anywhere and MS ActiveSync are not supported. Furthermore, Council A’s webmail
service uses 128-bit encryption with standard validation SSL certificate (Limwiriyakul
& Valli, 2011c).
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4.2.4.2 The existing online web system’s architecture of Council A

Council A has two online web systems which are the static web system and the online
payment system. The council’s online web system (online payment system) serves its
residents in terms of online payment services such as rates and infringements. The
online web servers are located in the DMZ and the internal network areas. As
previously mentioned, the council’s online static web system was not tested. Therefore,
the online static web system is only briefly discussed in the following section.

4.2.4.2.1 The existing static web system architecture

The council static web system consists of two web servers which are the Internet web
server and the Intranet web server. The Internet web server is located in the DMZ and
the Intranet web server is located in the council’s internal network. Both the Internet
web and the Intranet web servers interact with each other in a one-way direction from
the inside through the DMZ area via HTTP web protocol. This means that only the
Intranet web server can send HTTP web traffic to the Intranet web server. In addition,
the council’s media staff periodically pushes the updated data to the Internet web server.

4.2.4.2.2 The existing online payment system architecture

The council’s existing online payment system can be considered as a multi-tiered (3)
client-server architecture which consists mainly of a frontend web, application, and
backend database servers (Microsoft Corporation, 2010).

The existing system is comprised of the frontend web server (CoA-DMZ-Epathweb),
the application server (CoA-Pathway) and the backend database SQL server (CoASQL) as depicted in Figure 4.2.

The frontend web and application servers perform all of the application logic. The
backend database server performs the data logic. In terms of application software, the
council uses a third-party Pathway application with the online payment feature.
Typically, three-tiered client-server architecture consists of the following three
components:
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 Presentation logic – displays information and content which is normally related
to the user interface and user interactions via the client web browser;
 Application logic (business, middle tier, data access) – synchronises the
application, processes necessary commands and calculations required from the
web and application servers; and
 Data logic – deals with the storage and retrieval of information from the database
or file server (Microsoft Corporation, 2010).

There are benefits of deploying a three-tier client-server architecture as compared to
traditional application architectures (host-based and client-based architectures). They
are as follows:

 Improved availability – redundant application servers can be deployed in case of
hardware failure for critical applications;
 Scalability – the system can be expanded to deploy more application servers
(Microsoft Corporation, 2010);
 Better security – no direct connection between client and database thereby
ensuring data integrity. Moreover, the database is transparent;
 Reduced distribution – changes to application/business logic are done once only
on the server with no requirement to be distributed to all the clients; and
 Easier to implement – “complex application rules are easy to implement in
application server” (Kambalyal, n.d., p. 12).

In addition, the council used an external gateway security payment service to provide a
secured online payment service for its residents. Both the council’s online payment
system and the external gateway security payment services communicate using the
HTTPS protocol over a SSL connection which uses 128-bit encryption with standard
validation SSL certificate same as its webmail system (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c).
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Figure 4.2. The high level online payment system including network traffic protocols
currently in use by Council A

4.2.5 Email system testing

There were five stages which are summarised as follows:

 Network surveying includes discovery of the network architecture of the email
system of Council. See Section 4.2.4.1 for more details. This testing stage also
gathers information on the specifications of the email server and the spam
blocker appliances of council A;

61
 Auditing and configuration codes review of the council’s Internet infrastructure
including Internet border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switching devices;
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the
email server;
 Email spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark auditing on the email
server and the spam blocker appliance; and
 Email system security policy review.

4.2.6 Online web system testing

The online web system of the council can be categorised into two distinct application
profiles which are the static web system and the online payment system. Both the static
web and online payment systems have their own separate hardware for servers.

However, the testing analysis was restricted to the on the online payment system as
requested by the council’s IT operational staff. This online web system testing analysis
which was conducted consists of five stages which are summarised as follows:

 Network surveying: comprises the network architecture of the online payment
system of Council A. See Section 4.2.4.2 for more details. This testing stage also
gathers information from the static web, application and backend database
servers related to the online web system of the council;
 Identified risks review for the council’s internetwork infrastructure devices
which related to Council A’s online payment system;
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the
council’s online payment system’s servers;
 Vendor security benchmark auditing on the council’s online payment database
server; and
 Reviewing the council’s online payment system security policy.
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4.3 Council A’s email system results

The architecture design, the device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the email
system servers, the email spoofing, the vendor security benchmark and the security
policy were successfully tested, audited and reviewed. The following sections describe
all the results of these testings in detail.

4.3.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying

In this first testing stage, information of the council’s email system which includes the
email and spam blocker appliances, the infrastructure architecture and devices were
collected. The following information was collected:

 Overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure
connectivity including the email system; See Section 4.2.4.1 for more details;
 The specification and related email configuration codes of the Internet border
router, the Internet firewall, the Internet switch and two DMZ switches;
 The email server’s specification summary; and
 The spam blocker appliance’s specification summary.

The following sections describe the overall summary specifications of the email and
spam blocker appliances and the associated identified risks.

4.3.1.1 The email system devices

There are two specific devices which are the email server (MS Exchange 2007) and the
Symantec spam blocker appliance in Council A’s email system.

4.3.1.1.1 The email server

The current email server of Council A was migrated from its old MS Exchange 2003
email server. The email server has MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with
service pack 2 as an OS. MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1 is used as the email
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application. The current MS Exchange 2007 email application configuration of the
email server was configured as a simple single-server architecture which consisted of
three of five server roles which are the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport server and the
CAS roles.

Nevertheless, the other two MS Exchange 2007 feature server roles; the Edge Transport
and the Unified Messaging servers were not installed. This was due to the fact that
Council A uses the Symantec spam blocker and the Cisco Unity voice mail system
which perform the same function as the Edge Transport server role and the Unified
Messaging server role respectively. Table 4.1 summarises the email server
specifications.

Table 4.1 A summary of the email server specifications

Attributes

Details

Email application software

MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1

Email scanning software

None

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2

Hardware

8 Gigabyte (GB) Random Access Memory (RAM), Hard disks C:
20GB, e: 180GB, f: 200GB

IP address

172.16.25.251/24

MS Exchange 2007 server roles

Mailbox, Hub Transport, CAS combined

Email service protocols

SMTP and HTTPS

Other software

None

In addition, according to Microsoft TechNet (2007a), a simple single-server architecture
(MS Exchange 2007) should only be deployed in Windows’s Small Business Server
(SBS) which is suitable for small network environments.

Figure 4.3 demonstrates MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture based on a single-role
server.
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Figure 4.3. The MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture based on a single-role server
(Source: Microsoft TechNet, 2007a, p. 37)

Furthermore, the following summarises the MS Exchange 2007’s server roles
(Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team, 2009).

 CAS(s): to support Post Office Protocol 3 (POP3) and Internet Message Access
Protocol 4 (IMAP4) clients, MS Exchange ActiveSync, MS Office OWA and
MS Outlook Anywhere and new MS Outlook 2007 client functions;
 Edge Transport server(s): to handle message traffic to and from the Internet, run
spam filters and handle SMTP relay;
 Hub Transport server(s): to perform the internal message transfer, distribution
list expansions, and message conversions between Internet mail and MS
Exchange Server message formats;
 Mailbox server(s): to manage mailboxes, store databases and provide MS Office
Outlook clients and CAS with access to the data; and
 Unified Messaging server(s): to integrate voice and fax with email messaging
and run Outlook Voice Access.
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4.3.1.1.2 The spam blocker appliance

The spam blocker appliance was running on a Symantec hardware appliance with mail
security for MS Exchange Server 2007 software. The purpose of this box is to filter all
incoming email (SMTP) against virus and worm threats and to block spam emails. The
spam blocker appliance has two network interfaces which are 192.168.1.92 and
192.168.1.93. When incoming SMTP traffic enter the council’s network it goes through
the 192.168.1.92 interface of the spam blocker appliance. Then, the SMTP traffic is
checked and cleaned by the spam blocker appliance before forwarding the cleaned
SMTP traffic to the firewall via its 192.168.1.93 interface. See Figure 4.4 for the detail
on the demonstrated network connectivity of the council’s spam blocker appliance.

Figure 4.4. A high level diagram of Council A's email spam blocker appliance
As compared to MS Exchange 2007 server roles, this spam blocker appliance performs
the same as the MS Edge Transport server role. Table 4.2 summarised the spam blocker
appliance role.
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Table 4.2 A summary of the spam blocker appliance specifications

Attributes

Details

Spam blocker application software

Symantec Mail Security Suite 5.0.0-36

OS

Symantec

Hardware

Stand alone appliance

Interfaces

192.168.1.92 for sending and receiving SMTP traffics
between outside/external and DMZ networks
192.168.1.93 for sending and receiving SMTP traffics
between the council A inside/internal and DMZ networks

Feature roles

Scan virus, block spam email, block emails blacklist

4.3.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of testing stage 1 for Council A’s email system are described
in the following sections.
 Risk 1: Virus protection software
The current email server does not have any virus protection software installed. This may
be a source of potential risks against virus and worm attacks.
 Risk 2: Single point of failure
Council A’s current email architecture may be considered as a simple single-server
architecture as previously mentioned. As per recommended best practices by Microsoft
Exchange Documentation Team (2009), a simple single-server (MS Exchange 2007)
architecture should only be installed in MS Windows SBS which is typically designed
for small network environments and low network loads. However, the current Council
A’s email system and its network environment are considered to be a medium-sized
network as the email server handles over 1,000 mailboxes and provides email services
to over 700 staff.

The current email server performs three MS Exchange 2007 server roles concurrently as
previously mentioned. Therefore, this may be considered as being a single point of
failure due to the single email server having to handle all three MS Exchange server
roles.
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 Risk 3: Same subnetwork
The existing email server is positioned in the council’s internal network and on the
same subnetwork Virtual Local Area Network 5 (VLAN5) with all the other council’s
servers. This configuration may be exposing the council to potential risks as there are no
filtering mechanisms in place to separate or isolate traffic between the email and the
other council’s servers.

This may cause possible direct or indirect interruptions to Council A’s IT services in the
case of the email server being compromised, thereby allowing any infections or
intrusions to spread to other servers within the network. The filtering of network traffic
to and from the email server may therefore prevent or reduce this risk. The network
traffic filtering can be performed at Council A’s core switch.

4.3.2 Testing stage 2: The email system’s infrastructure – Internet border router,
IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews

The data collection of the device configuration codes for the Internet border router, the
IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switch were reviewed and are presented in the following
sections.

4.3.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews

Council A’s Internet border router is designed for routing purposes to route either
forward or reverse the council’s internetwork traffic or supported protocols such as
Citrix server and client services, email and WWW. The current router is also configured
to filter unnecessary traffic which means only permitted protocols are allowed to enter
and leave the council’s network. Table 4.3 summarises the specifications of the Internet
border router.
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Table 4.3 A summary of the Internet border router specifications

Attributes

Details

Device type

Cisco router 2811

OS

Cisco Internetwork OS (IOS) 12.4

Memory

256 Megabyte (MB) RAM, 64MB flash

Interface (2)

2 x Ethernet 10/100 full duplex

IP address

A.B.D.62/30, A.B.C.65/29

4.3.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews

The Internet border router and the firewall of Council A have their own built-in IDS/IPS
and IPS features respectively. However, the IPS features on both these devices were
currently disabled. It is important to have an active IDS/IPS system to provide early
warning information about intrusions or intrusion attempts to the network or system
administrators.

This information may reduce any potential risks against the network including the email
system by allowing the network or the system administrator ample time to counteract
the intrusion threats.

4.3.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews

The firewall of Council A provides filtering of both incoming and outgoing
internetwork traffic. The firewall also performs NAT. Table 4.4 summarises the
specifications of the firewall. See previous Figure 4.1 for illustration of the firewall
network architecture. In addition, the summary of the firewall configuration codes
including NAT related to the email system are summarised in Appendix A1.

Furthermore, Appendix A2 shows the summary of the firewall codes with respect to
Council A’s email system.
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Table 4.4 A summary of the firewall specifications

Attributes

Details

Device type

Cisco ASA

OS

ASA version 7.1 (2)

Memory

512 MB RAM, 64MB flash

Interfaces

5 x Ethernet 10/100 full duplex

IP addresses

Interface gigabit 0/0: A.B.C.66
Interface gigabit 0/1.16: 172.16.23.254, Interface gigabit 0/1.69: 192.168.1.254
Interface gigabit 0/2.31: 172.33.0.1 (Virtual Private Network or VPN), Interface
gigabit 0/2.67: A.B.C.x (VPN)
Interface gigabit 0/3.10: LAN failover, Interface gigabit 0/3.11: state failover
Interface management 0/0: 10.1.80.11

In addition, the access to the firewalls for administration purposes is already securely
configured as it only allows authorised staff (IT administrators) access based on
computer IP addresses. Both Secure Shell (SSH) and HTTPS are the only secure
communication methods which only permit valid username and password combinations.

4.3.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews

Council A has three Ethernet switches which provide connectivity for the council’s
internetwork. The Outside_sw provides connections between the Internet border router
and the firewalls. The Fwswitch and DMZ_sw switches provide DMZ connections for
the council’s DMZ servers.

In addition, the Fwswitch is connected to the council’s core switch (Cisco Catalyst
6500). The council’s core switch provides backbone and internal server connectivity.
The current overall hardware and software details of the three switches are depicted in
Table 4.5. The details on ports, VLANs including its connectivity are provided in
Figure 4.5.
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Table 4.5 Current switches hardware and software details of Council A’s
internetworking system

Attributes

Details

Device name

Outside_sw

Device type

Cisco Catalyst 3650 SM switch

OS

Cisco IOS version 12.2

Memory

256 MB

Port

24 x 10/100 MB Unshielded Twisted Pair (UTP) Ethernet ports, 2 x GB
Small Form-Factor Pluggable (SFP) ports

Operate at

Layer 2 Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)

IP address

A.B.C.69

VLAN number

1

Device name

Fwswitch

Device type

Cisco Catalyst 3650 SM switch

OS

Cisco IOS version 12.2

Memory

256 MB

Port

24 x 10/100 MB UTP Ethernet ports, 2 x GB SFP ports

Operate at

Layer 2 OSI

IP address

None

VLAN number(s)

20, 254

Device name

DMZ_sw

Device type

Cisco Catalyst 3650 SM switch

OS

Cisco IOS version 12.2

Memory

256 MB

Port

24 x 10/100 MB UTP Ethernet ports, 2 x GB SFP ports

Operate at

Layer 2 OSI

IP address

192.168.1.250/24

VLAN number(s)

1, 16, 31, 67, 69
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Figure 4.5. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council A

4.3.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues

The following section details the identified risk issue for the council’s email
infrastructure system (Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the
switches).
 Risk 1: Unnecessary ACL coding on the Internet border router
There was a single unnecessary configuration code (see Appendix A2: Policy number 3)
uncovered on the Internet border router.

72
 Risk 2: Internet border router’s IDS was disabled
Currently, the built-in IDS/IPS feature of the Internet border router (Cisco 2811) is
disabled which may be a potential security risk due to being vulnerable to scanning and
spoofing attacks.
 Risk 3: Firewall’s IPS was disabled
The current IPS feature on the firewall (Cisco ASA) is disabled which means both
incoming and outgoing SMTP and HTTPS email related protocols are not inspected.
This may cause potential risks, such as DoS and malicious code attacks (Check Point
Software Technologies Ltd., 2010) to the council’s network and email system.
 Risk 4: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP and HTTPS
The current firewall rule (see Appendix A2: Policy number 1) allows the spam blocker
appliance (interface 192.168.1.92) access anywhere via HTTP and HTTPS ports.
 Risk 5: Unused firewall ACL coding – LDAP, MS-DS
The current firewall rules (see Appendix A2: Policy numbers 4, 8 and 9) are configured
to allow the decommissioned internal server (172.16.5.70) and the spam blocker
appliance to communicate via LDAP and MS-DS ports.
 Risk 6: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – SMTP
The current firewall rule (see Appendix A2: Policy number 10) allows the spam blocker
appliance (interface 192.168.1.92) to directly access the email server via SMTP port,
which is an inadequate configuration code.
 Risk 7: Unused firewall ACL coding – MS-WBT-Server
The current firewall rule (see Appendix A2: Policy number 16) is configured to allow
the email server to access the decommissioned server (192.168.1.89) in the DMZ via
TCP port 3389.
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 Risk 8: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations
There were some insufficient switch security configuration codes on all the three
Ethernet switches. These may cause potential security risks such as Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) spoofing, ARP poisoning and broadcast storm attacks to Council A’s
internetwork.

4.3.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning,
vulnerability testing and results

NMAP and GFI LANguard were the network scanning tools used for all three testing
steps of this third testing stage. Both the software applications were run with full scan or
comprehensive options in order to collect as much information as possible, as well as to
fully test the council’s email system at the same time. This use of the applications in this
way creates scanning that is rigorous and intense.

4.3.3.1 Services and system identification results

The results of the services and system identification of Council A’s MS Exchange 2007
email server are described in the following sections. However, there was no testing on
the spam blocker appliance conducted as it was prohibited by the council’s IT manager.
More details are provided in Appendices A3 and A4.

4.3.3.2 Port scanning results

The port scanning testing analysis using both NMAP and GFI LANguard was
successfully performed on the council’s email server. However, no port scanning was
performed on the council’s spam blocker as requested by the IT staff.

Full details of the port scanning results of the council’s email server are found in
Appendix A5.
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4.3.3.3 Vulnerability testing results

The vulnerability testing was successfully conducted on Council A’s email server.
However, as previously mentioned, testing of the spam blocker appliance was
prohibited. Therefore, there was no vulnerability testing done on the spam blocker
appliance. The vulnerabilities of the email server are categorised into four security
levels which are high (H), medium (M), low (L) and potential (P) based on GFI
LANguard analysis software. Full details of the vulnerability testing results of the
council’s email server are presented in Appendix A6.

4.3.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council A’s email system are described
as follows.
 Risk 1: System information policy results for the email server
There were inadequate measures of the system information policy’s configuration of the
council’s email server which may cause potential risks to the council’s email system.
 Risk 2: System patching status results for the email server
Both GFI LANguard and NMAP network scanning tools were used to test the system
patching status of the council’s email server. There were vulnerability issues uncovered
which may create possible threats to the email server. The scan uncovered that the
service packs were current but there were nine missing patches on the email server. See
Appendix A4 for more details.
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on the email server
There were no issues found on the UDP ports. However, there were some issues
uncovered on the TCP ports of the email server. These TCP ports were unnecessarily
opened ports which pose potential risks to the council’s email server. Table 4.6 displays
the total numbers of TCP service ports opened on the email server. Furthermore, the full
details of all both opened TCP and UDP service ports including the possible mitigation
recommendations for the email server are listed in Appendix A5.
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Table 4.6 List of the number of open TCP and UDP ports on the email server

Server name

Opened TCP ports

Opened UDP ports

Comment

Email server

31

5

Refer to Appendix A5

 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on the email server
In terms of identified risk issues, there were two high, seven low and three potential risk
categories uncovered issues found on the council’s email server. For examples, there
were unnecessary TCP services left opened such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and
POP3. TCP services were inadvertently left opened which may cause potential risks to
the council’s email system. Table 4.7 shows the total numbers of the vulnerabilities
found on the email server.

Table 4.7 The overall of Council A’s email server – vulnerabilities

Server name

H

M

L

P

Overall vulnerability level

Comment

Email server

2

0

7

3

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix A6

4.3.4 Testing stage 4: Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server
auditing

4.3.4.1 Email system spoofing testing results

There were several spoofing testings conducted on the email server. Furthermore, at this
time the council’s IT manager permitted testing the council’s spam blocker appliance.
Therefore, both interfaces (192.168.1.92 and 192.168.1.93) of the spam blocker
appliance were also tested. A CIS template was used for the spoofing testings. There
were identified risk issues found on the email server and the spam blocker appliance
(interface 192.168.1.92). In terms of spoofing, there was no identified risk found on the
spam blocker appliance (interface 192.168.1.93).
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In addition, there was an egression testing on Council A’s email system. As per best
practice guidelines recommended by OSSTMM (Herzog, 2006) the council’s email
system correctly disallowed sending email from an internal address to either an internal
or external address using a third-party POP3 server such as Yahoo Mail server. The
egression testing result is presented in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8 The egression testing result and recommendation for Council A’s email
system

Testing technique

Purpose

Result

Recommendation

Sending an email from one
internal address to either an
internal or external addresses
using an external, a thirdparty POP server.

To test egression

Unsuccessful

None

4.3.4.2 Specific email security vendor auditing results

CIS for MS Exchange 2007 for MS Windows Server 2003 version 1 was modified to
suit Council A’s email system. The modified auditing checklist was successfully tested
on the council’s email server. The current MS Exchange 2007 email server was not
configured for both the Exchange Edge Transport and Unified Messaging server roles.
Therefore, both server roles were not included in the modified auditing checklist.

The summary auditing results and mitigation recommendations of the MS Exchange
2007 email server are categorised into three server roles which are the Mailbox server,
the Hub Transport server and the CAS roles. Tables 4.23, 4.24 and 4.25 on Section
4.5.1.1 provide details of these auditing results.

4.3.4.3 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues for the email spoofing, the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport
server and the CAS roles of the council’s email server are presented as follows.
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 Risk 1: The email server allowed relaying
Both internal and external relaying was allowed to be sent internally on the email
server. This mail relaying may be a cause of potential risks from internal spoofing
attacks to the council’s email server.
 Risk 2: The spam blocker appliance (interface 192.168.1.92) allowed relaying
Similar to the situation on the email server, emails from both internal and external
source addresses were allowed to be sent to the 192.168.1.92 interface destined for the
council’s internal or external email addresses. This situation is yet another cause of
potential risks to the council’s email system as the system allows anyone from the
council’s internal network to distribute email message via the spam blocker appliance
without go to the council’s email server.
 Risk 3: The Mailbox server role
Council A’s Mailbox server role has one mailbox. As per best practice guidelines
recommended by CIS (2007), there were a number of mis-configurations on the
council’s Mailbox server role. For examples, both the email send and receive size were
set to unlimited. This may a cause an unnecessary increase in the storage area of the
email server. It may also create unnecessary network traffic to the council’s network.
This extra network traffic may affect the speed of the valid network traffic due to the
increased volume caused by the extra load. See Table 4.23 for more details.
 Risk 4: The Hub Transport server role
Council A’s Hub Transport server role has one default group this is not optimal. As per
best practice guidelines recommended by CIS (2007), the current setting on the Hub
Transport server role of the council’s email server should be reconfigured to provide
better security to the MS Exchange 2007 email server of the council. See Table 4.24 for
more details.
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 Risk 5: The CAS role
As previously mentioned, both the POP3 and IMAP4 related mail protocols are not
being used at Council A. Therefore, both features of the CAS role were not included in
this modified checklist. There were some inadequate settings on the council’s CAS role.
These inadequate settings may cause potential risks to the council MS Exchange 2007
email server. See Table 4.25 for more details.

4.3.5 Testing stage 5: The email system security policy review

There was only a community access to Internet policy (see Appendix A24) on library
usage for the council. This library usage policy clarified the conditions of use for
community access to the Internet via Council A’s computer network. However, no other
information security policy or any technical policy (either issue-specific or systemsspecific security policy) was in existence for staff of the council. Consequently, there
were no rules, policy or procedure guidelines for the IT operational staff of the council
to follow.

4.3.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues

The lack of any related email security guidelines can create a source of vulnerability to
potential risks to the council’s email and related systems in the form of unintended
interruptions or intentional misuse of the email service.
 Risk 1: Interruption of the email service
The lack of an email security guideline such as any email server configuration
documentation may lead to misconfigration of the email server which may be a cause of
potential downtime to the server and its email service to the staff of Council A.
 Risk 2: Misuse of the email service
The lack of an email security guideline may also lead to poor communication of risk in
terms of the email system which may create a cause of potential risk which can allow
unauthorised persons to use the email server as a source to launch abuse or attacks in the
form of spam email to the staff of Council A.
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4.4 Council A’s online web system results

The architecture design, the device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the online
system servers, the vendor security benchmark and the security policy were successfully
tested, audited and reviewed for Council A. The following sections describe all the
results of these testings in detail.

4.4.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying

This network surveying stage was conducted in a similar way as completed in the
Testing stage 1 of the email system. In summary, the following network specifications
and policy documents of the council’s online web system were collected:

 The overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure
connectivity, and the ACL codes and specifications of the firewall which related
to the council’s online web system;
 The council’s online web system related configuration codes for the Internet
border, the IDS/IPS and the internetwork switches specifications; and
 The summary of three online payment servers (the DMZ frontend web, the
application and the backend database servers) specifications.

The following sections describe the overall summary specifications of the online
payment system devices at Council and the associated identified risks.

4.4.1.1 The online payment system devices

There online payment system comprised of three specific devices which were the
frontend web server (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb), the application server (the CoAPathway) and the backend database server (the CoA-SQL).
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4.4.1.1.1 The frontend web server

The location of the council frontend web server is in the council’s DMZ area. It
provides the frontline interface to the client web browser. The council’s residents can
access

the

frontend

web

server

through

the

council’s

website

(https://services.coa.wa.gov.au) and make payments using their valid assessment
number for rates, payment reference for applications or ticket numbers for
infringements. The frontend web server synchronises with the application server via the
HTTP port.

In addition, the application server performs SQL queries directly to the backend
database server using the assigned specific TCP port (2134). Table 4.9 displays the
overall details of the frontend web server specifications.

Table 4.9 A summary of the frontend web server specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

CoA-DMZ-Epathweb

Application software

Epathway, Epathweb

Other application software

Trend Micro virus protection software

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2

Hardware

IBM eServer BladeCenter

IP address

192.168.1.84/24

4.4.1.1.2 The application server

The application server functions as a middle tier application server which interacts with
the frontend web server and the backend database server. It synchronises the
transactions of the Pathway application, the processes commands and the calculations
from the backend database server. Table 4.10 summarised the application server
specifications.
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Table 4.10 A summary of the application server specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

CoA-Pathway

Application software

Pathway

Other application software

Trend Micro virus protection software

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2

Hardware

IBM eServer BladeCenter

IP address

172.16.25.173/24

4.4.1.1.3 The backend database server

The backend database server is a physical MS SQL Server 2005 cluster which consists
of two servers (the CoA-SQL1 and the CoA-SQL2). The two clustered servers work as
part of a redundant system where one server is in active mode and the other one is in
standby mode. The database server has most of the council‘s database applications such
as accounting, human resources, building, and recreation systems. These software
applications are running concurrently.

In terms of the online payment system, the backend database server keeps all the
important information such as payment numbers, rate and infringement notice reference
numbers, usernames, passwords and addresses. In addition, it holds sensitive
information such as credit card numbers and an expiry dates. Table 4.11 presents the
summarised of the backend database server specifications.

Table 4.11 A summary of the backend database servers’ specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

CoA-SQL1

Application software

MS SQL Server 2005

Other application software

Trend Micro virus protection software

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise x64 Edition with service pack 2

Hardware

IBM eServer BladeCenter HS21, 4 x Central Processing Unit (CPU)
EM64T 3 GHz, 16 GB RAM

IP address

172.16.25.222/24, 10.90.0.100/24 (Heartbeat: redundancy)
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Table 4.11 A summary of the backend database servers’ specifications (continued)

Attributes

Details

Name

CoA-SQL2

Application software

MS SQL Server 2005

Other application software

Trend Micro virus protection software

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise x64 Edition with service pack 2

Hardware

IBM eServer BladeCenter HS20, 4 x CPU EM64T 3 GHz, 10 GB RAM

IP address

172.16.25.224/24, 10.90.0.101/24 (Heartbeat: redundancy)

Name

CoA-SQL

IP address

172.16.25.227/24

Role

SQL server cluster

4.4.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of testing stage 1 for Council A’s online payment system are
described in the following sections.
 Risk 1: Sensitive data stored in the backend database server
As previously mentioned, the council’s backend database server holds the council’s
resident sensitive information such as credit numbers, expiry dates and credit card
types. These sensitive data have been entered manually by the council’s payroll staff.

Furthermore, the sensitive data is kept in unencrypted (clear text) format and can
therefore be viewed openly by anyone accessing the system. This means any staff
members that have access to the backend database server are able to view the sensitive
information. This scenario poses a very high risk in terms of staff access and may cause
the council susceptibility to loss of trust, identity theft and damage to the council’s
reputation.

83
 Risk 2: The application and the backend database servers are located in the same
subnet
Both the online payment application server and the online payment backend database
server are located in the council’s internal network. Both the application and the
backend database servers have the same subnet or IP address range and is also the same
as the other internal servers. Common attacks such as viruses, Trojans and DoS may
cause potential risks against the council’s online payment system particularly to the
backend database server and the other internal servers as well.

4.4.2 Testing stage 2: The infrastructure of the online web system – Internet
border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews

This second testing stage consisted of the review of the software configuration codes for
the router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switches.

4.4.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews

The council’s Internet border router specifications were previously discussed in Section
4.3.2.1. In terms of the council’s online payment system, the Internet border router was
configured correctly providing routing connectivity.

4.4.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews

As previously mentioned in Section 4.3.2.2, both the current IDS and IPS features have
been disabled.

4.4.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews

The details of the Internet firewalls specifications can be found in the previously
discussed in Section 4.3.2.3.
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4.4.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews

Council A’s internetwork has three switches as previously mentioned. Details of the
architecture, the configuration codes and the hardware specifications are previously
discussed and addressed in Section 4.3.2.4. Nevertheless, details on ports and VLANs,
including connectivity for the council’s online payment system are displayed in Figure
4.6.

Figure 4.6. A current low level network diagram of the online payment system for
Council A
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4.4.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues

The following section details the identified risk issues for the online payment
infrastructure system (Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches)
of the council.
 Risk 1: Firewall’s IPS was disabled
As previously explained in Section 4.3.2.5, the IPS of the council was disabled which
meant that incoming online payment web traffic (HTTPS) was not inspected for
abnormal patterns. According to Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. (2010)
security guidelines, this can cause potential risks such as DoS attacks, to the council’s
online payment system.
 Risk 2: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS inwards
Currently, the firewall permits HTTPS traffic from anywhere (see Appendix A7: Policy
number 1), allowing access to the online payment frontend web server. As per standard
firewall configurations best practice, this can be a cause of potential risks to the
frontend web server.
 Risk 3: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – Allows IP protocol from specific
computer to the frontend web server
The firewall permits two specific internal IP addresses (the IT operational staff’s
computers) to access the online frontend web server via IP protocol (see Appendix A7:
Policy numbers 5 and 6). This may cause potential risks in the form of an internal
attacker taking control of the IT operational staff’s computers.
 Risk 4: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – Allows two-way communications via
TCP port 2134 between the frontend web server and the internal backend database
server
The firewall rule allows two-way communications between the frontend web server and
the internal backend database server (the CoA-SQL) via the assigned TCP port 2134
(see Appendix A7: Policy numbers 9 and 21). This allows an SQL query from the CoADMZ-Epathweb server to the CoA-SQL server directly (personal communications with
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Council A, 2009). This may cause potential risks such as a DoS and SQL injection into
the council’s CoA-SQL backend database server which could lead to corruption,
extraction or possible manipulation of data from any database being served.

For example, an attacker may use a SQL injection manipulation or function call
injection attack technique to manipulate or modify the contents of the online payment
database of the council (Joshi, 2011). The manipulation of the database file contents can
be in the form of deletion or modification of the individual record details of residents of
the council. Preventing this two-way communication on the firewall will prevent this
type of vulnerability. See Figure 4.7 for more details.

Figure 4.7. The high level online payment system including network traffic protocols
currently in use by Council A
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 Risk 5: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP and DNS outwards
The firewall permits the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server access to anywhere via HTTP and
DNS (UDP port 53) (see Appendix A7: Policy numbers 13 and 14). This may be a
source of potential risk in case of the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server being used as a proxy
for staging further attacks on systems internal and external to the council.
 Risk 6: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP inter-devices
The firewall allows the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server access the internal servers (IP
172.16.25.214, 172.16.25.194, 172.16.25.193) via HTTP port 80 (see Appendix A7:
Policy numbers 17, 19 and 20). As per best practice recommendations to standard
firewall configurations, this may be a cause of potential risks as the DMZ web server
may directly access to the internal servers via HTTP port. This HTTP port may consider
as an unsecure web port when compared with HTTPS.
 Risk 7: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations
This point has been previously discussed in Section 4.3.2.5

4.4.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning,
vulnerability testing and results

Similarly techniques in Section 4.3.3 of the email system were used in this third testing
stage. Both network scanning tools (NMAP and GFI LANguard) were conducted on all
the testings steps (services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability
testings).

4.4.3.1 Services and system identification results

Appendices A8, A9, A10 and A11 provide the full details of the services and system
identification testing results for the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, the CoA-Pathway and the
CoA-SQL servers. Furthermore, this section can be identified issues into two groups
(system information policy results and system patching status results) similar to Section
4.3.3.1.
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4.4.3.2 Port scanning results

Similarity to Section 4.3.3.2, both NMAP and GFI LANguard were used to scan the
council online payment web servers. Moreover, both unnecessary TCP and UDP ports
were identified in all the three servers (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, the CoA-Pathway and
the CoA-SQL servers). Full details of the port scanning results are found in Appendices
A12, A13 and 14.

4.4.3.3 Vulnerability testing results

Similar to Section 4.3.3.3, the vulnerability testing result can be categorised into four
groups which are the high, medium, low and potential security risks based on the GFI
standard. There were vulnerabilities identified on all the three servers of the online
payment system. Full details of the vulnerability testing results are found in Appendices
A15, 16 and 17.

4.4.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council A’s online payment system are
described as follows.
 Risk 1: System information policy results for all the three servers
There were some insufficiently secured services, poor password and security auditing
policies presented in the MS Windows configuration settings on all three online
payment servers at Council A. These configurations may create potential vulnerabilities
to the council’s online payment system. More details are provided in Appendices A8,
A9 and A10.
 Risk 2: System patching status results for all the three servers
There were no missing service packs and patches on the CoA-Epathweb and the CoASQL servers. However, there were missing service packs as well as patches on the CoAPathway server. These missing service packs and patches are a source of potential risks
to the council’s online payment system.

89
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on all the three servers
There were 22 TCP and 11 UDP opened ports which include unnecessary ports on the
CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server. On the CoA-Pathway server, there were 22 TCP and nine
UDP opened ports which include unnecessary ports. Furthermore, there were 23 TCP
and 14 UDP opened ports on the CoA-SQL server. These unnecessary opened TCP and
UDP ports are a cause of potential risks such as manipulation of the database,
unauthorised access and DDoS attacks to the council’s online payment servers.

Table 4.12 displays the overall opened TCP and UDP ports of three servers of the
council’s online payment system. The overall opened TCP and UDP ports together with
the recommended opened ports for the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, CoA-Pathway and CoASQL servers are provided in Appendices A12, A13 and A14 respectively.

Table 4.12 Overall opened TCP and UDP ports of all Council A’s online payment
servers

Server names

Opened TCP ports

Opened UDP ports

Comments

CoA-DMZ-Epathweb

22

11

Refer to Appendix A12

CoA-Pathway

22

9

Refer to Appendix A13

CoA-SQL

23

14

Refer to Appendix A14

 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on all the three servers
There were Ports 1 and 8012 opened on the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server which may
lead to a source of potential risks from Trojan attacks. Table 4.13 depicts the summary
of the overall vulnerability testing results of the three servers, whereas the full details of
vulnerability testing results and possible mitigation recommendations of the three online
payment servers are provided in Appendices A15, A16 and A17 respectively.

Table 4.13 Overall vulnerability of the three online payment servers of Council A

Server names

H

M

L

P

Overall vulnerability levels

Comments

CoA-DMZ-Epathweb

6

0

7

2

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix A15

CoA-Pathway

1

0

2

0

High (8/10)

Refer to Appendix A16

CoA-SQL

2

0

2

2

High (8/10)

Refer to Appendix A17
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4.4.4 Testing stage 4: Vendor security: Database security benchmark auditing

This fourth testing stage pertains to the audit and analysis of database security on the
council’s backend database server (the CoA-SQL).

4.4.4.1 Database security benchmark results

MS SQL server 2005 is the database application software which is used in Council A’s
backend database server. The Security Configuration Benchmark for MS SQL Server
2005 version 1.2.0 January 12th, 2010 from CIS Benchmark was used and adapted as a
prime benchmark auditing tool. According to CIS (2010), the CIS benchmark auditing
tool consists of nine categories as follows:

1. OS and network specification configuration;
2. SQL server installation and patches;
3. SQL server settings;
4. Access controls;
5. Auditing and logging;
6. Backup and disaster recovery procedures;
7. Replication;
8. Application development best practices; and
9. Surface area configuration tool.

Furthermore, the risk rating can be categorised into four groups as follows:

 “H” represents a high risk level which may cause highly impact interruption to
the council backend database server and related system;
 “M” represents a medium risk level which may cause negatively impact
performance and utility to the council backend database and its applications;
 “L” represents a low risk level which may cause minor or little impact to the
council backend database server and its applications; and
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 “P” represents a potential risk level which may be a cause of potential risks to
the council backend database server and its database applications.

Group one to six were successfully audited. However, group seven to nine were not
audited as they were not applicable to the council’s backend database environment.

4.4.4.2 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues for the configuration of the MS SQL 2005 database on the
council’s backend server are presented as follow.
 Risk 1: Inadequate configuration for the database application of the backend
database server
There were some identified security issues on the CoA-SQL server from the auditing.
These security issues are a cause of potential risks to the backend database server. The
overall security issues uncovered (unsatisfactory) together with the risk rating of
Council A’s online payment backend database server based on the six audited category
groups are presented in Table 4.14. Appendices A18, A19, A20, A21, A22 and A23
provide the full details of all the findings and the possible mitigation recommendations.

Table 4.14 The overall risks of the six audited categories of the online payment backend
database server (the CoA-SQL)

Category no.

Risks
(H)

Risks
(M)

Risks
(L)

Risks
(P)

Comments

1) OS and network specification
configuration

1

0

6

3

Refers to Appendix A18

2) SQL server installation and patches

0

2

0

1

Refers to Appendix A19

3) SQL server settings

1

2

4

8

Refers to Appendix A20

4) Access controls

1

3

0

0

Refers to Appendix A21

5) Auditing and logging

0

0

0

43

Refers to Appendix A22

6) Backup and disaster recovery
procedures

0

1

3

1

Refers to Appendix A23

7) Replication

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

None

8) Application development best
practices

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

None

9) Surface area configuration tool

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

None
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4.4.5 Testing stage 5: The online web system security policy review

In terms of the online payment system, there is currently no existing information
security policy including any technical and specific system security policies.

4.4.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues

The lack of policy guidelines can be a cause of serious risks to the council’s online
payment system. The cause of these risks could be attributed to the following issues.
 Risk 1: Poor communication of risk
This was evident from the lack of discussion and discourses related to risk assessment
and risk management as these topics were notably absent from the weekly IT
operational staff meetings (personal communications with Council A, 2009, 2010).

Nevertheless, there were some specific verbal discussions in relation to the lack of IT
security policy issues between the network administrator and the telecommunication
officer during the beginning of year 2010 (personal communications with Council A,
2010). However, there was no written outcome or action plan instituted in order to
address this shortcoming.
 Risk 2: Possible misdirection of resources
The lack of IT information security policies could also be ascribed to a misdirection of
funds and resources directed to the establishment and maintenance of a security policy.
The budgetary constraints of the council permitted some of the IT operational staff to
work on a part-time basis (one day per week). The staff affected by this constraint
included the network administrator, the online payment application administrator, the
database administrator and the GIS officer.

Moreover, each staff was assigned on a different day of the week. Not only did this
constraint affect the formulation of an information security policy, but it also resulted in
a lack of communication between the affected staff in having discussions about
information security policy.
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Consequently, there was no allocation of budget, time and resources towards developing
any IT security related policy up until the beginning of 2011, at which point the
council’s executive management team began allocating funds for the development of an
organisational IT security policy.
 Risk 3: Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor
management/strategic oversight
This factor was evident from the fact that some of the council’s IT staff not being fully
aware of potential risks and their impact to the council’s online payment system. For
example, the online application software (Pathway) administrator was unaware that the
council residents’ confidential information was not stored in a secure format
(encryption).

Another instance of the lack of understanding of the risk was the fact that over 100
database file systems were located on a single cluster server. These cost saving
measures were implemented at the expense of the risk of a single point of failure. An
implemented security policy would have rated the risk of a single point of failure higher
than any cost saving initiative (personal communications with Council A, 2010).

4.5 Analysis and discussion

The analysis and discussion on both Council A’s email as well as online payment
systems are detailed in the following sections.

4.5.1 Analysis

The analysis can be separated into two sections for each of the analysis of Council A’s
email and online payment systems.

4.5.1.1 Council A’s email system analysis – possible mitigations

The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues of Council A’s email
system are described in the following sections. Each of the mitigations described relate
to the identified risk issue number.
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4.5.1.1.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
A virus protection software server version is recommended to be installed on the email
server in order to minimise potential attacks from virus and worms. Where possible this
should use a different antivirus scanner than the client computer.
 Risk 2
It is recommended that the council deploy an extra dedicated server to perform as a
CAS. This additional server may reduce the potential risk of a single point of failure.
The new CAS server can be a physical server or a Virtual Machine (VM) but on
independent hardware. The network connection between both the new CAS and the
existing email server should ideally be a gigabit connection with a high network
bandwidth and low-latency as per recommended best practices by Microsoft
Corporation (Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team, 2009).

In addition, virus protection software for the new CAS server is recommended to be
included in the new CAS. Table 4.15 displays the summary specifications of a new
dedicated CAS. Figure 4.8 illustrates details of its architecture including the new CAS.

Table 4.15 Recommended summary of the new CAS specifications

Attributes

Details

Email application software

MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1

OS

MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1

Hardware

8GB RAM, Hard disks C: 20GB, e: 100GB

MS Exchange 2007 server role

CAS

Exchange support

MS OWA, MS Outlook Anywhere, MS ActiveSync

TCP protocols

HTTPS, Remote Procedure Call (RPC), LDAP

IP network

Different subnet with other email servers (isolate)

Network connection

Gigabit link between Client Access and Mailbox servers

ACL

Permits only allowed or required protocols

Other software

Virus protection software
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 Risk 3
A new CAS may be installed on a different subnetwork in order to minimise any
potential risks that may take place. The current internal router (the layer 3 core switch)
may also be configured using an ACL to only allow the required network
communication protocols between the new CAS and the council’s network. See Figure
4.8 for more details. Figure 4.8 demonstrates the council’s email network diagram with
an extra MS Exchange Server 2007.

Figure 4.8. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS
Exchange Server 2007 (CAS role) for Council A
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4.5.1.1.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The current router allows anyone access to the external IP address (A.B.C.89) of the
email server via the web or Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic. This is
considered to be unnecessary as the required and allowed protocol should be HTTPS
only. Therefore, this configuration code could be removed. See Table 4.16 for more
details.

Table 4.16 The ACL configuration codes recommendation for Council A’s Internet
border router

Policy
no.

Rules

Protocol
types

From
(source)

To
(destination)

Ports
(service)

Recommendations

1

Permit

TCP

Any

A.B.C.82

SMTP

Satisfactory

2

Permit

TCP

Any

A.B.C.89

HTTPS

Satisfactory

3

Permit

TCP

Any

A.B.C.89

HTTP

Remove

 Risk 2
Enabling the IDS/IPS feature on the current Internet border router may provide an
additional prevention from scanning and spoofing attacks. More details are provided in
Table 4.17.
 Risk 3
The existing firewall (Cisco ASA) can provide stateful packet inspection to external
HTTPS traffic. This feature may serve to reduce any potential risks as previously
mentioned. Therefore, the council may wish to enable IPS on the two firewalls for
HTTPS inspection. See Table 4.17 for more details. However, managing traffic in this
way may not be practical because of the size and dynamic nature of the Internet.
Therefore, the council may consider using the existing old MS Internet Security and
Acceleration (ISA) Server 2006 which is currently unused to provide stateful inspection
and application-layer filtering on all HTTPS traffic. This technique enables the ISA
server to block any HTTPS traffic that appears out of context.
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With this option incoming traffic will not overload the current firewall and also add no
cost to the council’s IT budget. Figure 4.9 demonstrates the MS Exchange Server 2007
Client Access architecture for external clients via HTTPS using ISA. In addition, Figure
4.10 illustrates the council’s email network diagram with the CAS and ISA Server 2006.

Figure 4.9. Client access architecture for external clients
(Source: Microsoft TechNet, 2007a, p. 55)

From Figure 4.9 above, it can be seen that the ISA Server analyses the payload in data
packets, which requires ISA Server 2006 to decrypt the SSL stream. The SSL
connections from external network (the Internet) terminates on the ISA server and “then
re-establishes a new SSL connection between the ISA server and the Client Access
server. This SSL bridging process enables ISA Server 2006 to filter invalid data packets
before the traffic reaches the Client Access servers while maintaining the confidentiality
of client-to-server communication as it transits both external and internal networks”
(Microsoft TechNet, 2007a, p. 54). An external trusted SSL certificate must be installed
on the ISA server. Furthermore, for connections between the ISA Server 2006 and the
CAS either external or internal trusted SSL certificates may be used.
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Table 4.17 A summary of the IDS/IPS of the council’s internetwork system

Products

Current issues

Recommendations

Descriptions

IDS on the Internet
border router

Disabled

Enable (turn on)

For blocking of any
spoofing/scanning attacks.

IPS on the firewall

Disabled

Option 1: Enable (turn
on)

For real-time inspection of HTTPS
traffic for the purposes of blocking
and preventing any malicious or
unwanted behaviour in real-time.

IPS on the firewall

Disabled

Option 2: Deploy the
existing ISA 2006

For real-time inspection of HTTPS
traffic.

Figure 4.10. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS
Exchange 2007 (CAS role) and the existing MS ISA Server 2006 for Council A
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 Risk 4
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, the council
may allow the current spam blocker appliance access to only the required specific
places either via HTTP or HTTPS ports.
 Risk 5
These firewall rules may be removed as the internal server has been decommissioned.
The removal of obsolete configuration codes serves to prevent any confusion that may
arise in the future as to why a code which refers to a non-existent server is present. This
allows clean and possible no confusion of the firewall configuration codes to the
council’s network administrator.
 Risk 6
This firewall rule may be removed as the incoming SMTP traffic should forward traffic
from the spam blocker appliance interface 192.168.1.93 rather than 192.168.1.92.
 Risk 7
The firewall rule may be removed as the DMZ server (192.168.1.89) has been
decommissioned.
 Risk 8
The overall configurations including the possible mitigation recommendations are
presented in Table 4.18. As per best practice recommendations of switch configurations
and ISSAF (Rathore, 2006) guidelines, all the measures that are currently not
implemented may be activated in order to protect against such attacks as previously
mentioned.
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Table 4.18 Switches security identified issues and recommendations for Council A

Security features

Recommendations
Outside_sw

Fwswitch

DMZ_sw

ACL applied to block unwanted devices

To do

To do

Satisfactory

Access to the device via HTTP is disabled

Satisfactory

Not Applicable
(N/A)

Satisfactory

Access to the device via Telnet is disabled

To do

N/A

To do

Activate Loop protection on all ports

To do

To do

To do

Apply appropriate log server

To do

To do

To do

Apply appropriate timestamps debug time

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Apply appropriate timestamps log time

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Apply appropriate time zone

Satisfactory

To do

To do

Appropriate Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) used

N/A

N/A

Satisfactory

Appropriate VLAN used

To do

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

Best practice user name and/or password used

To do

To do

To do

Configure appropriate warning banner message

To do

To do

Satisfactory

Disable/shutdown unused switch ports

To do

To do

To do

Disable trunking on ports that do not need it

To do

To do

To do

Enable feature against ARP poisoning attacks

To do

To do

To do

Enable feature against ARP spoofing attacks

To do

To do

To do

Enable port broadcast storm control

To do

To do

To do

Enable port security limits MAC address to a port

To do

To do

To do

Ports connected to identified devices that do not
support spanning-tree should be configured with
Bridge Protocol Data Unit (BPDU) filtering

Satisfactory

To do

Satisfactory

Ports not connected to anything yet should be
configured with protection

To do

To do

To do

Set Data Tools Platform (DTP) on all ports not
being used for trunking

To do

To do

To do

Set strong password (Message-Digest Algorithm 5
or MD5) for authenticating VTP message

To do

To do

Satisfactory

Strong password encryption (MD5) used

To do

To do

Satisfactory

Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) service is
disabled

To do

N/A

To do
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4.5.1.1.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
Table 4.19 displays the summary of the overall system information policy testing result
of the Council A’s email system server. Furthermore, Appendix A3 provides the overall
system information policy testing results, uncovered issues and possible mitigation
recommendations of the council’s email server.a

Table 4.19 Overall system information policy of Council A’s email server

Server name

Password policy

Security audit policy

Comment

Email server

Unsatisfactory

Unsatisfactory

Refer to Appendix A3

 Risk 2
Appendix A4 provides the specific details of the missing service pack and patches
information as well as recommendations for updating of the email server.
 Risk 3
Table 4.20 presents the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on the
email server.

Table 4.20 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on the
email server

Server name

Recommended open
TCP ports

Recommended open
UDP port

Comment

Email server

8

1

Refer to Appendix A5

 Risk 4
Refer to Appendix A6 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible
mitigation recommendations.
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4.5.1.1.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The overall spoofing testing results including possible mitigation recommendations are
presented in Table 4.21.

Table 4.21 The spoofing testing results and mitigation recommendations for Council
A’s email server

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the email server and
sending an email from one
internal address to another
internal address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow mail
relaying

Sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
target email server.

To test external
relaying of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow mail
relaying

Sending an email from one
internal address to an external
address using the target email
server.

To test internal
relaying of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow mail
relaying

Sending an email from one
external address to an internal
address using the target email
server.

To test email
relaying of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow mail
relaying
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 Risk 2
The overall results and mitigation recommendations are provided in Table 4.22.

Table 4.22 The spoofing testing results and mitigation recommendations for Council
A’s spam blocker appliance (interface 192.168.1.92)

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the spam blocker
appliance (interface
192.168.1.92) and sending an
email from one internal
address to another internal
address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow email
relaying

Sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
spam blocker appliance
(interface 192.168.1.92).

To test external
relaying of the
email server

Unsuccessful (does
not allow relaying)

None

Sending an email from one
internal address to an external
address spam blocker
appliance (interface
192.168.1.92).

To test internal
relaying of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow email
relaying

Sending an email from one
external address to an internal
address spam blocker
appliance (interface
192.168.1.92).

To test email
relaying of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow email
relaying
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 Risk 3
Table 4.23 lists overall of the default settings, auditing results and mitigation
recommendations based on the CIS suggestions.

Table 4.23 The overall results of auditing and recommendations Mailbox server role of
Council A’s email server

References

Defaults

Council A

Recommendations

Restrict email deletion retention

7 (days)

14 (days)

7 (days)

Restrict mailbox deletion retention

30 (days)

30 (days)

30 (days)

Restrict deletion of mail or mailboxes until
archival

Unchecked

Unchecked

Checked

Mounting of mailbox database at startup

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Ensure mailbox database cannot be overwritten

Checked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Verify default mailbox storage limits (issue
warning at, prohibit send at, prohibit send and
receive at)

Custom

1991680
Kilobyte
(KB)
209752KB
2411520KB

Custom

Ensure public folder database cannot be
overwritten

Checked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Verify default public folder storage limits (issue
warning, prohibit send and receive at (KB)

Custom

1991680KB,
-, 10240KB

Custom

Audit public folder client access

Custom

Custom

Custom

Audit public folder administrative access

Custom

Custom

Custom

Verify proper permissions on public folder
database

Custom

Custom

Custom

Mounting of public folder database at startup

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Restrict email send size (mailbox identity, mail
contact identity and distribution group identity)

Unlimited
Unlimited
Unlimited

10MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict email receive size (mailbox identity,
mail contact identity and distribution group
identity)

Unlimited
Unlimited
Unlimited

10MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict max recipients

5000

Unlimited

2000

Audit mailbox spam bypass settings

False

False

False

AntiSpam updates

Disabled

Disabled

Disabled

Zero out deleted database pages

False

False

True
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 Risk 4
Table 4.24 lists overall default settings, results of auditing and mitigation
recommendations based on the CIS suggestions.

Table 4.24 The overall results of auditing and recommendations the Hub Transport
server role of Council A’s email server

References

Defaults

Council A

Recommendations

Audit DNS lookup servers

None

Custom

Custom

Restrict email send size (max send size, max
message size)

30MB
30MB

30 MB
30 MB

10MB
10MB

Restrict max recipients (max recipients per
message)

5000

5000

2000

Restrict email receive size (max receive size, max
message size, external Delivery Status
Notification (DSN) max message attach size and
internal DSN max message attach size)

30MB
30MB
10MB
10MB

30MB
30MB
10MB
10MB

10MB
10MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict IP range for receive connectors

None

None

Custom

 Risk 5
The overall results of auditing, factory default settings and mitigation recommendations
based on the CIS suggestions are presented in Table 4.25.

Table 4.25 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of Council
A’s email server

References

Defaults

Council A

Recommendations

Remove legacy web applications

Installed

Installed

Removed

Restrict web authentication methods*

See note

See note

See note

Require SSL for web applications

Checked
Unchecked

Checked
Unchecked

Checked
Checked

Disable web anonymous access

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Enable logging for default website

Checked

Checked

Checked

Enable policy for MS ActiveSync**

None

See note

See note

Forbid MS ActiveSync NonProvisionable devices

Checked

Checked

Unchecked
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Table 4.25 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of Council
A’s email server (continued)
References

Defaults

Council A

Recommendations

Forbid MS ActiveSync simple device
password

Checked

Checked

Unchecked

Disable MS ActiveSync Windows
SharePoint Services (WSS)/Universal
Naming Convention (UNC) access

Checked
Checked

Checked,
Checked

Unchecked
Unchecked

Require MS ActiveSync password

Unchecked

Unchecked

Checked

Require MS ActiveSync alphanumeric
password

Unchecked

Unchecked

Checked

Require MS ActiveSync minimum
password length

Checked, 4

Checked, 3

Checked, 8

Require MS ActiveSync password
expiration

Unchecked

Unchecked
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Restrict MS ActiveSync attachment size

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked
3MB

Require MS ActiveSync policy refresh

None

None

24.00:00:00

Restrict MS ActiveSync maximum
password attempts

8

8

8

Require MS ActiveSync Certificate Based
Authentication

Ignore Client
Certs

Ignore Client
Certs

Require Client
Certs

Require MS ActiveSync inactivity lockout
time

Enabled

Enabled

Disabled

Note:
Refers to restricted web authentication methods*
This task is to ensure that unneeded authentication methods for the MS Exchange web
applications should be disabled. Refer to CIS (2007, p. 76), the MS Exchange 2007
recommendation “for web services and applications that cannot be disabled and
removed from IIS ensure reasonable authentication methods are selected. These include
Autodiscover, Exchange, Exchange Web Services (EWS), Exadmin, Exchweb,
Microsoft-Exchange-ActiveSync, Offline Address Book (OAB), OWA, Public, and
Unified Messaging (UM)”. By doing this you limit the opportunity for unknown clients
to connect to unneeded services. See more details in Table 4.26.
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Table 4.26 The overall results and recommendations of auditing web authentication and
access control of Council A’s email server

Council A

Integrate

Digest

Autodiscover

X

X

Exchange

X

X

Exchange Web Services (EWS)

X

Exadmin

X

X

Exchweb

X

X

MS-Exchange-ActiveSync
Offline Address Book (OAB)

Basic

Passport

X
X

Outlook Web Access (OWA)

X

Public

X

Unified Messaging (UM)

X

Recommendations

Integrate

Autodiscover

X

Exchange

X

Exchange Web Services (EWS)

X

Exadmin

X

Exchweb

X

X

Digest

Basic

X

MS-Exchange-ActiveSync

X*

Offline Address Book (OAB)

X

Outlook Web Access (OWA)

X

Public

X

Unified Messaging (UM)

X

Passport

X

X represents enabled
X* represents only if not using Certificate

Refers to enable policy for MS ActiveSync**
This task creates and assigns policy for the MS ActiveSync service. Enabling and
configuring the MS ActiveSync policy may assist to ensure that all corporate (Council
A’s) mobile devices are in line with its policy. This therefore may reduce the potential
risks to the MS Exchange infrastructure in case of a mobile device disappearing (out of
sync) from the network (CIS, 2007).
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4.5.1.1.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation
 Risks 1 and 2
As per general best practice guidelines, a technical policy such as firewall and server
(email) rules should be implemented in order to provide better security of the council’s
email and related system.

4.5.1.2 Council A’s online payment system analysis – possible mitigations

The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues of Council A’s online
payment system are described in the following sections. Each of the mitigations
described relate to the identified risk issue number.

4.5.1.2.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
In the interest of best practices suggested by Kiely (2006), it is recommended that the
council deploys or applies an encryption method in order to secure the sensitive data
after it is entered. There are two important factors when considering using encryption in
a database. These two factors are performance and data bloat (or increase in size)
(Kiely, 2006).

 Performance: Typically, “the more secure the algorithm and the larger the key
size, the more processing cycles are required” (Kiely, 2006, p. 3). Therefore, it is
recommended that only the sensitive data be encrypted; and
 Data bloat: How much bloat really “depends on the algorithm, key size, and the
clear text that is being encrypted” (Kiely, 2006, p. 3). Table 4.27 represents the
increase in size of the encrypted data over the clear text.
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Table 4.27 Increased sizes of encrypted data over its clear text

Encryption
types

Algorithms

Maximum
increase

Minimum
increase

Average
increase

Symmetric

Triple Data Encryption Standard (DES)

3.80

0.45

1.77

Symmetric

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128

5.40

0.54

2.51

Symmetric

AES 192

5.40

0.54

2.51

Symmetric

AES 256

5.40

0.54

2.51

-

Certificate

11.80

0.54

5.16

Symmetric

DES

3.80

0.45

1.77

Symmetric

Data Encryption Standard XORed (DESX)

3.80

0.45

1.77

Symmetric

Rivest Cipher (RC)2

3.80

0.45

1.77

Symmetric

RC4

3.60

0.43

1.73

Asymmetric

Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) 1024

11.80

0.54

5.16

Asymmetric

RSA 2048

24.60

2.08

11.31

Asymmetric

RSA 512

5.40

1.06

3.23

(Source: Adapted from Kiely, 2006, p. 3)

It is recommended that asymmetric encryption keys with RSA 1024 algorithm on the
sensitive data be used. This method will selectively restrict access to the sensitive data,
thereby allowing only holders of the private key to decrypt and view the data.

In addition, the encryption method may apply only to the council’s sensitive data
(customer credentials) rather than the entire database and all its tables. This will
consume fewer loads and space on the backend database server (MS SQL 2005) (Dave,
2008; Microsoft Corporation, 2005).
 Risk 2
Both the online payment application and the backend database servers should be
configured into different subnetworks or a VLAN. Additionally, appropriate ACLs
should be configured to tighter or filter network traffic between the application and the
backend database servers as well as the subnets. This technique may mitigate the above
mentioned potential risks.
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4.5.1.2.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The HTTPS traffic should be inspected in order to provide better security to the
council’s online payment system.
 Risk 2
The firewall rule may be reconfigured to allow from anywhere (any) to outside
(external). This may minimise potential risks against the online payment frontend web
server (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb) from both the DMZ and the internal networks. The
purpose of the council’s frontend web server is to serve its residents to access the
frontend web server from outside of the network only.

Therefore, allowing access to the frontend web server from both the DMZ and the
internal networks is unnecessary as it will increase the chance of potential risks such as
virus and DoS attacks from either the DMZ or the internal networks in the event that
attackers gained access to the internal network or the DMZ.
 Risk 3
This rule may be tightened by allowing only the required TCP or UDP ports to the two
IP addresses. For example, TCP ports 22 for SSH and 443 for HTTPS connections to be
designated for administration purposes only.
 Risk 4
In order to mitigate the potential risks, as per discussion with the network administrator
and the online payment application administrator, the firewall rule may be disabled.
Therefore; no communication will be allowed between the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb and
the CoA-SQL servers. On the one hand, the current Epathweb software configuration on
the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server may be reconfigured for SQL queries to the CoAPathway rather than to the CoA-SQL server. The Pathway software configuration on the
CoA-Pathway server may also be reconfigured to allow SQL queries with the CoA-SQL
backend database server.
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This can minimise any potential risks of direct access from the frontend web server to
the internal backend database server. In addition, as per best practice recommendations
to standard firewall configurations, no network traffic communication should be
permitted between both the frontend web server and the backend database server.
 Risk 5
This potential risk can be mitigated by reconfiguration of the firewall rules from the
current destination setting which is anywhere (any), to outside (external) the network.
 Risk 6
As per discussion with the council’s network administrator, these firewall rules were
unnecessary and were subsequently removed by the network administrator except for
the firewall rule which, allows HTTP traffic between the frontend web server (the CoADMZ-Epathweb) and the Pathway application server (the CoA-Pathway). This was due
to the fact that, HTTP is the required protocol for the frontend web server for
communication with the Pathway application server.

In order to minimise the potential risk associated with the HTTP protocol, the council
should consider using the existing old MS Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA)
Server 2006 to provide stateful inspection and application-layer filtering on all HTTP
traffic. This practice allows the ISA server to filter any HTTP traffic that appears out of
context.

Figure 4.11 demonstrates the recommended high level online payment system including
network traffic protocols and the existing MS ISA Server 2006 for the council.
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Figure 4.11. The recommended high level online payment system including network
traffic protocols and the existing MS ISA Server 2006 for Council A
 Risk 7
See previously discussion on Section 4.5.1.1.2 for more details.
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4.5.1.2.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
In order to prevent any potential vulnerability that may arise as a result of poor
configuration on both the password and security auditing policies at all of the three
online payment system servers (the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb, the CoA-Pathway and the
CoA-SQL), it is recommended that the MS Windows password be reconfigured. In
addition the auditing policies should be reviewed at CoA-SQL server only as the DMZ
server is governed by a satisfactory audit policy as indicated in Appendix A10.

Appendices A8, A9 and A10 depict the system information policy review including
possible mitigation recommendations of the online payment servers pertaining to
Council A’s online payment system.
 Risk 2
There was one missing service pack and two missing patches on the Council A’s CoAPathway server as indicated in Appendix A11. One of these missing patches is
categorised as critical. It is therefore, recommended to install the patch to the server as
soon as possible. Furthermore, Appendix A11 displays the system patching testing
analysis and possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoA-Pathway
server.
 Risk 3
Table 4.28 presents the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on all
the council’s online payment servers.

Table 4.28 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on all
Council A’s online payment servers

Server names

Recommended open
TCP ports

Recommended open
UDP ports

Comments

CoA-DMZ-Epathweb

3

1

Refer to Appendix A12

CoA-Pathway

6

1

Refer to Appendix A13

CoA-SQL

9

2

Refer to Appendix A14
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 Risk 4
Refer to Appendices A15, A16 and A17 for full details of the identified risk issues and
the possible mitigation recommendations.

4.5.1.2.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
Appendices A18, A19, A20, A21, A22 and A23 provide the full details of all the
findings (satisfactory and unsatisfactory) and the possible mitigation recommendations.

4.5.1.2.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation
 Risks 1, 2 and 3
As per general recommendations to best practices, the council may wish to implement a
related general information security policy together with associated technical security
policies and procedures. The policies and procedures should cover the areas of the
internetwork infrastructure, the web server and the database server. The implementation
of these recommendations will serve to enhance the level of the information security of
the online payment system of the council.

4.5.2 Discussion

The research activities carried out at Council A revealed that the implementation of both
the email (MS Exchange 2007) and the online payment system were lacking in meeting
both national and industry standards. Consequently, these sub-standard implementations
pose a potential risk to the email, the online payment as well as the other related
systems of Council A. However, the recommendations to mitigate the risks have been
provided in the analysis section of this thesis.

Furthermore, the recommended frameworks for both the email and the online payment
systems demonstrated that these frameworks can be used in order to improve or audit
the security of systems within a similar environment. More details with references to the
research questions and examples are provided in Chapter 8: Section 8.3.
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There were seven main factors identified which may be a cause of potential risk to the
Council A’s email, online payment and other related IT systems. The risks can result in
interruptions, extraction of personal details and destruction of data to the council’s
email as well as the online payment systems.

For example, a lack of specific knowledge by staff in proper configuration of the
firewall will result in potential interruptions, modifications and destruction of the
councils email and online payment data. Any consequential compromise to the integrity
of the systems concerned will result in downtime while the systems become unavailable
during repair.

Furthermore, extraction of the personal details of the council’s residents becomes a
distinct possibility as IT staff were unaware that residents’ personal details information
should be stored in an encrypted format for security. Non encryption of such personal
detail information will result in a compromise to the confidentiality aspect of the
security of information held within these databases and systems.

The seven factors were the lack of IT security standards awareness, inadequate domain
or service specific knowledge, inefficient communication, limited IT training as a result
of restricted training budget, insufficient time for task completion, reliance on external
consultant for specific IT projects and no valid testing environment in place. The
following paragraphs provide an explanation of the seven factors in full detail.

Firstly, the lack of IT security standards awareness was examined. There were several
discussions with the council’s IT operational staff (the network administrator, the
Pathway application administrator, the system administrator, the telecommunication
administrator and the external database administrator) over a period of several months.
There were a number of potential risks apparent due to the lack of IT security standards
awareness disclosed in the investigation.

For example, the email (MS Exchange 2007) system’s architecture was not designed
following the MS Exchange 2007 architecture recommendation. The MS SQL Server
2005 database configuration on the backend database server was also not following the
industrial best practices standard recommended by CIS (2010).
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In addition, the Pathway application administrator was not aware that the sensitive
information (the client’s credentials) should be recorded in encryption format. These
represent serious knowledge gaps in human resource and should be addressed by further
training or supplementing through consultancy. Table 4.29 summarises the findings
related to the lack of IT security standards or general industrial best practices by the
staff of Council A

Table 4.29 The summary of the issues uncovered related to the lack of IT security
standards awareness by the IT staff

Results related to lack of IT security standards awareness by IT staff of the council

Council A

Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed

No

IDS/IPS deployed and currently in use

No

Encryption of client sensitive information

No

Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007 recommendations
to best practices

No

Secondly, the inadequate domain or service specific knowledge was outlined. This was
evident from the inadequate configuration on the three internetwork switches
configuration codes, the firewall rules, the unnecessary ports and the services installed
on the related servers. According to the network and system administrators, the
council’s IT operational staff have never been trained in specific knowledge such as
email (MS Exchange 2007) server and firewall (Cisco ASA) related courses. See the
following table for more details.

Table 4.30 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific
knowledge

Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff
of the council

Council A

Firewall configuration related to the email and online web systems

Insufficient

Switch configuration related to the email and online web systems

Insufficient

Setup and configuration of the email server application (MS Exchange 2007)

Incorrect

Setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL Server 2005)

Incorrect

Application of updated software patches on the email server

No

Application of updated software patches on the online web server

No
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Table 4.30 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific
knowledge (continued)

Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff
of the council

Council A

Application of updated software patches on the online payment server

No

Internal email spoofing allowed

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online web server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server

N/A

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server

Yes

Thirdly, the inefficient communication was highlighted. It was noticeable that there
were mis-configurations on the ACL codes of the firewall related to the online payment
system as a result of personal communications between the network administrator and
the Pathway application administrator.

Furthermore, currently there were no change management procedures. There was also
no apparent IT record of auditing systems in place. Introduction of a change
management will assist the council’s IT manager as well as operational staff to manage,
plan, track and predict any changes that may occur efficiently. IT record auditing
systems and documentation such as simple log books for firewall, email, database and
web servers would also provide benefits to the IT operational staff.

For example, properly maintained system log books will allow IT staff to review, report
or audit changes made, roll back changes made to previous states and minimise any
risks of inaccurate data and configurations.

In addition, both change management procedures and IT record auditing systems and
documentation procedures will also serve to increase the lack of communication
between the IT operational staff. Table 4.31 summarises the issues uncovered that can
contribute to the inefficient communication between the council’s IT operational staff.
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Table 4.31 The summary of results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient
communication

Results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication

Council A

Existence of change management procedures

No

Availability of simple specific technical log books

No

Updated documentation of the IT email system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system related

No

Fourthly, the limited IT training as a result of a restricted training budget was examined.
According to the council’s IT manager, each year the IT department receives a restricted
IT training budget resulting in each individual IT operational staff not being able to
attend specific IT training courses every year. This deficiency in funded training would
contribute further to the lack of specific IT knowledge within the council’s IT
department. See details in Table 4.32.

Table 4.32 The summary results related to the limited IT training as a result of limited
training budget

Issues uncovered in relation to the limited IT training budget

Council A

Formal industry or equivalent firewall training of the IT operational staff

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of the email application (MS Exchange 2007) of
the IT operational staff

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL Server 2005 or
equivalent) of the IT operational staff.

No

Formal IT Security training of the IT operational staff

Partly

IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational staff member

Partly

Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff

Yes

Fifthly, the matter of insufficient time for task completion was looked at. The council’s
IT team has one IT manager, six IT operational staff and two part time staff (network
and database administrators). Both the network and database administrators are
contractors and only work one day per week. The council’s IT team has to manage a
wide range of ICT areas such as GIS, GPS, library, email, Intranet, online payment,
online website, payroll, property, telecommunication and telephony systems. According
to the telecommunication, the network and system administrators, only just enough time
is available for them to complete their day to day operation tasks.
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Additionally, they do not have any time left for documentation. This was evident from
the uncompleted or partly completed network and system documentation. Table 4.33
summarised the insufficient time for task completion by the council IT operational staff.

Table 4.33 Results uncovered related to the inefficient time for task completion

Issues uncovered in relation to the inefficient time for task completion

Council A

The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task simultaneously

Yes

Use of enterprise information security policy

No

Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy

No

Updated documentation of the IT email system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system

No

Sixthly, the factor of the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects was
analysed. The council’s IT team always relies on outsourcing to solve the expertise
problems that may arise. This may result in a lack of knowledge transfer between the
external contractors to the council’s IT operational staff.

For example, in the projects which were completed by the contractors, there was a
distinct lack of documentation such as for the email system (MS Exchange Server 2007)
and the online payment system (Epathway). This indicates poor contract management
by the council when initiating and finalising projects as these basic elements should be
in the performance contract. See Table 4.34 for more details.

Table 4.34 Summary of issues uncovered relating to the reliance on external consultants
for specific IT projects

Issues in relation to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects

Council A

Implementation of the firewall system by external consultants

Yes

Appropriate documentation for the firewall installation and management provided by
the external consultants

No

Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external consultants

Yes

Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation and
management provided by the external consultants

No

Deployment of the online payment system by external consultants

Partly

Appropriate documentation for the online payment system (Epathweb) installation and
management provided by the external consultants

Partly
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Finally, there was no valid testing environment in place at Council A. The IT
department did not have any proper testing systems in place even though specific VM
servers were allocated as testing servers for the database, and online payment systems.

Additionally, there was no testing system for the network communication equipment
that would accurately match the testing environment to the architecture of the
production system in totality. A totally mirrored testing environment would minimise
any potential risks to down time and loss of productivity due to hapless misconfigurations, faulty installations or upgrades to the IT system carried out directly on
the production environment, as these would be fully tested in the testing environment
prior to a scheduled replication on the production system. The following table presents
more details of the summary of issues uncovered related to the lack of a valid testing
environment.

Table 4.35 Summary results uncovered related to no valid testing environment on place
at the council

Summary results related to the lack of a valid testing environment

Council A

Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure

No

Existence of a testing environment for the email system

Partly

Existence of a testing environment for the online payment system

Partly
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CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: A
CASE STUDY OF COUNCIL B

This chapter is presented in five subsections: (1) background information; (2)
methodology; (3) Council’s B email system results; (4) Council’s B online web system
results; and (5) analysis and discussion. Its objective is to exemplify the results and
findings from the examination of Council B’s email and online web systems in this
research.

5.1 Background information

Council B is a local government council in WA which runs its own IT department. The
council has an Ethernet network which connects its central and remote sites via fibre
optic, DSL and ADSL. The council’s central site is connected to the outside world or
the Internet via a fibre optic connection. The council’s network architecture is
considered to be structured in a star topology format. Council B runs an in-house email
system which provides email service to its staff. The council’s email system has over
1,000 mailboxes, the majority of which serves its staff. Furthermore, the email system
provides service to other indirect staff such as the councillors and external contractors
as well. The council’s email server is MS Exchange 2007 and MS Outlook 2007 is used
as an email client and personal information management tool.

In addition, the email system has a web-based email or webmail feature, which allows
the council’s authorised personnel to access their email via a web browser anywhere
over the Internet.

Council B also offers an online web system service to its residents. This online web
system provides general information, mailing lists, online community groups and online
payment services. Anyone can view the general information, join the online mailing
lists and become part of the community groups.

Additionally, the council offers online payment system to its residents for paying their
rates, applications, infringements, licence renewal and other invoices using their valid
type of payment numbers as follows:
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 Assessment number for rate payment;
 Payment reference number for application and licence renewal;
 Reference and invoice numbers for other invoices as meals on wheels payments;
and
 Ticket number for infringements such as dog, litter and parking fines.

These valid types of payment numbers are assigned to the council’s residents based on
their individual application. In addition, both the email and online web systems are
managed in-house by the council’s IT staff.

5.2 Methodology

The purpose of this subsection is to provide a detailed description of the methodology
used in this research. All the facets of the methodology including pre-interview
consultation, document review, interview investigation, existing architecture discovery,
email system testing and online web system testing are presented in the six sections.

5.2.1 Pre-interview consultation

Prior to the detailed analysis provided herewith, a pre-interview consultation was
conducted in order to determine the scope of the project. This interview was in the form
of initial open-ended meetings and discussions that were undertaken between
participants including the researcher, both the principal and associate supervisors, the
council’s IT managerial staff and IT operational staff.

All involved parties agreed that both the email and online web systems would be
audited as the findings may prove both useful and also serve to enhance security for
both the email and online web systems. In addition, all parties agreed that this
investigation may serve to increase the security awareness for the council’s IT staff.
Furthermore, the reports produced would serve to highlight any improvements to the
systems that may be required in order to fine tune the efficiency and security of the
email and online web systems.
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Council B agreed to an overall time frame of five months based on the estimate of two
and half months for each report produced. Additionally, the council agreed upon the
recommendation that the analysis be done in stages in order to minimise the disruption
to normal services.

It was also agreed that this project was to be undertaken at no cost to the council and the
recommendations would be presented to the council as a set of two reports: 1) the email
system and 2) the online web system. Additionally, the council would be under no
obligation to implement any of the recommendations contained in the reports and the
council may at its discretion, elect to abort the project at any time as desired.

5.2.2 Document review

There were two types of documents describing the email and online web systems that
were available. These were the hardware and software specification documents and the
organisation policy documents. The software documents consisted of in-house software
systems as well as the third-party software systems.

Several documents relating to both the council’s email and online web systems were
collected. These documents included specifications and records of configuration codes
of the Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the DMZ switch, the firewalls, the email
server, the spam blocker appliances, the static web servers, the application server and
the backend database server. Furthermore, a copy of the DMZ internetwork diagram
was collected.

From the interviews conducted it was established that both the email and online web
systems technical security policies were non-existent apart from a general email usage
policy. These omissions were due to the lack of time required for the implementation of
security policies for these systems.
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5.2.3 Interview investigation

Several interviews were conducted with the two main stakeholders as follows:

 Council B’s IT managerial staff (IT manager); and
 The council’s IT operational staff (database, network, Pathway application,
system and web administrators).

The interview with the IT managerial staff were a face-to-face interview to ascertain a
general overview of the council’s email and online web systems. In terms of outcomes,
an outline of the council’s expectation from the project was discussed. It emerged that
the council was interested in overall system documentation and risk analysis of both the
email and online web systems.

Ongoing testing analysis interviews were conducting using several interview techniques
such as face-to-face, telephone and email between the researcher, the network and the
web administrators.

Interviews conducted with the network administrator were related to discussions of
network connectivity of the various hardware entities. These included the firewalls, the
Internet border router, the switch, the static web servers, the email, the AD, the DNS
and the database servers. The ACL and configuration codes pertaining to the relevant
devices were also discussed.

Testing analysis interviews were conducted with the web administrator, relating to the
configurations of the backend database server, the static web servers, as well as the
application logic surrounding the online web payment system.
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5.2.4 Existing architecture discovery

This section describes the discovery of the existing architecture at Council B in relation
to their email and online web systems.

5.2.4.1 The existing email system architecture of Council B

Council B’s email system consists of one email server, and two spam blocker
appliances. These devices are connected together within the council’s internetwork
infrastructure. The email server is located in the council’s internal network whereas
both the spam blocker appliances are located in the council’s DMZ area. The
infrastructure has one Internet router, two firewalls and one switch as its components.
The only two email related network traffic protocols allowed in the network are HTTPS
and SMTP which are used for webmail and traditional email respectively. In terms of
HTTPS, Council B uses 128-bit encryption with standard validation SSL certificate for
its webmail connectivity (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c).

Figure 5.1 illustrates all the devices connectivity and allowed email network traffic
protocols in a high level network diagram.
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Figure 5.1. A current high level network diagram for the email system of Council B

5.2.4.2 The existing online web system’s architecture of Council B

The council’s current online web system provides the council’s general information
such as rates, libraries, events, facilities and jobs. Council B’s online web system can be
categorised into three different groups based on their features and architectures. These
three groups are as follows:

 The static web system;
 The CMS web system; and
 The online payment system.
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5.2.4.2.1 The existing static web system architecture

The current static web system has two CoB-DMZ-Web and CoB-Web servers. The
council’s static web system provides both simple/standard static and form-based web
pages. The CoB-DMZ-Web server is located in the council’s DMZ area, whereas the
CoB-Web server is located in the council’s internal network.

Figure 5.2 depicts the council’s current architecture on the static web system including
network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 5.2. The high level static web system currently in use by Council B
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5.2.4.2.2 The existing CMS web system architecture

The current CMS web system has two servers which are the CoB-DMZ-Web and the
CoB-Database servers. It provides both simple/standard static and form-based web
pages. The CoB-DMZ-Web acts as a CMS frontend web server whereas the CoBDatabase acts as a CMS management server. The CoB-Database server is located in the
council’s internal network. Figure 5.3 illustrates the council’s current CMS system
architecture including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 5.3. The high level CMS web system currently in use by Council B
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Both the CoB-DMZ-Web and CoB-Database servers interact with each other as part of
a Web Content Management System (WCMS). The CoB-Database permits the council’s
IT operational staff to manage and update web page information, prior to uploading the
validated web pages from the CoB-Database server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server.

This arrangement provides good security as there is no direct connection between the
client and the CMS management server. The council’s residents, access general council
information from the CMS frontend web server (the CoB-DMZ-Web) via the council’s
website (http://www.cob.wa.gov.au).

5.2.4.2.3 The existing online payment system architecture

The council’s current online payment system is designed as a three-tiered client-server
architecture. It consists mainly of two servers which include a frontend and web
application server, and a backend database server as depicted in Figure 5.4. CoB-DMZWeb performs the application logic function by covering both frontend and application
web features. The backend database (the CoB-Database) server performs the data logic.

In addition, the external gateway security payment service (the online gateway) is
employed by the council to provide a secured online payment system for its residents
and is used for payments such as rates and infringements. The council’s online payment
system communicates with the external gateway security payment service using the
HTTPS protocol.

Furthermore, the SSL protocol is used to provide an encrypted communication channel
between the client’s web browser and the council’s online payment system. This
method ensures secured private communications over the public Internet. The council
uses 128-bit encryption with standard validation SSL certificate for its online payment
SSL connection (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c).

Figure 5.4 demonstrates the council’s current online payment system architecture
including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.
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Figure 5.4. The high level online payment system currently in use by Council B

5.2.5 Email system testing

In this email system testing consists of five stages which are summarised as follows:

 Network surveying includes discovery of the current Council B’s email system’s
network architecture;
 Auditing and configuration codes review of the Internet border router, the
IDS/IPS, the firewalls and the switch devices;
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 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the
email and webmail servers;
 Email spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark auditing on the email
server; and
 Email system security policy review.

5.2.6 Online web system testing

The online web system of the council can be categorised into three distinct application
profiles which are the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment
system. All of these online web systems share and partly share hardware for servers.
More details of the servers are provided in the Testing stage 5.4.1.

This online web system testing analysis which was carried out consists of five stages
which are summarised as follows:

 Network surveying, which includes the current Council B’s online web system’s
network architecture, identified risks and mitigation recommendations;
 Auditing, configuration codes review, identified risks of the Internet border
router, the IDS/IPS, the firewalls and the switch devices related to Council B’s
online web system;
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the
online web system’s servers;
 Vendor security benchmark auditing on the online payment server; and
 Online web system security policy review.

5.3 Council B’s email system results

The following sections explain all the results of the review and testings for the
architecture design, the device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the email system
servers, the email spoofing, the vendor security benchmark and the security policy in
details.
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5.3.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying

This network surveying of the testing stage one consists of network surveying that
collects information on the email system including the email server, the two spam
blocker

appliances,

the

current

email

architecture,

identified

issues

and

recommendations. Information for the following components of Council B’s email
system were collected:

 Overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure
connectivity including the email system;
 The Internet border router, the two Internet firewalls, the DMZ’s switch
specification and the related email configuration codes;
 The email server’s specification summary; and
 The two spam blocker appliances’ specification summary.

5.3.1.1 The email system devices

The council’s email system consists of two specific devices type. These are the MS
Exchange 2007 email server and the Cisco IronPort spam blockers.

5.3.1.1.1 The email server

The current email server had MS Exchange 2007 with the newest service pack 1 as the
email application software. The software was running on MS Windows Server 2003
Enterprise Edition with service pack 2.

According to Microsoft TechNet (2007a), the current email server configuration may be
considered as a simple single-server architecture combining the Mailbox server, the Hub
Transport server and the CAS roles. However, the Edge Transport server and Unified
Messaging server roles were not included or installed for the same reasons as Council A
in that Cisco IronPort spam blockers are used to perform the same function as the MS
Edge Transport server role. Furthermore, Council B also uses the Notel VoIP system for
the Unified Messaging server role. Summary details are provided in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 A summary of the email server specifications

Attributes

Details

Email application software

MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1

Email scanning software

Trend Micro ScanMail for MS Exchange version 8.0.1181

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2

Hardware

VMware server

IP address

172.20.130.224/16

MS Exchange 2007 roles

Mailbox, Hub Transport, CAS combined

Email service protocols

SMTP and HTTPS

Other software

Trend Micro OfficeScan Client

5.3.1.1.2 The spam blocker appliance

There are two spam blocker appliances (email GW1 and GW2) which are running on
Cisco IronPort appliances. Each of the devices has two network interfaces for separating
incoming and outgoing email network traffic. The two devices run concurrently as part
of a redundancy strategy (active and standby mode). Table 5.2 summarises both the
spam blocker appliance roles and specifications.

Table 5.2 A summary of both the spam blocker appliance specifications

Attributes

Details

Device name

Email GW1

Spam blocker application software

Cisco IronPort C150

OS

Cisco IOS

Hardware

2 GB RAM, 2 x 80 GB Serial Advanced Technology
Attachment (SATA) drives

Interfaces (1, 2)

Gigabit Ethernet: A.B.C.98/27, A.B.C.99/27

Feature roles

Scan virus, block spam email, block email blacklist

Device name

Email GW2

Spam blocker application software

Cisco IronPort C150

OS

Cisco IOS

Hardware

2 GB RAM, 2 x 80 GB SATA drives

Interfaces (1, 2)

Gigabit Ethernet: A.B.C.100/27, A.B.C.101/27

Feature roles

Scan virus, block spam email, block email blacklist
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The purpose of these appliances is to filter all incoming and outgoing emails (SMTP)
against virus and worm threats and to block spam emails. As compared to MS Exchange
2007 server roles architecture (see previously discussed Section 4.3.1.1.1 for more
details), these spam blocker appliances perform the same role as the MS Exchange 2007
Edge Transport server role.

5.3.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues

The following sections describe the identified risk issues for the council’s email system.
 Risk 1: Single point of failure
As previously mentioned, the existing email architecture of Council B is made up of a
simple single-server. According to Microsoft TechNet (2007a), the simple single-server
(MS Exchange 2007) architecture should only be deployed in Windows’s SBS which is
suitable for small network environments. Council B’s network is considered to be a
medium size as it has over 1,000 mailboxes and over 600 staff (personal
communications with Council B, 2010).

As the current council’s email server performs three MS Exchange 2007 roles (CAS,
Hub Transport and Mailbox Server roles). This may be considered as a single point of
failure as all three MS Exchange Server roles are run by the single email server.
 Risk 2: Same subnetwork
The email server is located in the council’s internal network which has the same IP
address group (subnet) as the other important servers with no additional ACL filtering
for separation.

As the other important servers are the database, financial and file servers, they may be
open to potential security risks, such as virus attacks. Virus attacks and threats arising
on the email server may possibly infiltrate and infect other servers within the same
subnetwork thereby leading to interruptions to the IT services of the council.
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 Risk 3: MS ActiveSync – Authentication
MS ActiveSync supports three different authentication types which are the basic,
certificate and token forms. Council B currently uses the basic authentication together
with a SSL connection. This means that username and password are transmitted in clear
text whereas the connection on the other hand, is encrypted. Basic authentication can be
considered as the simplest as it provides the lowest level of security as compared to both
certificate and token form authentication methods (Luckett et al., 2008).
 Risk 4: MS Outlook Anywhere – Authentication
MS Outlook Anywhere or RPC over TCP is disabled by default (Microsoft TechNet,
2007b, c). However, Council B’s MS Outlook Anywhere is currently enabled. MS
Outlook Anywhere deployed in Council B allows direct external access into the internal
network using the basic client authentication method via the SSL connection. As the
basic authentication method provides the lowest security, it is recommended that it be
enhanced.

5.3.2 Testing stage 2: The email system’s infrastructure – Internet border router,
IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews

This email system’s infrastructure testing stage consists of a review of the council’s
email infrastructure data collections which are the Internet border codes, the IDS/IPS,
the firewalls codes and the switch codes data collection.

5.3.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews

According to the council’s internetworking, the Internet border router acts as a gateway
which allows the council network to be able to communicate with the outside world (the
Internet). The Internet border router is designed for routing purposes in order to forward
or route the internetworking traffics/protocols which serves the council network services
such as email and WWW. In addition, the router provides the first layer of traffic
filtering which means only permitted internetwork traffic or protocols are allowed to get
in and out the council’s network.
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Table 5.3 summarised the specifications of the Internet border router and the ACL codes
for the email system. In addition, the risk issues uncovered and the possible risk
mitigation recommendations are also presented.

Table 5.3 A summary of the Internet border router specifications

Attributes

Details

Device type

Cisco 2811

OS

Cisco IOS version 12.2

Memory

128 MB

Interfaces (2)

External: A.B.D.x/30, Internal: A.B.C.65/27

5.3.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews

IDS/IPS is a critical early warning system that may provide the necessary information to
the network administrator/email administrator in order to protect the email server from
attackers. The council’s Internet border router has its own built-in IDS/IPS. However,
the IDS/IPS feature on the router was disabled.

5.3.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews

In the council’s internetworking, the two firewalls act as a main filtering for all
incoming and outgoing internetwork traffic. In addition, they perform NAT as well. One
of the firewall operates in an active mode and the other operates in a standby mode.
Table 5.4 summarises the specifications of both the firewalls.

Table 5.4 A summary of the firewall specifications

Attributes

Details

Device type

CheckPoint Firewall-1

OS/model

UTM-1 272 (270 series)

Memory

512 MB

Interfaces

4 x Ethernet 10/100/100 full duplex, 1 sync port

IP address

See Figure 5.5 for full details
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Refer to Appendix B2 for the summary of the firewall configuration codes with respect
to NAT of the email system. In addition, Appendix B3 demonstrates the summary of the
firewall configuration codes with respect to the email system.

5.3.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews

Council’s B has only one Ethernet switch which provides network communication and
connectivity between the Internet border router, the firewalls, the DMZ servers and the
council’s internal network. The current overall hardware and software details of the
switch are depicted in Table 5.5 whereas details on ports, VLANs including its
connectivity are provided in Figure 5.5.

Table 5.5 The email system: Current switch hardware and software details

Attributes

Details

Device name

CoB-admin-central

Device type

Cisco Catalyst 3750G switch

OS

Cisco IOS version 12.2

Memory

128 MB

Port

24 x 10/100 MB UTP Ethernet ports, 2 x GB SFP ports

Operate at

Layer 3 OSI

VLAN number

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7
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Figure 5.5. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council B

5.3.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issue for the council’s email infrastructure system (Internet border
router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches) are detailed in the following sections.
 Risk 1: Poor ACL coding on the Internet border router
The current Internet border router allows any IP traffic including TCP and UDP to get
in and out the council network. This configuration may be considered contrary to the
best practice recommendations of standard firewall configurations.
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Nevertheless, the overall ACLs are sufficient to block some of the potential risky ports
such as TCP port 161, 162, SNMP, Simple Network Management Protocol Trap
(SNMPTRAP), Telnet, UDP port 259 as well as some private IP addresses. See
Appendix B1 for details on a summary of the council’s Internet border access list code
for the email system.
 Risk 2: Internet border router’s IDS was disabled
The IPS software feature on the Internet border router (Cisco 2811) is currently
disabled. This can be a cause of potential security risk to IP spoofing and scanning
attacks. There are various types of security attacks which rely on the IP spoofing
method in order to begin an attack such as SMURF or Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) flooding attack as well as DoS attacks (Network World, 2008). Such
spoofing attacks may result in a loss of Internet connectivity for council’s network as
well as disrupt the council’s community services.
 Risk 3: No IPS feature on both the firewalls
Currently there is no software IPS feature implementation on the two CheckPoint
firewall Unified Threat Management (UTM)-1 272 (270 Series) devices. Therefore,
both the incoming and outgoing SMTP email traffic is not inspected making the
network vulnerable to a broad range of threats including DoS, man in the middle and
other malicious attacks (Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., 2010).
 Risk 4: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – spam blockers
Both the two spam blockers (email GW1 and GW2) are currently accessible from
anywhere within the council’s internal network via both HTTP and Telnet remote
communication ports (see Appendix B3: Policy number 3). Both these remote access
communication methods are considered insecure, due to the fact that all data, including
passwords, communicated through these ports is in a plaintext (Microsoft TechNet,
2004, 2005a, b).

Furthermore, communication traffic can be intercepted by hackers through packet
sniffers and the password can be used later for further malicious purposes.
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 Risk 5: Inadequate firewall ACL coding - HTTP
The current firewall rule allows both the spam blocker appliances access anywhere via
HTTP port (see Appendix B3: Policy number 4).
 Risk 6: Firewalls cannot provide deep inspection on HTTPS traffic
The existing firewall (CheckPoint) cannot provide deep inspection on all HTTPS traffic
(Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., 2010). This means that the council’s webmail
(HTTPS) traffic is directly allowed into the council’s internal network without any
inspection for potential unwanted malware.
 Risk 7: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations
Similar to Council A, there were some inadequate switch code security configurations
on the current Ethernet switch. These inadequate configurations may lead to potential
risks such as ARP spoofing, ARP poisoning and broadcast storm attacks.
 Risk 8: Single point of failure
As mentioned earlier, the council has only one switch which provides network
communication and connectivity between the Internet border router, the firewalls, the
DMZ servers and the council’s internal network. This stand alone switch may be
considered as a single point of failure. In addition, it can be a source of potential risk in
that the council’s internal network may be exposed to attack through the methods
previously mentioned.

5.3.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning,
vulnerability testing and results

Similar testing steps conducted at Council A, NMAP and GFI LANguard network
scanning tools were used for the scanning test of the council’s email system. NMAP
with GUI standard (open source Zenmap version 5.0) for MS Windows XP version was
run. The slow comprehensive scan option was used in the test in order to collect as
much information as possible from the email system relating to the TCP, UDP ports,
vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware.
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In addition, GFI LANguard version 9.0 with full scan option was run in order to fully
test and collect the council’s email system information. Both these scanning techniques
allow deep information collection on the council’s email system.

5.3.3.1 Services and system identification results

The full results of the services and system identification of the MS Exchange 2007
email server are presented in Appendices B4 and B5. However, there were no testing
results for the two email gateway spam blocker appliances as neither of the testing
software (NMAP and GFI LANguard) could obtain any services and system
information, including patching information, for the two email gateway spam blocker
appliances.

5.3.3.2 Port scanning results

Both NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning tools were used to perform port
scanning on the email server and on the two email gateway spam blocker appliances
GW1 (A.B.C.99) and GW2 (A.B.C.101).

Moreover, there were some issues uncovered such as the TCP and UDP ports which
were found to be left opened unnecessarily. This was found to be the case on the email
server but not on the two email gateway spam blocker appliances (GW1 and GW2). Full
port scanning details of the council’s email server is provided in Appendix B6.

5.3.3.3 Vulnerability testing results

Similar to the vulnerability technique of Council A, the vulnerability is categorised into
four levels which are high (H), medium (M), low (L) and potential (P) security levels.
The vulnerability analysis was successfully executed on the email server. However,
there were no vulnerability analysis results for the gateway spam blocker appliances as
both the GFI LANguard and NMAP software did not yield any vulnerability
information from the vulnerability testing. Full vulnerability results are provided in
Appendix B7.
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5.3.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council B’s email system are described
as follows.
 Risk 1: System information policy results for the email server
There were inadequate measures of the system information policy’s configuration which
includes password policy, security auditing policy and services. This inadequacy may
lead to the potential risk of attacks against the organisation’s email system.
 Risk 2: System patching status results for the email server
The overall system patching status testing analysis of the council’s email server was
carried out using GFI LANguard and NMAP scanning tools. A number of issues were
uncovered. These related to missing and unimplemented system patching information
thereby creating vulnerabilities and possible threats to the council’s email server (the
CoB-email). The scan revealed that there were two missing patches on the email server.
See more details in Appendix B5.
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on the email server
It was found that there were 22 opened TCP ports and eight opened UDP ports on the
email server. These numbers include the unnecessarily opened ports. See Table 5.6 for
more a total numbers of opened TCP and UDP ports of the council’s email server. The
overall opened TCP and UDP ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations
are presented in Appendix B6.

Table 5.6 List of the number of open TCP and UDP ports on the email server

Server name

Opened TCP ports

Opened UDP ports

Comment

Email server

22

8

Refer to Appendix B6
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 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on the email server
There were vulnerabilities discovered on the email server. As an example the TCP
service port 110 (POP3) was left opened thereby presenting a vulnerability issue in the
high security risk category. Table 5.7 displays the overall Council B’s vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, Appendix B7 provides full details of the identified risk issues for Council
B’s email server.

Table 5.7 The overall of Council B’s email server – vulnerabilities

Server name

H

M

L

P

Overall vulnerability level

Comment

Email server

2

1

7

2

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix B7

5.3.4 Testing stage 4: Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server
auditing

This spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server auditing stage
consists of two testing steps which are the email system spoofing testing and specific
vendor security benchmark auditing of MS Exchange 2007 on the email server.

5.3.4.1 Email system spoofing testing results

Several spoofing testings were carried out over the email server and both the network
interfaces of each the email gateway spam blocker appliances (GW1 and GW2). The
spoofing testings were all conducted using the CIS template. Moreover, a number of
risk issues were identified from the spoofing testing.

In addition, the egression testing over the council’s email system was successfully
tested. This egression testing revealed that the council’s email system correctly
disallowed sending an email from an internal address to either an internal or external
address via a third-party POP3 server. Table 5.8 presents the egression testing result and
recommendation.
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Table 5.8 The egression testing result and recommendation

Testing technique

Purpose

Result

Recommendation

Sending an email from one internal
address to either an internal or
external addresses using an external,
a third-party POP server.

To test egression

Unsuccessful

None

5.3.4.2 Specific email security vendor auditing results

The overall modified auditing checklist tables were adapted and from the specific
security recommendations – The CIS Benchmark for MS Exchange 2007 for MS
Windows Server 2003 Version 1.0 to suit Council B’s email system same as technique
utilised in Council A. The Exchange Edge Transport and Unified Messaging server
roles and all defaults with “N/A” status are not included in the overall modified auditing
checklist tables. This is due to the fact that the existing MS Exchange 2007 architecture
for Council B is not configured for the Edge Transport server role.

The overall summary of the email MS exchange 2007 security benchmark testing
checklist for Council B can be categorised into three server roles which are the Mailbox
server, the Hub Transport server and the CAS roles. In terms of the Council B’s
Mailbox server role, there were five mailboxes as follows:

1) First storage group > Private mailbox store 1;
2) Pub folders storage group > Public folder database;
3) Second storage group > Private mailbox store 2;
4) Temp storage group > Temp mailbox database; and
5) Third storage group > Private mailbox store 3.

In addition, Tables 5.28, 5.29 and 5.30 in Section 5.5.1.1.4 provide details of these
auditing results relating to risks and mitigations.
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5.3.4.3 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues for the email spoofing, the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport
server and the CAS roles of Council B’s email server are presented as follows.
 Risk 1: The email server allowed relaying
The email server allows emails to be sent from both internal and external source
addresses to the council’s internal email address destination. This email relaying can be
a source of potential risk from spoofing attacks arising internally.
 Risk 2: The spam blocker appliance 1 (email GW1)
Emails from both internal and external source addresses to the council’s internal or
external email address destinations are allowed to be sent from the outbound2 interface
of the email GW1. This email relaying is a cause of potential risks to the council’s email
system as it will then be possible for an intruder to Telnet to the outbound2 interface
and directly send unauthorised emails.
 Risk 3: The spam blocker appliance 2 (email GW2)
Both internal and external relaying is allowed from the outbound interface of the email
GW2. This mail relaying again may be a cause of potential risk to the council’s email
system.
 Risk 4: The Mailbox server role
There were a number of mis-configurations on the Mailbox server role of the email (MS
Exchange 2007) server. An example of this type of configuration error was the
unlimited setting of the email send size. This unlimited setting could lead to a possible
increase in unnecessary network traffic and may affect the speed of the council’s
network traffic, by inadvertently causing a filling up of the storage capacity of the email
server as well as the backup system. See Table 5.28 for more details.
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 Risk 5: The Hub Transport server role
The council’s Hub Transport server role has three groups which are the default CoB
Gold, CoB Flourine and Client CoB Gold. In terms of following industry best practice
recommendations by CIS (2007), the Hub Transport server role of the council’s email
server should be reconfigured in order to increase its security. As an example, the IP
range could be restricted for receive connectors. See Table 5.29 for more details.
 Risk 6: The CAS role
The CAS role with POP3 and IMAP related features are not included in the overall
modified checklist auditing Table 5.30 as the email server is configured to support only
SMTP and both POP3 and IMAP protocols are not supported.

There were some mis-configurations on the CAS role. As an example, the MS
ActiveSync password options on both the default and executive Nokia policy were
disabled. Consequently, passwords are not required, thereby exposing the council’s
email system to possible intrusion. See Table 5.30 for more details.

5.3.5 Testing stage 5: The email system security policy review

This email system security policy stage consists of the review of the email system
security policy. There was no existing technical email system policy apart from a
general information security which covered aspects of email usage (see Appendix B30).

5.3.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues

The lack of any technical email system security policy can contribute to potential risks
such as interruption and misuse of the email services as previously discussed in Section
4.3.5.1, to Council B’s email as well as the related systems.
 Risk 1: Interruption of the email service
Similarly to Council A, the lack of an email security guideline may be a cause of
potential downtime to the email server as well as its services of Council B.
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 Risk 2: Misuse of the email service
As discussed in Chapter 4, the lack of an email security guideline at Council B can
contribute to a cause of potential risks in terms of allowing unauthorised access as well
as use of the email as a source to initiate email attacks to the council’s staff.

5.4 Council B’s online web system results

Council B’s online web system (the static web system, the CMS web system and the
payment system) was audited and tested for the architecture, the intrusion detection, the
device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the online web system servers, the
vendor security benchmark auditing and the security policy review. The following
sections describe all the results of these testings in detail.

5.4.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying

This network surveying stage involved making an audit of the online web system
architecture together with the networking devices such as the router, the firewalls and
the switch. The following network specifications and policy documents were collected
for the council’s system:

 The overall network diagram for the Internet link and the DMZ infrastructure
connectivity;
 The firewall device specification and ACL codes related to the council’s online
web system;
 The IDS/IPS, the Internet border, the DMZ switch specification and codes
related to council’s online web system; and
 The specifications summary of the online web system servers.

The following sections describe the overall summary specifications of the online web
system devices (the static web system, the CMS web system and the payment system) at
Council B as well as the associated identified risks.
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5.4.1.1 The static web system devices

The static web system consists of two web servers (the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoBWeb) as previously mentioned.

5.4.1.1.1 The CoB-DMZ-Web server

The CoB-DMZ-Web server is located in the DMZ so as to minimise any potential risks
arising from attackers to the council’s static web system. This web server provides the
council’s specific information via static web pages including forms, to its residents as
well as others. The summary specifications of the CoB-DMZ-Web server are presented
in Table 5.9.

Table 5.9 A summary of the CoB-DMZ-Web server specifications

Attributes

Details

Device name

CoB-DMZ-Web

Domain name

Cob.wa.gov.au

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0

Other application software

Trend Micro server protect

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 R2 with service pack 2

Hardware

Simple Standard Virtual Server (VMware) Small Computer System
Interface (SCSI) C: 30 GB, E: 50 GB, F: 9 GB; memory physical 2
GB and virtual 3.85 GB

IP address

A.B.C.121/27

5.4.1.1.2 The CoB-Web server

The CoB-Web is an in-house server, custom built to suite the council’s web system
requirements. It is located in the council’s internal network. It allows the council’s IT
operational staff (web administrator) to manage and update web pages information such
as PDF and MP3 files, before pushing or uploading the validated web pages from the
CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server. See Table 5.10 for more details.
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Table 5.10 A summary of the CoB-Web server specifications

Attributes

Details

Device name

CoB-Web

Domain name (internal)

CoB-Web.city.internal

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0

Other application software

Trend OfficeScan

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 R2 with service pack 2

Hardware

VMware SCSI C: 20 GB, E: 60 GB; memory physical 2 GB and virtual
3.85 GB

IP address

172.20.130.184/16

5.4.1.2 The CMS web system devices

As previously discussed in Section 5.2.4.2.2, the council’s CMS web system has two
servers which are the CMS frontend web server (the CoB-DMZ-Web) and the CMS
management server (the CoB-Database). The summary specifications of the CoBDatabase server are described as follows. However, the CoB-DMZ-Web server’s
specifications are not included as it has been previously described in Section 5.4.1.1.

5.4.1.2.1 The CMS frontend web server

The specification details of the CoB-DMZ-Web server have been previously discussed
in Section 5.4.1.1.

5.4.1.2.2 The CMS management server

The CoB-Database server works as the CMS management server as well as the backend
database. It interacts with the CoB-DMZ-Web as part of a Web Content Management
System (WCMS) as previously described in Section 5.2.4.2.2. Table 5.11 summarises
the CMS management server (the CoB-Database) specifications.
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Table 5.11 A summary of the CMS management server specifications

Attributes

Details

Device name

CoB-Database (CoB-Database.city.internal)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0

Other application software

Trend OfficeScan

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 with service pack 2

Hardware

VMware SCSI C: 30 GB, E: 50 GB, F: 12 GB; memory physical 4
GB and virtual 7.27 GB

IP address

172.20.130.148/16

5.4.1.3 The online payment system devices

The overall brief summary specifications of the council’s online payment servers
(frontend web, application and backend database servers) are described as follows.

5.4.1.3.1 The frontend web server

The current frontend web server is located in the DMZ to diminish any potential risks
which may take place from attackers to the council’s online payment system. It
performs the first part of the application logic which provides the front line interface to
the client web browser. The council’s residents can access the frontend web server
through the council’s website (http://www.cob.wa.gov.au/Live/PayOnline.aspx), using
their valid reference number for rates or infringement payments, whereas a valid
payment number is required for dog registration renewals. The details of the frontend
web server (the CoB-DMZ-Web server) specifications have been described earlier in
Table 5.9.

5.4.1.3.2 The application server

Typically, in the online web payment system environment, the application server
functions as a middle tier which interacts with the frontend DMZ web server and the
backend database server. It synchronises the transactions of the application, processes
necessary commands, and performs all calculations and queries of the data to and from
the SQL backend database server. As previously mentioned, the CoB-DMZ-Web server
performs both the frontend and application functions.
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5.4.1.3.3 The backend database server

The CoB-Database has the custom built database application running in conjunction
with MS SQL Server 2005. The CoB-Database server works as the backend database
which holds all the necessary information such as payment numbers, rates and
infringement notice reference numbers, usernames, passwords and street addresses.
Nevertheless, critical user information such as credit card numbers and expiry dates are
not stored in the database tables.

In addition, users’ data are stored in secured (encrypted) format. However, no further
information about the encrypted details were provided by the council (personal
communications with Council B, 2010). Furthermore, the CoB-Database server
performs both functions which include the CMS and online payment backend database
server functions. The backend database server specifications has been summarised
earlier in the CMS section in Table 5.11.

5.4.1.4 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of Testing stage 1 for Council B’s online payment system are
described in the following sections.
 Risk 1: The online payment system
As mentioned earlier that the council’s online payment system consists of two servers
(the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoB-Database). The CoB-DMZ-Web provides both
frontend and application features. This utilisation can be considered as a source of a
potential risk due to the single point of failure in the case of the CoB-DMZ-Web server
being compromised.

5.4.2 Testing stage 2: The infrastructure of the online web system – Internet
border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews

This second testing stage is made up of the review of the software configuration codes
for the router, switch, firewalls, IDS and IPS devices.
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5.4.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews

Details of the Internet border router specifications were previously discussed in Section
5.3.2.1. Moreover, the examination of the configuration codes from the Internet border
router revealed the risk issue to be a vulnerability to an IP spoofing attack.

5.4.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews

This section covers the data collection, reviews and recommendations for the IDS/IPS
features on the Internet border router and the two CheckPoint firewall UTM-1 272
devices. Several risk issues were uncovered during the review process for these devices
in relation to IDS and IPS in addition to the missing IPS software feature and the
disabled IDS software feature.

5.4.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews

This firewall review section is separated into three groups which cover the static web,
CMS web and online payment systems. More details of the council’s Internet firewalls
specifications are located in Section 5.3.2.3. Appendix B8 shows the summary of the
firewall configuration codes relevant to the online static web system’s servers (the CoBDMZ-Web and the CoB-Web). Examination revealed that only the web administrator
can access the CoB-DMZ-Web server via TCP port 3389 for remote administration
purposes from the designated computer (172.20.20.20/16).

In addition, TCP port 445 MS file sharing protocol allows one-way access from the
CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server. This allows the web administrator to
upload web contents from the CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server. On the
other hand, Appendix B9 shows the summary of the firewall configuration codes with
respect to both the CMS web system servers. Furthermore, the issues that were revealed
were associated with the firewall settings of the online payment system. Appendix B10
displays the full firewall coding details with respect to the council’s online payment
system.
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5.4.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews

As mentioned earlier, Council B has only one switch which provides network
communication and connectivity between the Internet border router, the firewalls, the
DMZ server and the council’s internal network. For more details in terms of the
architecture, the configuration codes, the hardware specifications and identified risk
issues see Section 5.3.2.4. However, details on ports and VLANs, including
connectivity for the council’s online web system are provided in Figure 5.6.

Figure 5.6. The low level online web system network diagram (including the static, the
CMS and the online payment web systems) currently in use by Council B
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5.4.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues

The following section details the identified risk issues for the infrastructure of the online
web system (Internet border router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches) of
Council B.
 Risk 1: Poor ACL coding on the Internet border router
The current ACL rule of the Internet border router allows any IP traffics get in and out
the council’s network. According to best practice recommendations to standard router
configurations, this setting is considered to be opened to cyber attacks such as IP
spoofing and unauthorised network probing.
 Risk 2: No inspection on web (HTTP) network traffic
The incoming and outgoing web (HTTP) network traffic is not inspected (by IPS) which
is a source of possible risks to attack from malware such as worms and Trojans.
 Risk 3: The static web system: inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP outwards
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server access to
anywhere through the HTTP port 80 (see Appendix B8: Policy number 4). This ACL
setting is a source of potential risk in terms of the CoB-DMZ-Web server being used as
a launch pad for staging further attacks.
 Risk 4: The static web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP interdevice
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server access to the
CoB-Web server which is located in the council’s internal network via HTTP port 80
(see Appendix B8: Policy number 5). This can be a cause of potential risks as HTTP
traffic from the DMZ network can directly access the internal network without any
packet inspection.
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 Risk 5: The static web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS outwards
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows both HTTP and HTTPS traffic from the
internal CoB-Web server to the CoB-DMZ-Web server in the DMZ (see Appendix B8:
Policy numbers 6 and 7). As per discussion with the web administrator, these ACL rules
were not required as HTTP and HTTPS traffic should not be permitted in this direction.
 Risk 6:The CMS web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTP inwards
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server which
located in DMZ area access to the internal CoB-Database server via HTTP port 80 (see
Appendix B9: Policy number 5). This is a source of potential risk as HTTP traffic from
the DMZ network is able to access the internal network without any traffic inspection.
 Risk 7: The CMS web system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS inwards
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows the CoB-DMZ-Web server access to the
internal CoB-Database server via HTTPS (see Appendix B9: Policy number 6). This is
a source of potential risk to the internal database server as the HTTPS traffic from the
DMZ network can directly flow to the council’s internal network without any
completed or deep packet inspection.

For example, there exists a potential risk from malware being spread through the
HTTPS traffic if deep packet inspection is not performed (Cisco, 2002; Websense,
2010).
 Risk 8: The online payment system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – HTTPS
outwards
The current ACL setting for the firewall allows HTTPS traffic from the CoB-DMZWeb server access to anywhere (any) (see Appendix B10: Policy number 4). This ACL
setting is a source of potential risks in terms of the web server in the DMZ area being
used as a launch pad for staging further attacks.
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 Risk 9: The online payment system: Inadequate firewall ACL coding – Sqlnet2
The current ACL setting for the firewall permits communications between the CoBDMZ-Web server and the CoB-Database server in both directions (incoming and
outgoing) via Oracle Sqlnet2 protocol (TCP ports: 1521, 1525 and 1526) (see Appendix
B10: Policy numbers 6 and 7). This firewall rule is considered unnecessary due to the
fact that the Oracle database server was decommissioned and is no longer in use having
been replaced with the MS SQL server.

Furthermore, these ACL rules can be a cause of potential risk to the CoB-Database
server via Sqlnet2 protocol ports such as multi-threaded operating system server issues
and disclosure of important information on the CoB-Database server.
 Risk 10: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations
This point has been previously discussed in Section 5.3.2.5.

5.4.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning,
vulnerability testing and results

In this third testing stage similar techniques which were used in Section 5.5.3 of the
email system were used. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning tools were
used for all three testing steps (services and system identification, port scanning and
vulnerability testing) for Council B’s online web system (including the static, the CMS
and the online payment web systems) network scanning.

5.4.3.1 Services and system identification results

The results of the services and system identifications of the three servers which are the
CoB-DMZ-Web (A.B.C.121), the CoB-Web (172.20.130.184) and the CoB-Database
(172.20.130.148) are summarised in Appendices B13, B14 and B15.
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5.4.3.2 Port scanning results

In this port scanning testing section, the techniques used were similar to Section 5.3.3.2
of the email system. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard were utilised to scan Council B’s
online web system servers. Moreover, there were unnecessary TCP and UDP ports
discovered in all three servers (the CoB-DMZ-Web, the CoB-Web and the CoBDatabase). Full details are provided in Appendices B16, B17 and B18.

5.4.3.3 Vulnerability testing results

The techniques that were used in this vulnerability testing phase were similar to Section
5.3.3.3. There are four vulnerability groups which include the high, medium, low and
potential security risks. There were vulnerabilities uncovered on all three servers of the
council’s online systems (the CoB-DMZ-Web, the CoB-Web and the CoB-Database).

5.4.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council B’s online web system are
described as follows.
 Risk 1: System information policy results for all the three servers
The Windows configuration settings of all the three servers of the council’s online web
systems were lacking in some respects in term of services, password and security
auditing policies. This can lead to vulnerabilities to the council’s online web system.
 Risk 2: System patching status results for all the three servers
Testing for this section was done using GFI LANguard and NMAP scanning tools.
There were no missing service packs and patches on the CoB-DMZ-Web server.
However, there were missing service packs and patches on both the CoB-Web and the
CoB-Database servers. These can be a source of potential risks to the council,
particularly the CoB-Database server which holds the council’s client sensitive
information.
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 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on all the three servers
There were 20 TCP and nine UDP opened ports which include unnecessary ports on the
CoB-DMZ-Web server. These unnecessary opened ports can lead to a cause of potential
risks in terms of unauthorised access to the DMZ web server. Table 5.12 presents the
overall opened TCP and UDP ports for all the three servers.

Additionally, Appendices B16, B17 and B18 provide the full details of the overall
opened TCP and UDP service ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations
of the CoB-DMZ-Web, the CoB-Web and the CoB-Database servers respectively.

Table 5.12 Overall opened TCP and UDP service ports of all the three servers

Server names

Opened TCP ports

Opened UDP ports

Comments

CoB-DMZ-Web

20

9

Refer to Appendix B16

CoB-Web

9

9

Refer to Appendix B17

CoB-Database

10

9

Refer to Appendix B18

 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on all the three servers
There were vulnerabilities discovered on the CoB-DMZ-Web server such as the guest
user account having access to application, security and system log files. Table 5.13 lists
the overall vulnerability testing results of the three servers.

The overall vulnerability testing results and the possible mitigation recommendations of
the three servers are summarised in Appendices B19, B20 and B21 respectively.

Table 5.13 Overall vulnerability of the three servers of Council B’s online web systems

Server names

H

M

L

P

Overall vulnerability levels

Comments

CoB-DMZ-Web

1

3

7

2

High (8/10)

Refer to Appendix B19

CoB-Web

1

0

6

1

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix B20

CoB-Database

1

0

4

2

High (9/10)

Refer to Appendix B21
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5.4.4 Testing stage 4: Vendor security: Database security benchmark auditing

This vendor security benchmark auditing stage consists of one testing step which is the
database security benchmark auditing on the council’s backend database server (the
CoB-Database).

5.4.4.1 Database security benchmark results

Similarly to Council A, MS SQL Server 2005 is an online web database application
which is deployed in the council’s backend database server (the CoB-Database). The
Security Configuration Benchmark for MS SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0 January
12th, 2010 from CIS was used in this audit as a prime benchmark auditing tool.

The CIS benchmark auditing tool is categorised into nine groups as previously
described in Section 4.4.4.1. The auditing was carried out on group one to six and group
eight to nine. Group seven (replication) was not audited as there was no replication
implemented in the council’s database system.

5.4.4.2 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues for the configuration of the MS SQL 2005 database on the
council’s backend server are presented as follow.
 Risk 1: Inadequate configuration for the database application of the backend
database server
There were some security issues uncovered from the auditing. These security issues
may lead to possible interruptions to the CoB-Database server. Table 5.14 presents the
overall security issues uncovered from the CoB-Database server based on the eight
category groups.

See Appendices B22, B23, B24, B25, B26, B27, B28 and B29 for full details of all the
results and findings including the possible mitigation recommendations based on the
eight category groups respectively.
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Table 5.14 The overall risks of the eight audited categories of the CoB-Database server

Category no.

Risks
(H)

Risks
(M)

Risks
(L)

Risks
(P)

Comments

1) OS and network specification
configuration

1

3

10

2

Refers to Appendix B22

2) SQL server installation and
patches

0

3

1

0

Refers to Appendix B23

3) SQL server settings

0

2

4

10

Refers to Appendix B24

4) Access controls

0

1

0

0

Refers to Appendix B25

5) Auditing and logging

0

0

0

43

Refers to Appendix B26

6) Backup and disaster recovery
procedures

0

1

1

1

Refers to Appendix B27

7) Replication

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

None

8) Application development best
practices

1

1

0

0

Refers to Appendix B28

9) Surface area configuration tool

0

1

2

1

Refers to Appendix B29

5.4.5 Testing stage 5: The online web system security policy review

There was a general information security policy for online services usage. This general
information security policy covered acceptable and prohibited usages of email, internet,
data confidentiality, logon accounts, passwords and electronic fax. However, there was
no existing related technical policy for the online web system in place at the council
such as a network infrastructure related policy and a data security policy (see Appendix
B30).

5.4.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues
This lack of related online web system security policy can create high risks to the
council’s online web system. Similar to Council A, the cause of these risks could be
characterised as follows:

 Poor communication of risk;
 Possible misdirection or resources; and
 Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor
management/strategic oversight.
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 Risk 1: Poor communication of risk
There was little or no discussion of ICT risk management in the weekly IT operation
staff meetings (personal communications with Council B, 2010). The reasons for the
non existence of risk management discussions was due to the lack of time as the
council’s IT operational team often have ample day to day operation tasks to manage,
and the fact that the council has no ICT risk management plan in place.
 Risk 2: Possible misdirection of resources
As a result of budget constraints in the council’s IT department, there was no budget
allocation for the development of an ICT security related policy, including a specific
technical security policy. The council’s IT department has fully allocated its budget,
mainly to resources and day-to-day operations (personal communications with Council
B, 2010). However, at the end of year 2010, general ICT and specific technical security
policies were discussed due to the recommendations of the IT email and online web
systems reports.

In addition, just before the Christmas 2010, the CoB-DMZ-Web server was hacked into
as a direct consequence of missing patches in the CoB-DMZ-Web server (personal
communications with Council B, 2010). This security break has raised ICT security
awareness among the council’s IT staff.
 Risk 3: Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor
management/strategic oversight
This aspect was due to the fact that some of the council’s IT operational staff lack a
reasonable knowledge of the details of IT security particularly in their area of
responsibility. For example, the web system analyst has a good knowledge of web
programming but little knowledge in web security related issues.

In addition, this research acted upon the concerns of management and staff with regards
to the identified security risks as expounded earlier. The resulting report and
recommendations provided as a result of this research serve to equip management with
a basis for support of these concerns and therefore herald a “call to action” for the
respective councils. The security recommendations serve as a justification for an
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internal review of the respective councils and act as a case for introduction of some
form of policy tightening especially in regards to the online systems. In addition, the
fact that some of the security risks arose as a result of a lack of training and personal
professional development of staff should serve as strong case for future budgetary
allocations in the area of ongoing staff training and up skilling.

5.5 Analysis and discussion

The analysis and discussion on both Council B’s email as well as online web systems
(the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment system) are
detailed in the following sections.

5.5.1 Analysis

The analysis can be separated into two sections for each of the analysis of Council B’s
email and online web systems.

5.5.1.1 Council B’s email system analysis – possible mitigations

The following sections (Testing stages 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) describe the possible mitigation
recommendations for the identified issues of Council B’s email system. Each of the
mitigations described relate to the identified risk issue number.

5.5.1.1.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
In order to mitigate this potential risk of a single point of failure, it is recommended that
Council B deploys an extra dedicated server to only perform a CAS role. This additional
server may be in the form of a VM or a physical server. In addition, the connection
between the CAS and the Mailbox Server should be used with a high-bandwidth and
low-latency connection as per Microsoft TechNet (2009, p. 2) which states that “the
minimum recommended bandwidth is 100 Mbps, but a 1-Gpbs connection should be
considered for enterprise data centres”. Therefore, a gigabit connection is strongly
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recommended. The summary specifications of a new dedicated CAS are provided in
Table 5.15. Figure 5.7 provides details of its architecture including the new CAS.

Additionally, the existing email system does not currently have the Unified Messaging
server role installed. However, in the medium to long term future Council B should
consider combining or replacing it with the council’s current voice mail product
provided its features have been updated and the cost is justified.

Table 5.15 A summary recommendations of the new CAS specifications

Attributes

Details

Email application software

MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1

OS

MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1

Hardware

VMware or equivalent 8 GB RAM, hard disks C: 20 GB, e: 100 GB

MS Exchange 2007 role

CAS

MS Exchange support

MS OWA, MS Outlook Anywhere, MS ActiveSync

TCP/IP protocols

HTTPS, RPC, LDAP

IP network

Different subnet with other email servers (isolate)

Network connection

Gigabit link between Client Access and Mailbox servers

ACL

Permits only allowed or required protocols

Other software

Virus protection software for server

 Risk 2
In order to further minimise and control any other potential risks that may occur, due to
the email server being on the same subnet, it is recommended that the dedicated CAS
may be configured to a different sub-network. In addition, ACL filtering may be
implemented to only allow the required network protocols for communication between
the new CAS and the network. See Figure 5.7 for more details.
 Risk 3
The use of either the certificate or token authentication methods may provide better
mechanism security when compared with the basic authentication method (Luckett et
al., 2008). In case of deploying certificate authentication method, it is recommended
that Council B should ensure that its mobile clients still authenticate with the MS
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ActiveSync protocol. This due to the fact that the “not all mobile devices can use
certificate-based authentication” (Luckett et. al., 2008, p. 531).

Alternatively, implementing token authentication method as an additional layer of
authentication typically requires a third-party authentication solution which comes with
additional costs, time and manpower. Table 5.16 summarises the options and
recommendations for enhancing the client access security methods for Council B.

Figure 5.7. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS
Exchange 2007 (CAS role)
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 Risk 4
It is known that NT LAN Manager (NTLM) provides better security than basic
authentication (Luckett et al., 2008). Therefore, NTLM authentication may be used in
conjunction with the SSL connection.

Furthermore, the current firewall (CheckPoint Firewall-1) needs to be configured in
order to handle NTLM authentication (Microsoft TechNet, 2007b, c). Table 5.16
identifies the MS Outlook Anywhere current authentication methods of Council B and
the enhancement recommendations.

Table 5.16 Overall current and recommendations client access security methods over
SSL for the email system of Council B

Client-to-server
connections

Authentication
options

Council B current
configuration

Recommended authentication
for Council B

MS OWA

Basic/form-based

Form-based

Form-based

MS ActiveSync

Basic/certificate/token

Basic

Certificate or token

MS Outlook
Anywhere

Basic/NTLM

Basic

NTLM

5.5.1.1.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The council may wish to tighten its ACL filtering; this may be achieved by creating
each individual ACL for each individual service usage. Recommended examples for the
email service are shown in Table 5.17.

Table 5.17 Possible examples of the Internet border ACL for the email system

Rules

Protocol
types

From
(source)

To
(destination)

Ports
(service)

Recommendations

Permit

TCP

Any

A.B.C.98-101

SMTP

Yes

Permit

TCP

Any

A.B.C.89

HTTPS

Yes
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 Risk 2
The Cisco IOS IPS software feature on the Internet border router (Cisco 2811) may be
enabled in order to monitor and prevent potential IP spoofing and scanning attacks.
Therefore, the Internet border router will act as a first protection layer for the
Internetwork system of the council. More details are provided in Table 5.18.
 Risk 3
The IPS feature can be added to the two current firewalls (UTM-1 272) to increase its
security. According to Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. (2010, p. 5), IPS
features on CheckPoint firewall UTM-1 270 can perform the following:
 “Network-layer protection blocks attacks such as DoS, port scanning and IP/
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)/TCP-related;
 Application-layer protection blocks attacks such as DNS cache poisoning, FTP
bounce and improper commands; and
 Detection methods signature-based, behavioural and protocol anomaly.”

This added IPS feature may cause both the incoming and outgoing email (SMTP) traffic
to be fully inspected. Consequently, vulnerability to the previously mentioned attacks
will be minimised. In addition, the IPS can inspect other network protocols such as
HTTP. Table 5.18 provides overall details of the identified issues and the
recommendation solutions.

Table 5.18 A summary of the IPS of the council’s internetwork system

Products

Current issues

Recommendations

Descriptions

IPS on the Internet
border router

Disabled

Enable (turn on)

For blocking of any spoofing/scanning
attacks.

IPS on the firewall

Non-existent

Add this optional
feature

For real-time inspection of all required
important network traffic (protocols)
for the purposes of blocking and
preventing any malicious or unwanted
behaviour in real-time.
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 Risk 4
Accessing the two spam blocker appliances from the council’s internal network via
HTTP or Telnet ports should be avoided or prohibited in order to conform to general
best practice recommendations. HTTPS and Secure Shell (SSH) protocols were
recommended to the council as alternatives for secure encrypted remote access
mechanisms to the two spam blocker appliances so that all communications through
these ports is encrypted.

The HTTPS (TCP: 443) and SSH (TCP: 22) ports should both be opened on the
firewalls for accessibility via the web interface as well as command line interface
respectively. Moreover, both HTTPS and SSH services should also be enabled on the
spam blocker appliances.
 Risk 5
Access to anywhere via port HTTP from either of the spam blocker appliances (email
GW1 and GW2) in the council’s DMZ network should be limited or specified in order
to match to best practice recommendations for standard firewall configurations.
 Risk 6
The council may consider deploying third-party solutions such as Cisco IronPort SSeries web security appliance or Websense Content Gateway in order to perform full or
deep inspection on the contents of HTTPS traffic (Cisco, 2002; Websense, 2010).

In addition, other web protocols such as HTTP can also be deeply inspected. Full
scanning of the contents of HTTPS traffic allows the council to identify and stop any
potential malware lurking in the HTTPS traffic. This security measure will increase the
Internet security of the council.

Figure 5.8 illustrates all devices connectivity including the recommended CAS as well
as the third-party solution in a high level network diagram.
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Figure 5.8. An overall recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an
extra MS Exchange 2007 (CAS role) and a third-party stateful device
 Risk 7
With reference to Table 5.19, it is recommended that all the measures that are currently
not implemented or enabled be activated for optimum security in order to protect attacks
against the council’s Ethernet switch.
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Table 5.19 Switch security identified issues and recommendations

Security features

Recommendations

ACL applied to block unwanted devices

To do

Access to the device via HTTP is disabled

To do

Access to the device via Telnet is disabled

To do

Activate Loop protection on all ports

To do

Apply appropriate log server

Satisfactory

Apply appropriate timestamps debug time

Satisfactory

Apply appropriate timestamps log time

Satisfactory

Apply appropriate time zone

Satisfactory

Appropriate SNMP used

To do

Appropriate VLAN used

Satisfactory

Best practice user name and/or password used

To do

Configure appropriate warning banner message

To do

Disable/shutdown unused switch ports

To do

Disable trunking on ports that do not need it

Satisfactory

Enable feature against ARP poisoning attacks

To do

Enable feature against ARP spoofing attacks

To do

Enable port broadcast storm control

To do

Enable port security limits MAC address to a port

To do

Ports connected to identified devices that do not support spanning-tree should
be configured with BPDU filtering

To do

Ports not connected to anything yet should be configured with protection

To do

Set DTP on all ports not being used for trunking

N/A

Set strong password (MD5) for authenticating VTP message

To do

Strong password encryption (MD5) used

To do

TFTP service is disabled

To do

 Risk 8
It is recommended that two additional switches should be deployed as follows:

 The outside area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls and the Internet
border router; and
 The DMZ area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls and the DMZ servers.
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On the other hand, the current switch can be used to connect between the firewall and
the council’s internal network. The new switches recommendations are provided in
Table 5.20. Figure 5.9 illustrates more details on ports, VLAN including its
connectivity.

Table 5.20 New switches hardware and software recommendations

Attributes

Details

Device location

The council’s outside network area

Device type

Cisco Catalyst 3560 switch (3560-12PC)

OS

Cisco IOS version 12.2 or higher

Memory

128 MB

Port

Ethernet 10/100 ports with Power over Ethernet (PoE) and 1 dual-purpose
10/100/1000 and SFP port

Operate at

Layer 2 OSI

Attributes

Details

Device location

The council’s DMZ network area

Device type

Cisco Catalyst 3560 switch (3560G-24TS)

OS

Cisco IOS version 12.2 or higher

Memory

128 MB

Port

24 Ethernet 10/100/1000 ports and 4 SFP-based gigabit Ethernet ports

Operate at

Layer 2 OSI
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Figure 5.9. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council B with
the new recommended switches

5.5.1.1.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The overall system information policy testing results of the council’s email server are
summarised in Tables 5.21 whereas full details of the overall system information policy
testing results and recommendations are provided in Appendix B4.

Table 5.21 Overall system information policy of Council B’s email server

Server name

Password policy

Security audit policy

Comment

Email server

Unsatisfactory

Unsatisfactory

Refer to Appendix B4

172
 Risk 2
Appendix B5 provides the specific details of the missing patches and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the email server.
 Risk 3
As previously discussed, there were 22 opened TCP and eight UDP ports. These opened
ports included unnecessary ports. Table 5.22 presents the total number of recommended
open TCP and UDP ports on the email server.

Table 5.22 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on the
email server

Server name

Recommended open
TCP ports

Recommended open
UDP port

Comment

Email server

7

1

Refer to Appendix B6

 Risk 4
Refer to Appendix B7 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible
mitigation recommendations.

5.5.1.1.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The overall spoofing testing results for the council email server including possible
mitigation recommendations are presented in Table 5.23.
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Table 5.23 The spoofing testing results and recommendations for the email server

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the email server and
sending an email from one
internal address to another
internal address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow mail
relaying

Sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
target email server.

To test external
relaying of the
email server

Unsuccessful (does
not allow relaying)

None

Sending an email from one
internal address to an external
address using the target email
server.

To test internal
relaying of the
email server

Unsuccessful (does
not allow relaying)

None

Sending an email from one
external address to an internal
address using the target email
server.

To test email
relaying of the
email server

Successful (allows
relaying)

Should not allow mail
relaying

 Risk 2
The overall results and mitigation recommendations of both the network interfaces of
the spam blocker appliance 1 (email GW1) are provided in Tables 5.24 and 5.25.

Table 5.24 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW1
(inbound2.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.98)

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
internal address to another
internal address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email GW1

Successful (allows
relaying)

None

Telnet to the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
spam blocker appliance.

To test external
relaying of the
email GW1

Unsuccessful (does
not allow relaying)

Block internal staff from
directly accessing the
device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
internal address to an external
address using the spam
blocker appliance.

To test internal
relaying of the
email GW1

Unsuccessful (does
not allow relaying)

Block internal staff from
directly accessing the
device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet to the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
external address to an internal
address using the spam
blocker appliance.

To test mail
relaying of the
email GW1

Successful (allows
relaying)

None
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Table 5.25 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW1
(outbound2.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.99)

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
internal address to another
internal address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email GW1

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block internal staff from
directly accessing the
device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet to the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
spam blocker appliance.

To test external
relaying of the
email GW1

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block internal staff from
directly accessing the
device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
internal address to an external
address using the spam
blocker appliance.

To test internal
relaying of the
email GW1

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block internal staff from
directly accessing the
device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet to the email GW1 and
sending an email from one
external address to an internal
address using the spam
blocker appliance.

To test mail
relaying of the
email GW1

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block internal staff from
directly accessing the
device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

 Risk 3
The overall spoofing testing results and mitigation recommendations of the spam
blocker appliance 2 (email GW2) are provided in both Tables 5.26 and 5.27.
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Table 5.26 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW2
(inbound.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.100)

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
internal address to another
internal address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email GW2

Successful (allows
relaying)

None

Telnet to the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
spam blocker appliance.

To test external
relaying of the
email GW2

Unsuccessful (does
not allow relaying)

Block the internal staff
from directly accessing
the device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
internal address to an
external address using the
spam blocker appliance.

To test internal
relaying of the
email GW2

Unsuccessful (does
not allow relaying)

Block the internal staff
from directly accessing
the device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet to the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
external address to an
internal address using the
spam blocker server.

To test mail
relaying of the
email GW2

Successful (allows
relaying)

None

Table 5.27 The spoofing testing results and recommendations of the email GW2
(outbound.cob.wa.gov.au: A.B.C.101)

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
internal address to another
internal address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email GW2

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block the internal staff
from directly accessing
the device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet to the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
spam blocker appliance.

To test external
relaying of the
email GW2

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block the internal staff
from directly accessing
the device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet to the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
internal address to an
external address using the
spam blocker appliance.

To test internal
relaying of the
email GW2

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block the internal staff
from directly accessing
the device via Telnet and
SMTP port.

Telnet to the email GW2 and
sending an email from one
external address to an
internal address using the
spam blocker appliance.

To test mail
relaying of the
email GW2

Successful (allows
relaying)

Block the internal staff
from directly accessing
the device via Telnet and
SMTP port.
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 Risk 4
Table 5.28 shows overall results of auditing the Mailbox server role of the council’s
email server including the possible mitigations based on the CIS suggestions.

Table 5.28 The overall results of auditing and recommendations Mailbox server role of
the council’s email server

References

Defaults

Council B

Recommendations

Restrict email deletion retention
1. Private mailbox store 1
2. Public folder database
3. Private mailbox store 2
4. Temp mailbox database
5. Private mailbox store 3

7 (days)

(days)
7
14
7
7
7

7 (days)

Restrict mailbox deletion retention
1. Private mailbox store 1
2. Public folder database
3. Private mailbox store 2
4. Temp mailbox database
5. Private mailbox store 3

30 (days)

(days)
30
30
30
30
30

30 (days)

Restrict deletion of mail or mailboxes until archival
1. Private mailbox store 1
2. Public folder database
3. Private mailbox store 2
4. Temp mailbox database
5. Private mailbox store 3

Unchecked

Mounting of mailbox database at startup
1. Private mailbox store 1
2. Public folder database
3. Private mailbox store 2
4. Temp mailbox database
5. Private mailbox store 3

Unchecked

Ensure mailbox database cannot be overwritten
1. Private mailbox store 1
2. Public folder database
3. Private mailbox store 2
4. Temp mailbox database
5. Private mailbox store 3

Checked

Verify default mailbox storage limits (issue warning
at, prohibit send at, prohibit send and receive at)
1. Private mailbox store 1
3. Private mailbox store 2
4. Temp mailbox database
5. Private mailbox store 3

Custom

Checked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
KB
For 1, 3-5
1572864,
2097152,
2411520

Custom
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Table 5.28 The overall results of auditing and recommendations Mailbox server role of
the council’s email server (continued)

References

Defaults

Council B

Recommendations

Ensure public folder database cannot be overwritten

Checked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Verify default public folder storage limits (issue
warning, prohibit send and receive at (KB)

Custom

1991680KB
10240KB

Custom

Audit public folder client access

Custom

Custom

Custom

Audit public folder administrative access

Custom

Custom

Custom

Verify proper permissions on public folder database

Custom

Custom

Custom

Mounting of public folder database at startup

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Restrict email send size (mailbox identity, mail
contact identity and distribution group identity)

Unlimited
Unlimited
Unlimited

10MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict mail receive size (mail box identity, mail
contact identity and distribution group identity)

Unlimited
Unlimited
Unlimited

10MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict max recipients

5000

Unlimited

2000

Audit mailbox spam bypass settings

False

False

False

AntiSpam updates

Disabled

Disabled

Disabled

Zero out deleted database pages
1. Private mailbox store 1
2. Public folder database
3. Private mailbox store 2
4. Temp mailbox database
5. Private mailbox store 3

False

True
False
False
False
False
False

 Risk 5
Table 5.29 demonstrates overall results of auditing the Hub Transport server role of the
council’s email server including the mitigation recommendations based on the CIS
suggestions.
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Table 5.29 The overall results of auditing and mitigation recommendations Hub
Transport server role of the council’s email server

References

Defaults

Audit DNS lookup servers
1. Default CoB Gold
2. CoB Flourine
3. Client CoB Gold

None

Restrict mail send size (max send size, max message
size)
1. Default CoB Gold
2. CoB Flourine
3. Client CoB Gold

30MB
30MB

Restrict max recipients (max recipients per
message)
1. Default CoB Gold
2. CoB Flourine
3. Client CoB Gold

5000

Restrict mail receive size (max receive size, max
message size, external dsn max message attach size
and internal dsn max message attach size)
1. Default CoB Gold
2. CoB Flourine
3. Client CoB Gold

30MB
30MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict IP range for receive connectors

None

Council B

Recommendations
Custom

Custom
Custom
Custom
MB

10MB
10MB

20, 20
20, 20
20, 20
2000
5000
200
200

20, 20, 10 ,10
20, 20, 10 ,10
20, 20, 10 ,10
None

10MB
10MB
10MB
10MB

Custom

 Risk 6
Table 5.30 shows overall results of auditing CAS role of the council’s email server
including the mitigation recommendations based on the CIS suggestions.

Table 5.30 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of the
council’s email server

References

Defaults

Council B

Recommendations

Remove legacy web applications

Installed

Removed

Removed

Restrict web authentication methods*

See note

See note

See note

Require SSL for web applications

Checked
Unchecked

Checked
Checked

Checked
Checked

Disable web anonymous access

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Enable logging for default website

Checked

Checked

Checked
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Table 5.30 The overall results of auditing and recommendations CAS role of the
council’s email server (continued)

References

Defaults

Council B

Recommendations

Enable policy for MS ActiveSync**

None

See note

See note

Forbid MS ActiveSync NonProvisionable
devices
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Checked

Forbid MS ActiveSync simple device
password
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Checked

Disable MS ActiveSync WSS/UNC access
(windows file shares, sharepoint services)
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Checked
Checked

Require MS ActiveSync password
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Unchecked

Require MS ActiveSync alphanumeric
password
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Unchecked

Require MS ActiveSync minimum
password length
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Checked, 4

Require MS ActiveSync password
expiration
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Unchecked

Restrict MS ActiveSync attachment size
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

Unchecked

Require MS ActiveSync policy refresh
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

None

Restrict MS ActiveSync maximum
password attempts
1. Default
2. Executive Nokia policy

8

Inactive
Inactive

8

Require MS ActiveSync Certificate Based
Authentication

Ignore
Client Certs

Ignore Client Certs

Require Client
Certs

Require MS ActiveSync inactivity lockout
time

Enabled

Enabled

Disabled

Unchecked
Checked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Checked,
Checked
Unchecked,
Unchecked

Unchecked
Unchecked

Checked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Checked
Unchecked
Unchecked
Checked, 8
Unchecked, 3
Unchecked, 3
60
Unchecked
Unchecked
For both 1 & 2
Unchecked,
Unallocated

Unchecked
3MB
24.00:00:00

Unlimited
01:00:00
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Note:
Refers to restrict web authentication methods*
This task is to ensure that unneeded authentication methods for MS Exchange web
applications are disabled. These measures will limit the possibility for unauthorised
clients to access any unneeded services. Refer to CIS (2007, p. 76), MS Exchange 2007
recommendation “for web services and applications that cannot be disabled and
removed from IIS ensure reasonable authentication methods are selected. These include
Autodiscover, Exchange, EWS, Exadmin, Exchweb, MS-Exchange-ActiveSync, OAB,
OWA, Public, and Unified Messaging”. See more detail in Table 5.31.

Table 5.31 The overall results and mitigation recommendations of auditing web
authentication and access control of the council’s email server

Council B

Integrate

Digest

Autodiscover

X

X

Exchange

X

X

Exchange Web Services (EWS)

X

Exadmin

X

X

Exchweb

X

X

MS-Exchange-ActiveSync
Offline Address Book (OAB)

Basic

Passport

X
X

Outlook Web Access (OWA)

X

Public

X

Unified Messaging (UM)

X

Recommendations

Integrate

Autodiscover

X

Exchange

X

Exchange Web Services (EWS)

X

Exadmin

X

Exchweb

X

X

Digest

Basic

X

MS-Exchange-ActiveSync

X*

Offline Address Book (OAB)

X

Outlook Web Access (OWA)

X

Public

X

Unified Messaging (UM)

X

X represents enabled
X* represents only if not using Certificate

X

Passport
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Refers to enable policy for MS ActiveSync**
This task creates and assigns policy for MS ActiveSync service. By enabling and
configuring MS ActiveSync policy may assist to ensure that all corporate (Council B’s)
mobile devices are in line with its policy. This therefore may reduce the potential risks
of the MS Exchange infrastructure in case of a mobile device disappearing (out of sync)
from the network (CIS, 2007).

5.5.1.1.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation
 Risks 1 and 2
A technical policy relating to infrastructure devices (firewall, IDS/IPS, router and
switch) as well as server (email) policies and procedures are recommended and should
be implemented in order to provide better security of the council’s email and related
system.

5.5.1.2 Council B’s online web system analysis – possible mitigations

As previously discussed, Council B’s online web system consists of three sub systems
which are the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment system.
The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues of Council B’s online
web system (all the three sub systems) are depicted in the following sections.
Furthermore, each of the mitigations described relate to the identified risk issue number.

5.5.1.2.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
In the interests of general best practices, it is recommended that both the frontend and
application features should be installed on different servers. The CoB-DMZ-Web server
may still act as the frontend web server, whereas a new additional server should be
installed to function as the application server. The new application server should be
configured using a different subnetwork that is separated from the current frontend web
server (the CoB-DMZ-Web). It should be located inside on the internal network.
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The application of appropriate firewall rules to control the network traffic between both
servers is also advisable in order to reduce any unwanted network traffic as well as
potential risks to the new application server. The recommended application server can
be just a VMware with appropriate Random Access Memory (RAM) and Small
Computer System Interface (SCSI) hard disk spaces. Virus protection software should
also be installed on this new application server to protect against virus and worm
attacks. Table 5.32 summarises the recommended application server specifications.

Table 5.32 A summary of the additional application server specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

Anyname (anyname.cob.wa.gov.au)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0 or 7.0 (preferred)

Other application software

Custom built application and virus protection software

OS

MS Windows 2003 Server service pack 2 or MS Windows 2008
(preferred)

Hardware

VMware C: 20 GB, E: 50 GB Hard Disk Drive (HDD) and virtual
memory 4 GB

IP address

172.20.x.x/16

Additionally, it is recommended that the new application server should be separated
from the backend database server (the CoB-Database). This separation can be done by
placing the new application server on a different subnetwork or a VLAN from the
backend database server. Moreover, appropriate ACLs should be configured to filter or
control network traffic between both the subnets. These measures may prevent or
mitigate any potential network security risks such as viruses, Trojans and DoS attacks
infiltrating the database server from the new application server subnetwork.

5.5.1.2.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
It is recommended that Council B tighten its ACL settings, by creating each individual
ACL for each individual service usage for both the HTTP and HTTPS protocols to only
allow HTTP and HTTPS protocols from any source to the council’s web server
(A.B.C.121). This ACL configuration can restrict any unwanted access protocols as
well as prevent potential risks such as DoS attacks to the web server.
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 Risk 2
The IDS/IPS software feature should be enabled on the Internet border router and a new
IPS feature on the firewall may also be installed in order to inspect both the incoming
and outgoing web network traffic. This can minimise any spoofing, scanning, malware,
worm and DoS attacks from the incoming internetwork traffic.

However, this IPS feature is not capable of inspecting secured web (HTTPS) network
traffic (Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., 2010). Refer to previous discussion on
Section 5.5.1.1.2: Risk 6 for a third-party HTTPS inspection solution.
 Risk 3
The aim of the frontend web server (CoB-DMZ-Web) is to only provide external access
for Council B’s residents. Allowing the frontend web server access to anywhere is
unnecessary and can be a source of potential risk as mentioned earlier. This risk may be
easily mitigated by changing the permit rule’s destination from anywhere (any) which
currently allows access to the DMZ, the internal and the external networks, to only
access the external network (outside).
 Risk 4
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. As per discussion with the web
administrator, this firewall rule was inadvertent and was subsequently removed by the
IT operational staff.
 Risk 5
As per discussion with Council B’s Web administrator, the CoB-Web server is not
required to communicate with the CoB-DMZ-Web server via HTTP or HTTPS.
Consequently, it is advisable to remove both these rules. Figure 5.10 illustrate the
council’s recommended static web system, including the network traffic protocols in a
high level network diagram.
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Figure 5.10. The recommended high level static web system including network traffic
protocols for Council B
 Risk 6
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. As per discussion with the web
administrator of the council, this firewall rule was inadvertent and was subsequently
deleted by the IT operational staff.
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 Risk 7
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. According to the web
administrator, this firewall rule was inadvertent and was subsequently eliminated by the
IT operational staff. Figure 5.11 display the council’s recommended CMS static web
system with network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 5.11. The recommended high level CMS web system with network traffic
protocols for Council B
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 Risk 8
This rule may be enhanced in terms of security by adjusting the destination from
anywhere (any) to outside or, this rule can be restricted to allow the CoB-DMZ-Web
server access only to the external Online Gateway through TCP: HTTPS port
 Risk 9
It was recommended that this rule should be removed. As per discussion with the web
administrator, this firewall rule relating to the Sqlnet2 protocol was inadvertent and was
subsequently removed by the IT operational staff. Figure 5.12 illustrates the
recommended council’s online payment system architecture with an additional
application server including the network traffic protocols.
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Figure 5.12. The recommended high level online payment system with an additional
application server including network traffic protocols for Council B
 Risk 10
In terms of the new switches detail recommendation, see previous discussion in Section
5.5.1.1.2 Risk 8. However, details on ports and VLANs, including possible connectivity
of for the new switch recommendations for the council’s online web system are
provided in Figure 5.13.
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Figure 5.13. The recommended low level online web system network diagram
(including the static, the CMS and the online payment web systems)

5.5.1.2.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
It is recommended to reconfigure the MS Windows password and revise the security
auditing policies on all three council’s online web servers (the CoB-DMZ-Web, the
CoB-Web and the CoB-Database) in order to avoid any potential vulnerability that may
occur. Furthermore, Appendices B11, B12 and B13 provide full details of the overall
system information policy testing results and recommendations of the servers of
Council B’s online web systems.
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 Risk 2
There was one missing service pack and one missing critical patch on the CoB-Web
server whereas the CoB-Database server had two missing service packs. In addition, the
overall system patching testing analysis and the possible mitigation recommendations
for the CoB-Web and the CoB-Database servers are presented in Appendices B14 and
B15 respectively.s
 Risk 3
Table 5.33 presents the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on all
the council’s online payment servers.

Table 5.33 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on all
Council B’s online web servers

Server names

Recommended open
TCP ports

Recommended open
UDP ports

Comments

CoB-DMZ-Web

3

2

Refer to Appendix B16

CoB-Web

4

2

Refer to Appendix B17

CoB-Database

5

3

Refer to Appendix B18

 Risk 4
Refer to Appendices B19, B20 and B21 for full details of the identified risk issues and
the possible mitigation recommendations.

5.5.1.2.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
See Appendices B22, B23, B24, B25, B26, B27, B28 and B29 for full details of all the
results and findings including the possible mitigation recommendations based on the
eight category groups respectively.

190
5.5.1.2.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation
 Risks 1, 2 and 3
As per general best practice recommendations, Council B may consider implementing
general information security as well as related online technical policies and procedures
such as web server, database server and infrastructure (firewall, IDS/IPS, router and
switch) policies and procedures. The use of new and stringent technical policies and
procedures will enhance the security of the council’s online web system.

5.5.2 Discussion

The research activities conducted on Council B discovered that both the email and the
online web system (the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment
system) did not meet either the national or the industry standards in terms of best
practices. This can be a cause of potential risk of attacks to the council’s email system,
online web system as well as related ICT systems. Nevertheless, the mitigation
recommendations have been presented in the analysis section of this thesis.

Similar to the results of Council A, both the recommended frameworks of email and
online web systems can be utilised in order to audit any IT security systems with similar
environments. See Chapter 8: Section 8.3 for examples and details of how to adapt the
frameworks to similar environments.

There were seven main factors were found which can lead to the causes of potential
risks in Council B’s email and online web systems similar to Council A.

These factors include the lack of CIS and MS’s IT security standards awareness,
inadequate domain or service specific knowledge, inefficient communication between,
limited IT training as a result of restricted training budget, insufficient time for task
completion and reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects. These factors
pose risks which may lead to interruption to both the email and online web systems
services.
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In addition, this may cause the council to lose its creditability. Full details of these
factors are described in the following paragraphs.

Firstly, the lack of IT security standards awareness was examined. An audit which
included several discussions with Council B’s network and web administrators as well
as testing analyses, was carried out over a period of several months. This investigation
revealed a number of potential risks due to the lack of security awareness.

For example, both the email and online web systems’ architectures were not following
the IT security industry best practices. The email server architecture was also not in
conformity to the MS Exchange 2007 architecture recommendation. Furthermore, there
is currently no IT security policy pertaining to the email and online web systems used in
Council B. Moreover, the architecture of the online payment system for Council B did
not follow the good design recommendations of a multi-tiered (3) client-server
architecture by Microsoft (Microsoft Corporation, 2010).

In addition, the interviews revealed that limited IT security standards of best practice
were applied during the implementation on both the email and online web systems,
according to the network and the web administrators. Table 5.34 summarises the
findings related to the lack of IT security standards or industrial best practices by the
staff of Council B.

Table 5.34 The summary of the issues uncovered related to the lack of IT security
standards awareness by the IT staff

Results related to lack of IT security standards awareness by IT staff of the council

Council B

Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed

No

IDS/IPS deployed and currently in use

No

Standalone external gateway switch deployed

No

Standalone DMZ switch deployed

No

Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007 recommendations
to best practices

No

Design of the online payment system conforming to recommendations of a multi-tiered
client-server architecture

No
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Secondly, the inadequate domain or service specific knowledge was outlined. This was
evident from incorrect and inadequate configuration of the Internet border router’s
ACL, the DMZ switch’s codes, the firewall rules, the unnecessary ports and the services
installed on the email and online payment servers.

In addition, both the network and the web administrators were not formally trained in
firewall and web security respectively (personal communications with Council B,
2010). Instead, they have kept abreast with technology through self-instruction mainly
done after-hours. Consequently, there was a slow uptake and reduced enthusiasm by the
IT operational staff to embrace new developments in firewall and web security. See the
following table for more details.

Table 5.35 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific
knowledge

Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff
of the council

Council B

Firewall configuration related to the email and online web systems

Insufficient

Switch configuration related to the email and online web systems

Insufficient

Setup and configuration of the email server application (MS Exchange 2007)

Incorrect

Setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL Server 2005)

Incorrect

Application of updated software patches on the email server

No

Application of updated software patches on the online web server

No

Application of updated software patches on the CMS server

No

Application of updated software patches on the online payment server

No

Internal email spoofing allowed

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online web server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the CMS server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the CMS server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server

Yes
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Thirdly, the inefficient communication was highlighted. It was apparent that there were
incorrect configurations of the firewall for both the DMZ web server and the backend
database server, such as wrong port numbers, as a result of verbal communication.

In addition, the lack of a change management process as well as IT recording auditing
system may contribute to the inefficient communication between the IT operational
staff. The use of a change management process will assist the council’s IT manager and
staff to manage, plan and track their system more efficiently.

Furthermore, a simple IT record auditing system such as a firewall log book would also
helpful to the IT operational staff in terms of recording, reviewing and reporting.
Additionally, the council has a total of 14 staff in its IT team which is further divided
into separate groups such as the network and system administrations team, the web
development team, the helpdesk team, the GIS and business software operation team
and the IT management team. As a result, inter-staff communication may also be
lacking due to poor interaction between the groups. Table 5.36 summarises the issues
uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication between the council’s IT
operational staff.

Table 5.36 The summary of results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient
communication between the IT operational staff

Results uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication between
the IT operational staff

Council B

Existence of change management procedures

No

Availability of simple specific technical log books

No

Updated documentation of the IT email system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system related

No

Fourthly, the limited IT training as a result of a restricted training budget was examined.
There is a restricted IT training budget allocated by the council according to the IT
managerial staff. This problem of specific training may be alleviated in the future
should more money be allocated towards a training budget by the council. See details in
Table 5.37.
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Table 5.37 The summary results related to the limited IT training as a result of limited
training budget

Issues uncovered in relation to the limited IT training budget

Council B

Formal industry or equivalent firewall training of the IT operational staff

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of the email application (MS Exchange 2007) of
the IT operational staff

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL Server 2005 or
equivalent) of the IT operational staff.

No

Formal IT Security training of the IT operational staff

No

IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational staff member

Partly

Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff

Yes

Fifthly, the matter of insufficient time for task completion was looked at. The 14 IT
staff of Council B have to manage a daily routine covering a wide range of tasks in all
areas including GIS, library, email, online payment, online website system, CMS,
property management, communication and telephony systems.

As a consequence, some tasks are perpetually left incomplete which in turn exacerbates
the problem of limited time for individual study or research. In addition, there is no time
left for documentation. Table 5.38 summarised the insufficient time for task completion
by the council IT operational staff.

Table 5.38 Results uncovered related to the insufficient time for task completion

Issues uncovered in relation to the insufficient time for task completion

Council B

The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task simultaneously

Yes

Use of enterprise information security policy

No

Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy

No

Updated documentation of the IT email system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – static web system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – CMS web system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – online payment system

No
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Sixthly, the factor of the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects was
analysed. The council’s practice and reliance of outsourcing to solve the expertise
problem has the disadvantage of a lack of knowledge transfer.

For example, there was no proper documentation that the firewall project was handed
over to the council’s IT operational staff apart from the notification of a simple ACL
configuration rule (personal communications with Council B, 2010). This lack of
handover procedures indicates poor contract management dealings with outsourcers.
See Table 5.39 for more details.

Table 5.39 Summary of issues uncovered relating to the reliance on external consultants
for specific IT projects

Issues in relation to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects

Council B

Implementation of the email spam blocker appliances by external consultants

Yes

Appropriate documentation for the email spam blocker appliances installation and
management provided by the external consultants

Partly

Implementation of the firewall system by external consultants

Yes

Appropriate documentation for the firewall installation and management provided by
the external consultants

No

Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external consultants

Yes

Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation and
management provided by the external consultants

No

Finally, there was no valid testing environment in place at Council B. Council B’s IT
department has a testing VM server for pilot testing different kinds of servers. However,
the council’s IT department has no testing environment for network communication
system.

Having both servers and network testing environments would provide enormous
benefits to the council such as minimising potential risks, flexibility and opportunity to
gain better understanding of the new system. The following table demonstrates more
details of the summary of issues uncovered related to the lack of a valid testing
environment.
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Table 5.40 Summary results uncovered related to no valid testing environment on place
at the council

Summary results related to the lack of a valid testing environment

Council B

Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure

No

Existence of a testing environment for the email system

No

Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – static web system

No

Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – CMS web system

No

Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – online payment system

Partly
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CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS: A
CASE STUDY OF COUNCIL C

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the results and findings as uncovered from
the examination of email and online web systems at Council C. The chapter is
comprised of five subsections, including (1) background information; (2) methodology;
(3) Council’s C email system results; (4) Council’s C online web system results; and (5)
analysis and discussion.

6.1 Background information

Council C is a WA local government council which has its own IT section. The IT
section provides IT support and services to the staff and residential clients of the
council. These IT services cover a range of services including GIS, library, email,
online web information and online payment systems, similar to Councils A and B.
Council C’s network infrastructure uses Ethernet network technology which currently
connects its central and remote sites together in a star topology configuration. Council C
connects to the outside world or the Internet via a leased fibre optic connection through
an ISP. In addition, all the council’s remote sites are interconnected to the council’s
central site via fibre optic, DSL and ADSL connections. Furthermore, the council owns
licensed wireless connections which provide connectivity between the council’s central
site and the two associated libraries.

Similar to both Councils A and B’s email systems, Council C also deploys MS
Exchange Server 2007 as the prime email server software whereas the email client
software uses MS Outlook 2007. This email system provides both traditional email and
webmail features to its staff. The email server serves over 900 mailboxes and over 500
staff (personal communications with Council C, 2010).

In terms of the online web system, both Councils B and C’s online web systems have
their similarity in terms of the general static web, the CMS and the online payment
systems. Council C’s online web system provides both online general information and
payment services to its residents.
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Although both the email and online web systems are managed in-house by the council’s
IT staff, Council C does resort to external outsourcing in the case of unsolved problems
or when implementing advanced ICT projects.

Ideally, advanced ICT projects would require advanced ICT technical skills to create,
implement or deploy. The followings are some typically advanced ICT projects, but not
limited to:
 Installation and/or upgrade of core switching and routing network system;
 Deployment of new redundancy firewall systems;
 Deployment or upgrade of Voice over IP systems;
 Deployment of fully secure wireless LAN systems;
 Upgrade of database and financial systems;
 Implementation of online payment systems;
 Deployment of Storage Area Network (SAN) systems; and
 Implementation of internet GIS mapping system (personal communications with
Council C, 2008, 2009).

6.2 Methodology

This subsection aims to depict the overall methodology used in this research. It consists
of pre-interview consultation, document review, interview investigation, existing
architecture discovery, email system testing and online web system testing.

6.2.1 Pre-interview consultation

Council C’s pre-interview consultation is similar to both the pre-interview consultation
of Councils A and B. However, the participants of the initial open-ended meetings were
the council’s IT manager, the system administrator and the network administrator.

The overall risk analysis was discussed and it was agreed that the analysis was to be
done in stages in order to minimise any potential risks or interruptions to the council’s
real-time Internet infrastructure, including the email and online web systems.
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The time frame was set to five months for both the report deliverables which was the
same time frame agreed upon by both Councils A and B.

In addition, the ethics and contract agreements were signed in the second meeting and
the contents of the contract agreements were the same as for Councils A and B. For
example, the project was to be done at no cost to the council with the two reports as
deliverables as well as the provision for the council to discontinue the project at any
time of its choosing.

6.2.2 Document review

The hardware and software specifications relating to both the council’s email and online
web systems documents were collected including specifications and records of
configuration codes of the DMZ switch, the firewalls, the email server, the reverse
proxy server, the static web server, the application server and the backend database
server. In addition, a copy of the DMZ internetwork diagram was collected. However,
there was no need for details of the Internet border router and IDS/IPS devices as both
these devices were not deployed in the council’s internetwork system.

From the interviews conducted with the IT manager and the system administrator, there
was no ICT technical security policy on either the email or the online web systems in
use, apart from an acceptable use of computing and communications facilities policy.

6.2.3 Interview investigation

Several interviews were carried out with the two main stakeholders as follows:

 The council’s IT manager; and
 The council’s IT Staff (the network and system administrators).

The purpose of the face-to-face interview and discussion with the council’s IT manager
was to obtain a general overview of the council’s ICT computer and network system, in
particular the council’s email and online web systems. In addition, the specific project
deliverables were discussed such as overall ICT system documentation, risk analysis
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and feasible mitigation techniques of both the email and online web systems. Several
interview techniques including face-to-face, telephone and email were used during the
ongoing testing analysis interviews between the researcher, the network administrator
and the system administrator. The interviews conducted with the network administrator
were related to the council’s network connectivity including the firewalls and the
switches.

Furthermore, other related information such as the ACL configuration codes, the AD
and the DNS were procured at this time. There were also a number of testing analysis
interviews conducted with the system administrator that related to the configurations of
the firewalls, the reverse proxy server, the email server, the backend database server, the
CMS server, the static web server and the application server.

6.2.4 Existing architecture discovery

The existing architecture discovery of the email and online web systems of Council C is
covered in this section in detail.

6.2.4.1 The existing email system architecture of Council C

The council’s email system consists mainly of one Exchange 2007 VMware server, and
one reverse proxy server. The email server is located in Council C’s internal network
whereas the reverse proxy server is situated in the DMZ area. Both devices are
interconnected via the council’s internetwork infrastructure. The infrastructure has two
firewalls and one core switch as its component devices. The switch also provides
internal network connectivity for Council C’s network devices. In addition, only SMTP
and HTTPS are allowed for email and webmail purposes similar to both Councils A and
B. Furthermore, Council C uses 128-bit encryption with standard vailidation SSL
certificate for thier webmail system (Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c).

In terms of the email system, the reverse proxy server communicates with the email
Exchange server via HTTPS whereas the domain controller (10.1.1.210) server
communicates via LDAP, radius and DNS ports. This communication mechanism
allows the reverse proxy server to obtain email details and publish the associated
webmail to the email users of Council C. More details are provided in Section 6.5.3 on
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firewall rules and network port numbers. The mail exchanger record (MX record) of
Council C is mail.coc.wa.gov.au and its corresponding Internet address is A.B.D.37.
Figure 6.1 portrays all the devices connectivity, communication protocols and allowed
email network traffic and related protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 6.1. A current high level network diagram with allowed email network traffic
and related protocols for the email system of Council C

6.2.4.2 The existing online web system’s architecture of Council C

Council C’s online web system provides the community services for the council’s
general information such as rates, libraries, events, facilities and jobs. At the time of the
auditing, this online payment system was also used to provide online payment services
to its residents for paying their rates, infringements and/or dog registrations.
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The architecture of Council C’s online web system can be categorised into three groups,
namely the static web, the CMS web and the online payment systems.

6.2.4.2.1 The existing static web system architecture

The static web system has one web server (the CoC-DMZ-Web server) which is located
in the council’s DMZ network. The CoC-DMZ-Web server provides both
simple/standard static and form based webpages. There were several UTP, TCP and IP
network protocols that were being used for the static web system. Figure 6.2 depicts the
council’s current architecture on the static web system including the network traffic
protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 6.2. The high level static web system including network traffic protocols
currently in use by Council C
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6.2.4.2.2 The existing CMS web system architecture

The CMS web system (the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers) provide
simple/standard static and form based webpages. The CoC-DMZ-CMS server is located
in the DMZ area in order to minimise any potential risks which may arise from attackers
to Council C’s CMS web system. On the other hand, the CoC-CMS server is located in
the council’s internal network.

Figure 6.3 illustrates Council C’s current architecture on the CMS web server system
including the network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 6.3. The high level CMS web system with network traffic protocols currently in
use by Council C
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Both the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers interact with each other as part of
a WCMS. The CoC-CMS server allows the council’s IT operational staff to manage and
update webpages information, before pushing the validated webpages from the CoCCMS to the CoC-DMZ-CMS servers.

In addition, this connectivity provides better security as there is no direct connection
between the client and the backend CMS server. The council’s residents are able to
access the CoC-DMZ-CMS server via http://www.coc.wa.gov.au to view or search for
general information of the council

6.2.4.2.3 The existing online payment system architecture

Council C’s current online payment system is multi-tiered (3-tier) client-server
architecture. It consists mainly of the frontend web (Epathweb), the application
(Epathway) and the backend database (Pathway) servers. The Epathweb and Epathway
servers perform all of the application logic whereas the Pathway server performs the
data logic.

In addition, the external gateway security payment service (Commweb01) is used by the
council to provide secure payments such as rates and infringements for its residents.
Council C’s online payment system communicates with the external gateway security
payment service via a HTTPS connection.

Furthermore, the SSL protocol is used to provide an encrypted communication channel
between the client’s web browser and the council’s online payment system. Council C
uses 128-bit encryption with extended validation SSL certificate (Limwiriyakul & Valli,
2011c). This method ensures secured private communications over the public Internet
as well as it gives “high security web browsers information to clearly identify”
(VeriSign Authentication Services, n.d., p. 1) the council website identity
(Limwiriyakul & Valli, 2011c).

Figure 6.4 demonstrates the council’s current online payment system architecture
including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.
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Figure 6.4. The high level diagram of the online payment system including network
traffic protocols currently in use by Council C

6.2.5 Email system testing

Similar to both Councils A and B, the email system testing analysis consisted of five
stages which are summarised as follows:

 Network surveying of Council C’s email system, network architecture and
network architecture recommendations;
 Auditing and reviewing the configuration codes of firewalls, switch and reverse
proxy devices;
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the
email server;
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 Email spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark auditing on the email
server; and
 Email system security policy review.

6.2.6 Online web system testing

The online web system testing analysis had five stages similar to Councils A and B, as
follows:

 Network surveying, which included the current Council C’s online web system’s
network architecture, identified risks and mitigation recommendations;
 Auditing, configuration codes review, identified risks and mitigation
recommendations of the IDS/IPS, the firewalls and the switch devices related to
Council C’s online web system;
 Services and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testing of the
council’s online web system’s servers;
 Vendor security benchmark auditing on the online payment database server; and
 Online web system security policy review.

6.3 Council C’s email system results

The review and testing results for the device configurations, the exposed vulnerabilities
of all the email system servers, the email spoofing, the vendor security benchmark and
the security policy for Council C are described in the following sections.

6.3.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying

This first testing stage consisted of network surveying that collected information on the
email system including the email server, the external spam blocker appliance, and the
current

Exchange

email

architecture

and

followed

by

the

corresponding

recommendations (same as Chapters 4 and 5). Information for the following
components of Council C’s email system was collected:
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 Overall network diagram for Internet link, internal and DMZ infrastructure
connectivity including the email system;
 The council’s mail exchanger record (MX record);
 The firewall devices specification and related email configuration codes;
 The internal/DMZ switch specification and configuration codes;
 The council’s reverse proxy and email servers specification summary; and
 The external spam blocker appliance to the council’s specification summary.

6.3.1.1 The email system devices

Council C’s email system consists of three specific devices. This includes the MS
Exchange 2007 email server, the external spam blocker appliance and the reverse proxy
server.

6.3.1.1.1 The email server

Current application software of the email server has MS Exchange Server 2007 with
service pack 1 installed. The email server’s operating software is running on MS
Windows Server 2008 with service pack 1. Similar to both the email servers of Councils
A and B, the current configuration of Council C’s email server is configured as a singleserver architecture in which two of the Exchange 2007 feature roles are not included
which are the Edge Transport and the Unified Messaging server roles.

This was due to the fact that Council C uses the external spam filtering service and the
Nortel PBX digital telephony systems. Both these systems perform the same
functionality as the Edge Transport and the Unified Messaging server roles respectively.
Summary details are presented in the Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 A summary of the email server specifications

Attributes

Details

Email application software

MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1

Email scanning software

Sophos Anti-Virus

OS

MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1

Hardware

VMware server

IP address

10.1.15.154, 255.0.0.0

MS Exchange 2007 roles

Mailbox, Hub Transport, CAS combined

Email service protocols

SMTP and HTTPS

Other software

None

6.3.1.1.2 The spam blocker appliance

Webroot services is an external IT company which currently provides Internet filtering
(email spam and web traffic) to Council C. Incoming SMTP email traffic is directly
forwarded to Webroot services first, in order to remove viruses and block unwanted
spam emails. Thereafter, only the desired email traffic is redirected to Council C’s email
server.

On the other hand, outgoing email traffic first arrives at the MS Exchange Server 2007,
which then acts as a SMTP mail relay connector server. It forwards the email traffic to
Webroot services which inspects and cleans any potential spam, prior to delivery of the
emails to the recipients. The purpose of the external spam blocker appliance is to filter
all incoming and outgoing SMTP emails to block malware, spyware and spam emails.
More details for the external spam blocker appliance in terms of its current connectivity
were provided in the high level network architecture diagram in Figure 6.1.

6.3.1.1.3 The reverse proxy server

Currently, there is a physical server which runs MS ISA 2006 which is being used as a
reverse proxy server and is located in Council C’s DMZ internetwork. The purpose of
the reverse proxy server is that it is used as an intermediary by the council’s Internet
users who want to access the council’s internal web database and webmail by sending
its requests indirectly. In addition, the use of the reverse proxy server increases the
security strength of the council’s internal network.
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Furthermore, in terms of the council’s email system, both the reverse proxy and the MS
Exchange (2007) servers communicate securely via TCP port 443 (HTTPS) in a serverto-server communication. The reverse proxy server is configured to publish a
combination of popular methods including MS OWA, MS Exchange ActiveSync and
MS Outlook Anywhere. Summary details of the reverse proxy server are provided in
Table 6.2. Details of its current connectivity were provided in Figure 6.4.

Table 6.2 A summary of the MS ISA server specifications

Attributes

Details

Proxy application software

MS ISA 2006 standard version

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with service pack 2

Hardware

HP 360 Generation 6

IP address

A.B.C.183 255.255.255.240

Interface

2 x Gigabit Ethernet (team)

MS Exchange 2007 roles

MS OWA, MS Exchange ActiveSync and MS Outlook Anywhere

Email service protocol

HTTPS

Other software

IIS version 7.0

6.3.1.2 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues

The following sections explain the identified risk issues for the council’s email system.
 Risk 1: Single point of failure
The existing email architecture of Council C is made up of a simple single-server
architecture similar to both Councils A and B. Council C’s email system was considered
to be a medium-sized deployment which may pose the potential risk of a single point of
failure as the current system has only one email server.

The other potential risks to the email server are in the form of virus and malware
attacks, which may allow attackers to steal the email credentials of the council’s staff or
interrupt the email services of the council.
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 Risk 2: Same subnetwork
The current email server is located in the same subnetwork as the other important
servers of the council such as the application, file and database servers. This
configuration may cause a potential risk to the other important servers in the event of
the email server getting compromised due to the fact that there was no filtering
mechanism in place to separate network traffic between the email and other servers.
 Risk 3: MS ActiveSync – Authentication
The current email configuration for MS ActiveSync authentication was the same as the
email system of Council B. Council C currently uses a basic authentication method
together with a SSL connection.

In comparison to both certificate and token form authentication methods, basic
authentication is considered as the simplest authentication method (Luckett et al., 2008).
This is due to the fact that the passwords in basic authentication are sent in clear text or
plain text format which may expose them to sniffing or eavesdropping attacks.
 Risk 4: MS Outlook Anywhere – Authentication
Currently, Council C’s email system supports MS Outlook Anywhere with basic
authentication via SSL connection to its staff. The basic authentication is considered to
provide the lowest security as compared to the other authentication option (NTLM)
(Luckett et al., 2008).

6.3.2 Testing stage 2: The email system’s infrastructure – Internet border router,
IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews
This second stage can be separated into a data collection and review of Internet border
router, IDS/IPS, firewall and switch reviews of the council’s email infrastructure.
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6.3.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews

Typically, an Internet border router acts as a gateway that permits the council’s network
to be able to communicate with the outside world. It forwards or routes the network
traffics or protocols which serves the council’s network services. However, Council C
connects its internetwork directly via its firewall, which means that there is no existing
Internet border router being deployed.

6.3.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews

The existing firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances) have an annual licensed
IPS engine and are available with an add-on feature called Juniper Networks Deep
Inspection Firewall Signature Packs. This IPS engine provides deep inspection of the
council’s internetwork including protocol anomaly detection, stateful protocol
signatures, IPS/Deep Inspection or DI attack pattern obfuscation and nightly updates of
attack signatures (Juniper Networks, 2009).

6.3.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews

In the council’s internetwork, the two firewalls act as a main filter for all incoming and
outgoing network traffic. Furthermore, they perform NAT, Port Address Translation
(PAT) as well as IPS functions. However, both the firewalls do not provide antivirus
and antispam checking as both these antivirus and antispam features require additional
annual licenses.

Nevertheless, both these features may not be required to be performed by the firewalls
as the council uses the Sophos antivirus software to protect against virus attacks.
However, one of the firewalls operates in the active mode and the other operates in a
standby mode. More details of the firewall’s connectivity are provided in Figure 6.5.
Table 6.3 summarises the brief specifications of both the firewalls.

In addition, Appendix C1 shows the summary of the firewall codes with respect to the
NAT/PAT of the council’s email system. On the other hand, Appendix C2 shows the
summary of the firewall codes with respect to Council C’s email system.
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Table 6.3 A summary of the firewalls specifications

Attributes

Details

Device type

Juniper firewall x 2

OS/model

SSG-350M series

Memory

256 MB (based memory)

Interfaces (fixed I/O)

4x10/100/1000

Physical Interface Module
(PIM) Slots

5

Wide Area Network (WAN)
interface options (PIMS)

Serial, T1, E1, ADSL/ADSL2/ADSL2+, G.SHDSL

LAN interface options (uPIMS)

8x10/100/1000, 16x10/100/1000, and 6xSFP

6.3.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews

Council C’s network is considered as an Ethernet network environment. The council has
only one switch, which provides network communication and connectivity between the
firewalls, the DMZ servers and the council’s internal network. It is also a core switch,
which interconnects all of Council C’s Intermediate Distribution Frames (IDFs) and
servers.

The current overall hardware and software details of the core switch are depicted in
Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 The email system – current switch hardware and software details

Attributes

Details

Device name

C60175 (CoC-Core-Switch)

Device type

HP E5412 zl switch chassis (J8698A)

OS

K.14.41

Memory

256 MB

Switch port

12 open module slots; 1 RS-232C DB-9 console port; Supports a
maximum of 48 10-GbE ports or 288 10/100/1000 ports or 288
mini-GBICs, or a combination

Operate at

Layer 2/3 OSI

VLANs

1, 2, 3, 10, 15, 17-19, 24-26, 29, 60, 80, 82, 100, 110-117, 200
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Furthermore, details on ports and VLANs including its connectivity of the council’s
email system are presented in Figure 6.5.

Figure 6.5. A current low level network diagram of the email system for Council C

6.3.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues for Council C’s email infrastructure system are detailed in the
following sections.
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 Risk 1: No Internet border router in place
As mentioned earlier, there was no existing Internet border router deployed within the
council’s internetwork system. A missing Internet border router means that the
council’s internetwork system has only one layer of protection against any outside
intrusion attacks such as spoofing and DoS.

The council used two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances) to provide
several features such as routing, VPN, filtering and inspecting incoming and outgoing
network traffic for the council’s internetwork system. This arrangement can be
considered as a single point of failure for the several tasks that the firewalls serve.
 Risk 2: No IDS/IPS on the Internet border router
As previously described, there was no Internet border router deployed at Council C. The
future deployment of an Internet border router with IDS/IPS feature can provide a first
layer of defence against intrusion attacks such as spoofing and scanning.
 Risk 3: Unnecessary ACL rule
The firewall rule (see Appendix C1: Policy number 2) allows anyone to access the
email server via the SMTP port. This accessibility to the email server is a potential risk
to the email system of Council C, as unauthorised persons can potentially access the
email server.
 Risk 4: Not in use ACL rule
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C2: Policy number 5) translates the internal
server (10.1.1.3) to the Exchange_gate2 name.
 Risk 5: Duplicated ACL rule
There are duplicated firewall policy rules (see Appendix C2: Policy numbers 14 and
15).
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 Risk 6: Duplicated ACL rule
The current firewall rules allow anyone from the council’s internal network to access
the firewall via several methods including HTTPS, SSH, console and Telnet ports.
 Risk 7: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations
On the current Council C’s core switch (HP C60175), there were some inadequate
switch code security configurations, which may lead to potential security risks such as
ARP spoofing, ARP poisoning and sniffing attacks.
 Risk 8: Single point of failure
Connectivity between the council’s outside (external), the DMZ and the inside (internal)
networks were served by only one core switch which can be considered as a single point
of failure. In case of the core switch failure, serious interruptions may be caused to the
council’s core network, which includes downtime to the council’s staff as well as the
online systems to its residents.

6.3.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning,
vulnerability testing and results

Similar to testing steps conducted at Councils A and B, both NMAP and GFI LANguard
network scanning tools were used to obtain information such as TCP, UDP ports,
vulnerabilities, patches, services, software and hardware from the email system. NMAP
with GUI standard (open source Zenmap version 5.0) for MS Windows XP version was
run with slow comprehensive scan option.

On the other hand, GFI LANguard version 9.0 with full scan option was also utilised.
Running intense comprehensive as well as full scan options on both the applications
will maximise the collection of information
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6.3.3.1 Services and system identification results

Appendices C3 and C4 summarise the results of the services and system identifications
including system information and system patching status results for Council C’s email
server (MS Exchange 2007). However, the researcher did not test against the reverse
proxy server (ISA01) as per recommendation of the system administrator in order to
minimise any potential downtime which may have occurred due to the fact that the
ISA01 server provides services to a wide range of Council C’s computer systems.

6.3.3.2 Port scanning results

Similar techniques as carried out in Councils A and B were used for this purpose, in that
both NMAP and GFI LANguard were used for port scanning on the email server. There
was no unnecessarily opened UDP port found on the email server. However, there were
some unnecessarily opened TCP ports found. Full details of the overall opened TCP and
UDP ports are provided in Appendix C5.

6.3.3.3 Vulnerability testing results

In this testing stage, the vulnerability was categorised into four groups, which are high
(H), medium (M), low (L) and potential (P) security vulnerabilities similar to Councils
A and B. The vulnerability analysis was successfully conducted on the email server.
Full details of the vulnerability testing results are provided in Appendix C6.

6.3.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for the council’s email system are described
as follows.
 Risk 1: System information policy results for the email server
The system information policy guidelines were not adhered to in parts, which can lead
to a potential risk to the email server of Council C. The policy security measures not
followed were the password, security auditing and services policies.
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 Risk 2: System patching status results for the email server
Both GFI LANguard and NMAP scanning tools were used to conduct the testing
analysis of Council C’s email server. There was one missing service pack and two
missing patches which may create a security vulnerability to the council’s email server.
See Appendix C4 for full details.
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on the email server
It was found that there were 24 opened TCP ports which include the unnecessarily
opened ports identified on the email server. Some of these opened TCP ports can be a
source of potential security risks to the email server.

See Table 6.5 for more a total numbers of opened TCP and UDP ports of the council’s
email server. Furthermore, Appendix C5 provides full details of the overall opened TCP
and UDP ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations.

Table 6.5 List of the number of open TCP and UDP ports on the email server

Server name

Opened TCP ports

Opened UDP port

Comment

Email server

24

1

Refer to Appendix C5

 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on the email server
There were nine low and two potential risk category issues uncovered on the email
server. For example, there were unnecessary TCP ports left opened such as POP3 and
IMAP4 which may pose potential risks to the email server of the council.

Table 6.6 presents the total number of vulnerabilities found on the council’s email
server. See Appendix C6 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible
mitigation recommendations.

Table 6.6 The overall of Council C’s email server – vulnerabilities

Server name

H

M

L

P

Overall vulnerability level

Comment

Email server

0

0

9

2

Medium (5/10)

Refer to Appendix C6
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6.3.4 Testing stage 4: Spoofing testing and vendor security benchmark email server
auditing

Two testing steps were undertaken; the email system spoofing testing and specific
vendor security benchmark auditing of the MS Exchange 2007 on the council’s email
server are included in this stage.

6.3.4.1 Email system spoofing testing results

Both the OSSTMM and CIS templates were successfully used for the email system
spoofing testing and specific vendor security benchmark auditing (MS Exchange 2007)
respectively on Council C’s email server. A number of identified risk issues were
uncovered on the email server.

In addition, egression testing similar to Councils A and B was successfully carried out
on the email system of Council C. The egression testing result and recommendation is
detailed in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7 Test egression result and recommendation – Council C’s email server

Testing technique

Purpose

Result

Recommendation

Sending an email from one
internal address to both
internal and external addresses
using an external, a third-party
POP server.

To test egression

Unsuccessful

Unsuccessful

6.3.4.2 Specific email security vendor auditing results

The auditing checklist in this section was adapted from the CIS – Exchange 2007 for
Windows Server 2003 Version 1.0 in order to suit Council C’s email system in the same
manner as both Councils A and B.

Council C’s email server was not configured for the Edge Transport server and the
Unified Messaging server roles. Therefore, the Edge Transport server and the Unified
Messaging server roles are not included in the overall modified checklist auditing
tables.
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6.3.4.3 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues for the email spoofing, the Mailbox server, the Hub Transport
server and the CAS roles of Council C’s email server are explains as follows.
 Risk 1: The email server allowed relaying
The email server may cause potential risks to spoofing attacks internally due to the fact
that the email server allows emails to be sent from both internal and external addresses
to any internal email addresses within Council C.
 Risk 2: The Mailbox server role
Council C’s Mailbox server role had one mailbox called GAIA which was stored at two
different locations which were the Private Mailbox Store 1 and the Private Mailbox
Store 2. A number of mis-configurations were uncovered on the Mailbox server role of
the council’s email server. For example the “restrict max recipients” option was set to
unlimited. This particular configuration setting may cause the possibility of unnecessary
network traffic which may affect the council’s network performance. It may also be a
potential risk to email flooding attacks. See Table 6.28 for more details.
 Risk 3: The Hub Transport server role
Council C’s Hub Transport server role has three groups which are the default GAIA, the
application server using GAIA as a relay server and the client GAIA. As per industry
best practice recommendations by CIS (2007), there were some misconfigurations or
default configurations identified which should be reconfigured in order to increase the
security of the email server. See Table 6.29 for more details.
 Risk 4: The CAS role
The CAS role has one default group which has some mis-configurations, for example
the “require ActiveSync password” and the “ActiveSync password expiration” options
were disabled (unchecked). These particular mis-configurations may lead to the
possibility of potential risk to the email server from authentication vulnerabilities. See
Table 6.30 for more details.
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6.3.5 Testing stage 5: The email system security policy review

There was no existing general and technical email policies apart from an acceptable use
of computing and communications facilities policy (see Appendix C39) at Council C
similar to both Councils A and B. Consequently, there were no policy and procedure
guidelines for the council’s IT operational staff.

6.3.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues

The lack of a specific email system security policy can create a general cause of
potential risk to the council’s email and other ICT related systems. These potential risks
are the possible interruption and misuse of the email services similar to both Councils A
and B. See previous discussion in Section 4.3.5.1.
 Risk 1: Interruption of the email service
Similarly to both Councils A and B, the lack of an email technical security policy may
be a source of potential interruption to the council’s email server as well as its related
system.
 Risk 2: Misuse of the email service
The lack of an email technical security guideline at the council may create a cause of
potential risks such as allowing internal mail relaying and unauthorised access to the
council’s staff. See previous discussion in Chapter 4 for more details.

6.4 Council C’s online web system results

Council C’s online web system, including the static web, the CMS and the online
payment systems, was audited and tested for the architecture, the intrusion detection, the
device configurations, the vulnerabilities of all the online web system servers, the
vendor security benchmark auditing on the backend database server and the online web
system security policy review. The following sections depict all the results of these
testings in detail.
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6.4.1 Testing stage 1: Network surveying

This network surveying stage involved making an audit of the online web system
architecture together with the networking devices such as the firewalls and the switch.
The following network specifications and policy documents were collected:

 The overall network diagram for the Internet link, the DMZ infrastructure, the
LAN and the WAN connectivity;
 The firewall device specification and the ACL codes related to Council C’s
online web system;
 The IDS/IPS, the DMZ switch specifications and configuration codes related to
council’s online web system; and
 The summary of online web system servers (the DMZ web server, the frontend
CMS and the backend CMS servers) specifications and the online payment
system servers (the frontend web, the application and the backend database
servers) specifications summary.

The overall summary specifications of Council C’s online web system devices (the
static web system, the CMS web system and the payment system) are described in the
following sections.

6.4.1.1 The static web system devices

As previously mentioned the static web system consists of a single web server which is
the CoC-DMZ-Web server.

6.4.1.1.1 The CoC-DMZ-Web server

The CoC-DMZ-Web server is located in the DMZ area in order to reduce any potential
risks that may arise from attackers. This web server presents Council C’s specific
information via static webpages to its residents and others.
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The volunteer website (www.coc.volunteers.com.au) is an example of the council’s
specific information concerning its community. The CoC-DMZ-Web server
specifications are summarised in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8 A summary of the CoC-DMZ-Web server specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

CoC-DMZ-Web (coc-dmz-web.coc.wa.gov.au)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0

Application software

MS SQL Server 2000 8.00.194

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 with service pack 2

Hardware

HP physical server, 4GB Ram, hard disk size total 284 GB

IP address

A.B.C.181/28

6.4.1.2 The CMS web system devices

As previously discussed in Section 6.2.4.2.2 the CMS web system consists of two
servers which are the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers.

6.4.1.2.1 The frontend CMS server

The CoC-DMZ-CMS server served as a frontend CMS web server. The summary
specifications of the server are described in the following table.

Table 6.9 A summary of the frontend CMS web server specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

CoC-DMZ-CMS (www.coc.wa.gov.au)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 7.0

Application software

Sophos

OS

MS Windows Server 2008 with service pack 2

Hardware

HP physical server

IP address

A.B.C.186/28
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6.4.1.2.2 The CMS management server

The CoC-CMS server acts as the council’s backend CMS management server. The
summary specifications of the server are displayed in Table 6.10.

Table 6.10 A summary of the backend CMS server specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

CoC-CMS (CoC-CMS.coc.wa.gov.au)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 7.0

Application software

Sophos

OS

MS Windows Server 2008 x64

Hardware

VMware, virtual memory 7.5 GB, free virtual memory 5.85 GB

IP address

10.1.15.184/8

6.4.1.3 The online payment system devices

Council C’s online payment servers (the frontend web, the application and the backend
database servers) are summarised and briefly described as follows.

6.4.1.3.1 The frontend web server

The current frontend web server (the Epathweb) acts as application logic and is located
in the DMZ area. It provides the frontline interface to the client web browser. Council
C’s residents or others can access the frontend web server via the website
https://secure.coc.com/epathway using their registered usernames and passwords for
applications. Either of or a combination of a valid assessment, invoice and payment
numbers are required for rate, infringement, registration and application payments.
Table 6.11 summarises the frontend web server specifications.
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Table 6.11 A summary of the frontend web server (the Epathweb) specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

Epathweb (epathweb.coc.wa.gov.au)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0

Application software

Epathweb, MS SQL Server 2005 9.00.4035 service pack 3, Sophos

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 service pack 2

Hardware

HP (H343LGP), 1.5 GB RAM

IP address

A.B.C.179

6.4.1.3.2 The application server

The application server (the Epathway) operates as a middle tier application server which
interacts with both the frontend DMZ web server as well as the backend database
server. It is located in the council’s internal network and performs all necessary
commands, calculations and SQL queries of the data from the backend database server.
Table 6.12 summarises the council’s application server specifications.

Table 6.12 A summary of the application server (the Epathway) specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

Epathway (epathway.coc.wa.gov.au)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0

Application software

Epathway

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 service pack 2

Hardware

VMware, virtual memory 3.86 GB, free virtual memory 3.22 GB

IP address

10.1.15.166/8

6.4.1.3.3 The backend database server

The backend database server (the Pathway) is located within the council’s internal
network. It has the Pathway database application software running in conjunction with a
MS SQL database Server 2005 application. The Pathway server operates as a backend
database server which keeps all the necessary and important information such as
usernames, passwords and street addresses.
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However, any sensitive user information such as credit card numbers and expiry dates
are not recorded in the database table. Table 6.13 presents more specification details of
the council’s backend database server.

Table 6.13 A summary of the backend database server (the Pathway) specifications

Attributes

Details

Name

Pathway (pathway.coc.wa.gov.au)

Web server software

MS IIS web server 6.0

Application software

Pathway, MS SQL Server 2005 9.00.4035 service pack 3, Sophos

OS

MS Windows Server 2003 service pack 2

Hardware

VMware, virtual memory 7.34 GB, free virtual memory 5.02 GB

IP address

10.1.15.162/8

6.4.1.4 Testing stage 1: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of testing stage 1 for Council C’s online payment system are
described in the following sections.
 Risk 1: The online payment system
As previously mentioned the Epathway application server is located within the council’s
internal network and it has the same subnet or IP address range as the Pathway backend
database server as well as other internal servers. This may be a potential risk to the
council’s backend database and other internal servers.

In case of the Epathweb frontend web server, which is located in the DMZ area being
compromised, the attacks may carry on through the Epathway application server. This is
due to the fact that the Epathway application server has direct communication (same
subnet) with the Epathweb frontend web server.
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6.4.2 Testing stage 2: The infrastructure of the online web system – Internet
border router, IDS/IPS, firewalls and switch reviews

Testing stage 2 consists of the device and software configuration codes for the Internet
border router, the switches, the firewalls, the IDS and the IPS.

6.4.2.1 Internet border router configuration codes data collection and reviews

As previously mentioned, there is no Internet border router being used at the council.
The overall recommendations of an Internet border router were also previously
discussed in Section 6.3.2.1. The emphasis in this section is on suggesting appropriate
Internet border router’s ACL codes which relate specifically to the online web system of
the council.

6.4.2.2 IDS/IPS configuration codes data collection and reviews

Each of the two currently operating firewalls has a built-in IPS engine. This engine is
being used to provide deep inspection of all Council C’s internetwork traffic including
protocol anomaly detection, stateful protocol signatures and IPS/DI attack pattern
obfuscation as mentioned earlier in Section 6.5.2.2.

In addition, both HTTP and HTTPS protocols are inspected in real-time. However,
several risk issues were uncovered related to the IPS during the review process for both
the firewall devices. For example there was no IPS inspection of the DNS traffic.

6.4.2.3 Firewall configuration codes data collection and reviews

This section is separated into three groups which are the static web (the CoC-DMZ-Web
server), the CMS web (the CoC-DMZ-CMS and CoC-CMS servers) and the online
payment (the Epathweb, the Epathway and the Pathway servers) systems. For more
details of the council’s Internet firewalls specifications see Section 6.3.2.3.
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A summary of all the firewall configuration codes related to the online static web
system server (the CoC-DMZ-Web) is included in Appendix C7. The CoC-DMZ-Web
server is used to communicate with the internal DNS server via a DNS port. It can also
be used to communicate with any other device via the TCP port 2005. On the other
hand, the firewall system allows any devices access to the CoC-DMZ-Web server via an
IP (any) port. Currently, the IT operational staffs remotely manage the CoC-DMZ-Web
server via TCP port 6502.

Council C’s CMS web system consisted of the frontend web CMS (the CoC-DMZCMS) and the CMS management (the CoC-CMS) servers as previously mentioned. The
summary of the firewall configuration codes with respect to both the CMS web servers
are provided in Appendix C8. In addition, a related firewall configuration code setting
of the CMS web system was uncovered, which can be a cause of potential risk to the
council’s CMS web system.

In terms of the online payment system, Pathway is the application software which is
currently being used for Council C’s online payment system similar to Council A. As
previously mentioned in Section 6.2.4.2.3, Council C’s online payment system consists
of three servers which are the frontend web server (the Epathweb), the application
server (the Epathway) and the backend database server (the Pathway).

The council’s online payment system also uses the reverse proxy server (ISA01) as a
network traffic screener to filter incoming protocol (all IP) which is forwarded from the
Epathweb server to the Epathway server. The summary of the firewall codes with
respect to the three online payment system servers are presented in Appendix C9.

6.4.2.4 Switch configuration codes data collection and reviews

Council C has only one switch which provides network communication and
connectivity between the Internet connection (ISP), the firewalls, the DMZ servers and
the council’s internal network as previously mentioned in Section 6.3.2.4. The switch is
also a core switch which interconnects all of Council C’s Intermediate Distribution
Frame (IDF) and servers. Accordingly, low level details on switch ports and VLANs
including its connectivity for the council’s online web system are presented in Figure
6.6.
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Figure 6.6. A current low level network diagram of the online web system for Council
C

6.4.2.5 Testing stage 2: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues for the infrastructure of the online web system (Internet border
router, the IDS/IPS, the firewall and the switches) of Council C are detailed in the
following sections.
 Risk 1: No Internet border router in place
See Section 6.3.2.5 for more details.
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 Risk 2: No IDS/IPS inspect on the DNS traffic
Currently, the council’s DMZ online web servers communicate with the council’s
internal DNS server via a DNS service port. This may be considered as a cause of
potential risk to DNS spoofing and DNS cache poisoning attacks.
 Risk 3: The static web system: Unused firewall rules
Currently, there are a number of unused firewall rules related to the council’s static web
system, which are TCP port 2005 as well as Appendix C7: Policy numbers 28 and 29.
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, these firewall
rules should be removed.
 Risk 4: The static web system: Inadequate DNS traffic not inspected
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 27) permits UDP: DNS
network traffic from the council’s DMZ network to the two internal DNS servers which
are located in the council’s internal network. The two DNS servers also act as domain
controllers (primary and secondary).

This can be a cause of potential risk to DNS attacks such as DNS cache poisoning, DNS
amplification and reflection attacks which may lead to DoS or DDoS attack resulting in
an interruption to the internal network of the council (Cisco, n.d.-a).
 Risk 5: The static web system: Permits IP from the CoC-DMZ-Web to the specific
external network
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 30) allows the CoC-DMZWeb server to access the specific external network (Webexternal) via IP port (any TCP
or UDP ports).

This can be a cause of potential risk in the case of the static web server being
compromised and controlled by an intruder to use as a proxy site from which attacks
against the specific external network can be launched. This inadequate configuration
can result in a bad reputation for the council as an easily compromisable site.
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 Risk 6: The static web system: Allows IP from the CoC-DMZ-Web to the specific
external network
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 31) permits the CoC-DMZWeb server to access the specific external network (Nearmapserver) via IP port. This
configuration can cause a potential risk to the specific external network.
 Risk 7: The static web system: Allows IP from the internal network to the DMZ
network
The existing firewall rule (see Appendix C7: Policy number 32) allows the council’s
internal network to access the DMZ network via any protocols (IP). This configuration
can be a cause of potential risk as anyone from the council’s internal (inside) network
has the ability to access the council’s DMZ network via any type of protocol. Therefore,
internal attackers can utilise a variety of tools to compromise or gain knowledge of the
council’s DMZ network information.
 Risk 8: The CMS web system: DNS traffic not inspected
Similar to the Risk 4, the current firewall rule permits UDP: DNS network traffic from
the DMZ network to the two internal DNS servers. Furthermore, the CoC-DMZ-CMS
server is required to obtain DNS information from the internal DNS servers via the
UDP: DNS port. This basic configuration can cause a potential risk of DNS poisoning
attacks.
 Risk 9: The CMS web system: Allows IP from the internal network to the DMZ
network
The firewall rule permits any devices on the council’s internal network to access the
DMZ network via any protocol ports (IP). This can be a cause of potential risk of
unauthorised access from the internal network against all the DMZ resident devices.
 Risk 10: The online payment system: Mapping a whole destination subnet
There was a firewall rule which mapped the whole class C subnet of the external
A.B.C.0 network to the name “Commweb01” (see Appendix C9: Policy number 4). As
per discussion with the system administrator, the requirement is specific to a few hosts.
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 Risk 11: The online payment system: No logging on both HTTP and HTTPS
traffics
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C9: Policy number 5) allows both HTTP and
HTTPS traffic without the logging feature from the external (outside) network to the
frontend web server or the Epathweb (A.B.C.179) which is located in the council’s
DMZ network.
 Risk 12: The online payment system: Allows IP traffic from the Epathweb to the
Epathway
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C9: Policy number 6) allows all traffic
protocols (IP) from the Epathweb frontend web server to the Epathway application
server (10.1.15.166) via the council’s reverse proxy server (ISA01). This configuration
can cause a potential risk to the council’s online payment system allowing an attacker
direct access to the other DMZ servers of the council, should the Epathweb frontend
web server get compromised.
 Risk 13: The online payment system: Allows HTTP traffic from the Epathweb to
the external gateway payment service
The current firewall rule (see Appendix C9: Policy number 7) allows both HTTP and
HTTPS from the Epathweb frontend web server to the external gateway payment
service (Commweb01). As per discussion with the system administrator, the permission
to allow HTTP traffic was not required.
 Risk 14: The online payment system: DNS traffic not inspected
The current firewall rule allows any device in the council’s DMZ including the
Epathweb frontend web server to communicate with the internal DNS server via the
UDP: DNS port (see Appendix C9: Policy number 8). This rule can cause a potential
risk to DNS poisoning attacks. See previously mentioned in Section 6.6.2.3 for more
details.
 Risk 15: Overall inadequate switch code security configurations
This point has been previously explained in Section 6.3.2.5: Risk 7.
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6.4.3 Testing stage 3: Services and system identification, port scanning,
vulnerability testing and results

The testing techniques in this Testing stage 3 were the same as carried out for Councils
A and B. Both NMAP and GFI LANguard were used in all three testing steps (services
and system identification, port scanning and vulnerability testings) for Council C’s
online web system (including the static, the CMS and the online payment web systems)
network scanning.

6.4.3.1 Services and system identification results

The overall results of the services and system identifications of the six servers which
were the CoC-DMZ-Web, the CoC-DMZ-CMS, the CoC-CMS, the Epathweb, the
Epathway and the Pathway are summarised in Appendices C12, C13, C14, C15, C16,
C17, C18 and C19. Furthermore, there were inadequate settings on password and
security auditing policies on all the six servers.

6.4.3.2 Port scanning results

Similar to both Councils A and B, both NMAP and GFI LANguard network scanning
tools were used to test the council’s online web system servers. There were unnecessary
TCP and UDP ports discovered in all the six servers. See the overall results in
Appendices C20, C21, C22, C23, C24 and C25.

6.4.3.3 Vulnerability testing results

The same techniques as described in Section 6.3.3.3 were used in this vulnerability
testing phase. There were vulnerabilities identified on all the six online web system
servers which can lead to potential failures or interruptions to the council’s online web
system.
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6.4.3.4 Testing stage 3: Identified risk issues

The identified risk issues of Testing stage 3 for Council C’s online web system are
explained as follows.
 Risk 1: System information policy results for all the six servers
Council C’s MS Windows current configuration settings for the six online web servers
were lacking in that some services were missing and there were inadequate settings on
password and security auditing policies. These inadequate settings can cause potential
risks and create possible vulnerabilities to the council’s online web system.
 Risk 2: System patching status results for all the six servers
There were no missing service packs and patches on the CoC-CMS server. Furthermore,
there were no service packs and system patching results for the CoC-DMZ-CMS as
these were unobtainable due to the fact that access was denied to the server’s system
service and identification status.

In addition, there were a number of missing service packs and patches on the other four
servers which can be a source of potential risks to the council, particularly to the
Pathway server which holds the council’s client database information.
 Risk 3: Unnecessary opened ports on all the six servers
On the CoC-DMZ-CMS server, there were 24 TCP and two opened UDP ports which
include unnecessary service ports such as FTP, MS-SQL and POP3 service ports which
can cause a potential risk to the CoC-DMZ-CMS server.

Furthermore, both the CoC-DMZ-Web and the Epathweb servers had unnecessarily
opened TCP ports over 500 and 600 respectively. These opened TCP ports on the
Epathweb server include a majority number of unnecessarily opened TCP ports such as
Edonkey, FTP, finger, login, shell, POP2, POP3, printer and whois. These opened ports
can lead to possible unauthorised access to the Epathweb server, misuse of its services
and create a potential risk to the council’s internal network.
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The overall opened TCP and UDP ports for all the six servers are provided in Table
6.14. Furthermore, Appendices C20, C21, C22, C23, C24 and C25 present all the
opened TCP and UDP ports as well as the possible mitigation recommendations for the
six servers respectively.

Table 6.14 Overall opened TCP and UDP service ports of all the six servers

Server name

Opened TCP ports

Opened UDP ports

Comment

CoC-DMZ-Web

528

12

Refer to Appendix C20

CoC-DMZ-CMS

24

2

Refer to Appendix C21

CoC-CMS

13

1

Refer to Appendix C22

Epathweb

653

10

Refer to Appendix C23

Epathway

22

6

Refer to Appendix C24

Pathway

21

7

Refer to Appendix C25

 Risk 4: Vulnerabilities found on all the six servers
As previously mentioned, there were vulnerabilities identified on all the six online web
system servers. For example, there were low and potential security vulnerabilities
discovered on the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers, such as the fact that FTP
and POP3 services were enabled. The remote code execution vulnerability in MS
DirectShow was uncovered on the Pathway server.

The overall vulnerability testing analysis and possible mitigation recommendations of
the six servers are summarised in Table 6.15. See Appendices C26, C27, C28, C29, C30
and C31 for more details of the identified risk issues and the possible mitigation
recommendations for all the six online web system servers respectively.

Table 6.15 Overall vulnerability of the three servers of Council C’s online web systems

Server name

H

M

L

P

Overall vulnerability level

Comment

CoC-DMZ-Web

7

0

10

5

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix C26

CoC-DMZ-CMS

0

0

3

3

Low (3/10)

Refer to Appendix C27

CoC-CMS

0

0

5

1

Low (3/10)

Refer to Appendix C28

Epathweb

8

1

8

4

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix C29

Epathway

3

0

7

2

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix C30

Pathway

3

0

6

3

High (10/10)

Refer to Appendix C31
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6.4.4 Testing stage 4: Vendor security: Database security benchmark auditing

Similar to both Councils A and B, this fourth stage testing has one testing step which is
the database security benchmark auditing on the council’s online payment backend
database server (the Pathway).

6.4.4.1 Database security benchmark results

Similar to both Councils A and B, Council C’s online payment backend database server
runs MS SQL Server 2005 as a database application. The database application is also
running, together with the Pathway application. Both applications are currently running
on the Epathway server. In this database security benchmark auditing stage, the Security
Configuration Benchmark for Microsoft SQL Server 2005 version 1.2.0 January 12th,
2010 from CIS was used as a prime benchmark auditing tool.

As previously mentioned in Sections 4.4.4.1 and 5.4.4.1, the CIS benchmark auditing
tool is categorised into nine groups. However, this database security audit was
conducted on seven groups only, which were one to six and group nine. Group seven
(replication) was not audited as there was no replication implemented in the council’s
database system. Furthermore, group eight (application development best practices) was
also not audited as the council’s IT operational staff has no responsibility for developing
or editing the council’s online webpage application.

6.4.4.2 Testing stage 4: Identified risk issues

The following sections describe the identified risk issues for the configuration of the
MS SQL 2005 database on the council’s backend server.
 Risk 1: Inadequate configuration for the database application of the backend
database server
There were some security issues uncovered from all the seven tested categories. These
security issues can possibly cause interruptions to the council’s Pathway backend
database server. Table 6.16 displays the overall security issues uncovered
(unsatisfactory) including risk rating of Council C’s Pathway backend database server
based on the seven category groups.
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The overall details of all the findings (satisfactory and unsatisfactory) and the possible
mitigation recommendations are provided in Appendices C32, C33, C34, C35, C36,
C37 and C38.

Table 6.16 The overall risks of the seven audited categories of the Pathway backend
database server

Category no.

Risks
(H)

Risks
(M)

Risks
(L)

Risks
(P)

Comments

1) OS and network specification
configuration

1

4

9

4

Refers to Appendix C32

2) SQL server installation and
patches

2

3

0

1

Refers to Appendix C33

3) SQL server settings

1

0

3

10

Refers to Appendix C34

4) Access controls

1

4

1

5) Auditing and logging

0

0

0
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Refers to Appendix C36

6) Backup and disaster recovery
procedures

2

1

3

1

Refers to Appendix C37

9) Surface area configuration tool

0

0

2

0

Refers to Appendix C38

Refers to Appendix C35

6.4.5 Testing stage 5: The online web system security policy review

This final testing stage consists of the review of the security policy for Council C’s
online web system which includes the static web, the CMS and the online payment
systems. As previously discussed in Section 6.3.5, there were no existing general and
technical information security policies at Council C, apart from an acceptable use of
computing and communications facilities policy (see Appendix C39).

6.4.5.1 Testing stage 5: Identified risk issues
This lack of both general and technical information security policies can be considered
as a cause of potential risks in terms of possible interruptions to Council C’s online web
services. Similar to both Councils A and B, the cause of these risks could be
characterised as follows:
 Poor communication of risk; and
 Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor
management/strategic oversight.
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 Risk 1: Poor communication of risk
There were some but not frequent enough discussions of ICT risk management in the
weekly IT operational staff meetings (personal communications with Council C, 2010).
This was due to the fact that the council’s IT operational staff were often too busy
managing their day to day operational tasks.
 Risk 2: Poor understanding of the risks that are in the system as a result of poor
management/strategic oversight
This was due to the fact that some of Council C’s IT operational staff have a lack of
technical knowledge of IT security. For example, there were some inadequate
configurations on the firewalls and the core switch as a result of a lack of specific
knowledge with regard to the device configuration.

6.5 Analysis and discussion

The details of analysis and discussion on both Council C’s email and online web
systems (the static web system, the CMS web system and the online payment system)
are described in the following sections.

6.5.1 Analysis

The analyses of both Council C’s email and online web systems are divided into two
sections which are the email and the online web systems.

6.5.1.1 Council C’s email system analysis – possible mitigations

The possible mitigation recommendations for the identified issues for Testing stages 1
to 5 of the council’s email system are explained in the following sections.
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6.5.1.1.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
In order to mitigate this type of potential risk, Council C should deploy an extra
dedicated server to only perform a CAS role. This additional server would also reduce
the load on the current MS Exchange server.

Similarly to both Councils A and B, a high-bandwidth (Gigabit) connection is strongly
recommended for the connection between the CAS and the Mailbox server (Microsoft
Exchange Documentation Team, 2009). Summary specifications of a new dedicated
CAS are provided in Table 6.17.

Table 6.17 A summary recommendations of the new CAS specifications

Attributes

Details

Email application software

MS Exchange 2007 with service pack 1

OS

MS Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition with service pack 1

Hardware

VMware or equivalent 8 GB RAM, hard disks C: 20 GB, e: 100 GB

MS Exchange 2007 role

CAS

MS Exchange support

MS OWA, MS Outlook Anywhere, MS ActiveSync

TCP/IP protocols

HTTPS, RPC, LDAP

IP network

Different subnet with other email servers (isolate)

Network connection

Gigabit link between Client Access and Mailbox servers

ACL

Permits only allowed or required protocols

Other software

Virus protection software for server

 Risk 2
The new dedicated CAS should be configured to a different subnetwork in order to
further minimise and control any other potential risks that may occur. Any unwanted
network traffic which allows communication between both the current email server and
the new dedicated CAS should be filtered. An ACL is an example of a filtering
technique that could be used to control the Exchange email related protocols.

Figure 6.7 illustrates all the devices connectivity including the recommended CAS in a
high level network diagram.
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Figure 6.7. A recommended MS Exchange Server 2007 architecture with an extra MS
Exchange 2007 server role (CAS role)
 Risk 3
The use of either the certificate or token authentication methods will offer a better
security mechanism than basic authentication. Token authentication is strongly
recommended as the council already has an existing token authentication system in
place. Therefore, the council should consider incorporating the email system
authentication with the existing token authentication system. Although this option is a
cost saving as opposed to purchasing a new server and application software, more
tokens/dongles and software licenses will be required.
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In addition, implementing the token authentication method may provide an additional
layer of authentication to the email system of the council. Table 6.18 summarises the
options and recommendations for improving the client access security authentication
methods for Council C.
 Risk 4
The mitigation recommendation is the same as for Council B, in that NTLM
authentication may be considered for use with the current SSL connection in order to
provide the best possible authentication method between the clients to the email server
for the council’s MS Outlook Anywhere application. See Table 6.18 for more details.

Table 6.18 Overall current and recommendations client access security methods over
SSL for the email system of Council C

Client-to-server
connections

Authentication
options

Council C current
configurations

Recommended
authentications for Council C

MS OWA

Basic/form-based

Form-based

Form-based

MS ActiveSync

Basic/certificate/token

Basic

Token

MS Outlook
Anywhere

Basic/NTLM

Basic

NTLM

Additionally, if the council wishes to manage the in-house spam blocker appliance, then
MS Forefront Security may be taken into consideration as an example of spam blocker
appliance technology. This spam blocker appliance may enhance the security capability
when integrated with the council’s current reverse proxy server (ISA 2006).

According to Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team (2006, p. 7), “Forefront
Security for Exchange server delivers comprehensive on-premise antivirus protection
for Exchange Edge Transport, Hub Transport and Mailbox roles. Using a multiple-scan
engine with content-filtering capabilities, Forefront Security for Exchange server offers
layered protection against virus-laden messages”. See Figure 6.8 for more details.
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Figure 6.8. Using MS Forefront Security for MS Exchange Server 2007 for virus
protection
(Source: Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team, 2006, p. 7)

6.5.1.1.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
Council C can enhance its internetwork performance and security by deploying an
Internet border router. An Internet border router will provide a first layer of traffic
filtering by only permitting addressed network traffic in and out of the council’s
network. This filtering function of the Internet border router can reduce the number of
Internet-based worms prior to them reaching the firewall of Council C. It will also ease
the load on the existing firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances).

Furthermore, the IPS feature of the Internet border router may more accurately identify,
classify, and stop or block malicious traffic such as network spoofing and scanning in
real-time. Table 6.19 summarises the specifications of the recommended Internet border
router.

In addition, with these recommendations to the council’s internetwork system structure,
the council may further enhance efficiency in terms of redundancy and load balancing
with the alternate Internet link using connections such as Hot Standby Router Protocol
(HSRP) or Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP) technologies. However, more
research may be required for this purpose in terms of protocols, equipment and costs.
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Table 6.19 A summary of the new Internet border router specifications

Attributes

Details

Device type

Cisco 2911 or other equivalent vendor product

OS

12.4(15)T3 or later

Memory

Standard

Interfaces

3 integrated 10/100/1000 Ethernet ports (RJ-45 only)

IP addresses

A.B.D.x/27, A.B.D.x/27

Security and other features

Cisco IOS IPS, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA), IOS firewall, voice and video support

Finally, as mentioned earlier, in terms of filtering network traffic, Council C should
consider tightening its ACLs when deploying an Internet border router, such as by
blocking potential risky ports as well as private IP addresses.

In addition, creating each individual ACL for each individual service usage constitutes a
recommended best practice for standard router configurations. Examples for the email
service and the appropriate ACL recommendations are shown in Table 6.20.

Table 6.20 Possible examples of the Internet border ACL for the email system

Policy
no.

Rules

Protocol
types

From
(source)

To (destination)

Ports
(service)

Recommendations

1

Permit

TCP

Webroot
services

The MS Exchange
Server 2007

SMTP

Yes

2

Permit

TCP

Any

The ISA 2006
server

HTTPS

Yes

 Risk 2
According to Juniper Networks (2009), IPS/DI features on the firewalls (Juniper SSG350M security appliances) perform protocol anomaly detection, stateful protocol
signatures and IPS/DI attack pattern obfuscation. Internet security can be increased
significantly by simply enabling the IPS feature on both the existing firewalls (Juniper
SSG-350M security appliances).
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As previously discussed, the council’s firewalls have enabled their IPS feature.
Therefore, no further action is required in terms of network infrastructure for the email
system.

The

summarised

overall

IDS/IPS

details

and

possible

mitigation

recommendations for the council’s internetwork are provided in Table 6.21.

Table 6.21 A summary of the IDS/IPS of the council’s internetwork system

Products

Currents

Recommendations

Descriptions

IDS/IPS on the
new Internet
border router

Non-existent

Deploy an Internet
border router with
integrated with IPS

For blocking of any spoofing/scanning
attacks and malicious traffic
For reducing the load of the firewall’s IPS

IPS on the firewall
(DI)

Installed

No action is
required

For real-time DI of all required important
network traffic such as HTTPS for the
purposes of blocking and preventing
application-level attacks, any malicious or
unwanted behaviour in real-time. See note
below for more details.

 Risk 3
As per discussion with the council’s system administrator, Policy number 2 in Appendix
C1 is unnecessary and may pose a potential risk to Council C’s email system.
According to the council’s SMTP policy, the source of incoming SMTP traffic should
only come from the Webroot services. Therefore, this rule should be removed as it is
redundant.
 Risk 4
As per discussion with the system administrator of Council C, the internal server
(10.1.1.3) is no longer in use. Therefore, this rule can be safely removed. The removable
of any unused firewall configuration codes can prevent any confusion which may arise
in the future.
 Risk 5
According to Appendix C2, the Policy number 14 is duplicated with the Policy number
15, and as such it can be safely removed.
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 Risk 6
Access to both the firewalls for administration purposes should be limited to an
authorised staff member. Access to these devices via the Telnet port should be disabled
as it poses a potential risk to sniffing attacks. Table 6.22 summarises the current and
recommended access rules for both the firewalls.

Table 6.22 A recommendation accessing methods summary of the firewalls

Accessing
types/from

Current rules

Recommendations

Comments

HTTP

Enable

Enable

Redirect to HTTPS

HTTPS

Enable

Enable

Secured web access

SSH

Disable

Enable

Provide more security as compared to
Telnet

Telnet

Enable

Disable

Insecure, potential to sniffing attacks

Console

Enable

Enable

Recommended to create strong user name
and password with MD5 (if applicable)

10.0.0.0 IP range

Allow

Limit IP range

Should only allow to the council’s IT
administrators access to the group’s IP
subnet

 Risk 7
The council’s switch codes review is presented in Table 6.23 along with the
recommendations, which may feasibly mitigate such attacks against the council’s core
switch.

Table 6.23 Council C’s switch security audit details

Security features

Recommendations

ACL applied to block unwanted devices

To do

Access to the device via HTTP is disabled

To do

Access to the device via Telnet is disabled

To do

Activate loop protection on all ports

To do

Apply appropriate log server

Satisfactory

Apply appropriate timestamps debug time

N/A

Apply appropriate timestamps log time

N/A

Apply appropriate time zone

Satisfactory
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Table 6.23 Council C’s switch security audit details (continued)

Security features

Recommendations

Appropriate SNMP in use

To do

Appropriate VLAN in use

Satisfactory

Best practice username and/or password in use

To do

Configure appropriate warning banner message

To do

Disable/shutdown unused switch ports

To do

Disable trunking on ports that do not need it

Satisfactory

Enable feature against ARP poisoning attacks

To do

Enable feature against ARP spoofing attacks

To do

Enable port broadcast storm control

Satisfactory

Enable port security limits MAC address to a port

To do

Ports connected to identified devices that do not support spanning-tree should
be configured with BPDU filtering

To do

Ports not connected to anything yet should be configured with protection

To do

Set DTP on all ports not being used for trunking

N/A

Set strong password (MD5) for authenticating VTP message

To do

Strong password encryption (MD5) in use

To do

TFTP service is disabled

To do

 Risk 8
Consequently, similar to Council B, it is recommended that two additional switches
should be installed in the outside and the DMZ areas as follows:

 The outside area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M
security appliances) and the new Internet border router; and
 The DMZ area: A new switch to connect the two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M
security appliances) and the DMZ servers.

With this in place, the current core switch may be used solely to connect between the
two firewalls (Juniper SSG-350M security appliances) and the council’s internal
network. The new switches recommendation details are provided in Table 6.24.
Furthermore, Figure 6.9 illustrates the new switch recommendations, ports, VLANs
including its connectivity.
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Table 6.24 New switches hardware and software recommendations for Council C

Attributes

Details

Device location

The council’s outside network area

Device type

HP 2610-24 (J9085A) OR HP 2810-24G (J9021A) switch

OS

Newest

Memory

Standard

Port

24 auto-sensing 10/100 ports (IEEE 802.3 type 10Base-T, IEEE 802.3u type
100Base-TX), 2 open mini-GBIC (SFP) slots

Operate at

Layer 2 OSI

Device location

The council’s DMZ network area

Device type

HP 2810-24G (J9021A) switch

OS

Newest

Memory

Standard

Port

20 auto-sensing 10/100/1000 ports, 4 dual-personality ports - each port can be
used as either an RJ-45 10/100/1000 port or an open mini-GBIC slot

Operate at

Layer 2 OSI
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Figure 6.9. A low level network diagram of the email system for Council C with the
new recommended switches
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In addition, Figure 6.10 illustrates a recommended overall high level network diagram
of the email system for Council C.

Figure 6.10. A recommended overall high level network diagram of the email system
for Council C

6.5.1.1.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The overall system information policy testing results of Council C’s email system
server are summarised in Table 6.25. Moreover, Appendix C3 provides full details of
the overall system information policy testing results and recommendations of Council
C’s email system server.
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Table 6.25 the overall system information policy of the email server

Server name

Password policy

Security audit policy

Comment

Email server

Unsatisfactory

Unsatisfactory

Refer to Appendix C3

 Risk 2
Appendix C4 provides full details of the missing service pack and patches as well as
possible mitigation recommendations for updating the email server.
 Risk 3
As previously discussed, there were a total of 24 opened TCP ports including some
unnecessarily opened ports. The total number of recommended open TCP ports on the
email server is eight with only one open UDP port. Table 6.26 presents the total number
of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on the email server.

Table 6.26 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on the
email server

Server name

Recommended open
TCP ports

Recommended open
UDP port

Comment

Email server

8

1

Refer to Appendix C5

 Risk 4
Refer to Appendix C6 for full details of the identified risk issues and the possible
mitigation recommendations.

6.5.1.1.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
Council C’s email server allowed relaying of email messages for internal connectivity
from both internal and external addresses to any internal email address. Table 6.27
presents the overall spoofing testing results and recommendations for the email server
of Council C.
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Table 6.27 The spoofing testing results and recommendations for Council C’s email
server

Testing techniques

Purposes

Results

Recommendations

Telnet to the email server and
sending an email from one
internal address to another
internal address.

To test internal
connectivity of the
email server

Successful (allow
relaying)

Should not allow
email relaying
See note

Sending an email from one
external address to another
external address using the
target email server.

To test external
relaying of the email
server

Unsuccessful (do not
allow relaying)

None

Sending an email from one
internal address to an external
address using the target email
server.

To test internal
relaying of the email
server

Unsuccessful (do not
allow relaying)

None

Sending an email from one
external address to an internal
address using the target email
server.

To test email relaying
of the email server

Successful (allow
relaying)

Should not allow
email relaying
See note

Note:
Council C may block internal email relaying to the MS Exchange 2007 email server
from unauthorised users by configuring the MS Exchange 2007 email server SMTP port
to an alternative TCP port. The TCP port 587 is an alternative example which is
recommended by Ganger (2007). This configuration will allow the Exchange client
communicating with the Exchange server via TCP port 587 instead of typical SMTP
port 25. Furthermore, Council C may configure both the firewalls to block their internal
staff from directly accessing the email server via Telnet (TCP port 23) including SMTP
(TCP port 25) ports.

 Risk 2
Table 6.28 presents overall results of the auditing of the Mailbox server role of Council
C’s email server including the possible mitigation recommendations based on the CIS
suggestions.
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Table 6.28 The overall results of auditing and recommendations for the Mailbox server
role of Council C’s email server

References

Defaults

Council C

Recommendations

Restrict email deletion retention
Private mailbox stores 1, 2

7 (days)

7, 7 (days)

7 (days)

Restrict mailbox deletion retention
Private mailbox stores 1, 2

30 (days)

3, 3 (days)

30 (days)

Restrict deletion of emails or mailboxes until
archival
Private mailbox stores 1, 2

Unchecked

Unchecked
Unchecked

Checked

Mounting of mailbox database at startup
Private mailbox stores 1, 2

Unchecked

Unchecked
Unchecked

Unchecked

Ensure mailbox database cannot be overwritten
Private mailbox stores 1, 2

Checked

Unchecked
Unchecked

Unchecked

Verify default mailbox storage limits (issue
warning, prohibit send, prohibit send and receive
at (KB))
Private mailbox stores 1, 2

Custom

Unassigned
Unassigned

Custom

Ensure public folder database cannot be
overwritten

Checked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Verify default public folder storage limits (issue
warning, prohibit send, prohibit send and receive
at (KB))

Custom

Unassigned

Custom

Audit public folder client access

Custom

Unassigned

Custom

Audit public folder administrative access

Custom

Unassigned

Custom

Verify proper permissions on public folder
database

Custom

Unassigned

Custom

Mounting of public folder database at startup

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Restrict deletion of emails or mailboxes until
archival

Unchecked

Unchecked

Checked

Restrict email send size (mailbox identity, email
contact identity, distribution group identity)

Unlimited
Unlimited
Unlimited

10MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict email receive size (mailbox identity,
email contact identity, distribution group
identity)

Unlimited
Unlimited
Unlimited

10MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict max recipients

5000

Unlimited

2000

Audit mailbox spam bypass settings

False

False

False

AntiSpam updates*

Disabled

Disabled

See note

Zero out deleted database pages
Private mailbox stores 1, 2

False

False
False

True
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 Risk 3
Table 6.29 presents overall results of auditing and recommendations for the Hub
Transport server role of Council C’s email server.

Table 6.29 The overall results of auditing and recommendations for the Hub Transport
server role of Council C’s email server

References

Defaults

Council C

Recommendations

Audit DNS lookup servers
1. Default GAIA
2. Relay server
3. Client GAIA

None

Enable TLS for basic authentication

Unchecked

Unchecked

Checked

Restrict out of office responses

None

None

Internal only

Restrict email send size (max send size,
max message size)
1. Default GAIA
2. Relay Server
3. Client GAIA

30MB
30MB

MB

10MB
10MB

Restrict email receive size (max receive
size, max message size, external dsn max
message attach size, internal dsn max
message attach size)
1. Default GAIA
2. Relay server
3. Client GAIA

30MB
30MB
10MB
10MB

Restrict max recipients (max recipients per
message)
1. Default GAIA
2. Relay server
3. Client GAIA

5000

Restrict IP range for receive connectors

None

Custom
Custom
Custom
Custom

30, 30
Unlimited
10, 10
MB

30, 30, - ,30, 30, - ,30, 30, - ,-

10MB
10MB
10MB
10MB

2000
5000
200
200
None

Custom
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 Risk 4
The overall results of auditing CAS role of Council C’s email server including the
recommendations are presented in Table 6.30.

Table 6.30 The overall results of auditing and recommendations for the CAS role of
Council C’s email server

References

Defaults

Council C

Recommendations

Remove legacy web applications

Installed

Installed

Removed

Restrict web authentication methods**

See note

See note

See note

Require SSL for web applications

Checked
Unchecked

Checked
Checked

Checked
Checked

Disable web anonymous access

Unchecked

Unchecked

Unchecked

Enable logging for default website

Checked

Checked

Checked

Enable policy for ActiveSync***

None

None

See note

Forbid ActiveSync NonProvisionable devices

Checked

Checked

Unchecked

Forbid ActiveSync simple device password

Checked

Checked

Unchecked

Disable ActiveSync WSS/UNC access (Windows
file shares, sharepoint services)

Checked
Checked

Checked
Checked

Unchecked
Unchecked

Require ActiveSync password

Unchecked

Unchecked

Checked

Require ActiveSync alphanumeric password

Unchecked

Unchecked

Checked

Require ActiveSync minimum password length

Checked, 4

Checked, 3

Checked, 8

Require ActiveSync password expiration

Unchecked

Unchecked

60

Require ActiveSync password history

0

0

5

Restrict ActiveSync attachment size

Unchecked

Unchecked
Unallocated

Unchecked, 3MB

Require ActiveSync policy refresh

None

Unlimited

24.00:00:00

Restrict ActiveSync maximum password attempts

8

8

8

Require ActiveSync certificate based
authentication

Ignore Client
Certs

Ignore Client
Certs

Require Client Certs

Require ActiveSync inactivity lockout time

Checked, 15

Checked, 15

Checked, 15

Disable Outlook Anywhere

Enabled

Enabled

Disabled

Note:
Refers to AntiSpam updates*
Council C is currently using an outside external antispam server as a combined email
system. Therefore, this setting can remain as the default (disabled).
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Refers to restrict web authentication methods**
As per best practice recommendations by CIS (2007), this task is to ensure that
unneeded authentication methods for MS Exchange web applications should be
disabled.

Refers to enable policy for ActiveSync***
The policy of ActiveSync should be enabled in order to reduce the potential risks to the
MS Exchange infrastructure in case of a mobile device out of sync (failing) from the
council’s network (CIS, 2007). See Table 6.31 for more detail.

Table 6.31 The overall results of auditing web authentication and access control of
Council C’s email server

Council C

Integrate

Autodiscover

X

Digest

Passport

X

Exchange
Exchange Web Services (EWS)

Basic

X
X

X

Exadmin

X

Exchweb

X

MS-Exchange-ActiveSync

X

Offline Address Book (OAB)

X

Outlook Web Access (OWA)

X

Public

X

Unified Messaging (UM)

X

Recommendations

Integrate

Autodiscover

X

Exchange

X

Exchange Web Services (EWS)

X

Exadmin

X

Exchweb

X

X

Digest

Basic

X

MS-Exchange-ActiveSync

X*

Offline Address Book (OAB)

X

Outlook Web Access (OWA)

X

Public

X

Unified Messaging (UM)

X

X

Passport
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6.5.1.1.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation
 Risks 1 and 2
In order to provide better security to the council’s email system, it is strongly
recommended that an ICT security policy be implemented to cover all of aspects of the
council’s network infrastructure, Internet border router, firewall, email and other ICT
related systems.

6.5.1.2 Council C’s online web system analysis – possible mitigations

Council C’s online web system consists of three sub systems as previously discussed.
The three sub systems are the static web system, the CMS web system and the online
payment system. The following sections present the mitigation recommendations for the
identified issues of all the three sub systems. Moreover, each of the mitigations
described relate to the identified risk issue number.

6.5.1.2.1 Testing stage 1: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
In the interests of general best practices, it is recommended that both the application and
the backend database servers be placed separately into different subnetworks or a
VLAN. Furthermore, appropriate ACLs should be configured to filter or control
network traffic between both the subnets. These measures can prevent or mitigate any
potential network security risks such as viruses, trojans and DoS attacks.

6.5.1.2.2 Testing stage 2: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
It is recommended that an Internet border router be deployed as previously discussed on
Section 6.5.1.1.2: Risk 1. Furthermore, it is also recommended to create an individual
ACL for each service usage, such as permitting only HTTP traffic to the Epathweb
server. Such ACL rules can restrict and allow only required access protocols to the web
server. Therefore, it can minimise any potential vulnerability risks to the server.
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 Risk 2
Table

6.32

summarised

overall

IDS/IPS

details

and

possible

mitigation

recommendations for Council C’s internetwork system related to the online web system.

Table 6.32 A summary of the IDS/IPS of the council’s internetwork system for the online
web system

Products

Settings

Recommendations

Descriptions

IPS on the firewall
(deep inspection)
applied to HTTP and
HTTPS protocols

Applied

No action is required

For real-time deep inspection of
web network traffic (HTTP and
HTTPS) for the purposes of
blocking and preventing
application-level attacks, any
malicious or unwanted
behaviour in real-time.

IPS on the firewall
(deep inspection)
applied to DNS
protocol

Not applied

Apply deep inspection
to DNS inbound
protocol

For real-time deep inspection of
DNS traffic particulary the
DNS packet size from DMZ
web servers to the council DNS
server. This can prevent against
DNS spoofing, cache poisoning,
amplification or reflection
attacks (Cisco, n.d.-c).

 Risk 3
As per discussion with the system administrator, the TCP port 2005 and Appendix C7:
Policy numbers 28 and 29 are no longer in use. Therefore, these firewall rules can be
safely eliminated. The removal of unused firewall rules can prevent any potential
confusion that may arise in the future to both the system and network administrators of
the council.
 Risk 4
This firewall rule should be incorporated with the DNS deep inspection (filter) and log
feature in order to prevent any potential DNS attacks against the council’s internal DNS
servers (domain controllers). This DNS deep packet inspection will monitor the DNS
packets (the message exchange) to ensure that both the IDS of the DNS queries and
responses match (Cisco, n.d.-b). It also performs security checks on the size of the DNS
packets such as checking that the maximum label length and the maximum domain
name length are not longer than the DNS packet specifications (Cisco, n.d.-c).
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 Risk 5
As per discussion with the system administrator, this rule can be tightened by changing
the allowed protocol from IP to TCP port 80 (HTTP) and TCP port 443 (HTTPS).
 Risk 6
As per discussion with the system administrator, this rule can be tightened by adjusting
the allowed protocol from IP to any other required TCP or UDP protocols which can be
investigated by the system administrator in the future.
 Risk 7
This rule opens all IP ports (all TCPs and UDPs) for the council’s inside network to
access its DMZ network. This can pose a potential risk to Council C’s online web
system. As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, this
rule can be tightened by allowing the required TCP or UDP ports to specific user groups
only, such as any ports for the IT administrator group, HTTP ports and HTTPS ports for
normal Internet usage by the council’s IT staff.

In addition, Figure 6.11 illustrates Council C’s recommended static web server system
including the network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.
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Figure 6.11. The recommended high level static web system including network traffic
protocols for Council C
 Risk 8
All DNS traffic which flow from the DMZ network to the council’s internal network
should be blocked or denied, otherwise this rule should be incorporated with the DNS
deep inspection and log feature in order to prevent any potential DNS attacks against the
council’s internal DNS servers (domain controllers).
 Risk 9
Only one-way communication is required from the CoC-DMZ-CMS server which is
located in the council’s internal network to push web content information through the
firewall via a HTTP port to the CoC-DMZ-CMS server.
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As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, this rule
should be changed from permitting an IP to permitting only the HTTP (see Appendix
C8: Policy number 6). This rule change will limit the CoC-CMS server to access the
CoC-DMZ-CMS server via the HTTP port only.

In addition, this rule also allows the system administrator to manage the CoC-DMZCMS using the DameWare Mini Remote Control (via TCP port 6129) and MS Terminal
Services (via TCP port 3389) software. A new firewall rule should be created in order to
allow only the authorised devices (computers) to access the CoC-DMZ-CMS server via
both TCP ports 3389 and 6129. Figure 6.12 illustrates the council’s recommended CMS
web system including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 6.12. The recommended high level CMS web system with network traffic
protocols for Council C
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 Risk 10
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, the firewall
rule can be tightened by mapping only the required IP addresses rather than the whole
subnet.
 Risk 11
Security can be enhanced using this rule by turning on the log feature of the firewalls.
 Risk 12
As per best practice recommendations to standard firewall configurations, the port
service should be changed from “any” (IP) protocol to the required protocol (TCP:
HTTP). In addition, by activating both “IPS inspect (filter)” feature on the firewalls and
“HTTP application layer inspect” on the reverse proxy server (ISA01), security can be
enhanced and any potential risk related to its port service will be minimised.
 Risk 13
HTTPS is only required for a one-way communication protocol from the Epathweb
frontend web server to the external gateway payment service (Commweb01). Therefore,
the setting for HTTP traffic can be safely removed.
 Risk 14
In order to prevent any potential DNS attacks against the council’s online payment
system, a new firewall rule should be created to allow only the Epathweb frontend web
server to access both the internal DNS servers via the UDP: DNS port in conjunction
with DNS deep inspection and enabling the log feature.
 Risk 15
Refer to previous comments in Section 6.5.1.1.2: Risk 7 for details. In addition, this rule
allows the system administrator to manage the Epathweb frontend web server using the
DameWare Mini Remote Control (via TCP port 6129) and NetOp Remote Control
software (via TCP port 6502).
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Therefore, creating a new firewall rule which allows the system administrator to
manage the Epathweb frontend web server via both TCP ports 6129 and 6502 is
recommended. Figures 6.13 illustrate the council’s recommended online payment
system including network traffic protocols in a high level network diagram.

Figure 6.13. The recommended high level diagram of the online payment system
including network traffic protocols for Council C

Note:
There were some critical firewall rules which were uncovered, that were not related to
this thesis. Nevertheless, these firewall rules can be a source of potential risk against the
council’s internal network. Therefore, the identified risk issues and possible mitigation
recommendations were discussed with the system administrator and provided in a
separate submitted report.
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 Risk 16
Details of the new switch recommendations were previously discussed in Section
6.5.1.1.2: Risk 8. Furthermore, low level details on the new switch ports and VLANs
including its connectivity for the council’s online web system are presented Figure 6.14.

Figure 6.14. The recommended low level network diagram of the online web system for
Council C with the two new recommended switches
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6.5.1.2.3 Testing stage 3: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
There were poor Windows password configurations on the CoC-DMZ-Web, the CoCDMZ-CMS, the CoC-CMS and the Pathway servers. The Windows password policy on
these servers should be reconfigured in order to prevent any potential vulnerability. In
addition, the security audit policy on the CoC-CMS, the Epathweb, the Epathway and
the Pathway servers should be reviewed as indicated in Appendices C12, C13, C14 and
C15.
 Risk 2
It is recommended to install the missing service packs as well as patches to the four
servers (the CoC-DMZ-Web, the Epathweb, the Epathway and the Pathway).
Appendices C16, C17, C18 and C19 present the overall system patching testing analysis
and the possible mitigation recommendations.
 Risk 3
As previously discussed, there were unnecessary open TCP and UDP ports on all the six
servers, particularly the CoC-DMZ-Web and the Epathweb servers. Table 6.33 presents
the total number of recommended open TCP and UDP ports on all the council’s online
payment servers.

Table 6.33 The total number of recommended open TCP and UDP service ports on all
Council C’s online web servers

Server names

Recommended open
TCP ports

Recommended open
UDP ports

Comments

CoC-DMZ-Web

6

1

Refer to Appendix C20

CoC-DMZ-CMS

4

1

Refer to Appendix C21

CoC-CMS

7

1

Refer to Appendix C22

Epathweb

4

1

Refer to Appendix C23

Epathway

10

2

Refer to Appendix C24

Pathway

11

3

Refer to Appendix C25
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 Risk 4
See Appendices C26, C27, C28, C29, C30 and C31 for full details of the identified risk
issues and the possible mitigation recommendations for all the six online web system
servers respectively.

6.5.1.2.4 Testing stage 4: Possible mitigation
 Risk 1
The overall details of all the findings (satisfactory and unsatisfactory) and the possible
mitigation recommendations are provided in Appendices C32, C33, C34, C35, C36,
C37 and C38 respectively.

6.5.1.2.5 Testing stage 5: Possible mitigation
 Risks 1 and 2
As per recommendation to general best practices, the council may consider employing
related online technical policies and procedures particularly for the online backend
database as well as the web servers. In addition, policies and procedures for the
council’s infrastructure such as the firewall, the IDS/IPS and the switch may be
considered, as the infrastructure provides internetwork connectivity to the database and
the online web servers. This will enhance the security of Council C’s online web
system.

6.5.2 Discussion

In terms of general best practices, the research actions carried out on Council C
identified that both the email and the online web system (the static web system, the
CMS web system and the online payment system) did not meet the CIS and MS
industry standards similar to both the results from Councils A and B. In addition, the
recommended frameworks of email and online web systems were successfully utilised
during the auditing period similar to both the results of Councils A and B. Chapter 8:
Section 8.3 provides examples and details of how to use as well as adjust the
recommended frameworks to other similar environments.
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Six main factors were identified which can lead to the cause of potential risks and
interruptions to the council’s email, online web and other related systems. Similar to
Council A and B, these factors include the lack of IT security standards awareness,
inadequate specific knowledge, limited IT training as a result of restricted training
budget, insufficient time for task completion, reliance on external consultants for
specific IT projects and no valid testing environment in place. The full details of these
factors are explained in the following paragraphs.

Firstly, the lack of IT security standards awareness was examined. There were several
discussions with Council C’s network administrator and system administrator in this
audit testing analyses, which was conducted over a period of five months. This
investigation uncovered a number of potential risks due to the lack of security
awareness such as both the email and online web systems’ architectures not following
the CIS and MS IT security industry recommendations to best practices.

Similar to both Councils A and B, the email server architecture was not in conformity to
the MS Exchange 2007 architecture recommendation. According to the network
administrator and the system administrator, the MS Exchange email server was
designed and deployed by the council’s IT operational staff with some assistance from
the external contractor.

Another lack of IT security standards awareness was that council’s network architecture
infrastructure did not have an Internet border router in place. Furthermore, the
infrastructure used only one core switch to provide network connectivity for both the
DMZ and the internal network areas. These factors can lead to be a cause of potential
risks to the council’s network infrastructure system in terms of a single point of failure.

Table 6.34 summarises the findings related to the lack of IT security standards or
industrial best practices by the staff of Council C
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Table 6.34 The summary of the issues uncovered related to the lack of IT security
standards awareness by the IT staff

Results related to lack of IT security standards awareness by IT staff of the council

Council C

Internet border router deployed

No

Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed

No

Standalone external gateway switch deployed

No

Standalone DMZ switch deployed

No

Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007 recommendations
to best practices

No

Secondly, the inadequate domain or service specific knowledge was outlined. Similar to
both Councils A and B, this was evident from incorrect and inadequate configurations
on the DMZ switch, the firewall rules, the unnecessary ports and services installed on
the related servers. Furthermore, according to both the network administrator and the
system administrator, they were not formally trained in specific email and online web
system related courses, or even any other general ICT security related courses.

For example, system and network administrators did not attend any firewall, MS
Exchange 2007 and MS SQL Server 2005 training courses. Instead, the IT operational
staff have merely kept up-to-date with ICT developments through self instruction that
was mainly done after working hours. See Table 6.35 for more details.

Table 6.35 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific
knowledge

Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff
of the council

Council C

Firewall configuration related to the email and online web systems

Insufficient

Switch configuration related to the email and online web systems

Insufficient

Setup and configuration of the email server application (MS Exchange 2007)

Incorrect

Setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL Server 2005)

Incorrect

Application of updated software patches on the email server

No

Application of updated software patches on the online web server

No
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Table 6.35 The summary of results uncovered related to the inadequate specific
knowledge (continued)

Results related to inadequate domain or service specific knowledge by the IT staff
of the council

Council C

Application of updated software patches on the CMS server

No

Application of updated software patches on the online payment server

No

Internal email spoofing allowed

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online web server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the CMS server

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the CMS server

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server

Yes

Thirdly, the limited IT training as a result of a restricted training budget was examined.
According to the council’s IT manager, each year the IT operational staff received a
very restricted training budget. Consequently, each of the IT operational staff had to
take turns in training courses that occurred only every two or three years. See details in
Table 6.36.

Table 6.36 The summary results related to the limited IT training as a result of limited
training budget

Issues uncovered in relation to the limited IT training budget

Council C

Formal industry or equivalent routing training of the IT operational staff

No

Formal industry or equivalent firewall training of the IT operational staff

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of the email application (MS Exchange
2007) of the IT operational staff

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL Server
2005 or equivalent) of the IT operational staff.

No

Formal IT Security training of the IT operational staff

No

IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational staff member

Partly

Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff

Yes
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Fourthly, the matter of insufficient time for task completion was looked at. Council C
has eight IT operational staff including the IT manager. The IT operational staff have to
manage a daily operation covering GIS, library, email, online payment, online website
system, CMS, property management, communication and telephony systems.

In terms of infrastructure, the network administrator and the system administrator
provide support for the infrastructure as well as all the ICT related servers. Therefore,
some tasks were continually left incomplete, with little or no time for documentation
and individual self study. Table 6.37 summarised the insufficient time for task
completion by the council IT operational staff.

Table 6.37 Results uncovered related to the insufficient time for task completion

Issues uncovered in relation to the insufficient time for task completion

Council C

The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task simultaneously

Yes

Use of enterprise information security policy

No

Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy

No

Updated documentation of the IT email system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – static web system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – CMS web system

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – online payment system

No

Fifthly, the matter of the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects was
analysed. Council C also required external consultant to assist in implementing on some
of their ICT projects such as wireless network, microwave link, email 2007 server and
Pathway online payment server. However, they first tried to do as much as possible by
themself before going to the external consultant (personal communications with Council
C, 2010).

There was an evident lack of knowledge transfer in the implementation of email 2007
server such as partly email server installation documentation guide was given to the
staff. This may point out that missed contract management by the council when dealing
the project with the external consultant.

See Table 6.38 for more details relating to the reliance on external consultants for
specific IT projects (related to both the email and online web systems) by Council C.
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Table 6.38 Summary of issues uncovered relating to the reliance on external consultants
for specific IT projects

Issues in relation to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects

Council C

Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external consultants

Yes

Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation and
management provided by the external consultants

No

Deployment of the online payment system by external consultants

Partly

Appropriate documentation for the online payment system (Epathweb) installation and
management provided by the external consultants

Partly

Finally, there was no valid testing environment in place at Council C. There is a testing
VM server environment at the council’s IT department for pilot testing on different
kinds of servers such as email and online web servers.

Similar to both Councils A and B, there was no network communication system testing
environment for the IT department at Council C. The installation of a network testing
environment would provide benefits to all the of council such as minimising potential
risks as well as providing flexibility to the council’s IT operational staff during
deployment of new devices. See the following table for more details.

Table 6.39 Summary results uncovered related to no valid testing environment on place
at the council

Summary results related to the lack of a valid testing environment

Council C

Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure

No

Existence of a testing environment for the email system

No

Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – static web system

No

Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – CMS web system

No

Existence of a testing environment for the online web system – online payment system

Partly
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION, FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS

7.1 Discussion

The audit and analysis carried out at the three selected councils through the
methodology described revealed several common security risks and deficiencies. It was
identified that there was a prevalence of a lack of overall education, training and
knowledge of security measures and issues, a lack of inter-staff communication and a
lack of resources such as time and expertise.

The overall limitations of the research were in relation to limited time for conduction of
testing and scheduling of meetings. Other limitations were due to changing conditions
associated with real time systems as well as deficiencies in database knowledge (SQL
2005 Server).

7.2 Findings

This section is divided into two subsections, which include the seven common issues
discovered as well as generic action plan checklist.

7.2.1 The seven common issues discovered

The following is list of the seven common factors uncovered during the email and
online web systems testing process.


Lack of IT security standards awareness;



Inadequate domain or service specific knowledge;



Inefficient communication;



Limited IT training as a result of restricted training budget;



Insufficient time for task completion;



Reliance on external consultants for specific IT projects; and



No valid testing environment in place at Council.
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There were seven common security risk factors uncovered at both Councils A and B.
However, there were six risk factors uncovered at Council C, the missing risk factor
was the “Inefficient communication between the IT operational staff”.

The following sections describe the seven factors in detail.

1) Lack of IT security standards awareness: The two audits carried out included
several discussions with the councils’ IT managerial and IT operational staff
together with the email and online web testing analyses for each of the selected
councils. The results of these audits indicated that there was a lack of IT security
standards observance by the relevant IT operational staff.

For example, the email server (MS Exchange 2007) architecture for all of the
selected councils was not based on the MS Exchange 2007 best practice
recommendations. Furthermore, the architecture of the online payment system
for Council B did not follow the Microsoft best practice design
recommendations of multi-tiered (3) client-server architecture (Microsoft
Corporation, 2010). The following table describes the overall findings related to
the lack of IT security standards awareness for generally accepted industrial best
practice recommendations.

Table 7.1 Overall findings related to the lack of IT security standards awareness for
industrial best practices by the IT staff for the three selected councils

Finding

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

Internet border router deployed

Yes

Yes

No

Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link
deployed

No

No

No

IDS/IPS deployed and currently in use

No

No

Yes

Standalone external gateway switch deployed

Yes

No

No

Standalone DMZ switch deployed

Yes

No

No

Design of email server architecture based on the MS
Exchange 2007 recommendations to best practices

No

No

No

Design of the online payment system conforming to
recommendations of a multi-tiered client-server architecture

Yes

No

Yes
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2) Inadequate domain or service specific knowledge: There was evidence of
incorrect and insufficient configuration in all three selected councils’
internetwork infrastructure (the firewalls, the switches and the Internet border
routers) and the related servers. To some extent this was attributed to the lack of
formal Internet and web server knowledge that was attributed to insufficient
training, according to the different IT operational staff from each of the selected
councils. The discussions with the IT management staff revealed that the IT
operational staff was not well versed in the administration of the firewalls, the
web servers’ security, MS Exchange 2007 and MS SQL Server 2005. Table 7.2
below presents the overall evidence related to the factor of the inadequate
specific knowledge at Councils A, B and C.

Table 7.2 Overall results uncovered related to the inadequate specific knowledge

Finding

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

Insufficient configuration on the Internet border router related
to the email and online web systems

No

Yes

N/A

Insufficient configuration on the firewall related to the email
and online web systems

Yes

Yes

Yes

Insufficient configuration on the switch related to the email
and online web systems

No

Yes

Yes

Incorrect setup and configuration of the email server
application (MS Exchange 2007)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Incorrect setup and configuration of the online database
application (MS SQL Server 2005)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Application of updated software patches on the email server

No

No

No

Application of updated software patches on the online web
server

N/A

No

No

Application of updated software patches on the CMS server

N/A

No

No

Application of updated software patches on the online
payment server

No

No

No

Internal email spoofing allowed

Yes

Yes

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email
server

Yes

Yes

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online
web server

N/A

Yes

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the CMS
server

N/A

Yes

Yes

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online
payment server

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Table 7.2 Overall results uncovered related to the inadequate specific knowledge
(continued)

Finding

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server

Yes

Yes

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online web server

N/A

Yes

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the CMS server

N/A

Yes

Yes

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server

Yes

Yes

Yes

3) Inefficient communication: There was no evidence of a change management
processes in place or any simple specific technical log books evident at any of
the three selected councils. The absence of such guidelines and recording
demonstrated inefficient communication and handover procedures between the
IT operational staff. The lack of communication was also evidenced by the
inadequate or non-existent IT documentation of both the email and online web
systems. The lack of change management, documentation and communication
contributed to a lack of knowledge transfer and knowledge sharing.

For example, at Council A, there was a missed configuration on the firewall
relating to the online payment application and database servers due to the
Pathway application administrator not informing the network administrator to
update the firewall rule. Similarly at Council B there was a missed configuration
on the firewall rule related to the unnecessarily opened database ports as result
of lack of communication between the network administrator and the web
developer.

It should be noted that, the mis-communication ceased following the email and
online web system testings, which included several interviews with the network
and system administrators of Council C. However, the evident inadequate or
non-existent IT documentation of both email and online web systems will
continue to contribute to a lack of knowledge transfer in the near future. Table
7.3 describes the overall findings that can contribute to the inefficient
communication between the IT operational staff.
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Table 7.3 Overall issues uncovered that can contribute to the inefficient communication

Finding

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

Existence of change management procedures

No

No

No

Availability of simple specific technical log books

No

No

No

Updated documentation of the IT email system

No

No

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system related

No

No

No

4) Limited IT training for the IT operational staff as a result of restricted training
budget: Several discussions with the IT operational staff at all three selected
councils revealed that the IT training budget was limited. For example, each IT
operational staff member was permitted to attend a maximum of one IT specific
training course per year or every two years. This education policy contributed to
insufficient specific knowledge for managing both the email and online web
systems including the network infrastructure. The overall findings of the limited
IT training for the IT operational staff as a result of restricted training budget are
displayed in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Overall findings related to the limited IT training for the IT operational staff
as a result of limited training budget

Finding

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

Formal industry or equivalent routing training of the IT
operational staff

Yes

No

No

Formal industry or equivalent firewall training of the IT
operational staff

No

No

No

The IT operational staff were formally industry or equivalent
trained on the switching related course

Yes

No

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of the email
application (MS Exchange 2007) of the IT operational staff

No

No

No

Formal industry or equivalent training of database application
(MS SQL Server 2005 or equivalent) of the IT operational
staff

No

No

No

Formal IT Security training of the IT operational staff

Partly

No

No

IT training yearly budget allocation for each IT operational
staff member

Yes

Partly

Partly

Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT
operational staff

Yes

Yes

Yes
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5) Insufficient time for documentation: This was evident from the lack of proper IT
documentation such as, no IT enterprise security and no technical policies and
procedures in relation to both the email and online web systems at all three
selected councils. The various discussions with the IT operational and
management staff in all three selected councils revealed that there was
insufficient time allocated for efficient and appropriate task completion, due to
excessive workload as staff are required to manage several complex tasks
simultaneously.

For example, the network administrator of Council B was responsible for the
entire network infrastructure, the telephony system, the virtual servers and the
backup systems. Similarly, Council C’s system administrator managed the
database, the firewalls, the proxy, the email, the web, the applications and the
virtual servers together with the backup systems.

Table 7.5 provides the overall findings which related to the insufficient time for
documentation.

Table 7.5 Overall findings related to the insufficient time for documentation

Finding

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems
task simultaneously

Yes

Yes

Yes

Use of enterprise information security policy

No

No

No

Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security
policy

No

No

No

Updated documentation of the IT email system

No

No

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – static
web system

No

No

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – CMS
system

N/A

No

No

Updated documentation of the IT online web system –
payment system

No

No

No
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6) Reliance on external consultant for specific IT projects: The reliance on external
consultants was supported by the fact that the implementation of the email
systems in all three selected councils was outsourced. The outsourced
implementation of the email systems was exacerbated by the fact that no
appropriate documentation was provided by the external consultants to be used
as instruction manuals for the firewall, email installation and management.
Consequently, this shortcoming in documentation and handover contributed to a
lack of knowledge transfer in all three selected councils. The following table
lists the overall findings which related to the reliance on external consultants for
specific IT projects.

Table 7.6 Overall findings related to the reliance on external consultants for specific IT
projects

Finding

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

Implementation of the firewall system by external consultants

Yes

Yes

No

Appropriate documentation for the firewall installation and
management provided by the external consultants

Partly

Partly

N/A

Implementation of the email spam blocker appliances by
external consultants

Yes

Yes

N/A

Appropriate documentation for the email spam blocker
appliances installation and management provided by the
external consultants

Yes

Yes

N/A

Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application
server by external consultants

Yes

Yes

Yes

Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange
2007) installation and management provided by the external
consultants

No

No

No

Deployment of the online payment system by external
consultants

Partly

No

Partly

Appropriate documentation for the online payment system
(Epathweb) installation and management provided by the
external consultants

Partly

N/A

Partly

In addition, in the case of all the three selected councils, no real costing and IT
budgetary percentages either earmarked or allocated for external consultancy
contracting were discussed or disclosed to the researcher. However, all of the
three selected councils’ IT managers made mention of allocated IT budgets for
each advanced ICT project that required external consultancy (personal
communications with the three selected WA councils, 2008, 2009).
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Furthermore, it was found that all the three selected IT managers did prefer to
use external consultants for their advanced ICT projects and only used their own
IT staff to basic ICT projects (personal communications with the three selected
WA councils, 2008, 2009).

The three selected councils’ IT managers emphasised that the reasons and
benefits of using external contractors were the confidence and trust in external
professional expertise as well as to minimise any potential risk of project failure
that may occur during the process (personal communications with the three
selected WA councils, 2009). In addition, the use of external consultants was
most likely provided that the projects were considered to be advanced ICT
ventures, regardless of whether internal IT staff had undergone specific training
courses for the same assigned projects (personal communications with the three
selected WA councils, 2009).

7) No valid testing environment in place: All of the IT departments of the three
selected councils did not have any mirrored live testing environments in place,
apart from specific VM servers which were allocated as virtual testing servers
for the database (Councils B and C only) and online payment servers (all three
councils). The project also noted that there were no testing systems for the
network communication equipment at all three selected councils. Table 7.7
displays more details of the summary of issues uncovered related to the lack of a
valid testing environment.

Table 7.7 Summary results uncovered related to the absence of a valid testing
environment

Findings

Council
A

Council
B

Council
C

Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure

No

No

No

Existence of a testing environment for the email system

Partly

Partly

Partly

Existence of a testing environment for the online payment
system

Partly

Partly

Partly
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In addition, there were a total of 32 t common findings based on the seven factors at all
three selected WA councils (A, B and C). These most common factors are listed in
Table 7.8.

Table 7.8 Overall summary of the most common deficiencies uncovered at all three
selected WA councils

Total

Factor
number

Findings

1

1

Internet border router redundancy/alternative Internet link deployed

2

1

Design of email server architecture based on the MS Exchange 2007
recommendations to best practices

3

1

Design of the online payment system conforming to recommendations of a
multi-tiered client-server architecture

4

2

Insufficient configuration on the firewall related to the email and online web
systems

5

2

Incorrect setup and configuration of the email server application (MS
Exchange 2007)

6

2

Incorrect setup and configuration of the online database application (MS SQL
Server 2005)

7

2

Application of updated software patches on the email server

8

2

Application of updated software patches on the online payment server

9

2

Internal email spoofing allowed

10

2

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the email server

11

2

Unnecessarily opened or unused service ports on the online payment server

12

2

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the email server

13

2

Vulnerabilities uncovered on the online payment server

14

3

Existence of change management procedures

15

3

Availability of simple specific technical log books

16

3

Updated documentation of the IT email system

17

3

Updated documentation of the IT online web system related

18

4

Formal industry or equivalent firewall training of the IT operational staff

19

4

Formal industry or equivalent training of the email application (MS Exchange
2007) of the IT operational staff

20

4

Formal industry or equivalent training of database application (MS SQL
Server 2005 or equivalent) of the IT operational staff

21

4

Support of the council for self-costed self study of IT operational staff

22

5

The IT operational staff manages several complex IT systems task
simultaneously

23

5

Use of enterprise information security policy

24

5

Use of technical (issue-specific and systems-specific) security policy
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Table 7.8 Overall summary of the most common deficiencies uncovered at all three
selected WA councils (continued)

Total

Factor
number

Findings

25

5

Updated documentation of the IT email system

26

5

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – static web system

27

5

Updated documentation of the IT online web system – payment system

28

6

Deployment of the email (MS Exchange 2007) application server by external
consultants

29

6

Appropriate documentation for the email (MS Exchange 2007) installation
and management provided by the external consultants

30

7

Existence of a testing environment for the infrastructure

31

7

Existence of a testing environment for the email system

32

7

Existence of a testing environment for the online payment system

7.2.2 Generic action plan and checklist

The outcome of this research was a generic action plan for any organisation interested in
tightening its system and infrastructure security. This action plan was derived as a
result of abstraction from the procedures carried out at the three selected WA councils.
It emerged in the form of a checklist operating at three different levels that cover
internetwork

infrastructure,

application

services

and

documentation.

At

the

infrastructure level, organisations should be concerned with the secure operation of
devices such as the internet border router (outside communications), firewalls
(screening) and switches (outside, DMZ and internal communications) as well as the
general physical security of the whole installation. Within the application services level,
organisations should be concerned with the security of their intranet and internet
services such as email and online web services, whilst at the documentation level; the
security focus should be on the general and specific ICT policy and procedures for
standardisation and operational security.

This generic action plan is depicted in Tables 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11 in the form of quick
checklist designed for use by ICT managers or system administrators to formulate their
action plans if needed for their regular system audits. Ideally, this action plan should be
revisited every six months or at each device or application service change as
appropriate.
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Table 7.9 Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking
Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking

RT

FW

OSW

DSW

ISW

Severity

1

Physical security

1.1

Place device in appropriate environment against
dust, flood, etc.











Important

1.2

Install temperature control system including air
conditioner











Important

1.3

Deploy appropriate uninterruptible power supply
or alternative power supply











Critical

1.4

Allow access to only authorised personnel











Critical

1.5

Deploy surveillance system











Low

2

Infrastructure architecture

2.1

Redundancy or alternative link

2.2

Redundancy firewall architecture



Low

2.3

Double firewall architecture



Low

2.4

Deploy or enable IDS/IPS feature





Important

2.5

Deploy or enable logging server





2.6

Deploy standalone external gateway or outside
switch

2.7

Deploy standalone DMZ gateway or outside
switch



Important

2.8

Create multiple DMZs (if applicable)



Low

3

Hardware and cabling

3.1

Redundancy hardware: Dual power supply (if
applicable)











Important

3.2

Space each device physically for air flow











Low

3.3

All required cables should connect properly











Important

4

IOS/OS and application

4.1

IOS/OS up-to-date











Critical

4.2

Up-to-date patch/hot fix











Critical

4.3

Disable unused ports and interfaces











Critical

4.4

Disable unnecessary services











Critical

4.5

Application up-to-date (if applicable)





Critical

4.6

Install antivirus software (if applicable)





Critical

5

Configuration of administrative, ACL and rules

5.1

Secure administrative control











Critical

5.2

Appropriate privilege level or viewing access to
different user groups











Critical

5.3

Apply different login name and password to
internal network infrastructure











Important



Low









Important
Important
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Table 7.9 Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking (continued)
Recommended generic checklist 1: Internetworking

RT

FW

OSW

DSW

ISW

Severity

5.4

Disable and restrict commonly configured
management services, such as SNMP (if
applicable use SNMP v.3)











Important

5.5

Appropriate configure timekeeping which
required encrypted authentication











Important

5.6

Appropriate ACL rules to protect against IP
spoofing, probing and scanning



5.7

Appropriate ACL rules to specific required
services such as DNS, email, FTP and web



5.8

Critical


Critical

Inspect critical external incoming network
traffic such as HTTP and HTTPS



Important

5.9

Screen unwanted and/or potential risk protocols
such as IRC, Kazaa and MSN



Important

5.10

Appropriate configuration of NAT and PAT



Critical

5.11

Appropriate configuration to protect against
ARP poisoning attacks







Important

5.12

Apply appropriate VLAN setup and do not use
vendor default VLAN setup







Important

5.13

Appropriate configuration of switch port
network and security control such as broadcast
storm and port security (if applicable)







Important

5.14

Appropriate configuration of trunking



Important

RT

represents Internet border router

FW

represents firewall

O-SW represents outside switch
D-SW represents DMZ switch
I-SW represents inside switch
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Table 7.10 Recommended generic checklist 2: Application services
Recommended generic checklist 2: Application
services

CMS

Email

Payment

Static
web

Severity

1

Physical security

1.1

Place device in appropriate environment to
protect against dust, flood, etc.









Important

1.2

Install temperature control system including
air conditioner









Important

1.3

Deploy appropriate UPS or alternative power
supply









Critical

1.4

Allow access to only authorised personnel









Critical

1.5

Deploy surveillance system









Low

2

Application architecture

2.1

Separate both frontend CMS and backend web
servers by placing the frontend CMS server at
DMZ area (if applicable) and placing the
backend CMS server within the internal
network with its own isolated network or
VLAN (if applicable)

2.2

Separate both traditional email (SMTP) and
webmail servers by placing the webmail server
in the DMZ or internal network (depending on
vendor email architecture recommendations to
best practices) and the SMTP server within
internal network



Important

2.3

Deploy or install email spam blocker to filter
incoming email traffic before forwarding to
email (SMTP) server. The spam blocker
should be located in the DMZ area (if
applicable)



Critical

2.4

Deploy online payment system conforming to
recommendations of a multi-tiered clientserver architecture by placing frontend online
payment web server in DMZ area, and placing
application server within the internal network
with its own isolated network or VLAN

2.5

Place static (or dynamic) web server in DMZ

3

Hardware and cabling

3.1

Redundancy hardware: Dual power supply,
hard disk (if applicable)



Important

3.2

All required cables should connect properly



Important

3.3

Dedicate stand alone hardware and
redundancy hard disks for critical servers such
as database server

3.4

Appropriate assignment of high
bandwidth/speed network to critical servers
such as database, email client servers (if
applicable)



Important



Critical





Critical



Important



Important

283
Table 7.10 Recommended generic checklist 2: Application services (continued)
Recommended generic checklist 2: Application
services

CMS

Email

Payment

Static
web

Severity

4

Secure operating system

4.1

OS up-to-date









Critical

4.2

Up-to-date patch/hot fix/service pack









Critical

4.3

Disable unused ports and services









Critical

4.4

Disable unnecessary user accounts (e.g. guest)









Important

4.5

Secure administrative control









Critical

4.6

Install antivirus software









Critical

5

Secure application software and data

5.1

Applications update









Critical

5.2

Application of up-to-date patch/hot fixes









Critical

5.3

Disable default application login name and
password (if applicable)









Important

5.4

Create appropriate levels of role based
authorisation of users









Important

5.5

Apply appropriate alternative configuration
port instead of default port such as SQL

5.6

Configure alternative internal email port to
mitigate against email spoofing

5.7

Apply asymmetric encryption method to
sensitive data such as customer credentials
information



Critical

5.8

Encrypt network traffic between servers
(frontend, application and backend) if
applicable



Important

5.9

Limit access permission on all data folders









Important

5.10

Regularly backup and secure all the data









Critical

6

Administrative, monitoring and logging

6.1

Allow only secure communication between
server application and administrator terminal
such as HTTPS, SSH









Critical

6.2

Appropriate application of logging feature to
all servers









Important

6.3

Apply appropriate username and password for
applications and operating systems









Important



Important



Payment

represents online web system – payment system

Static web

represents online web system – static web system

Important
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Table 7.11 Recommended generic checklist 3: Workflow and documentation
Recommended generic checklist 3: Workflow and documentation

Severity

1

Create/apply appropriate change management procedures

Important

2

Create/apply appropriate simple specific technical log books such as for firewall
and servers

Important

3

General or enterprise ICT security policies

Important

4

Technical ICT security (issue-specific and systems-specific) policies such as
network, remote access policies

Important

5

End-user ICT policies such as login and email usage policies

Important

6

Standards, guidelines and procedures – circulation, updates and enforcement

Important

7

Regularly team meeting to minimise potential of lack of communication between
ICT staff

Important

8

Allocate sufficient training budget to its ICT staff (if applicable)

Important

9

All external consultancy work carried out should be fully documented and available
on site

Critical

10

Appropriate deployment of testing environment for network infrastructure

Important

11

Appropriate deployment of testing environment for server, particularly critical
servers such as database server

Critical

7.3 Limitations of the research

There were a number of limitations of the research associated with the testing and
analysis phases conducted at the three selected councils. They are presented below.

1) Audit meetings cancelled or re-scheduled: Meetings with each of the selected
councils were sometimes postponed as a result of unforeseen circumstances. This
meant that delays were incurred in the testing and analyses cycles. These were
further complicated when the testing and analyses cycles were time critical in that
there were performance time windows for when they could be carried out on the
online web systems. The fact that this research was done on a non-payment basis
may have contributed to this attitude of ascribing little importance to the meetings
or the time set aside for the testings.

2) Real-time data difficulties during the analysis: As a result of data collection in realtime, several disruptions to data recordings occurred at all three selected councils.
For instance, during the data collection and analysis process at Council A, the
firewall configuration codes changed several times over a period of two weeks
which meant that the reports had to be redone with the new configuration codes. In
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addition, the email and online web systems at all three selected councils are realtime systems, requiring regular software updating such as patches and service
packs. Any updates that occurred after the testing and analysis obfuscated the
results and rendered the recommendations invalid.

3) Limited time frame for data collection and reporting: The data collection and
reporting process, which included two reports per council, had a one year time
frame in which both the email and online web systems at the three selected councils
had to be completed. However, due to the unforeseen circumstances, the data
collection and reporting process had to be extended from 12 months to 15 months.

4) Requests for additional testing outside the scope of the research: Two of the
selected councils, Councils A and C, asked for additional testing analyses not
covered by the parameters of the engagement.

For example, Council A asked for security testing on their virtual servers, Citrix
and remote access systems. Council C requested for in-depth security testing on
their network infrastructure. These were not able to be carried out as they would
have detracted from the main purpose of the research.

5) Lack of specific database management skills in the selected councils: There was a
lack of database management skills in MS SQL Server 2005 for the IT operational
staff in all three selected councils. These caused small interruptions during the
online web system testing period at all three selected councils, as additional time
had to be allocated to figure out the formulation of the benchmarking for the online
web system testing.

As a consequence of the above mentioned difficulties, the research was limited to two
systems only, viz. the email and online web systems. Online services such as the online
library, online GIS and online GPS systems which normally form the suite of services,
in addition to the email and online web systems, were outside the scope of this research.

Furthermore, time constraints prevented the web application security testing as denoted
in Figure 8.3 in chapter 8 to be performed. This limitation meant that vulnerability
testing specific to web application architecture to attack scenarios was not performed.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

8.1 Conclusion

Three research questions were formulated in order to investigate feasible solutions to
the problems that were exposed in the initial audit. These research questions were
outlined in Chapter 1 and relate to the level of security of the email and online web
systems deployed at the selected councils in terms of standards, usage and possible
improvement.

The research activities carried out in this undertaking revolved around answering the
three research questions postulated at the outset. The first question was to determine
whether the current email and online web systems at the three selected councils (A, B
and C) met with the relevant aforementioned IT security standards. The analyses that
were conducted over a six-, 12- and 18-month period revealed that the implementation
of these systems fell short of meeting these standards. Nevertheless, the research
activity relating to this question provided recommendations to the selected councils to
rectify the problems by implementing the proposed solutions so that those standards
requirements could be met.

The second research question queried whether the processes could be formulated into a
framework that could be used to improve the strength of the security of the email and
online web systems at the selected councils. This was demonstrated in the form of a
methodology and regime of implementation and maintenance at the selected councils
that if followed consistently and repetitively with respect to the nature of the system
(email, online static, dynamic and payment) under review would ensure the security
strength of the systems for the future as all processes would be documented by check
listing each phase of the frameworks as denoted in Figure x and Figure y for the email
and online web systems respectively.
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The third question was to determine whether other organisations with similar
architecture and environments could utilise the proposed data analysis frameworks for
both the email and online web systems to suit their own individual and specific needs.
This question was answered in the first instance by the selection of the three separate
entities of Councils A, B and C.

In the second instance, in as far as whether the frameworks are workable for other
organisations are concerned, the frameworks have additional and generic stages which
allow for substitutions of the parameters that uniquely characterise those systems under
review. These substitutions have been already noted in the frameworks in Figure 8.1
and Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.1. Data analysis framework for the analysis of the email system
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Figure 8.2. Data analysis framework for the analysis of the online web system

The provision of these examples of substitutions within the frameworks for the email
and online web systems parameters peculiar to any other organisations, allow for
generalisations and translatability fundamental to the concept of frameworks.
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8.2 Recommendations

Given the findings from this research, a number of recommendations were proposed to
the three selected councils in WA. The IT operational staff of the three selected councils
were given the option to implement the solutions provided in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 for
Councils A, B and C respectively. In addition, a more formal methodological
framework solution, as outlined in Chapter 3 could be utilised to be implemented as a
management solution at any council and/or organisation with similar architecture, with
a view to enhancing network security as per individual requirements. For example, any
other council wishing only to apply the developed information security framework for
the online web system testing of their static online web systems without database
servers auditing, may simply adjust the developed information security framework to
suit their specific requirements. This modification to the online web system framework
may be achieved by a simple removal of Testing stage 4: Vendor security benchmark
auditing as depicted in Figure 8.3.

Figure 8.3. A sample of the modified framework of the static online web system
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Another example in Figure 8.4 illustrates how the current email security auditing
framework can be used at similar organisations which have the same or a different email
application software.

For example, in case of an organisation using IBM Lotus Notes as their email
application software, the only change to the framework is the vendor security
benchmark auditing (on the email server) at stage 4. All other stages within the
framework need not change. Specifically the only change would be in the auditing and
best practices of IBM Lotus Notes instead of MS Exchange 2007 email applications in
name only. The actual auditing steps would however, remain the same.

Figure 8.4. An example of the change required for a different email application
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8.3 Future research directions

The methodology used in the analysis of the online web system was limited to the
review and analysis of the internetwork, the vulnerability assessment of the web, the
application and backend database servers, the vendor security benchmark auditing on
the database server and the review of the related security policy due to constraints of
this research study.

A future research direction would be to enhance the online web system framework by
the addition of a web application security testing step in Testing stage 4 as denoted in
Figure 8.5.

Figure 8.5. A diagram of the testing process framework of the online web system with
the additional web application testing phase
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The added web application security testing steps would incorporate testing the processes
and applications for vulnerability against attacks on web platforms, web service (XML),
input validation, web database, web authentication and authorisation (Scambray et al.,
2006). See Figure 8.6 for more details.

Figure 8.6. A diagram of detailing the extra web application security testing steps that
would be included in the framework

This additional testing of the web application would cover the vulnerability issues
related to a series of web threats and attack scenarios specific to the web application
architecture deployed at each of the selected councils. In addition, the extra security
testing in stage 4 would provide a defence strategy that could be deployed to mitigate
any identified potential risks that the online web systems at these councils or other
organsitions would be exposed to.
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Another future direction would be to extend the security focus to the other online
community services of the councils such as online library, online GIS and online GPS
systems, in addition to the email and online web systems already covered in this
research. These additions to the framework are outlined in the Figure 8.7.

Figure 8.7. The stage module diagram incorporating all five online services for the
further security enhancement of the councils

Figure 8.7 shows both the specific system testings as well as the finalised testings of the
internetworking infrastructure devices and the policy review testing. The finalised
testings would include services and system identification, port scanning, vulnerability
and specific vendor assessment of the entire internetworking infrastructure devices such
as the Internet border router, the DMZ switch(s), the firewall(s), the IDS/IPS and the
reverse proxy server(s). Lastly, an overall ICT security policy review could also be
included in any future undertaking.
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This research has presented a multiple interpretive case based study of a method for
security proofing an online communication service. This research was conducted
through the extensive analysis of the email and online web systems of three selected
councils. The analysis covered the details of network architecture, device
configurations, port scanning, vulnerability testing, email and database auditing and
related information security policy reviews. Data was gathered from stakeholders,
organisation documents and network security audits (email and online web systems) in
order to arrive at the conclusions put forward after the detailed analysis.

In conclusion, this research is the first step in a series of steps that provides a simple
network auditing mechanism for both email and online (static, dynamic and payment)
web systems. As such, the auditing mechanism could be extended to cover an audit of
personal online banking websites for policy and information provided to existing and
future customers based on the system of scrutiny utilised in this research. For example,
the extension could commence with Australian banks and then be followed by similar
audits to banks in other countries. Shifting the security focus in this way, could open up
a myriad of other future research directions.

Furthermore, the extensions and future directions should further satisfy the seven
principles of research expounded upon earlier. For example, porting this research and its
principles to other contexts satisfy the principle of hermeneutics, contextualisation and
abstraction and generalisation. Exploration of different contexts and environments also
satisfy the principle of interaction between the researcher and the subjects.

295

REFERENCES

Abie, H., et al. (2004). The need for a digital rights management framework for the next
generation of e-government services. Electronic Government, an International
Journal 1(1), 8 - 28.

ABS. (2006). 8146.0: household use of information technology, Australia, 200506.Retrieved January, 2008, from http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/
subscriber.nsf/0/B1A7C67456AE9A09CA25724400780071/$File/81460_200506.pdf

ABS. (2009). 8146.0: household use of information technology, Australia, 200809.Retrieved November, 2010, from http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@
.nsf/DetailsPage/8146.02008-09?OpenDocument

Al-Ahmad, W., & Al-Kaabi, R. (2008). An extended security framework for egovernment. Paper presented at the IEEE International Conference on
Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI 2008) Taipei, Taiwan.

Alavi, M., & Carlson, P. (1992). A review of MIS research and disciplinary
development. Journal of Management Information Systems, 8(4), 45-62.

Allen, J., et al. (2007). Governing for enterprise security implementation guide.
Retrieved January, 2008, from http://www.cert.org/governance/ges.html

Al-Mashari, M. (2007). A benchmarking study of experiences with electronic
government. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 14(2), 172-185.

Australia Post. (n.d.). Postbillpay. Retrieved May, 2011, from http://www
.postbillpay.com.au/

Australian Communications and Media Auhtority. (2008). Telecommunications today:
Report 6 - Internet activity and content Retrieved September, 2011, from
http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_9058

296
Australian Government: Attorney-General's Department. (2006). Wireless security –
Information for CIO’s. Retrieved September, 2011, from http://www.ag.gov.au
/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(7A188806B7893EBA0402BC1472412E58)~
Wirel

Basta, A., & Halton, W. (2008). Computer security and penetration testing (1st ed.).
Boston: Thompson.

Benbasat, I., et al. (1987). The case research strategy in studies of information systems.
MIS Quarterly, 11(3), 369-386.

Benbasat, I., & Weber, R. (1996). Research commentary: Rethinking "Diversity" in
information systems research. Information systems research, 7(4), 389-399.

Berger, P. L., & Kellner, H. (1981). Sociology reinterpreted: An essay on method and
vocation. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday.

Cacho-Elizondo, S., & Loussaïef, L. (2009). The impact of sustainable development
initiatives on consumers’ relationship with retailers: An exploratory study of
French food retailers. Retrieved March, 2010, from www.marketing-trendscongress.com/2009.../CachoElizondo_Loussaief.pdf

Cavaye, A. L. M. (1996). Case study research: A multi-faceted research approach for
IS. Information Systems Journal, 6(3), 227-242.

Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. (2010). Check Point datasheet: UTM-1
appliances. Retrieved November, 2010, from http://www.64bit.eu/soubory
/3187/check-point-utm-1-datasheet.pdf?ms=3

CIS. (2007). Center for internet security benchmark for Exchange 2007 for Windows
Server 2003 version 1.0. Retrieved March, 2008, from http://www.
cisecurity.org/tools2/exchange/CIS_Benchmark_Exchange2007_1.0.pdf

297
CIS. (2010). Security configuration benchmark for Microsoft SQL Server 2005 version
1.2.0 January 12th, 2010. Retrieved March, 2010, from https://www.
cisecurity.org/.../sqlserver/CIS_SQL2005_Benchmark_v1.2.0.pdf

Cisco. (2002). Action steps to improving information security. Retrieved January, 2008,
from http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/neso/sqso/roi5_wp.pdf

Cisco. (n.d.-a). Cisco IronPort S-Series web security appliances. Retrieved September,
2011,

from

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns170/ns896/ns

895/ironport_s_series_datasheet.pdf

Cisco. (n.d.-b). DNS best practices, network protections, and attack identification.
Retrieved

August,

2011,

from

http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/

intelligence/dns-bcp.html

Cisco. (n.d.-c). Configuring application protocol inspection. Retrieved August, 2011,
from

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/app_ntwk_services/data_center_app

_services/ace_appliances/vA1_7_/configuration/security/guide/
appinsp.html#wp1063720

Commonwealth Bank of Australia. (n.d.). BPOINT. Retrieved May, 2011, from http://
www.commbank.com.au/xpos/bpoint/bpoint.asp

Dave, P. (2008). Introduction to SQL Server encryption and symmetric key encryption
tutorial. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://dotnetslackers.com/articles/sql/In
troductionToSQLServerEncryptionAndSymmetricKeyEncryptionTutorial.aspx

Davis, G. B., et al. (1992). Diagnosis of an information system failure: A framework
and interpretive process Information & Management, 23(5), 293-318.

DMS. (n.d.). IntraMaps. Retrieved May, 2011, from http://www.mapsolutions.com.au/
intramaps.aspx

298
Economic Commission for Africa. (2003). E-strategies: National, sectoral and regional
ICT policies, plans and strategies. Retrieved October, 2010, from http:// www.
uneca.org/aisi/docs/e-strategies.pdf

Fadia, A. (2006). The unofficial guide to ethical hacking (2nd ed.). USA: Thomson
Course Technology.

Farahmand, F., et al. (2003). Managing vulnerabilities of information systems to
security incidents. Paper presented at the ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th
International Conference on Electronic Commerce, New York, USA.

Farahmand, F., et al. (2005). A management perspective on risk of security threats to
information systems. Information Technology and Management, 6(2-3), 203225.

Fontana, J. (2007). DNS hole puts e-mail, directory services at risk. Retrieved January,
2008,

from

http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/180325/dns_hole_puts_e-

mail_directory_services_risk/

Ganger, D. L. (2007). Top 5 Exchange Server 2007 security best practices. Retrieved
March, 2011, from http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc512685.aspx

GFI. (2009). Network security scanning and patch management. Retrieved November,
2009, from http://www.gfi.com/lannetscan/

Gillett, S. E., et al. (2004). Local government broadband initiatives. Telecommunica
tions Policy, 28(7-8), 537-558.

Glanz, L. (2003). Expatriate stories: A vehicle of professional development abroad?
Journal of Managerial Psychology, 18(3), 259-274.

Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In
K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (pp. 105117). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

299
Hamel, J., et al. (1993). Case study methods. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.

Herzog, P. (2006). OSSTMM 2.2: Open-source security testing methodology manual.
Retrieved January, 2008, from http://isecom.securenetltd.com/osstmm.en.2.2.pdf

Hirwade, M. A. (2010). Responding to information needs of the citizens through egovernment portals and online services in India. The International Information
& Library Review 42(3), 154-163.

Hwang, M.-S., et al. (2004). Challenges in e-government and security of information.
Information & Security, 15(1), 9-20.

Infor. (2009). ePathway. Retrieved May, 2011, from http://www.infor.com/content
/brochures/epathway.pdf/

Intel Corporation. (2005a). Core technologies for developing a digital community
framework: Solutions for transforming government. Retrieved January, 2008,
from

http://download.intel.com/pressroom/kits/digitalcommunities/DCFrame

work_Whitepaper_5_081405.pdf

Intel Corporation. (2005b). Digital community best practices: Solutions for
transforming government. Retrieved January, 2008, from http://www.intel.
com/business/bss/industry/government/digital-community-best-practices.pdf

Intel Corporation. (2005c). The wireless city: Solutions for transforming government.
Retrieved January, 2008, from http://www.intel.com/business/bss/industry/
government/wireless_city.pdf

Ishida, T., (Ed). (2003). Understanding digital cities: Cross-cultural perspectives.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Joshi, S. (2011). SQL injection attack and defense. Retrieved June, 2011, from http://
www.securitydocs.com/library/3587/

300
Juniper Networks. (2009). Datasheet: SSG320M and SSG350M secure services
gateways.

Retrieved

March,

2010,

from

http://www.juniper.net/us/en/

local/pdf/datasheets/1000203-en.pdf

Kambalyal, C. (n.d.). 3-Tier architecture. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://
channukambalyal.tripod.com/NTierArchitecture.pdf

Kaplan, B., & Maxwell, J. A. (1994). Qualitative research methods for evaluating
computer information systems. In J. G. Anderson, C. E. Aydin & S. J. Jay
(Eds.), Evaluating health care information systems: Methods and applications
(pp. 45-68). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Kiely, D. (2006). Microsoft SQL Server 2005: Protect sensitive data using encryption in
SQL Server 2005. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://download.microsoft.
com/download/4/7/a/47a548b9.../sqlencryption.doc

Kim, J.-W., et al. (2006). Securing e-government services. Computer, 39(11), 111-112.

Klein, H. K., & Myers, M. D. (1999). A set of principles for conducting and evaluating
interpretive field studies in information systems. MIS Quarterly, 23(1), 67-88.

Klein, H. K., & Myers, M. D. (2001). A classification scheme for interpretive research
in information systems. In E. M. Trauth (Ed.), Qualitative research in IS: Issues
and trends (pp. 218-239). Hershey, PA, USA: IGI Global.

Lee, A. S. (1989). A scientific methodology for MIS case studies. MIS Quarterly 13(1),
33-52.

Limwiriyakul, S. (2009). Method for securing online community service: A study of
selected Western Australian councils. Paper presented at the 7th Australian
Information Security Management Conference, Perth, Western Australia.

Limwiriyakul, S., & Valli, C. (2011a). An IT security investigation into the email
systems of selected local government councils in WA. Paper presented at the

301
International Conference on Information and Electronics Engineering (ICIEE
2011), Bangkok, Thailand.

Limwiriyakul, S., & Valli, C. (2011b). Results from the deployment of a targeted
security testing framework for the testing of email systems in local government
in Western Australia. International Journal of Information and Electronics
Engineering (IJIEE), 1(1).

Limwiriyakul, S., & Valli, C. (2011c). An IT security investigation into the online
payment systems of selected local government councils in WA. Paper presented
at the 2011 International Conference on Security and Management (SAM'11),
Las Vegas, Nevada, USA.

Luckett, R., et al. (2008). Microsoft Exchange Server 2007: The complete reference
(2nd ed.). Berkshire, UK: McGraw-Hill Education.

Lyon, G. (2009). Nmap security scanner. Retrieved November, 2009, from http://
nmap.org

Mayo, E. (1933). The human problems of an industrial civilization. New York:
MacMillan.

McDonald, D., et al. (2009). Delphi technique: Dialogue methods for understanding a
problem broadly: integrating judgments. Retrieved June, 2012, from
http://epress.anu.edu.au/dialogue_methods/mobile_devices/ch03s04.html

Microsoft Corporation. (2005). Improving data security by using SQL Server 2005.
Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.itsecure.hu/library/file/Biztons%C3
%A1gi%20%C3%BAtmutat%C3%B3k/Adatb%C3%A1zis%20szerverek/Micro
soft%20IT%20Showcase%20Improving%20Data%20Security%20by%20Using
%20SQL%20Server%202005.pdf

Microsoft Corporation. (2010). N-Tier data applications overview. Retrieved
November, 2010, from http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb384398.aspx

302
Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team. (2006). An overview of Microsoft Exchange
Server 2007. Retrieved October, 2009, from http://www.priasoft.com/.../
Exchange2007_Overview_WhitePaper.pdf

Microsoft Exchange Documentation Team. (2009). Exchange Server 2007 planning.
Retrieved March, 2010, from http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/en/details
.aspx?FamilyID=1A6EFDD6-D80E-489D-9A1D8F3E01BAA3C5&displaylang=en

Microsoft TechNet. (2004). Securing Exchange communications Retrieved March,
2008, from http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd277366.aspx

Microsoft TechNet. (2005a). Telnet Client concepts. Retrieved March, 2008, from
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc740241(WS.10).aspx

Microsoft TechNet. (2005b). Telnet Client overview. Retrieved March, 2008, from
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc757343(WS.10).aspx

Microsoft TechNet. (2007a). IT showcase: Exchange Server 2007 design and
architecture at Microsoft. Retrieved March, 2008, from http://www.microsoft.
com/downloads/en/details.aspx?FamilyID=98C522BC-814A-421A-99C0D964ED119C0D&amp;displaylang=en&displaylang=en

Microsoft TechNet. (2007b). Overview of Outlook Anywhere. Retrieved March, 2008,
from http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb123741(EXCHG.80).aspx

Microsoft TechNet. (2007c). Recommendations for Outlook Anywhere. Retrieved
March,

2008,

from

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa997703

(EXCHG.80).aspx

Microsoft TechNet. (2009). Planning for Client Access Servers. Retrieved January,
2010, from http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb232184(v=exchg.140)
.aspx

303
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Qualitative data analysis: A source book of
new methods. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.

Myers, M. (2000). Qualitative research and the generalizability question: Standing firm
with Proteus [Electronic Version]. The Qualitative Report, 4. Retrieved
February 2011 from http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR4-3/myers.html.

Myers, M. D. (1997). Qualitative research in information systems. MIS Quarterly 21(2),
241-242.

Myers, M. D. (2009). Qualitative research in business & management. London: Sage
Publications.

Myers, M. D., & Walsham, G. (1998). Exemplifying interpretive research in
information systems: An overview Journal of Information Technology, 13(4),
233-234.

Neuman, W. L. (1997). Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative
approaches (3rd ed.). Boston, USA: Allyn & Bacon.

Orlikowski, W. J., & Baroudi, J. J. (1991). Studying information technology in
organizations: Research approaches and assumptions. Information System
Research, 2(1), 1-28.

Ortiz, J. A., & Tapia, A. H. (2008a). Keeping promises: Municipal communities
struggle to fulfill promises to narrow the digital divide with municipalcommunity wireless networks. The Journal of Community Informatics – Special
issue on wireless networking for communities, citizens and the public interest,
4(1).

Ortiz, J. A., & Tapia, A. H. (2008b). On democracy, public participation, and ethics,
municipal wireless networks: Toward justice for all? Sociological Focus Journal,
41(3), 256-275.

304
OWASP. (2009). Buffer overflow. Retrieved March, 2009, from http://www.owasp.
org/index.php/Buffer_Overflow

Paul, S., et al. (2011). Architectures for the future networks and the next generation
internet: A survey Computer Communications, 34(1), 2-42.

Pazalos, K., et al. (2010). A structured methodology for assessing and improving eservices in digital cities. Telematics and Informatics, 1-14.

Phiri, J., & Agbinya, J. I. (2006). Modelling and information fusion in digital identity
management systems. Paper presented at the International Conference on
Networking, International Conference on Systems and International Conference
on Mobile Communications and Learning Technologies (ICNICONSMCL'06),
Morne, Mauritius.

Pinto, J. K., & Slevin, D. P. (1989). The project champion: Key to implementation
success. Project Management Journal, 20(4), 15-20.

Rathore, B., et al. (2006). Information systems security assessment framework (ISSAF)
draft 0.2.1. Retrieved January, 2009, from http://www.oissg.org/downloads/
issaf-0.2/index.php

Reddick, C. G. (2005). Citizen interaction with e-government: From the streets to
servers? Government Information Quarterly, 22(1), 38–57.

Robey, D. (1979). User attitudes and management information system use. Academy of
Management Journal, 22(3), 527-538.

Scambray, J., et al. (2001). Hacking exposed: Network security secrets & solutions (2nd
ed.). Osborne: McGraw-Hill.

Scambray, J., et al. (2006). Hacking exposed web applications (2nd ed.): McGraw-Hill
Osborne Media.

305
Secure Computing Corporation. (2006). Eliminating your SSL blind spot: The solution
to managing—and securing—HTTPS traffic. Retrieved February, 2011, from
http://www.silicon.com/i/s/wp/spnsr/securecomputing/WW-SSL-WPAug06vF1.pdf

Shan, S., & Wang, J. (2009). A study on the evaluation model for development of local
eGovernment in China. Paper presented at the Management and Service Science,
2009. MASS '09. International Conference on, Wuhan.

Speed Guide. (n.d.-a). Port 9 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=9

Speed Guide. (n.d.-b). Port 19 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=19

Speed Guide. (n.d.-c). Port 79 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=79

Speed Guide. (n.d.-d). Port 666 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=666

Speed Guide. (n.d.-e). Port 999 details Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=999

Speed Guide. (n.d.-f). Port 1080 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=1080

Speed Guide. (n.d.-g). Port 1900 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=1900

Speed Guide. (n.d.-h). Port 1999 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=1999

Speed Guide. (n.d.-i). Port 2049 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=2049

306
Speed Guide. (n.d.-j). Port 6969 details. Retrieved October, 2010, from http://www.
speedguide.net/port.php?port=6969

Stanford University. Residential Computing. (2007). Information & news: Wireless in
the residences: What to buy and how to configure it. Retrieved February, 2011,
from http://rescomp.stanford.edu/info/wireless/recommendation.html

Stanton, D. (2004). Local e-government in Western Australia: How prepared are
councils to deliver services and interact with communities in an electronic
environment? Retrieved January, 2008, from http://www.finance.gov.au/
publications/future-challenges-for-egovernment/docs/AGIMO-FC-no1.pdf

Stewart, J. (2003). Third-party mail relay (open relay) and Microsoft Exchange Server.
Retrieved January, 2008, from http://www.sans.org/reading_room/ whitepapers/
email/third-party-mail-relay-open-relay-microsoft-exchange-server_963

Steyaert, J. (2000). Local government online and the role of the resident. Social Science
Computer Review, 18(1), 3-16.

Tanabe, M., et al. (2002). Digital cities In LNCS 2362 (pp. 101–109). Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

Tapia, A., et al. (2006). Making IT work for municipalities: Building municipal wireless
networks Government Information Quarterly, 23(3-4), 359-380.

Teece, D. J. (2010). Business models, business strategy and innovation Long Range
Planning, 43(2-3), 172-194.

Tellis, W. (1997). Introduction to case study The Qualitative Report, 3(2).

Torres, L., et al. (2005). E-government developments on delivering public services
among EU cities Government Information Quarterly, 22(2), 217-238.

307
Tracy, M., et al. (2007). Guidelines on securing public web servers: Recommendations
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved January, 2008,
from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-44-ver2/SP80044v2.pdf

VeriSign Authentication Services. (n.d.). FAQ: Extended validation SSL. Retrieved
May,

2011,

from

http://www.verisign.com.au/ssl/ssl-information-

center/extended-validation-ssl-certificates/

Wack, J., et al. (2003). Guideline on network security testing. Retrieved January, 2008,
from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-42/NIST-SP800-42.pdf

WALGA. (2007). Local government: Council websites. Retrieved January, 2008, from
http://www.walga.asn.au/careers/council_websites

WALGA. (2010a). ICT online services. Retrieved November, 2010, from http://www.
walga.asn.au/products_services/documents/directory/ict_online_services.pdf

WALGA. (2010b). Local government: Council websites. Retrieved November, 2010,
from http://www.walga.asn.au/careers/council_websites

Walsham, G. (1993). Interpreting information systems in organizations. Chichester:
Wiley

Walsham, G. (1995). Interpretive case studies in IS research: Nature and method.
European Journal of Information Systems 4(2), 74–81.

Websense. (2010). Websense content gateway HTTPS configuration. Retrieved
February,

2011,

from

http://kb.websense.com/pf/12/webfiles/Webinars/

webinar_pdf/February 202010_WebinarSlides.pdf

Whitman, M. E., & Mattord, H. J. (2006). Principles of incident response and disaster
recovery (1st ed.). USA: Thomson Course Technology.

308
Williamson, K., et al. (2002). Research methods for students, academics and
professionals: Information management and systems (2nd ed.). Wagga Wagga,
NSW: Centre for Information Studies, Charles Sturt University.

Yin, R. (1984). Case study research: Design and method (1st ed.). Beverly Hills, CA:
SAGE.

Yin, R. (1993). Applications of case study research. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.

Yin, R. (1994). Case study research: Design and method (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA:
SAGE.

309

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Additional results for Chapter 4

Appendix A1: A summary of the firewall configuration codes (email-NAT) of Council
A’s firewall

Policy no.

Rules

From (source)

To (destination)

1

Translate

A.B.C.82

192.168.1.92

2

Translate

A.B.C.89

172.16.25.251
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Appendix A2: A summary of the firewall configuration codes of Council A’s email
system
Policy
no.

Rules

Protocol
types

Interface

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

Permit

TCP

Outside

Any

192.168.1.92

SMTP

2

Permit

TCP

Inside

172.16.25.251

192.168.1.92

SMTP

3

Permit

TCP

Inside

172.16.25.251

192.168.1.92

SSH

4

Permit

TCP

Inside

172.16.25.70

192.168.1.92

MS-DS

5

Permit

UDP

DMZ

192.168.1.92

Any

DNS

6

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.92

Any

HTTP

7

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.92

Any

HTTPS

8

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.92

172.16.5.70

MS-DS

9

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.92

172.16.5.70

LDAP

10

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.92

172.16.25.251

SMTP

11

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.92

Any

SMTP

12

Permit

TCP

Inside

172.16.25.251

192.168.1.93

SMTP

13

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.93

172.16.25.251

SMTP

14

Permit

TCP

DMZ

192.168.1.93

Any

SMTP

15

Permit

TCP

Inside

172.16.25.251

Any

SMTP

16

Permit

TCP

Inside

172.16.25.251

192.168.1.89

ms-wbt-server

17

Permit

TCP

Inside

172.16.25.251

Any

HTTPS
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Appendix A3: A full details of system information policy results of Council A’s email
server

System information policy – CoA-email server (172.16.25.251)
Services
116

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length:

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age:

30 days

30 days

Minimum password age:

0 day

0 day

Force logoff:

Never force

Force

Password history:

3 passwords

N/A

Security auditing policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account logon
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Audit object access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit policy change

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system events

No

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix A4: A summary of both missing service packs and patches information of
Council A’s email server
Missing service pack (0) – email server (172.16.25.251)
Product

Severity

Description

Vulnerability issue

Recommendation

N/A

NA/

N/A

N/A

N/A

Missing patches (9) – email server (172.16.25.251)
Products

Severities

Descriptions

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

Windows

Moderate

KB961501

in Windows print spooler
could allow remote code
execution

Deploy/patch

Windows

Important

KB968537

in Windows kernel could
allow elevation of privilege

Deploy/patch asap

Windows

Important

KB970238

in RPC could allow elevation
of privilege

Deploy/patch asap

Windows

Important

KB970483

in IIS could allow elevation of
privilege

Deploy/patch asap

Windows

Important

KB956803

in the MS Ancillary function
driver could allow elevation
of privilege

Deploy/patch asap

Windows

N/A

KB951072

cumulative time zone update
for MS Windows OS

Deploy/patch

Exchange

N/A

KB960384

many vulnerabilities based on
update rollup 7 for MS
Exchange Server 2007 service
pack 1

Deploy an update rollup 7
for MS Exchange Server
2007 service pack 1 asap.

Exchange

Critical

KB959241

many vulnerabilities based on
update rollup 6 for MS
Exchange Server 2007 service
pack 1

Deploy an update rollup 6
for MS Exchange Server
2007 service pack 1
immediately.

Exchange

Important

KB949870

many vulnerabilities based on
update rollup 3 for MS
Exchange Server 2007 service
pack 1

Deploy update rollup 3 for
MS Exchange Server 2007
service pack 1 asap.
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Appendix A5: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendation on Council A’s email server

The overall opened TCP service ports (31) – email server (172.16.25.251)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions

Products

Recommendations

25

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol

MS ESMTP

Open

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer
Protocol

MS IIS webserver 6.0

Open

110

POP3-proxy

Post Office Protocol 3

AVG POP3 proxy
8.5.373/8.5.374

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call

MS Windows RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS session service

NetBIOS session service

Open

143

imap

Internet message access
protocol

MS Exchange 2007
imapd

Close

443

HTTPS

HTTP over TLS/SSL

MS IIS webserver 6.0

Open

445

microsoft-ds

MS-DS active directory,
Windows shares

MS Windows 2003

Open

587

MS ESMTP

email message submission

MS ESMTP

Close

593

ncacn_http_
epmap

HTTP RPC Ep Map

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

993

Imaps

Internet message access
protocol over SSL

MS Exchange 2007
imapd

Close

995

POP3S

Post office protocol 3 over
TLS/SSL

MS Exchange 2007
POP3d

Close

1046

msrpc

MS Windows RPC

Close

1052

ddt

Dynamic DNS tools

Close

1098

rmiactivation

RMI activation

Close

1114

mini-sql

Mini SQL

Close

1124

hpvmmcontrol

HP VMM control

Close

1127

kwdb-commn

KWDB remote
communication

Close

1149

bvtsonar

BVT sonar service

Close

1192

caids-sensor

caids sensors channel

Close

1232

msrpc

MS Windows RPC

1239

nmsd

NMSD

Close

1283

productinfo

Product information

Close

3128

ndl-aas

Active API server port

Close

3389

microsoft-rdp

60016002,
6004

ncacn_http

MS Windows RPC

8080

http-alt

HTTP alternate

MS Windows RPC

Close

MS terminal service

Open

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

Open
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The overall opened TCP service ports (31) – email server (172.16.25.251) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions

8400

cvp

Commvault unified data
management

8402

galaxy

Products

Recommendations
Close

Galaxy client event
manager

Close

The overall opened UDP service ports (5) – email server (172.16.25.251)
Port no

Services

Descriptions

Products

Recommendations

137

netbios-ns

NETBIOS Name Service

MS Windows NT
netbios-ssn

Open

138

netbios-dgm

NETBIOS datagram service

Close

445

microsoft-ds

Microsoft-DS SMB file
sharing

Close if not required

500

isakmp

Internet Security
Association and Key
Management Protocol

Close

4500

nat-t-ike

IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC
3947)

Close
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Appendix A6: A summary of Council A’s email server – the vulnerabilities and the
possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council A’s email server
(172.16.25.251)
High security vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

It is a virtual server, no action is required.

Services: TCP port 110 (POP3) open

Should be disabled

Low security vulnerabilities (7)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Services: FTP

Should be disabled

Services: HTTP

Should be disabled if not required

Services: HTTPS

Satisfactory

Services: IMAP

Should be disabled

Services: POP3

Should be disabled

Services: SMTP

Satisfactory

Potential vulnerabilities (3)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

Rename the administrator account.

Information: Some IMAP4 server banners providing
information to attacker

The service POP3 server should be turned off.

Information: Some POP3 server banners providing
information to attacker

The service POP3 server should be turned off.
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Appendix A7: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council A’s online
payment system

Policy
no.

Rules

Protocol
types

From (source)

To
(destination)

Ports (service)

1

Translate

N/A

A.B.C.84

192.168.1.84

N/A

2

Permit

TCP

Any

A.B.C.84

https (443)

3

Permit

TCP

172.16.25.73

192.168.1.84

www (80)

4

Permit

TCP

172.16.25.75

192.168.1.84

www (80)

5

Permit

IP

172.16.21.21 (admin)

192.168.1.84

Any

6

Permit

IP

172.16.21.22 (admin)

192.168.1.84

Any

8

Permit

TCP

172.16.25.40

192.168.1.84

ms-wbt-server (3389)

9

Permit

TCP

172.16.25.227

192.168.1.84

avenue (2134)

10

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.173

www (80)

11

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.175

www (80)

12

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

Any

www (80)

13

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

Any

https (443)

14

Permit

UDP

192.168.1.84

Any

domain (53)

15

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.68

m-sql-s (1433)

16

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.214

bb (1984)

17

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.214

www (80)

18

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.64

m-sql-s (1433)

19

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.194

www (80)

20

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.193

www (80)

21

Permit

TCP

192.168.1.84

172.16.25.227

avenue (2134)
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Appendix

A8:

A

full

details of

system

information policy results and

recommendations of Council A’s CoA-DMZ-Epathway server

System information policy – CoA-DMZ-Epathway server (192.168.1.84)
Services
102

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

0 char

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

42 days

30 days

Minimum password age

0 day

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

No history

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Appendix

A9:

A

full

details of

system

information policy results and

recommendations of Council A’s CoA-Pathway server

System information policy – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173)
Services
N/A (could not obtained the services information; access denied)

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

45 days

30 days

Minimum password age

2 days

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

6 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix A10: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council A’s CoA-SQL server
System information policy – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227)
Services
N/A (due to error connecting to WMI server: Access was denied)

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

45 days

30 days

Minimum password age

2 days

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

6 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix A11: A summary of missing service pack and patches, and the possible
mitigation recommendations for the CoA-Pathway server

Missing service pack (1) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173)
Product

Filename

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issue

Recommendation

Virtual
Studio

VS80sp1KB926601X86-ENU.exe

N/A

Virtual studio 2005
service pack 1

Deploy/patch

Missing patches (2) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

Windows

Low

N/A

Windows IE 7 for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

SDK
components

Critical

KB931906

MS07-028 security update
for CAPICOM

Deploy/patch asap
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Appendix A12: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server

The overall opened TCP service ports (22) – CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server (192.168.1.84)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

Close

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS
webserver 6.0

Close if not required

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows
RPC

Close if not required

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS session service

Close if not required

443

HTTPS

Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS/SSL
MS IIS webserver 6.0

Open

445

Microsoft-ds

MS-DS active directory, Windows shares
MS Windows 2003

Close

1025

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1038

MTQP

Message Tracking Query Protocol

Close

1049

Flexlm

FlexLM license manage

Close

3128

NDL-AAS

Active API server port

Close

3389

Microsoft-rdp

MS WBT server, MS terminal service

Open

5168

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows
RPC

Close

5169

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows
RPC

Close

5555

Omiback

HP open view omniback

Close

5988

Tcpwrapped

Tcpwrapped

Close

5989

SSL/TCPwrapped

SSL/TCPwrapped

Close

8080

HTTP alternate

Alternate HTTP port

Open

8400

CVP

Commvault unified data management

Close

8402

Galaxy

Galaxy client event manager

Close

8600

Asterix

Surveillance data

Close

14247

Unassigned

Unassigned

Close

The overall opened UDP service ports (11) – CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server (192.168.1.84)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

1

Sockets des Troie

Remote access/ICQ Trojan

Close

53

Domain

Domain name server

Open

69

TFTP

Trivial File Transfer

Close

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS name service MS Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn

Close if not required
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The overall opened UDP service ports (11) – CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server (192.168.1.84)
(continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

138

NetBIOS-dgm

NetBIOS datagram service

Close if not required

445

ms-ds

Microsoft-DS SMB file sharing

Close

500

Isakmp

Internet security association and key
management protocol

Close if not required

1755

WMS

Microsoft Media Services (MMS, msstreaming)

Close

4500

Nat-t-ike

IPSec NAT-traversal (RFC 3947)

Close if not required

8012

Ptakks

Backdoor.Ptakks, remote access/keylogger

Close

61747

KiLo

Remote access

Close
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Appendix A13: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoA-Pathway server

The overall opened TCP service ports (22) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

Close

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS
webserver 6.0

Open

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows
RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS session service

Open

445

Microsoft-ds

MS-DS active directory, Windows shares
MS Windows 2003

Open

1025

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1049

Flexlm

FlexLM license manage

Close

1068

Instl_bootc

instl_bootc, installation bootstrap proto. Cli.

Close

3104

Autocuelog

Autocue logger protocol

Close

3128

NDL-AAS

Active API server port

Close

3389

Microsoft-rdp

MS WBT server, MS terminal service

Open

4105

Ca-mq

CA message queuing server

Close

4728

Capmux

CA port multiplexer

Close

5988

Tcpwrapped

Tcpwrapped

Close

5989

SSL/TCPwrapped

SSL/TCPwrapped

Close

7166

arubaserver/Flexlm

Aruba eDiscovery Server

Close if not required

7188

Unassigned

Unassigned

Close

8080

HTTP alternate

Alternate HTTP port

Open

8400

CVP

Commvault unified data management

Close

8402

Galaxy

Galaxy client event manager

Close

14247

Unassigned

Unassigned

Close

The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

5

RJE

Remote job entry

Close

13

Daytime

Daytime (RFC 867)

Close

18

MSP

Message send protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS name service MS Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn

Open/ Close if not
required

138

NetBIOS-dgm

NetBIOS datagram service

Open/ Close if not
required
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The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoA-Pathway server (172.16.25.173) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

445

Microsoft-ds

MS-DS SMB file sharing

Open

500

Isakmp

Internet security association and key
management protocol

Close

1051

Optima-vnet

Optima VNET

Close

4500

Nat-t-ike

IPSec NAT-traversal (RFC 3947)

Close
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Appendix A14: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoA-SQL server

The overall opened TCP service ports (23) – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

Close

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS
webserver 6.0

Open

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

111

Rpcbind

SUN Remote Procedure Call

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows
RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS session service

Open

445

Microsoft-ds

MS-DS active directory, Windows shares
MS Windows 2003

Open

775

Rpcbind

Entomb

Close

1042

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

Open

1050

Java-orOTGfileshare

J2EE nameserver, also OTG, also called
Disk/Application extender. Could also be
MiniCommand backdoor OTGlicenseserv

Close

1215

MSRPC

MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1433

MS-SQL-S

MS-SQL-server

Open

1518

MSRPC

MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC

2134

Assigned

Council A’s assigned port

Open

3104

Autocuelog

Autocue logger protocol

Close

3128

NDL-AAS

Active API server port

Close

3389

Microsoft-rdp

MS WBT server, MS terminal service

Open

4105

CA-MQ

CA Message Queuing server

Close

4443

MSRPC

MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC

Close

4728

Capmux

CA port multiplexer

Close

8080

HTTP alternate

Alternate HTTP port

Open

8400

CVP

Commvault unified data management

Close

8402

Galaxy

Galaxy client event manager

Close

The overall opened UDP service ports (14) – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

111

Rpcbind

SUN remote procedure call

Close

123

NTP

Network time protocol

Close

135

MSRPC

MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC

Open/Close if not
required

326
The overall opened UDP service ports (14) – CoA-SQL server (172.16.25.227) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS name service MS Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn

Open/Close if not
required

138

NetBIOS-dgm

NetBIOS datagram service

Open/Close if not
required

161

SNMP

SNMP

Close

445

Microsoft-ds

Microsoft-DS SMB file sharing

Open

500

Isakmp

Internet security association and key
management protocol

Close

753

RRH

Reverse Routing Header

Close

1025

MSRPC

MS remote procedure call, MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1026

Winrpc

Windows RPC

Close

1069

Cognex-insight

COGNEX-INSIGHT

Close

1434

MS-SQL-M

Microsoft-SQL-monitor

Open

4500

Nat-t-ike

IPSec NAT-traversal (RFC 3947)

Close
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Appendix A15: A summary of Council A’s CoA-DMZ-Epathweb server – the
vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council A’s CoA-DMZEpathweb server
High security vulnerabilities (6)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Backdoor – open ports commonly used by
Trojans: Sockets des Troie (1)

Disable port 1

Backdoor – open ports commonly used by
Trojans: NetControle (1772)

Disable port 1772

Backdoor – open ports commonly used by
Trojans: Ptakks (8012)

Disable port 8012

Backdoor – open ports commonly used by
Trojans: KiLo (61747)

Disable port 61747

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 port

Low security vulnerabilities (7)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Registry: Last logged-on username visible

Should be disabled

Registry: Windows AutoUpdate is enabled
but requires user intervention for both
patch download and installation

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: HTTPS

No further action is required

Potential vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account.

Information: Some POP3 server banners
providing information to attacker

Disable POP3 service port
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Appendix A16: A summary of Council A’s CoA-Pathway server – the vulnerabilities
and the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the Council A’s CoAPathway server
High security vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 port

Low security vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port
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Appendix A17: A summary of Council A’s CoA-SQL server – the vulnerabilities and
the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the Council A’s CoA-SQL
server
High security vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Backdoor – open ports commonly used by
Trojans: Force (1215)

Disable port 1215

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 port

Low security vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Potential vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: MS SQL server
Information: Some POP3 server banners
providing information to attacker

Disable POP3 service port
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Appendix A18: OS and network specification configuration

OS and network specification configuration
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

1.1

Physical security

Place the SQL server in an
area where it will be
physically secure.

Satisfactory

H

1.2

Domain
environment

If the SQL Server is in a
domain that is trusted by other
domains, document the access
granted by the trust.

Satisfactory; only IT
administrator groups are
allowed to access the
online backend database
server.

H

1.3

SQL servers
accessed via
Internet

If the SQL server is being
accessed via the Internet, place
the SQL Server inside a DMZ
with the Web Server.

Satisfactory; there is a
frontend web (CoADMZ-Epathweb) server
located in the DMZ.

H

1.4

SQL servers
accessed via
Internet

Put a firewall between your
server and the Internet.
Block TCP port 1433 and
UDP port 1434 on your
perimeter firewall. If named
instances are listening on
additional ports, block those
too. In a multi-tier
environment, use multiple
firewalls to create more secure
screened subnets

Satisfactory; the SQL
server is located be hide
the Internet firewall, and
both TCP port 1433 and
1434 are blocked from
external access.

H

1.5

Encryption

Implement SSL. Use the fullyqualified DNS name of the
frontend web server in the
certificate to help prevent
masquerading.

Satisfactory; the
Epathway frontend server
uses SSL and fully
qualified DNS name.

H

1.6

Test and
development servers

Maintain test and development
servers on a separate network
segment from the production
servers.

Not satisfactory (the test
and development servers
are on the same class C
network).

H

1.7

Dedicated server

Install SQL server on a
computer that does not provide
additional services, e.g., Web
or mail services.

Satisfactory; the SQL
server is only for SQL
database operation.

M

1.8

OS benchmark
configuration

Configure Windows 2003
server level I benchmark
settings with the following
modifications:

1.8.1

Windows accounts

Make sure the Windows guest
account is disabled.

Satisfactory

M

1.8.2

Disk subsystem

Use RAID for critical data
files.

Satisfactory; raid level 10:
database and temp drives
raid level 5: backup drive.

M
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OS and network specification configuration (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

1.8.3

Separate partitions

Create separate partitions for
OS/SQL program files, SQL
data files, and SQL transaction
logs.

Satisfactory

M

1.8.4

Volume / partition
type

Format all volumes with
NTFS

Satisfactory

H

1.9

Services

Disable the following services
on a SQL server machine

1.9.1

Alerter

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

P

1.9.2

Clipbook server

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

P

1.9.3

Computer browser

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.4

DHCP client

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.5

Distributed file system

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual.

L

1.9.6

Distributed transaction
coordinator

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.7

Fax service

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.8

Internet connection sharing

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.9

IPSec policy agent

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.10

License logging

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.11

Logical disk manager
administrative service

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic
(this service is needed by
the system administrator).

L

1.9.12

Messenger

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.13

NetMeeting remote desktop
sharing

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.14

Network DDE

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.15

Network DDE DSDM

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.16

Print spooler

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.17

Remote access connection
manager

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.18

Remote registry

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic

L

1.9.19

Removable storage

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.20

RunAs service

Satisfactory; (disabled)

M

1.9.21

Smart card

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.22

Smart card helper

Satisfactory; (disabled)

P
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OS and network specification configuration (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

1.9.23

Task scheduler

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

P

1.9.24

Telephony

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.25

Telnet

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.26

Windows installer

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.10

MSSQL server
service account

Use a low-privileged local or
Domain account for the MS
SQL server service.

Satisfactory

M

1.11

SQL server agent
service account

Use a low-privileged domain
account for SQL server agent
if replication, DTS, or other
inter-server connection is
required.

Satisfactory

M

1.12

Local users group
membership

Assign the local service
account as a member of only
the users group.

Satisfactory

M

1.13

Domain service
account group
membership

Make a domain service
account a member of only
non-privileged groups.

N/A; the current
configuration does not use
the domain service account
group.

M

1.14

SQL server service
account rights

Grant the SQL server service
account(s) the following
rights:

N/A; there is no SQL
service account assigned.

1.15

SQL server agent
service account
rights

Log on as a service

M

Act as part of the OS.

L

Log on as a batch job

L

Replace a process-level token

L

Bypass traverse checking

L

Adjust memory quotas for a
process

M

Permission to start SQL server
active directory helper

L

Permission to start SQL writer

M

Grant the SQL server agent
service account(s) the
following rights:

N/A; there is no SQL
service account assigned.

Log on as a service

M

Act as part of the OS

L

Log on as a batch job

L

Replace a process-level token

L

Bypass traverse checking

L

Adjust memory quotas for a
process

M
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OS and network specification configuration (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

1.16

Integration service
account rights

Grant the integration service
account(s) the following
rights:

N/A; there is no SQL
service account assigned.

Risk
levels

Log on as a service

M

Permission to write to the
application event log

L

Bypass traverse checking

L

Create global objects

M

Impersonate a client after
authentication

L

1.17

SQL server services
account rights

Deny the service account the
“Log on locally” right.

Satisfactory

M

1.18

SQL server services
account rights

If a service account is a
domain account, configure the
account to have the Windows
permission “Log on To” the
database server only.

Satisfactory

M

1.19.1

SQL server proxy
accounts

Create dedicated user accounts
specifically for proxies, and
only use these proxy user
accounts for running job steps.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M

1.19.2

SQL server proxy
accounts

Only grant the necessary
permissions to proxy user
accounts. Grant only those
permissions actually required
to run the job steps that are
assigned to a given proxy
account.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M

1.19.3

SQL server proxy
accounts

Do not run the SQL server
agent service under a MS
Windows account that is a
member of the Windows
administrators group.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M
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Appendix A19: MS SQL server installation and patches audit details

MS SQL server installation and patches audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

2.1

SQL server install
platform

Avoid installing SQL server
on a domain controller.

Satisfactory

M

2.2

Patches and hotfixes

Ensure the current SQL
server service pack and
hotfixes are installed.

Satisfactory; currently
updating both service pack
and critical hotfixes every
three months

H

2.3

SQL server ports

Change SQL server default
ports from 1433 and 1434.

Satisfactory

H

2.4

Naming conventions

In naming SQL Server
instances, limit the instance
name to less than 16
characters with no reference
to a version number or other
sensitive information.

Satisfactory; currently the
name is less than 16
characters (11).

L

2.5

SQL server instances

Keep an inventory of all
versions, editions and
languages of SQL Server.

Not satisfactory; there is no
inventory process.

P

2.6

Authentication mode

Select Windows
authentication mode.

Not satisfactory (currently
the council uses both
Windows and SQL server
authentication modes).

M

2.7

Rename sa account

The “sa” account should be
renamed to something that is
not easily identifiable as the
“sa” account.
ALTER LOGIN sa WITH
NAME = <new name>

Not satisfactory; the
council uses the default
account (sa).

M

2.8

Strong password

Use a strong password for
the “sa” login account.

Satisfactory

M

2.9

Sample databases

Do not install the sample
databases. Delete all sample
databases if they already
exist.

Satisfactory; there is no
sample database installed.

L

2.10

Initialisation
parameter

C2 Audit Mode– set to 1 if
no custom defined audit trace
is enabled

Satisfactory; the current
setup is 1.

P

2.11

Initialisation
parameter

Remote Access– set to 0
unless replication is being
used or the requirement is
justified

Satisfactory; the current
setup is 0.

M

2.12

Initialisation
parameter

Scan for Startup Procedures–
set to 0 unless justified

Satisfactory; the current
setup is 0.

L
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Appendix A20: MS SQL server setting audit details

MS SQL server setting audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

3.1

SQL server
configuration
manager

Disable the “Named Pipes”
network protocol.

Not satisfactory

L

3.2

SQL server
properties

The following settings are
recommended:

3.2.1

Auto restart SQL
server

Set the SQL server service start
mode to “Automatic”

Satisfactory

L

3.2.2

Auto restart SQL
server agent

If the SQL server agent is
required, set the “SQL server
agent” start mode to “Automatic”.

Satisfactory

L

3.2.3

Distributed
transaction
coordinator

Set the “distributed transaction
coordinator” service start mode to
“Disabled” if this service is not
required.

N/A

L

3.2.4

Cross databaseownership chaining

Disable the
cross_db_ownership_chaining
option.

Satisfactory

M

3.2.5

Advanced server
settings

Do not enable direct modifications
to the system catalogs.

N/A

M

3.2.6

Backup/restore from
tape timeout

Set the backup/restore from tape
timeout period to “Try for 5
minutes”

Not satisfactory;
(currently set to
“Wait Indefinitely”)

L

3.2.7

Media retention

Set the default backup media
retention to the minimum number
of days needed to retain a full
backup of the database. Ideally,
this should be as high as your
resources permit.

Satisfactory

L

3.3

Data directory

The default data directory should
be a dedicated data partition

Not satisfactory;
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL
server\mssql\data)

M

3.4

Data directory

The default log directory should be
a dedicated partition separate from
all programs and data

Not satisfactory;
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL
server\mssql\logs)

M

3.5

Replication

Do not enable replication.

N/A

L

3.6

Other SQL server
configuration
options

Set the number of logs retained
based on the maximum number of
restarts and log cyclings which
may occur within your desired log
retention window. The default
value of 6 may be too low for
many installations.

Satisfactory; the
default is 6.

P
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

3.7

Database mail

Disable database mail where
messaging is not required.

Satisfactory

L

3.8

Trace messages

Error log/include execution trace
messages = off

Satisfactory

P

3.9

User-defined stored
procedures

Ensure that all user-defined
stored procedures are stored in
encrypted format.

Not satisfactory;
stored in unencrypted
format.

H

3.10

User-defined
extended stored
procedures

Avoid using user-defined
extended stored procedures. If
extended functionality is
required, use Common
Language Runtime (CLR)
assemblies instead.

Not installed

L

3.11

Extended stored
procedures

Disable access to the following
extended stored procedures:

3.11.1

xp_available media

Satisfactory

L

3.11.2

xp_cmdshell

Satisfactory

L

3.11.3

xp_dirtree

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.4

xp_dsninfo

Satisfactory

P

3.11.5

xp_enumdsn

Satisfactory

P

3.11.6

xp_enumerrorlogs

Satisfactory

P

3.11.7

xp_enumgroups

Satisfactory

P

3.11.8

xp_eventlog

Satisfactory

P

3.11.9

xp_fixeddrives

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.10

xp_getfiledetails

Satisfactory

P

3.11.11

xp_getnetname

Satisfactory

P

3.11.12

xp_logevent

Satisfactory

P

3.11.13

xp_loginconfig

Satisfactory

P

3.11.14

xp_msver

Satisfactory

P

3.11.15

xp_readerrorlog

Satisfactory

P

3.11.16

xp_servicecontrol

Satisfactory

P

3.11.17

xp_sprintf

Satisfactory

P

3.11.18

xp_sscanf

Satisfactory

P

3.11.19

xp_subdirs

Satisfactory

P

3.12

SQLmail extended
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
SQLMail extended stored
procedures:

3.12.1

xp_deletemail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.2

xp_findnextmsg

Satisfactory

P
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

3.12.3

xp_get_mapi_default_profile

Satisfactory

P

3.12.4

xp_get_mapi_profiles

Satisfactory

P

3.12.5

xp_readmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.6

xp_sendmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.7

xp_startmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.8

xp_stopmail

Satisfactory

P

3.13

Configuration
items

WebTask extended
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
WebTask extended stored
procedures. Delete the
xpweb70.dll file that implements
the following WebTask extended
stored procedures:

3.13.1

xp_cleanupwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.2

xp_convertwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.3

xp_dropwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.4

xp_enumcodepages

Satisfactory

P

3.13.5

xp_makewebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.6

xp_readwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.7

xp_runwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.14

OLE automation
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
OLE automation stored
procedures:

3.14.1

sp_OACreate

Satisfactory

L

3.14.2

sp_OADestroy

Satisfactory

L

3.14.3

sp_OAGetErrorInfo

Satisfactory

L

3.14.4

sp_OAGetProperty

Satisfactory

L

3.14.5

sp_OAMethod

Satisfactory

L

3.14.6

sp_OASetProperty

Satisfactory

L

3.14.7

sp_OAStop

Satisfactory

L

3.15

Registry access
extended stored
procedures

Disable access to the following
registry access extended stored
procedures:

3.15.1

xp_regaddmultistring

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.2

xp_regdeletekey

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.3

xp_regdeletevalue

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.4

xp_regenumvalues

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P
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MS SQL server setting audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

3.15.5

xp_regremovemultistring

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.6

xp_regwrite

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.16

Advanced setting

SQL server event
forwarding/forward events to a
different server = off

Satisfactory; (off).

L

3.17

SQL server browser
service

Disable SQL server browser
service

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

L
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Appendix A21: MS SQL server access controls audit details

MS SQL server access controls audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

4.1

Permissions on OS
tools

Restrict access to the
executables in the System32
directory e.g. Explorer.exe and
cmd.exe.

Not satisfactory
(administrator has full
control, Power users set
to modify, and user
group set to execute).

H

4.2

SQL server install
directory
permissions

Modify the permissions to the
[Drive]:\Program
Files\Microsoft SQL server
directory.

Satisfactory; remove the
Users group’s
permission to run
executables.

H

4.3

SQL server database
instance directory
permissions

Delete or secure old setup files.
Protect files in the <system
drive>:\Program
Files\Microsoft SQL
Server\MSSQL.X\MSSQL\Inst
all, e.g., sqlstp.log, sqlsp.log
and setup.iss. “X” represents
the installations of various SQL
server installs due to the fact
that multiple instances of SQL
server or SQL express can be
installed.

Satisfactory; access to
the current install folder
is allowed for the system
administrator groups
only.

M

4.4

Assigning system
administrators role

When assigning database
administrators to the system
administrators role, map their
Windows accounts to SQL
logins, and then assign them to
the role.

Satisfactory

M

4.5

SQL logins

Remove the default
BUILTIN\administrators SQL
login.

Not satisfactory; the
BUILTIN\administrators
SQL login is still exits.

M

4.6

SQL logins

Ensure that all SQL logins have
strong passwords.

Satisfactory

M

4.7

OS guests access

Deny database login for the
guests OS group.

Satisfactory

H

4.8

Fixed server roles

Only use the fixed server roles
sysadmin, server admin, setup
admin etc, to support DBA
activity.

Satisfactory

L

4.9

SQL server database
users and roles

Remove the guest user from all
databases except master and
tempdb.

Not satisfactory; (the
guest user stills exist).

M

4.10

Statement
permissions

Grant DDL statement
permissions to only the
database and schema owner,
not individual users.

Satisfactory

M

4.11

Database owners
permissions

Ensure dbo owns all usercreated database schemas

Not satisfactory

L
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MS SQL server access controls audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

4.12

Low-privileged
users

Do not grant object permissions
to PUBLIC or GUEST.

N/A

M

4.13

Stored procedure
permissions

Grant executes permissions on
stored procedures to database
roles (not users).

Satisfactory

M

4.14

Using the GRANT
option

Do not assign the GRANT
option of object permission to a
user or role.

N/A

M

4.15

SQL server agent
subsystem privileges

Restrict proxy access to
required/approved subsystems.

N/A; no proxy access.

M

4.16

User-defined
database roles

Create user-defined database
roles to assign permissions to
objects in the database when a
pre-defined database role does
not supply the appropriate
permissions to a group of users.

N/A; no user defined
database roles.

M

4.17

Database roles

Avoid nesting database roles.

Satisfactory

M

4.18

Users and roles

Ensure that the members of the
roles (users/groups/other roles)
in the target database actually
exist.

Satisfactory

L

4.19

Application roles

Use application roles to limit
access to data to users of
specific applications. Use
encryption to protect the role
name and password in the
connection string. Use
“EXECUTE AS WITH NO
REVERT” or “WITH
COOKIE” to allow individuals
to access the application
without knowing the password.

N/A

M

4.20

Use of predefined
roles

Avoid assigning predefined
roles to PUBLIC or GUEST.

N/A; no predefined roles
created.

L

4.21

Linked or remote
servers

Use linked servers rather than
remote servers where required.
Remove any unused linked
servers or disable this feature.

N/A

L

4.22

Linked or remote
servers

Configure linked or remote
servers to use Windows
authentication where required.
Disable linked servers
otherwise.

Not satisfactory;
(currently the council
uses both windows and
SQL authentications).

M

4.23

Linked server logins

Allow linked server access only
to those logins that need it.
Disable linked servers
otherwise.

Satisfactory

M

4.24

Ad Hoc data access

Disable ad hoc data access on
all providers for all users except
members of the sysadmin fixed
role.

N/A

L
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Appendix A22: MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details

MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

5.1

Auditing – general

Prepare a schedule for
reviewing audit information
regularly.

Not satisfactory; currently
there is no auditing
schedule.

P

5.2

SQL server
properties – security
tab

Through the SQL server
management studio, enable
auditing for SQL server.

Satisfactory

P

5.3

SQL server logs

SQL server audit data must be
protected from loss. The SQL
server and SQL server agent
logs must be backed up before
they are overwritten.

Satisfactory; the default
setup is 6.

P

5.4

SQL profiler

Use SQL profiler to generate
and manage audit trails.

Satisfactory

P

5.5

Profiler events

Capture the following events
using SQL profiler
Event

5.5.1

Audit add DB user event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.2

Audit add login to server Role

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.3

Audit add member to DB role

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.4

Audit add role event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.5

Audit addlogin event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.6

Audit app role change
password

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.7

Audit backup/restore

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.8

Audit broker conversation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.9

Audit broker login

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.10

Audit change audit

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.11

Audit change database owner

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.12

Audit DBCC

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.13

Audit database management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.14

Audit database object access

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.15

Audit database object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.16

Audit database object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.17

Audit database object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.18

Audit database operation

Not satisfactory

P
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MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

5.5.19

Audit database principal
impersonation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.20

Audit database principal
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.21

Audit database scope GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.22

Audit login change password

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.23

Audit login change property

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.24

Audit login

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.25

Audit login failed

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.26

Audit login GDR event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.27

Audit logout

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.28

Audit object derived
permission event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.29

Audit schema object access

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.30

Audit schema object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.31

Audit schema object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.32

Audit schema object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.33

Audit server alter trace

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.34

Audit server object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.35

Audit server object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.36

Audit server object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.37

Audit server operation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.38

Audit server principal
impersonation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.39

Audit server principal
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.40

Audit server scope GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.41

Audit server starts and stops

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.42

Audit statement permission
event

Not satisfactory

P
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Appendix A23: MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details

MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details
Item
no.

Configuration items

Action / recommended
Parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

6.1

Backups – general

Use full database backups
combined with differential or
transaction log backups to
restore the database to a
specific point in time.

Satisfactory; currently the
council’s backup is done
nightly.

M

6.2

System databases

It is important to include the
system databases in your
backup plan i.e. the master,
msdb and model databases.

Satisfactory

M

6.3

Backing up master
database

Backup the master database
when any of the following
events occur:
 A database is created or
deleted
 Login accounts are created,
deleted or modified
Server-wide or database
settings are modified

Satisfactory

M

6.4

Backing up MSDB
database

Backup the msdb database
when any of the following
events occur:
Alerts, jobs, schedules or
operators are created, deleted
or modified

Satisfactory

M

6.5

Backup media

Password protects the backup
media.

Satisfactory

H

6.6

Access to backup files

Restrict access to the backup
files to system administrators.

Satisfactory

H

6.7

Access to backup files

Restrict restore permissions to
DBAs

Satisfactory; currently,
only the system
administrator group can
restore the backup files.

H

6.8

Recommended
periodic
administrative
procedures

Run the MS baseline security
analyser weekly and follow
the security recommendations
as closely as possible to
secure the OS.

Not satisfactory; the MS
baseline security analyser
not in use.

L

6.9

Recommended
periodic
administrative
procedures

Run the SQL best practices
analyser regularly and note
any changes to the
environment.

Not satisfactory; the SQL
best practices analyser not
in use.

L
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MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration items

Action / recommended
Parameters

Council A

Risk
levels

6.10

Enable password
policy enforcement

When a password change
mechanism is introduced into
clients and applications;
enable password expiration.
Always specify
MUST_CHANGE when
specifying a password on
behalf of another principal.

Not satisfactory; no
enforce password policy

M

6.11

Periodic scan of role
members

Periodically scan fixed server
and database roles to ensure
that only trusted individuals
are members.

Not satisfactory; currently,
there are only a few users.
Periodic scan may is
recommended when
number of users increases.

L

6.12

Periodic scan of
stored procedures

Verify stored procedures that
have been set to AutoStart are
secure.

Not satisfactory; no
AutoStart enabled.

P
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Appendix A24: Council A’s information security policy

A97/7041 – Council A community access to the Internet policy
Recommendation
1.

That the following libraries policy (4) - community access to the Internet - be
adopted:

Libraries Policy (4)

Subject: Community access to the Internet
Objective
To ensure our community has access to a local
gateway of knowledge and information necessary to
enhance

lifelong

learning,

literacy,

education,

independent decision making and cultural, business or
personal development.

The policy aims to clarify the conditions of use for
community access to the Internet.

Policy statement
The Council A library and information service provides
community access to the Internet through its public
library system which includes:


AH Bracks library.



Bull Creek library.



Canning Bridge library.



Civic Square library.



Willagee library.

Community access to the Internet through the Council
A public library system is based on the following:
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A)

Conditions of use.

B)

Management of use.

C)

The principles of equity and access.

1. Conditions of use

A)

Community access to the Internet will be available during
the normal library hours of operation;

B)

The maximum length of any one session will be limited to
thirty (30) minutes. Any change to this condition will be
at the discretion of the branch librarian;

C)

Search and read facilities only are available for public use;

D)

Facilities such as e-mail and file transfer are not available
for public use;

E)

Print facilities will be available and charged at a rate of
20¢ per page which will be subject to an annual review;
and

F)

The Council A does not guarantee or accept any liability
for

the

accuracy,

authoritativeness,

timeliness

or

usefulness of any information retrieved from the Internet.

2. Management of use

A)

The staff of the Council A libraries under the direction of
the manager library and information services and the
respective branch librarian, will be responsible for
managing the use of community access to the Internet;

B)

Prospective users of the Internet will be encouraged to book
their session in advance to avoid unnecessary delays;

C)

Booking in advance may not be necessary if the Internet is
not being used. It should be noted a pre booked session will
take precedence over casual use; and

D)

Library users are expected to comply with all local, state,
and federal laws while using the Internet. Users found to
have violated any laws, (including but not limited to those
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concerning copyright, fraud, privacy, or obscenity) or who
access

information

that

is

considered

unacceptable

according to common community standards and that would
not be included in the normal print collection while using
library facilities or equipment will have their privileges
revoked.

3.

Equity and access

The principle that all members of the community are entitled to
have access to library services and resources and that such
person should not be discriminated against on the grounds of
age, sex, race, religion, national origin, disability, economic
conditions, individual lifestyle or political or social views are
recognised and will be upheld where possible within this policy.
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Appendix B: Additional results for Chapter 5

Appendix B1: A summary of the Internet border access list code for the email system
of Council B
Policy no.

Rule

Protocol type

From (source)

To (destination)

Port (service)

1

Permit

IP

Any

Any

Any
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Appendix B2: A summary of the firewall configuration codes (email-NAT) of Council
B’s firewall

Policy no.

Rule

From (source)

To (destination)

1

Translate

A.B.C.89

172.20.130.224
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Appendix B3: A summary of the firewall configuration codes of Council B’s email
system

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

Permit

TCP

CoB Internal
LAN

A.B.C.99
A.B.C.101

SMTP

2

Permit

TCP

Any

A.B.C.98
A.B.C.100

SMTP

3

Permit

TCP

CoB Internal
LAN

A.B.C.98
A.B.C.100

HTTP,HTTPS,
Telnet,
IronPort_quarantine

4

Permit

TCP

A.B.C.98
A.B.C.100

Any

HTTP,HTTPS,
SMTP,
Global_Catalogue
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Appendix

B4:

A

full

details of

system

information policy results and

recommendations of Council B’s email server

System information policy– CoB-email server (172.20.130.224)
Services
135

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length:

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age:

45 days

30 days

Minimum password age:

2 days

0 day

Force logoff:

Never force

Force

Password history:

6 passwords

N/A

Security auditing policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix B5: A summary of missing patches information of Council B’s email server

Missing patches (5) – email server (172.20.130.224)
Products

Severities

Descriptions

Vulnerabilities

Recommendations

MS
Windows

N/A

KB890830

It helps remove specific
prevalent malicious software
from computers that are
running MS Windows Server
2003, and other Windows OS.

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Critical

KB938464

MS08-052 - addresses a
vulnerability in MS Windows
vulnerabilities in GDI+ could
allow remote code execution
(954593)

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Exchange

N/A

KB960384

Many vulnerabilities based on
update rollup 7 for MS
Exchange Server 2007 service
pack 1

Deploy an update rollup 7
for MS Exchange Server
2007 service pack 1 asap

MS
Exchange

Critical

KB959241

Many vulnerabilities based on
update rollup 6 for MS
Exchange Server 2007 service
pack 1

Deploy an update rollup 6
for MS Exchange Server
2007 service pack 1
immediately.

MS
Exchange

Important

KB949870

Many vulnerabilities based on
update rollup 3 for MS
Exchange Server 2007 service
pack 1

Deploy update rollup 3 for
MS Exchange Server 2007
service pack 1 asap
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Appendix B6: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendation on Council B’s email server

The overall opened TCP service ports (21) – email server (172.20.130.224)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions

Products

Recommendations

25

SMTP

SMTP

MS ESMTP

Open

80

HTTP

HTTP

MS IIS webserver 6.0

Open

110

POP3

POP3

MS Exchange Server
2007 POP3

Close

135

MSRPC

MS RPC

MS Windows RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS ssn

NetBIOS Session Service

NetBIOS Session
Service

Open

443

HTTPS

Hypertext Transfer Protocol
over TLS/SSL

MS IIS webserver 6.0

Open

445

MS-ds

MS-DS Active Directory,
Windows shares

MS Windows 2003

Open

587

email
message
submission

email message submission
(SMTP)

MS ESMTP

Close

593

ncacn_http_
epmap

HTTP RPC Ep Map

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

1075

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC

Close

1091

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC

Close

1123

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC

Close

1163

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC

Close

1165

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC

Close

1248

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC

Close

3389

MS-RDP

MS Remote Session

MS Terminal Service

Open

6001

ncacn_http

MS RPC for MS Exchange
(information store)

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

6002

ncacn_http

MS RPC (directory referral)

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

6004

ncacn_http

MS RPC (DSProxy/NSPI)

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

8400

cvp

Commvault Unified Data
Management

8402

galaxy

Close
Galaxy Client Event
Manager

Close
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The overall opened UDP service ports (8) - email server (172.20.130.224)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions

Products

Recommendations

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

137

NetBIOS -ns

NetBIOS Name Service

MS Windows NT
netbios-ssn

Open

138

NetBIOS dgm

NetBIOS Datagram Service

MS Windows

Close

161

SNMP

Simple Network
Management Protocol

SNMP v1 server (public)

Close

445

MS-ds

MS-DS SMB file sharing

MS Windows

Close if not required

500

isakmp

Internet Security
Association and Key
Management Protocol

MS Windows

Close

1434

ms-sql-m

MS SQL Server

MS SQL Server
9.00.4035.00

Close if not required

4500

nat-t-ike

IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC
3947)

MS Windows

Close

Close
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Appendix B7: A summary of Council B’s email server – the vulnerabilities and the
possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the email server
(172.20.130.224)
High security vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

It is a virtual server, no action is required.

Services: TCP port 110 (POP3) open

Should be disabled

Medium security vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

SNMP

Should be disabled if not required

Low security vulnerabilities (7)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Services: Alter service enabled

Should be disabled if not required

Services: HTTP

Should be disabled if not required

Services: SMTP

Satisfactory

Services: HTTPS

Satisfactory

Services: POP3 open

Should be disabled

Potential vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account
exists

Rename the administrator account.

Information: Some POP3 server banners
providing information to attacker

The service POP3 server should be turned off.
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Appendix B8: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council B’s static
web system with respect to the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoB-Web servers

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

MIP

Address

CoB-DMZ-Web

A.B.C.121/27

N/A

2

MIP

Address

CoB-Web

172.20.130.184/16

N/A

3

Permit

TCP

Any

CoB-DMZ-Web

HTTP

4

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

Any

HTTP

5

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

CoB-Web

HTTP

6

Permit

TCP

CoB-Web

CoB-DMZ-Web

HTTP

7

Permit

TCP

CoB-Web

CoB-DMZ-Web

HTTPS

8

Permit

TCP

CoB-Web

CoB-DMZ-Web

445

9

Permit

TCP

172.20.20.20/16

CoB-DMZ-Web

3389
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Appendix B9: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council B’s CMS
web system with respect to the CoB-DMZ-Web and the CoB-Database servers

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

MIP

Address

CoB-DMZ-Web

A.B.C.121/27

N/A

2

MIP

Address

CoB-Database

172.20.130.148/16

N/A

3

Permit

TCP

Any

CoB-DMZ-Web

HTTP

4

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

Any

HTTP

5

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

CoB-Database

HTTP

6

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

CoB-Database

HTTPS

7

Permit

TCP

CoB-Database

CoB-DMZ-Web

HTTP

8

Permit

TCP

CoB-Database

CoB-DMZ-Web

HTTPS

9

Permit

TCP

172.20.20.20/16

CoB-DMZ-Web

3389
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Appendix B10: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council B’s online
payment system

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

MIP

Address

Online Gateway

x.x.x.x

N/A

2

Permit

TCP

Any

CoB-DMZ-Web

HTTP

3

Permit

TCP

Any

CoB-Database

HTTPS

4

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

Any

HTTP

5

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

Any

HTTPS

6

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

CoB-Database

Sqlnet2

7

Permit

TCP

CoB-DMZ-Web

CoB-Database

1443
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Appendix B11: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council B’s CoB-DMZ-Web server

System information policy– CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121)
Services
115

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

45 days

30 days

Minimum password age

2 days

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

6 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix B12: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council B’s CoB -Web server

System information policy – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184)
Services
111

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

45 days

30 days

Minimum password age

2 days

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

6 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix B13: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council B’s CoB –Database server

System information policy– CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148)
Services
117

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

45 days

30 days

Minimum password age

2 days

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

6 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current
settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix B14: A summary of missing service pack and patches, and the possible
mitigation recommendations for the CoB-Web server

Missing service pack (1) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184)
Product

Filename

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issue

Recommendation

Virtual
Studio

VS80sp1KB926601X86-ENU.exe

N/A

Virtual Studio 2005
service pack 1

Deploy/patch

Missing patches (3) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS
Windows

N/A

KB890830

MS Windows malicious
software removal tool April 2009

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

N/A

N/A

MS Windows IE 7 for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

SDK
components

Critical

KB931906

MS07-028 security update
for CAPICOM

Deploy/patch asap
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Appendix B15: A summary of missing service packs and patch, and the possible
mitigation recommendations for the CoB-Database server

Missing service packs (2) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148)
Products

Filenames

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

Visual
Studio

VS80sp1KB926601-X86ENU.exe

N/A

Visual Studio 2005
service pack 1

Deploy/patch

Office

OWC11SP3.CAB

N/A

MS Office 2003 service
pack 3

Deploy/patch

Missing patch (1) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148)
Product

Severity

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issue

Recommendation

MS
Windows

N/A

KB890830

MS Windows malicious
software removal tool x64
- April 2009

Deploy/patch
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Appendix B16: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoB-DMZ-Web server

The overall opened TCP service ports (20) – CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

25

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, MS ESMTP
6.0.3790.1830

Close

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver
6.0

Open

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC

Open/close if not
required

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS Session Service

Close if not required

443

HTTPS

MS IIS webserver 6.0

Open

445

MS-DS

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares, MS
Windows 2003

Open/close if not
required

554

RTSP

Real-Time Streaming Protocol, MS Windows
Media Server 9.1.1.5001

Close if not required

1025

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1040

NETSAINT

Netsaint status daemon, If this service is not
installed beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

1047

TROJAN

remoteNC, If this service is not installed beware
could be Trojan

Close if not required

1052

MSRPC

MSMQ, If this service is not installed beware could
be Trojan: Fire HacKer, Slapper

Close if not required

1056

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1057

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1080

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1720

H.323/Q.931

Interactive media

Close if not required

1755

WMS

Windows media service

Close if not required

3389

MS-rdp

MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service

Open

8400

CVP

Commvault Unified Data Management

Close if not required

8402

Galaxy

Galaxy Client Event Manager

Close if not required

8600

Asterix

Surveillance Data

Close if not required

The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

67

DHCPs

Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Server; also used by
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)

Close

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS -ns

NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT netbiosssn

Open/Close if not
required

138

NetBIOS dgm

NetBIOS Datagram Service

Close if not required
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The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.121) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

161

SNMP

Simple Network Management Protocol

Close if not required

445

MS-ds

MS-DS SMB file sharing

Open/close if not
required

500

isakmp

Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol

Close

1755

WMS

MS Media Services (MMS, ms-streaming)

Close

4500

nat-t-ike

IPSec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947)

Close
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Appendix B17: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoB-Web server

The overall opened TCP service ports (9) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

25

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, MS ESMTP
6.0.3790.1830

Close

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver
6.0

Open

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS ssn

NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer
Sharing

Open

445

MS-DS

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares

Open/close if not
required

1025

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

3389

MS-RDP

MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service

Open

8400

CVP

Commvault Unified Data Management

Close if not required

8402

Galaxy

Galaxy Client Event Manager

Close if not required

The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-Web server (172.20.130.184)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, Actions and products

Recommendations

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS -ns

NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT

Open/ Close if not
required

138

NetBIOS dgm

NetBIOS Datagram Service

Close

161

SNMP

Simple Network Management Protocol

Close if not required

445

MS-DS

MS-DS SMB file sharing

Open

500

ISAKMP

Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol

Close

3456

IISrpc-or-vat

Also VAT default data; If this service is not
installed beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

4128

RedShad

If this service is not installed beware could be
Trojan

Close if not required

4500

Nat-t-ike

IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947)

Close
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Appendix B18: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoB-Database server

The overall opened TCP service ports (10) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver
6.0

Close if not required

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS SSN

NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer
Sharing

Open

445

MS-DS

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares

Open

1037

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Windows RPC; If
this service is not installed beware could be
Trojan: Arctic , Dosh, KWM, MoSucker

Close if not required

1433

MS-SQL-S

MS SQL Server 2005

Open

2383

MS-OLAP-4

MS OLAP

Close if not required

3389

MS-RDP

MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service

Open

8400

CVP

Commvault Unified Data Management

Close if not required

8402

Galaxy

Galaxy Client Event Manager

Close if not required

The overall opened UDP service ports (9) – CoB-Database server (172.20.130.148)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS -NS

NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT netbiosssn (workgroup: CoB-SHIRE)

Open/Close if not
required

138

NetBIOS DGM

NetBIOS Datagram Service

Close

161

SNMP

Simple network management protocol

Close if not required

162

SNMP TRAP

Simple network management protocol trap

Close if not required

445

MS-DS

MS-DS SMB file sharing

Open

500

ISAKMP

Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol

Close

1434

MS-SQL-M

MS SQL Server database management system
Monitor; MS SQL Server 9.00.4035.00

Open

4500

NAT-T-IKE

IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947)

Close
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Appendix B19: A summary of Council B’s CoB-DMZ-Web server – the vulnerabilities
and the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoB-DMZ-Web
server
High security vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives.

Medium security vulnerabilities (3)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: Guest users have access to the
application log

Disable guest access by creating a DWORD key named
"RestrictGuestAccess" with value of "1"
(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/System/CurrentControlSet/Se
rvices/EventLog/Application)

Registry: Guest users have access to the
security log

Disable guest access by creating a DWORD key named
"RestrictGuestAccess" with value of "1"
(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/System/CurrentControlSet/Se
rvices/EventLog/Security).

Registry: Guest users have access to the
system log

Disable guest access by creating a DWORD key named
"RestrictGuestAccess" with value of "1"
(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/System/CurrentControlSet/Se
rvices/EventLog/System)

Low security vulnerabilities (7)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Registry: Last logged-on username visible

Should be disabled

Services: Alerter service enabled

Should be disabled

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: SMTP

Disable SMTP service port

Services: HTTPS

No further action is required

Potential vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account.

Information: User WMUS_COBMANGANESE never logged on

It is recommended to remove this account if not used.
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Appendix B20: A summary of Council B’s CoB-Web server – the vulnerabilities and
the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoB-Web
server
High security vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives.

Medium security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Low security vulnerabilities (6)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Services: Alerter service enabled

Should be disabled

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: SMTP

Disable SMTP service port

Web: IIS: Frontpage check

Disable the Frontpage extensions which currently are
installed on this computer.

Potential vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account.
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Appendix B21: A summary of Council B’s CoB-Database server – the vulnerabilities
and the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of the council’s CoB-Database
server
High security vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives.

Medium security vulnerabilities (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Low security vulnerabilities (4)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Services: Alerter service enabled

Should be disabled

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Potential vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account.

Information: MS SQL Server

No further action is required
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Appendix B22: OS and network specification configuration

OS and network specification configuration
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

1.1

Physical security

Place the SQL server in an
area where it will be
physically secure.

Satisfactory

H

1.2

Domain
environment

If the SQL Server is in a
domain that is trusted by other
domains, document the access
granted by the trust.

Satisfactory; only IT
administrator groups are
allowed to access the
online backend database
server.

H

1.3

SQL servers
accessed via
Internet

If the SQL server is being
accessed via the Internet, place
the SQL Server inside a DMZ
with the Web Server.

Satisfactory; there is a
frontend web (CoB-DMZWeb) server located in the
DMZ.

H

1.4

SQL servers
accessed via
Internet

Put a firewall between your
server and the Internet.
Block TCP port 1433 and
UDP port 1434 on your
perimeter firewall. If named
instances are listening on
additional ports, block those
too. In a multi-tier
environment, use multiple
firewalls to create more secure
screened subnets

Satisfactory; the SQL
server is located be hide
the Internet firewall, and
both TCP port 1433 and
1434 are blocked from
external access.

H

1.5

Encryption

Implement SSL. Use the fullyqualified DNS name of the
frontend web server in the
certificate to help prevent
masquerading.

Satisfactory; the frontend
server uses SSL and fully
qualified DNS name.

H

1.6

Test and
development servers

Maintain test and development
servers on a separate network
segment from the production
servers.

Not satisfactory; the test
and development servers
are on the same class B
network.

H

1.7

Dedicated server

Install SQL server on a
computer that does not provide
additional services, e.g., Web
or mail services.

Satisfactory; the SQL
server is only for SQL
database operation.

M

1.8

OS benchmark
configuration

Configure Windows 2003
server level I benchmark
settings with the following
modifications:

1.8.1

Windows accounts

Make sure the Windows guest
account is disabled.

Satisfactory

M

1.8.2

Disk subsystem

Use RAID for critical data
files.

Not satisfactory;
VMware with SCSI hard
disks.

M
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OS and network specification configuration (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

1.8.3

Separate partitions

Create separate partitions for
OS/SQL program files, SQL
data files, and SQL transaction
logs.

Not satisfactory; both
SQL data files and
transaction logs are located
in different folders but in
the same drive partition.

M

1.8.4

Volume / partition
type

Format all volumes with
NTFS

Satisfactory

H

1.9

Services

Disable the following services
on a SQL server machine

1.9.1

Alerter

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

P

1.9.2

Clipbook server

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.3

Computer browser

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.4

DHCP client

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.5

Distributed file system

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual.

L

1.9.6

Distributed transaction
coordinator

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.7

Fax service

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.8

Internet connection sharing

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.9

IPSec policy agent

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.10

License logging

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.11

Logical disk manager
administrative service

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic
(this service is needed by
the system administrator).

L

1.9.12

Messenger

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.13

NetMeeting remote desktop
sharing

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.14

Network DDE

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.15

Network DDE DSDM

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.16

Print spooler

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.17

Remote access connection
manager

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.18

Remote registry

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.19

Removable storage

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.20

RunAs service

Satisfactory; (disabled)

M

1.9.21

Smart card

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.22

Smart card helper

Satisfactory; (disabled)

P
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

1.9.23

Task scheduler

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

P

1.9.24

Telephony

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

P

1.9.25

Telnet

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.26

Windows installer

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.10

MSSQL server
service account

Use a low-privileged local or
Domain account for the MS
SQL server service.

Satisfactory

M

1.11

SQL server agent
service account

Use a low-privileged domain
account for SQL server agent
if replication, DTS, or other
inter-server connection is
required.

Satisfactory

M

1.12

Local users group
membership

Assign the local service
account as a member of only
the users group.

Not satisfactory; there is
no assigned user in the
“Users” group.

M

1.13

Domain service
account group
membership

Make a domain service
account a member of only
non-privileged groups.

N/A; the current
configuration does not use
the domain service account
group.

M

1.14

SQL server service
account rights

Grant the SQL server service
account(s) the following
rights:

N/A; there is no SQL
service account assigned.

1.15

SQL server agent
service account
rights

Log on as a service

M

Act as part of the OS.

L

Log on as a batch job

L

Replace a process-level token

L

Bypass traverse checking

L

Adjust memory quotas for a
process

M

Permission to start SQL server
active directory helper

L

Permission to start SQL writer

M

Grant the SQL server agent
service account(s) the
following rights:

N/A; there is no SQL
service account assigned.

Log on as a service

M

Act as part of the OS

L

Log on as a batch job

L

Replace a process-level token

L

Bypass traverse checking

L
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Adjust memory quotas for a
process
1.16

Integration service
account rights

Grant the integration service
account(s) the following
rights:

Risk
levels
M

N/A; there is no SQL
service account assigned.

Log on as a service

M

Permission to write to the
application event log

L

Bypass traverse checking

L

Create global objects

M

Impersonate a client after
authentication

L

1.17

SQL server services
account rights

Deny the service account the
“Log on locally” right.

Satisfactory

M

1.18

SQL server services
account rights

If a service account is a
domain account, configure the
account to have the Windows
permission “Log on To” the
database server only.

Not satisfactory; currently
the domain/sqladmin
account can log on to all
computers.

M

1.19.1

SQL server proxy
accounts

Create dedicated user accounts
specifically for proxies, and
only use these proxy user
accounts for running job steps.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M

1.19.2

SQL server proxy
accounts

Only grant the necessary
permissions to proxy user
accounts. Grant only those
permissions actually required
to run the job steps that are
assigned to a given proxy
account.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M

1.19.3

SQL server proxy
accounts

Do not run the SQL server
agent service under a MS
Windows account that is a
member of the Windows
administrators group.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M
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MS SQL server installation and patches audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

2.1

SQL server install
platform

Avoid installing SQL server
on a domain controller.

Satisfactory

M

2.2

Patches and hotfixes

Ensure the current SQL
server service pack and
hotfixes are installed.

Satisfactory; currently
updating both service pack
and critical hotfixes every
three months

H

2.3

SQL server ports

Change SQL server default
ports from 1433 and 1434.

Satisfactory

H

2.4

Naming conventions

In naming SQL Server
instances, limit the instance
name to less than 16
characters with no reference
to a version number or other
sensitive information.

Satisfactory; currently the
name is less than 16
characters (11).

L

2.5

SQL server instances

Keep an inventory of all
versions, editions and
languages of SQL Server.

Not satisfactory; there is
no inventory process.

P

2.6

Authentication mode

Select Windows
authentication mode.

Not satisfactory; currently
the council uses both
Windows and SQL server
authentication modes.

M

2.7

Rename sa account

The “sa” account should be
renamed to something that is
not easily identifiable as the
“sa” account.
ALTER LOGIN sa WITH
NAME = <new name>

Not satisfactory; the
council uses the default
account (sa).

M

2.8

Strong password

Use a strong password for
the “sa” login account.

Satisfactory

M

2.9

Sample databases

Do not install the sample
databases. Delete all sample
databases if they already
exist.

Satisfactory; there is no
sample database installed.

L

2.10

Initialisation
parameter

C2 Audit Mode– set to 1 if
no custom defined audit trace
is enabled

Satisfactory; the current
setup is 1.

P

2.11

Initialisation
parameter

Remote Access– set to 0
unless replication is being
used or the requirement is
justified

Not satisfactory (the
current setup is 1).

M

2.12

Initialisation
parameter

Scan for Startup Procedures–
set to 0 unless justified

Satisfactory; the current
setup is 0.

L
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MS SQL server setting audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

3.1

SQL server
configuration
manager

Disable the “Named Pipes”
network protocol.

Not satisfactory

L

3.2

SQL server
properties

The following settings are
recommended:

3.2.1

Auto restart SQL
server

Set the SQL server service start
mode to “Automatic”

Satisfactory

L

3.2.2

Auto restart SQL
server agent

If the SQL server agent is
required, set the “SQL server
agent” start mode to “Automatic”.

Satisfactory

L

3.2.3

Distributed
transaction
coordinator

Set the “distributed transaction
coordinator” service start mode to
“Disabled” if this service is not
required.

N/A

L

3.2.4

Cross databaseownership chaining

Disable the
cross_db_ownership_chaining
option.

Satisfactory

M

3.2.5

Advanced server
settings

Do not enable direct modifications
to the system catalogs.

N/A

M

3.2.6

Backup/restore from
tape timeout

Set the backup/restore from tape
timeout period to “Try for 5
minutes”

Not satisfactory;
currently set to “Wait
Indefinitely”

L

3.2.7

Media retention

Set the default backup media
retention to the minimum number
of days needed to retain a full
backup of the database. Ideally,
this should be as high as your
resources permit.

Not satisfactory
(currently set to 0.)

L

3.3

Data directory

The default data directory should
be a dedicated data partition

Not satisfactory;
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL
server\mssql\data)

M

3.4

Data directory

The default log directory should be
a dedicated partition separate from
all programs and data

Not satisfactory;
(c:\programfiles\micr
osoft SQL
server\mssql\logs)

M

3.5

Replication

Do not enable replication.

N/A

L

3.6

Other SQL server
configuration
options

Set the number of logs retained
based on the maximum number of
restarts and log cyclings which
may occur within your desired log
retention window. The default
value of 6 may be too low for
many installations.

Satisfactory; the
default is 6.

P
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

3.7

Database mail

Disable database mail where
messaging is not required.

Satisfactory

L

3.8

Trace messages

Error log/include execution trace
messages = off

Satisfactory

P

3.9

User-defined stored
procedures

Ensure that all user-defined
stored procedures are stored in
encrypted format.

Not satisfactory;
stored in unencrypted
format.

H

3.10

User-defined
extended stored
procedures

Avoid using user-defined
extended stored procedures. If
extended functionality is
required, use Common
Language Runtime (CLR)
assemblies instead.

Not installed

L

3.11

Extended stored
procedures

Disable access to the following
extended stored procedures:

3.11.1

xp_available media

Satisfactory

L

3.11.2

xp_cmdshell

Satisfactory

L

3.11.3

xp_dirtree

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.4

xp_dsninfo

Satisfactory

P

3.11.5

xp_enumdsn

Satisfactory

P

3.11.6

xp_enumerrorlogs

Satisfactory

P

3.11.7

xp_enumgroups

Satisfactory

P

3.11.8

xp_eventlog

Satisfactory

P

3.11.9

xp_fixeddrives

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.10

xp_getfiledetails

Satisfactory

P

3.11.11

xp_getnetname

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.12

xp_logevent

Satisfactory

P

3.11.13

xp_loginconfig

Satisfactory

P

3.11.14

xp_msver

Satisfactory

P

3.11.15

xp_readerrorlog

Satisfactory

P

3.11.16

xp_servicecontrol

Satisfactory

P

3.11.17

xp_sprintf

Satisfactory

P

3.11.18

xp_sscanf

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.19

xp_subdirs

Satisfactory

P

Satisfactory

P

3.12

3.12.1

SQLmail extended
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
SQLMail extended stored
procedures:
xp_deletemail
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Item
no.

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

3.12.2

xp_findnextmsg

Satisfactory

P

3.12.3

xp_get_mapi_default_profile

Satisfactory

P

3.12.4

xp_get_mapi_profiles

Satisfactory

P

3.12.5

xp_readmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.6

xp_sendmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.7

xp_startmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.8

xp_stopmail

Satisfactory

P

3.13

Configuration
items

WebTask extended
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
WebTask extended stored
procedures. Delete the
xpweb70.dll file that implements
the following WebTask extended
stored procedures:

3.13.1

xp_cleanupwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.2

xp_convertwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.3

xp_dropwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.4

xp_enumcodepages

Satisfactory

P

3.13.5

xp_makewebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.6

xp_readwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.7

xp_runwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.14

OLE automation
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
OLE automation stored
procedures:

3.14.1

sp_OACreate

Satisfactory

L

3.14.2

sp_OADestroy

Satisfactory

L

3.14.3

sp_OAGetErrorInfo

Satisfactory

L

3.14.4

sp_OAGetProperty

Satisfactory

L

3.14.5

sp_OAMethod

Satisfactory

L

3.14.6

sp_OASetProperty

Satisfactory

L

3.14.7

sp_OAStop

Satisfactory

L

3.15

Registry access
extended stored
procedures

Disable access to the following
registry access extended stored
procedures:

3.15.1

xp_regaddmultistring

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.2

xp_regdeletekey

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.3

xp_regdeletevalue

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.4

xp_regenumvalues

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

3.15.5

xp_regremovemultistring

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.6

xp_regwrite

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.16

Advanced setting

SQL server event
forwarding/forward events to a
different server = off

Satisfactory; (off).

L

3.17

SQL server browser
service

Disable SQL server browser
service

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

L
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MS SQL server access controls audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

4.1

Permissions on OS
tools

Restrict access to the
executables in the System32
directory e.g. Explorer.exe and
cmd.exe.

Not satisfactory;
administrator has full
control, Power users set
to modify, and user
group set to execute.

H

4.2

SQL server install
directory
permissions

Modify the permissions to the
[Drive]:\Program
Files\Microsoft SQL server
directory.

Not satisfactory;
currently the council’s
local administrator and
user groups and is
allowed.

H

4.3

SQL server database
instance directory
permissions

Delete or secure old setup files.
Protect files in the <system
drive>:\Program
Files\Microsoft SQL
Server\MSSQL.X\MSSQL\Inst
all, e.g., sqlstp.log, sqlsp.log
and setup.iss. “X” represents
the installations of various SQL
server installs due to the fact
that multiple instances of SQL
server or SQL express can be
installed.

Satisfactory; access to
the current install folder
is allowed for the system
administrator groups
only.

M

4.4

Assigning system
administrators role

When assigning database
administrators to the system
administrators role, map their
Windows accounts to SQL
logins, and then assign them to
the role.

Satisfactory

M

4.5

SQL logins

Remove the default
BUILTIN\administrators SQL
login.

Not satisfactory; the
BUILTIN\administrators
SQL login is still exits.

M

4.6

SQL logins

Ensure that all SQL logins have
strong passwords.

Satisfactory

M

4.7

OS guests access

Deny database login for the
guests OS group.

Satisfactory

H

4.8

Fixed server roles

Only use the fixed server roles
sysadmin, server admin, setup
admin etc, to support DBA
activity.

Satisfactory

L

4.9

SQL server database
users and roles

Remove the guest user from all
databases except master and
tempdb.

Not satisfactory; the
guest user stills exist.

M

4.10

Statement
permissions

Grant DDL statement
permissions to only the
database and schema owner,
not individual users.

Satisfactory

M

4.11

Database owners
permissions

Ensure dbo owns all usercreated database schemas

Not satisfactory

L

381
MS SQL server access controls audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

4.12

Low-privileged
users

Do not grant object permissions
to PUBLIC or GUEST.

N/A

M

4.13

Stored procedure
permissions

Grant executes permissions on
stored procedures to database
roles (not users).

Satisfactory

M

4.14

Using the GRANT
option

Do not assign the GRANT
option of object permission to a
user or role.

N/A

M

4.15

SQL server agent
subsystem privileges

Restrict proxy access to
required/approved subsystems.

N/A; no proxy access.

M

4.16

User-defined
database roles

Create user-defined database
roles to assign permissions to
objects in the database when a
pre-defined database role does
not supply the appropriate
permissions to a group of users.

N/A; no user defined
database roles.

M

4.17

Database roles

Avoid nesting database roles.

Satisfactory

M

4.18

Users and roles

Ensure that the members of the
roles (users/groups/other roles)
in the target database actually
exist.

Satisfactory

L

4.19

Application roles

Use application roles to limit
access to data to users of
specific applications. Use
encryption to protect the role
name and password in the
connection string. Use
“EXECUTE AS WITH NO
REVERT” or “WITH
COOKIE” to allow individuals
to access the application
without knowing the password.

N/A

M

4.20

Use of predefined
roles

Avoid assigning predefined
roles to PUBLIC or GUEST.

N/A; no predefined roles
created.

L

4.21

Linked or remote
servers

Use linked servers rather than
remote servers where required.
Remove any unused linked
servers or disable this feature.

N/A

L

4.22

Linked or remote
servers

Configure linked or remote
servers to use Windows
authentication where required.
Disable linked servers
otherwise.

Not satisfactory;
currently the council
uses both windows and
SQL authentications.

M

4.23

Linked server logins

Allow linked server access only
to those logins that need it.
Disable linked servers
otherwise.

Satisfactory

M

4.24

Ad Hoc data access

Disable ad hoc data access on
all providers for all users except
members of the sysadmin fixed
role.

N/A

L
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MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

5.1

Auditing – general

Prepare a schedule for
reviewing audit information
regularly.

Not satisfactory; currently
there is no auditing
schedule.

P

5.2

SQL server
properties – security
tab

Through the SQL server
management studio, enable
auditing for SQL server.

Satisfactory

P

5.3

SQL server logs

SQL server audit data must be
protected from loss. The SQL
server and SQL server agent
logs must be backed up before
they are overwritten.

Satisfactory; the default
setup is 6.

P

5.4

SQL profiler

Use SQL profiler to generate
and manage audit trails.

Satisfactory

P

5.5

Profiler events

Capture the following events
using SQL profiler
Event

5.5.1

Audit add DB user event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.2

Audit add login to server Role

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.3

Audit add member to DB role

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.4

Audit add role event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.5

Audit addlogin event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.6

Audit app role change
password

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.7

Audit backup/restore

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.8

Audit broker conversation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.9

Audit broker login

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.10

Audit change audit

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.11

Audit change database owner

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.12

Audit DBCC

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.13

Audit database management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.14

Audit database object access

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.15

Audit database object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.16

Audit database object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.17

Audit database object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.18

Audit database operation

Not satisfactory

P
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

5.5.19

Audit database principal
impersonation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.20

Audit database principal
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.21

Audit database scope GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.22

Audit login change password

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.23

Audit login change property

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.24

Audit login

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.25

Audit login failed

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.26

Audit login GDR event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.27

Audit logout

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.28

Audit object derived
permission event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.29

Audit schema object access

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.30

Audit schema object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.31

Audit schema object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.32

Audit schema object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.33

Audit server alter trace

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.34

Audit server object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.35

Audit server object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.36

Audit server object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.37

Audit server operation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.38

Audit server principal
impersonation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.39

Audit server principal
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.40

Audit server scope GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.41

Audit server starts and stops

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.42

Audit statement permission
event

Not satisfactory

P
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MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details
Item
no.

Configuration items

Action / recommended
Parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

6.1

Backups – general

Use full database backups
combined with differential or
transaction log backups to
restore the database to a
specific point in time.

Satisfactory; currently the
council’s backup is done
nightly.

M

6.2

System databases

It is important to include the
system databases in your
backup plan i.e. the master,
msdb and model databases.

Satisfactory

M

6.3

Backing up master
database

Backup the master database
when any of the following
events occur:
 A database is created or
deleted
 Login accounts are created,
deleted or modified
Server-wide or database
settings are modified

Satisfactory

M

6.4

Backing up MSDB
database

Backup the msdb database
when any of the following
events occur:
Alerts, jobs, schedules or
operators are created, deleted
or modified

Satisfactory

M

6.5

Backup media

Password protects the backup
media.

Satisfactory

H

6.6

Access to backup files

Restrict access to the backup
files to system administrators.

Satisfactory

H

6.7

Access to backup files

Restrict restore permissions to
DBAs

Satisfactory; currently,
only the system
administrator group can
restore the backup files.

H

6.8

Recommended
periodic
administrative
procedures

Run the MS baseline security
analyser weekly and follow
the security recommendations
as closely as possible to
secure the OS.

Satisfactory; the MS
baseline security analyser
is in use.

L

6.9

Recommended
periodic
administrative
procedures

Run the SQL best practices
analyser regularly and note
any changes to the
environment.

Satisfactory; the SQL best
practices analyser is in use.

L
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Item
no.

Configuration items

Action / recommended
Parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

6.10

Enable password
policy enforcement

When a password change
mechanism is introduced into
clients and applications;
enable password expiration.
Always specify
MUST_CHANGE when
specifying a password on
behalf of another principal.

Not satisfactory; no
enforce password policy

M

6.11

Periodic scan of role
members

Periodically scan fixed server
and database roles to ensure
that only trusted individuals
are members.

Not satisfactory;
currently, there are only a
few users. Periodic scan
may is recommended when
number of users increases.

L

6.12

Periodic scan of
stored procedures

Verify stored procedures that
have been set to AutoStart are
secure.

Not satisfactory; no
AutoStart enabled.

P
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Application development best practices
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
Parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

8.1

Ownership chaining

Use ownership chaining within
a single database to simplify
permissions management.

Not satisfactory

M

8.2

Role assignments

Assign permissions to roles
rather than users. The principle
of “Least Privilege” applies,
thus users should not be given
access to roles they do not need
for their job function.

Satisfactory

M

8.3

Encrypted
connections

Enable encrypted connections
between the user and the
database server.

Not satisfactory; no
encrypted connections
between the user and the
CoB-Database server.

H

8.4

Error handling

Do not propagate errors back to
the user.

Satisfactory

P

8.5

User input

Prevent SQL injection by
validating all user input before
transmitting it to the database
server.

Satisfactory

H

8.6

Developer awareness

Increase awareness of issues
such as cross-site scripting,
buffer overflows, SQL injection
and dangerous APIs.

Satisfactory

L

8.7

Developer awareness

Identify categories of threats
that apply to your application,
such as denial of service,
escalation of privileges,
spoofing, data tampering,
information disclosure and
repudiation.

Satisfactory

L

8.8

Security reviews

Add security reviews to all
stages of the application
development lifecycle (from
design to testing).

Satisfactory

L

8.9

Distributing
SQLEXPRESS

If you distribute
SQLEXPRESS, install
SQLEXPRESS using Windows
security mode as the default.

N/A

L

8.10

Net-Libraries

If SQLEXPRESS will operate
as a local data store, disable any
unnecessary client protocols.

N/A

L

8.11

Customer awareness

Let your customers know that
your product includes
SQLEXPRESS so that they can
be prepared to install or accept
SQLEXPRESS -specific
software updates.

N/A

L
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Surface area configuration tool audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended parameters

Council B

Risk
levels

9.1

Ad Hoc Remote
Queries

Disable Ad Hoc Remote Queries
where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.2

CLR integration

Disable CLR integration where not
required.

Satisfactory

L

9.3

DAC

Disable the remote dedicated
administrator connection where not
required.

Satisfactory

L

9.4

Database mail

Disable database mail where
messaging is not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.5

Native XML web
services

Do not configure XML web services
endpoints where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.6

OLE automation

Disable OLE automation where not
required.

Satisfactory

L

9.7

Service broker

Do not configure service broker
endpoints where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.8

SQL mail

Do not enable SQL mail where not
required or where database mail
could be used instead.

Satisfactory

L

9.9

Web assistant

Disable web assistant where not
required.

Satisfactory

P

9.10

xp_cmdshell

Disable the xp_cmdshell stored
procedure where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.11

Ad Hoc data
mining

Disable ad hoc data mining queries
where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.12

Anonymous
connections

Disable anonymous connections to
the analysis services where not
required.

Satisfactory

M

9.13

Linked objects

“Enable links to other instances”
should be disabled where not
required.

Not satisfactory

L

9.14

Linked objects

“Enable links from other instances”
should be disabled. where not
required.

Not satisfactory

L

9.15

User-defined
functions

Disable loading of user-defined
COM functions where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.16

Scheduled events
and report delivery

Disable scheduled events and report
delivery where not required.

Not satisfactory

P

9.17

Web service and
HTTP access

Disable web service and HTTP
access where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.18

Windows integrated
security

Enable Windows integrated security
for report data source connections.

Not satisfactory

M
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Appendix B30: Council B’s information security policy

Keywords
Protocol

Protocol Name: Online Services Usage Protocol
Acceptable use, prohibited use, email and Internet, data confidentiality, logon
accounts, passwords, electronic fax
This Protocol provides guidance on the acceptable business use and
incidental personal use when using the City’s online services to ensure that
the services are used in an appropriate and professional manner. It also
provides guidance on the use of logon accounts, passwords and email
etiquette.
The purpose of this Protocol is to safeguard the City as well as individuals
from the misuse of the City’s email, Internet and electronic fax
communications systems.
Any queries regarding this Protocol should be directed to the Manager IT on
Ext xxxx.

Related policies (Council/City)
Related documentation (Plans/Legislative
Authority)

Protocol/procedure owner
Last reviewed
Flowchart

Code of Conduct Policy 4-1
Records Management Policy 8-4
Your Record Keeping Responsibilities
State and Commonwealth legislation including but not
limited to:
State Records Act – 2000
Freedom of Information Act 1992
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000
Copyright Act 1968
Public Service Regulations 1968
Criminal Code – Section 85
Manager IT
September 2009
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PROTOCOL PROCEDURE

Protocol name: Online Services Usage Protocol

Objectives

This Protocol has been developed to:


Maintain and protect the availability, reliability, confidentiality, integrity and
security of all networked systems and related data from risk or inappropriate use;



To ensure the City’s internal computer network and related systems are used in
an appropriate manner consistent with business needs and best practice;



To define acceptable and unacceptable use of the City’s online services; and



To educate users about their responsibilities.

Scope

The Online Services Usage Protocol applies to:


All employees of the City; and



The use of the Council network and related systems, including Internet, email
and electronic fax.

Employee responsibilities

When using City information systems, officers are expected to be aware of their
responsibilities to:


Comply with all legislative and administrative requirements;



Ensure any action taken serves to enhance the services of the City and will not
bring the City into disrepute;
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Be informed of all security requirements and risks related to the use of Internet
and email facilities and ensure that the facilities are not compromised by their
actions; and



Seek advice if they are unsure of what is required.

Non-compliance with the Online Services Usage Protocol

Non-compliance with this protocol may result in loss of access privileges or disciplinary
action and will be subject to the provisions of Policy 4-1 - Code of Conduct and the
Corporate Protocol – Managing Employee Relations Issues or provisions of other
relevant State or Commonwealth legislation. Directors and Managers are responsible for
Business Unit compliance with this protocol.

Acceptable use

The City’s network and related systems are provided primarily for conducting the City’s
business or directly related to the mission, charter or work tasks of the City. Users are
expected to treat systems with due care and ensure that all communications are
professional and respectful to others.

New employees agree to the Online Services Usage Protocol at Induction when they
sign a copy of this document and all employees agree to the Protocol on each occasion
they log in.

Prohibited uses

Prohibited uses include:


A use which is in breach of the law;



A use which is in breach of the City’s Code of Conduct;



Personal gain or for profit, including private business, commercial activity,
advertising or gambling;



Unauthorised copy or transmission of copyright material;
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Accessing or distributing material or emails which may be illegal, offensive,
threatening or harassing to others or discriminatory on the basis of race, religion,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, physical features or age;



Deliberately accessing material perceived as indecent, obscene or pornographic;



Misrepresentation of persons without the expressed consent of those other
persons;



Breaching confidentiality;



Political lobbying;



Unauthorised use, release or destruction of corporate records;



Unauthorised access to or use of systems;



Downloading unauthorised software;



Downloading large files containing picture images, live pictures or graphics
which increases the load on the network or slows down the system for other
uses. This includes:
o Computer games
o Music files
o Radio or television stations broadcasting via the Internet;



Non-compliance with or deliberate avoidance of the City’s procedures for
filtering of viruses, malware or otherwise filtered content;



Use of Internet services to interfere with or disrupt network users, services or
equipment;



Use of Internet services to develop programs designed to harass other users or
infiltrate a computer system, and/or damage or alter the software components,
e.g. implant viruses;



Use for fundraising or public relations activities not specifically related to the
City’s activities;



Subscriptions to electronic newsletters that are not related to work or
professional development;



Spending excessive time on personal usage which impacts on completion of an
employee’s work; and

392


Distributing chain letters or spam.

Where a genuine reason exists to access sites that would normally be regarded as
inappropriate, Managers are required to nominate the staff members requiring access
and written authorisation by the relevant Director is required before access will be
given.

Personal use

Incidental personal use of online services, including email, Internet and electronic faxes,
is permitted so long as it does not interfere with work, is not detrimental to the City’s
business, does not involve unethical behaviour and does not involve any of the
prohibited uses listed above. Communications relating to professional development are
permitted.

All Internet use, whether on City business or personal use, is subject to content filtering
that restricts access to illegal or otherwise undesirable or unapproved content. Personal
use is entirely at the risk of the individual staff member.

Monitoring of emails, Internet use, electronic faxes and business records

All activities on the network may be monitored or recorded to protect the City from
potential consequences that may occur through misuse. Users consent to monitoring
when they agree to the Online Services Usage Protocol. The City maintains a log of
Internet and email access transactions for all users and examines unusual usage patterns.
The City is able to determine the sites visited and the times they were accessed. The
City has the right to review, audit, intercept, access and disclose all activities received
or sent via the Internet or email.

All incoming and outgoing email is retained in an archive, which is separate from the
Record Keeping system. All archived email is potentially subject to a legal discovery
order (providing records for court proceedings) or similar forms of legal process.

The CEO, Directors and Managers may determine what is regarded as appropriate use
of the Internet or email and may restrict, suspend or close a user at any time.
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Access to business records

The City respects the rights of employees to privacy, however, reserves the right to
access business records created by all employees and to investigate any suspected
improper conduct on the part of an employee. Officers authorised by the CEO may
investigate alleged breaches of the City’s Code of Conduct.

Mailbox privacy

Access to another user’s email account without the user’s permission or the
authorisation of a Manager is not permitted. Only officers from IT are permitted to
access individual email boxes and only if:


A request is formally logged via the IT Service Desk Request;



The mailbox owner makes the request; or



The written request is signed by a Manager, Director or the CEO stating the
reason for the request. Each request will be judged on its merits and further
justification may be requested by the Manager IT if there are any doubts to the
validity of the request.

Where the requests for access arise from statutory obligations, legal discovery orders or
similar legal obligations, the request will be complied with. Access by IT staff will be
for the duration of the requested task only.

Confidentiality

Information on the City’s systems is for the purposes of conducting the City’s business
and must not be disclosed to third parties. (See the Protocol on Data Privacy).

Corporate records

Email and electronic fax communications are subject to the same legal, privacy, records
management and Freedom of Information obligations as a letter, memo or report. Users
should:
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Ensure that all content in emails and faxes is expressed in a professional manner;
and



Ensure that emails and electronic faxes which are considered corporate records
are stored to the City’s Records Management System. Refer to Your Record
Keeping Responsibilities.

Other legal obligations

There is a range of legislation which applies to users of information systems, designed
to promote compliance with record keeping and copyright provisions, and to restrict
illegal practices and the availability of inappropriate material. These include but are not
restricted to the:


State Records Act – 2000;



Freedom of Information Act 1992;



Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000;



Copyright Act 1968;



Public Service Regulations 1968; and



Criminal Code – Section 85.

The Council and the user can be held liable for illegal activities, such as breaches of
copyright or licensing agreements, disclosing confidential information, sending
libellous, defamatory, offensive or racist content in emails and accessing inappropriate
material. Staff members must at all times comply with their legal obligations under
relevant legislation. Any unauthorised access or attempted access of any
Commonwealth or state computing and/or network system or violation of Australian
Commonwealth or State laws is subject to criminal prosecution.
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SCHEDULE 1 – ELECTRONIC MAIL ETIQUETTE

Schedule 1 presents some general guidelines for electronic mail etiquette.


Check emails regularly, at least daily;



Reply to emails promptly in accordance with the Customer Service Charter;



Check the calendar function of Outlook daily;



Maintain the Inbox, Sent Items and Deleted Items. Delete unwanted items
regularly to maintain available system space;



Store emails which contain corporate records to the Records Management
System;



Ensure that an Out of Office message is set up for periods of absence or leave.
Under exceptional circumstances a Business Unit Manager may request IT to
activate an Out of Office message if a staff member has unplanned leave for a
significant period of time, e.g. sickness;



Staff are responsible for managing delegated access to their mailbox by other
users;



Avoid sending emails to the group CoB All Staff. If the matter relates to City
business it is recommended that a News Item on the intranet is published. This
reduces email traffic;



Avoid sending internal emails with large attachments as this may slow down the
network. It is better to place the attachment on the Intranet and use a link in an
email or in a News Item;



Emails which exceed 20 megabytes in size will be blocked from being
transmitted to external recipients. Consult the IT Service Desk for assistance in
these instances. Note that an external email recipient’s system may not
necessarily be able to receive large emails;



Do not use emails instead of formal contracts or agreements because of the
potential for forgery or misrepresentation. Note that emails are considered
written records and are legally binding; and
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Ensure that emails have a confidentiality note in the signature block as set out
below.

Email signatures
All email text should be black with no backgrounds or wallpapers. The signature block
should be set in your email options so that it will be used by default on all emails.
(Refer to the Intranet - How do I?)

GivenName FamilyName
Position or Title
Council B

- 10 point Arial, bold
- 10 point Arial, normal
- 10 point Arial, normal

Tel: 08 9xxx xxxx
Mobile: 0xxx xxx xxx
Fax: 08 9xxx xxxx
Email:givenname.familyname@CouncilB.wa.gov.au

- 8 point Arial, normal
- 8 point Arial, normal
- 8 point Arial, normal
- 8 point Arial, normal

Council B
The information contained in this communication may be confidential or commercially sensitive. If you are not the
intended recipient you must not copy this communication, disclose its contents to any other party, or take any action in
reliance on it. Please delete and destroy all copies and immediately notify the sender on 9xxx xxxx, or by reply message.

Logon accounts and passwords


A logon and password is created following an authorised New User Request
(See How Do I – Forms.) Users are provided with a secure temporary password
which they are forced to change immediately upon next login;



Expired accounts require an authorised New User Request before they will be
reactivated;



Each user requires his/her own log on and password to use the City’s network
and all systems. This is to prevent unauthorised access and to facilitate
confidentiality and security of all networked systems and related data;



Logon accounts are the means to validate a user’s identity to access the City’s
network or application systems;



Logon accounts are derived from a unique combination of the user’s first name
and initial characters of their surname;



Shared workstations, e.g. workstation used for the issuing of books in libraries
or handling customer enquiries are given a generic logon which reflects the
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function. Access through generic logons to fileservers, email and corporate
applications are restricted to functions that do not require user accountability or
security network security;


Users maintain their own passwords;



Avoid keeping a paper copy of passwords;



Temporary passwords provided when users forget or lock their password
account will only be supplied following positive identification of the user;



Passwords are not to be divulged to third parties and details are not to be
provided to other users to enable their use of a specific application;



Change passwords when there is an indication of possible system or password
compromise; and



Passwords must comply with system enforced password rules.These rules are
displayed when prompted by the system to change your password.

Closing down and locking the workstation


The PC automatically locks following a period of inactivity;



It is the responsibility of all system users to ensure that they activate the
workstation locking mechanism before leaving their desks using the
CTRL+Alt+Delete keys to ensure the PC is secure while unattended; and



Users should shut down the PC at the close of each business day.
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Appendix C: Additional results for Chapter 6

Appendix C1: A summary of the firewall configuration codes (email-NAT) of Council
C’s firewall

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol
types

From (source)

To
(destination)

Ports
(service)

1

MIP (mapped
IP)

TCP

Webrootservices

A.B.C.37

SMTP

2

MIP

TCP

Any

A.B.C.37

SMTP
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Appendix C2: A summary of the firewall configuration codes of Council C’s email
system

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol
types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

Translate

Address

ISA-Exchange

A.B.C.184

N/A

2

Translate

Address

BDC-1

10.1.1.150

N/A

3

Translate

Address

BDC-2

10.1.1.210

N/A

4

Translate

Address

Exchange-gate1

10.1.15.154

N/A

5

Translate

Address

Exchange-gate2

10.1.1.3

N/A

6

Add

Address

BDC-1

Domaincon

N/A

7

Add

Address

BDC-2

Domaincon

N/A

8

Permit

TCP

Exchange-gate1

Any

SMTP

9

Permit

TCP

ISA-Exchange

Exchange-gate1

HTTPS

10

Permit

TCP

Any

ISA-Exchange

HTTPS

11

Inspect

TCP

Any

ISA-Exchange

HTTPS

12

Permit

TCP/UDP

ISA-Exchange

Domaincon

DNS

13

Permit

TCP

ISA-Exchange

Domaincon

LDAP (389)

14

Permit

UDP

ISA_Exchange

Domaincontrollers

Radius (1812,
1813)

15

Permit

UDP

ISA_Exchange

Domaincontrollers

Radius (1812,
1813)
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Appendix C3: A full details of system information policy results of Council C’s email
server

System information policy – exchange.coc.wa.gov.au (10.1.15.154)
Services
157

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length:

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age:

91 days

30 days

Minimum password age:

0 day

0 day

Force logoff:

Never force

Force

Password history:

8 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current settings)

Failure
(current
settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account logon
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit policy change

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system events

No

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix C4: A summary of both missing service pack and patches information of
Council C’s email server

Missing service pack (1) – email server (10.1.15.154)
Product

Severity

Description

Vulnerability issue

Recommendation

MS
Windows

N/A

MS Windows
Server 2008
service pack 2
standalone x64based systems
(KB948465)

Service pack 2 for MS
Windows Server 2008 is an
update to MS Windows Server
2008 that supports new kinds of
hardware and emerging
hardware standards, and
includes all updates delivered
since service pack 1.

Deploy/patch

Missing patches (2) – email server (10.1.15.154)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS
Windows

Moderate

KB969897

MS09-019 cumulative security
update for MS Internet
Explorer 7 for MS Windows
Server 2008 x64 edition

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

N/A

KB951072

Update for MS Windows
Server 2008 x64 edition

Deploy/patch
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Appendix C5: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendation on Council C’s email server

The overall opened TCP service ports (24) – email server (10.1.15.154)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions

Products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

25

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol

MS ESMTP

Open

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer
Protocol

MS IIS webserver 7.0

Open

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

MS Exchange Server 2007
POP3

Close

135

MSRPC

Microsoft Remote
Procedure Call

MS Windows RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS session service

NetBIOS session service

Open

143

IMAP4

Internet Message Access
Protocol 4

MS Exchange 2007 imapd

Close

443

HTTPS

Hypertext Transfer
Protocol over TLS/SSL

MS IIS webserver 6.0

Open

445

MS-DS

MS-DS Active Directory,
Windows shares

MS Windows 2003

Open

587

Email
message
submission

Email message
submission (SMTP)

MS ESMTP

Close

593

Ncacn_http_
epmap

HTTP RPC Ep Map

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

993

Imaps

Internet Message Access
Protocol over SSL

MS Exchange 2007 imapd

Close

1028

MSRPC

LSASS

MS Windows RPC,
Possibility of a Trojan
attack if not installed

Close

1029

MSRPC

InetInfo

MS Windows RPC,
Possibility of a Trojan
attack if not installed

Close

1058

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC

Close

3389

Microsoft-rdp

MS terminal service

MS terminal service

Open to authorised
users only

5357

HTTP

MS HTTPAPI

MS HTTPAPI httpd 2.0
(SSDP/UPnP)

Close

6001

Ncacn_http

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

6002

Ncacn_http

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

6004

Ncacn_http

MS Windows RPC

MS Windows RPC over
HTTP 1.0

Close

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (24) – email server (10.1.15.154) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions

Products

Recommendations

6129

Damewaremr

DameWare mini remote
control

DameWare mini remote
control

Close if not required

6969

Tcpwrapped

8080

HTTP-ALT

HTTP alternate

10000

Snet-sensormgmt

Webmin and Oracle

Close
Open
Possibility of a Trojan
attack if not installed

Close

The overall opened UDP service port (1) – email server (10.1.15.154)
Port no.

Service

Description

Product

Recommendation

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS name service,
(workgroup: COCSHIRE)

Microsoft Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn

Open
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Appendix C6: A summary of Council C’s email server – the vulnerabilities and the
possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s email server
(10.1.15.154)
Low security vulnerabilities (9)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Registry: Last logged-on username visible

Should be disabled

Services: HTTP

Should be disabled if not required

Services: FTP

Should be disabled

Services: SMTP

Satisfactory

Services: HTTPS

Satisfactory

Services: TCP port 110 (POP3) open

Should be disabled

Services: IMAP4

Should be disabled

Potential vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

Rename the administrator account

Information: IMAP4 server banner provides
information to attacker

IMAP banners should be omitted or changed to
something more generic
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Appendix C7: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council C’s static
web system with respect to the CoC-DMZ-Web server

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

MIP

Address

A.B.C.181

CoC-DMZ-Web

N/A

2

MIP

Address

HeadOffice

10.0.0.0/8

N/A

3

MIP

Address

BDC-1

10.1.1.210

N/A

4

MIP

Address

BDC-2

10.1.1.150

N/A

5

MIP

Address

Wbaseline1

X.X.X.101

N/A

6

MIP

Address

Wbaseline2

X.X.X.11

N/A

7

MIP

Address

Wbaseline3

X.X.X.157

N/A

8

MIP

Address

NearMap #01

Y.Y.X.0/24

N/A

9

MIP

Address

NearMap #02

Y.Y.Y.0/24

N/A

10

MIP

Address

NearMap #03

Y.Y.Z.0/24

N/A

11

MIP

Address

Busgov

V.V.V.122

N/A

12

Set

Group

Domaincon

N/A

N/A

13

Set

Group

Winbaseline

N/A

N/A

14

Set

Group

Webexternal

N/A

N/A

15

Set

Group

Nearmapserver

N/A

N/A

16

Add

Address

BDC-1

Domaincon

N/A

17

Add

Address

BDC-1

Domaincon

N/A

18

Add

Address

Wbaseline1

Winbaseline

N/A

19

Add

Address

Wbaseline2

Winbaseline

N/A

20

Add

Address

Wbaseline3

Winbaseline

N/A

21

Add

Address

Busgov

Webexternal

N/A

22

Add

Address

NearMap#01

Nearmapserver

N/A

23

Add

Address

NearMap #02

Nearmapserver

N/A

24

Add

Address

NearMap #03

Nearmapserver

N/A

25

Set

TCP

src-port 2005

des-port 0-65535

2005

26

Permit,
inspect

TCP

Any
(outside/untrust)

CoC-DMZ-Web

HTTP, HTTPS

27

Permit

UDP

Any (DMZ)

Domaincon

DNS

28

Permit

TCP

CoC-DMZ-Web

HeadOffice

2005

29

Permit

IP

CoC-DMZ-Web

Winbaseline

Any

30

Permit

IP

CoC-DMZ-Web

Webexternal

Any

31

Permit

IP

CoC-DMZ-Web

Nearmapserver

Any

32

Permit

IP

Any (inside/trust)

Any (DMZ)

Any
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Appendix C8: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council C’s CMS
web system with respect to the CoC-DMZ-CMS and the CoC-CMS servers

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

MIP

Address

A.B.C.186

CoC-DMZ-CMS

N/A

2

MIP

Address

F.F.F.169

Seamless web
service

N/A

3

Permit,
inspect,
log

TCP

Any (outside)

CoC-DMZ-CMS

HTTP, HTTPS

4

Permit,
log

TCP

CoC-DMZ-CMS

Seamless web
service

HTTP

5

Permit

UDP

Any (DMZ)

Domaincon

DNS

6

Permit

IP

Any (inside/trust)

Any (DMZ)

Any
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Appendix C9: A summary of the firewall configuration codes for Council C’s online
payment system

Policy no.

Rules

Protocol types

From (source)

To (destination)

Ports (service)

1

MIP

Address

A.B.C.179

Pathway-server

N/A

2

MIP

Address

10.1.15.166

Pathway-app

N/A

3

MIP

Address

A.B.C.183

ISA01

N/A

4

MIP

Address

N.N.N.0/24

Commweb01

N/A

5

Permit,
inspect

TCP

Any (outside)

Pathway-server

HTTP, HTTPS

6

Permit,
log

IP

ISA01 (DMZ)
source address
Pathway-server

Pathway-app

Any

7

Permit,
log

TCP

Pathway-server

Commweb01

HTTP, HTTPS

8

Permit

UDP

Any (DMZ)

Domaincon

DNS

9

Permit

IP

Any
(inside/trust)

Any (DMZ)

Any
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Appendix C10: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web server

System information policy – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181)
Services
140

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

0 char

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

42 days

30 days

Minimum password age

0 day

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

No history

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current settings)

Failure
(current settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege
use

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Appendix C11: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-CMS server

System information policy – CoC-DMZ-CMS server (A.B.C.186)
Services
N/A – could not obtained (access denied)

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

0 char

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

42 days

30 days

Minimum password age

0 day

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

No history

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current settings)

Failure
(current settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit logon
events

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege
use

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes
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Appendix C12: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council C’s CoC-CMS server

System information policy – CoC-CMS server (10.1.15.184)
Services
145

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

At least 8 chars

Maximum password age

91 days

30 days

Minimum password age

0 day

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

8 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current settings)

Failure
(current settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit logon
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege
use

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

No

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix C13: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council C’s Epathweb server

System information policy – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179)
Services
126

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

10 chars

No action required

Maximum password age

30 days

No action required

Minimum password age

0 day

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

10 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current settings)

Failure
(current settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit logon
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege
use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

412
Appendix C14: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council C’s Epathway server

System information policy – Epathway server (10.1.15.166)
Services
124

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

No action required

Maximum password age

91 days

No action required

Minimum password age

0 day

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

8 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current settings)

Failure
(current settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account
logon events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit logon
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit object
access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit policy
change

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege
use

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system
events

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix C15: A full details of system information policy results and
recommendations of Council C’s Pathway server

System information policy – Pathway server (10.1.15.162)
Services
118

Password policy
Types

Current settings

Recommendations

Minimum password length

6 chars

No action required

Maximum password age

91 days

No action required

Minimum password age

0 day

0 day

Force logoff

Never force

Force

Password history

8 passwords

N/A

Security audit policy
Auditing policies

Success
(current settings)

Failure
(current settings)

Success
(recommendations)

Failure
(recommendations)

Audit account logon
events

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Audit account
management

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit directory
service access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit logon events

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit object access

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit policy change

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit privilege use

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit process
tracking

No

No

Yes

Yes

Audit system events

No

No

Yes

Yes
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Appendix C16: A summary of missing service packs and patch, and the possible
mitigation recommendations for the CoC-DMZ-Web server

Missing service packs (2) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181)
Products

Filenames

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

Office

MAINSP3ff.ca
b

N/A

Office XP service pack 3

Deploy/patch

SQL server

SQL2000KB884525SP4-x86ENU.EXE

N/A

2000 service pack 4 for
database components

Deploy/patch

Missing patch (0) – CoC-DMZ-Web (A.B.C.181)
Product

Severity

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issue

Recommendation

Not
available

Not available

Not available

Not available

Not available
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Appendix C17: A summary of missing service packs and patches, and the possible
mitigation recommendations for the Epathweb server

Missing service packs (5) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179)
Products

Filenames

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

Visual
Studio

VS80sp1KB926601X86-ENU.exe

N/A

Visual Studio 2005
service pack 1

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

dotnetfx35.exe

KB951847

MS.NET framework 3.5
service pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update x86

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP20SP2KB958481x86.exe

KB951847

MS.NET framework 3.5
service pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update x86

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP30SP2KB958483x86.exe

KB951847

MS.NET framework 3.5
service pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update x86

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP35SP1KB958484x86.exe

KB951847

MS.NET framework 3.5
service pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update x86

Deploy/patch

Missing patches (37) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS09-024

Important

KB957646

Security update for MS
Office XP

Deploy/patch

MS09-021

Important

KB969680

Security update for MS
Excel 2002

Deploy/patch

MS09-027

Important

KB969602

Security update for MS
Word 2002

Deploy/patch

MS09-017

Important

KB957781

Security update for MS
PowerPoint 2002

Deploy/patch

MS09-010

Important

KB933399

Security update for MS
Office XP

Deploy/patch

MS08-056

Moderate

KB956464

Security update for MS
Office 2002

Deploy/patch

MS08-052

Important

KB953405

Security update for MS
Office XP

Deploy/patch

MS08-044

Important

KB921596

Security update for MS
Office XP

Deploy/patch

MS08-041

Critical

KB955440

Security update for
Access Snapshot Viewer
2002

Deploy/patch asap

MS08-027

Important

KB950129

Security update for MS
Publisher 2002

Deploy/patch
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Missing patches (37) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS08-017

Critical

KB932031

Security update for MS
Office Web Components
2000 for MS Office XP

Deploy/patch asap

MS08-015

Critical

KB946985

Security update for MS
Outlook 2002

Deploy/patch asap

MS08-013

Important

KB944423

Security update for MS
Office XP

Deploy/patch

MS07-013

Important

KB920816

Security update for MS
Office XP

Deploy/patch

MS09-020

Important

KB970483

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-019

Moderate

KB969897

Cumulative security
update for MS Internet
Explorer 7 for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-026

Important

KB970238

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-025

Important

KB968537

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-022

Moderate

KB961501

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-011

Critical

KB961373

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS09-012

Important

KB956572

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-012

Important

KB952004

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-013

Critical

KB960803

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS09-015

Important

KB959426

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-010

Important

KB923561

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

N/A

Important

KB890830

MS Windows Malicious
Software Removal Tool April 2009

Deploy/patch

MS09-007

Important

KB960225

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

N/A

Important

KB960715

Update Rollup for
ActiveX Killbits for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS09-001

Critical

KB958687

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS08-071

Critical

KB956802

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch asap

417
Missing patches (37) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS08-076

Important

KB954600

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS08-076

Important

KB952069

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS08-068

Important

KB957097

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS08-069

Important

KB954459

Security Update for MS
Microsoft XML Core
Services 6.0 service pack
2

Deploy/patch

MS08-069

Critical

KB955069

Security update for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS07-040

Critical

KB928365

Security update for
Microsoft .NET
framework, version 2.0

Deploy/patch asap

MS07-050

Critical

KB938127

Security update for MS
Internet Explorer 7 for
MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch asap
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Appendix C18: A summary of missing service packs and patches, and the possible
mitigation recommendations for the Epathway server

Missing service packs (4) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166)
Products

Filenames

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS
Windows

dotnetfx35.exe

KB951847

Microsoft .NET
framework 3.5 service
pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

DP20SP2KB958481x86.exe

KB951847

Microsoft .NET
framework 3.5 service
pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP30SP2KB958483x86.ex

KB951847

Microsoft .NET
framework 3.5 service
pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP35SP1KB958484x86.exe

KB951847

Microsoft .NET
framework 3.5 service
pack 1 and .NET
framework 3.5 family
update

Deploy/patch

Missing patches (22) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS Office

Important

KB969559

MS09-024 security update
for the 2007 MS Office
system

Deploy/patch

MS Office

Important

KB969613

MS09-027 security update
for the 2007 MS Office
system

Deploy/patch

MS Office

Important

KB969604

MS09-027 security update
for MS Word 2007

Deploy/patch

MS Office

Important

KB969682

MS09-021 security update
for MS Excel 2007

Deploy/patch

MS Office

Important

KB969679

MS09-021 security update
for the 2007 MS Office
system

Deploy/patch

MS Office

Important

KB957789

MS09-017 security update
for MS PowerPoint 2007

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB970483

MS09-020 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch
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Missing patches (22) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166) (continued)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS
Windows

Important

KB970238

MS09-026 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB956803

MS08-066 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB954459

MS08-069 security update
for MS XML core
services 6.0 SP 2

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

N/A

N/A

MS Windows Internet
Explorer 7 for Windows
Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB944653

MS07-067 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Critical

KB941569

MS07-068 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Critical

KB933854

MS07-040 security update
for Microsoft .NET
framework, version 1.1
service pack 1

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Critical

KB938127

MS07-050 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Important

KB926122

MS07-039 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Critical

KB925398

MS06-078 security update
for MS Windows Media
Player 6.4

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Low

KB929123

MS07-034 cumulative
security update for MS
Outlook Express for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB924667

MS07-012 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Moderate

KB932168

MS07-020 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Critical

KB930178

MS07-021 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS SQL
server

Critical

925673

MS06-061 MS XML 6.0
RTM security update

Deploy/patch asap
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Appendix C19: A summary of missing service packs and patches, and the possible
mitigation recommendations for the Pathway server

Missing service packs (5) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162)
Products

Filenames

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS
Windows

dotnetfx35.exe

KB951847

Microsoft .NET framework
3.5 service pack 1 and
.NET framework 3.5
family update

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP20SP2KB958481x86.exe

KB951847

Microsoft .NET framework
3.5 service pack 1 and
.NET framework 3.5
family update

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP30SP2KB958483x86.exe

KB951847

Microsoft .NET framework
3.5 service pack 1 and
.NET framework 3.5
family update

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

NDP35SP1KB958484x86.exe

KB951847

Microsoft .NET framework
3.5 service pack 1 and
.NET framework 3.5
family update

Deploy/patch

MS Office

OWC11SP3.C
AB

N/A

MS Office 2003 service
pack 3

Deploy/patch

Missing patches (15) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS
Windows

Important

KB970238

MS09-026 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB970483

MS09-020 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB956803

MS08-066 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB954459

MS08-069 security update
for MS XML core services
6.0 service pack 2

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

N/A

MS Internet Explorer 7 for
MS Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB944653

MS07-067 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Critical

KB941569

MS07-068 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch asap
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Missing patches (15) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162) (continued)
Products

Severities

Knowledge base

Vulnerability issues

Recommendations

MS
Windows

Critical

KB933854

MS07-040 security update
for Microsoft .NET
framework, version 1.1
service pack 1

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Critical

KB938127

MS07-050 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Critical

KB925398

MS06-078 security update
for MS Windows media
player 6.4

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Important

KB926122

MS07-039 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Important

KB924667

MS07-012 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Low

KB929123

MS07-034 cumulative
security update for MS
Outlook Express for MS
Windows Server 2003

Deploy/patch

MS
Windows

Critical

KB930178

MS07-021 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch asap

MS
Windows

Moderate

KB932168

MS07-020 security update
for MS Windows Server
2003

Deploy/patch
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Appendix C20: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoC-DMZ-Web server

The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181)
Port
no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

6

N/A

Unassigned

Close

7

echo

echo

Close

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol; MS FTP service

Close

22

SSH

Secure Shell Open; SSH_3.8

Close if not required

24

Priv-mail

Any private mail system

Close

25

SMTP

Simple Mail Transfer Protocol; MS ESMTP
6.0.3790.3959

Close

30

N/A

Unassigned

Close

32

N/A

Unassigned

Close

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol; MS IIS webserver
6.0

Open

81

hosts2-ns

HOSTS2 Name Server

Close

82

xfer

XFER Utility

Close

83

mit-ml-dev

MIT ML device

Close

85

mit-ml-dev

MIT ML device

Close

88

Kerberos-sec

Kerberos

Close if not required

90

dnsix

DNSIX security attribute token map

Close

99

metagram

Metagram relay

Close

106

POP3pw

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

125

locus-map

Locus PC-Interface Net Map Ser

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and printer

Close if not required

Close

sharing
144

news

NeWS window system

Close

146

iso-tp0

ISO-IP0

Close

161

snmp

SNMP

Close if not required

163

cmip-man

CMIP/TCP manager

Close

211

914c/g

Texas instruments 914C/G terminal

Close

212

anet

ATEXSSTR

Close

222

rsh-spx

Berkeley rshd with SPX auth

Close

259

esro-gen

Efficient short remote operations

Close

280

http-mgmt

http-mgmt

Close

301

N/A

Unassigned

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

389

ldap

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

Close if not required

406

imsp

Interactive Mail Support Protocol

Close

417

onmux

Onmux

Close

443

HTTPS

Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS/SSL; MS
IIS webserver 6.0

Open

445

MS-ds

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares MS
Windows 2003

Close if not required

464

kpasswd

kpasswd

Close

465

SMTPS

SMTP secure

Close

481

dvs

DVS

Close

500

isakmp

Security association and key management
protocol

Close if not required

512

exec

Remote Execution-- Allows remote execution
of commands without logon.

Close

513

login

Remote Login-- Remote term service that
operates via telnet process- but with automatic
auth performed based on trust. If no trust- will
prompt for username/password logon similar to
telnet.

Close

524

NPC

NCP

Close

544

kshell

krcmd

Close

625

apple-xsvradmin

Apple

Close

636

ldapssl

ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sldap)

Close if not required

648

RRP

Registry Registrar Protocol (RRP)

Close

667

disclose

Campaign contribution disclosures - SDR
Technologies

Close

668

mecomm

MeComm

Close

691

resvc

MS Exchange routing engine

Close

700

epp

Extensible Provisioning Protocol

Close

714

iris-xpcs

IRIS over XPCS

Close

722

unknown

Unassigned

Close

726

unknown

Unassigned

Close

765

webster

Webster

Close

777

multiling-http

Multiling HTTP

Close

783

spamassasin

Apache SpamAssassin spamd

Close

787

qsc

QSC

Close

800

mdbs_daemon

Mdbs_daemon

Close

801

device

Device

Close

808

ccproxy-http

CCProxy HTTP/Gopher/FTP (over HTTP)
proxy

Close

873

rsync

rsync

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

888

accessbuilder

AccessBuilder

Close

898

sunmanageconsole

Solaris Management Console Java listener
(Solaris 8 & 9)

Close

900

unknown

unknown

Close

901

samba-swat

Samba SWAT tool

Close

903

iss-console-mgr

ISS Console Manager

Close

912

apex-mesh

APEX relay-relay service

Close

990

FTPs

FTP protocol, control, over TLS/SSL

Close if not required

992

Telnets

Telnet protocol over TLS/SSL

Close if not required

1007

unknown

unknown

Close

1009

unknown

Unassigned

Close

1010

surf

surf or possibility Doly Trojan

Close

1025

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1026

LSA-or-nterm

nterm remote_login network_terminal

Close

1029

ms-lsa

Ms-lsa

Close

1031

iad2

BBN IAD

Close

1034

zincite-a

Zincite.A backdoor

Close

1035

multidropper

A Multidropper Adware, or PhoneFree

Close

1036,
1037

unknown

unknown

Close

1038

mtqp

Message Tracking Query Protocol

Close

1039

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

1040

netsaint

Netsaint status daemon

Close

1041

danf-ak2,
Trojan

AK2 Product , Dosh, RemoteNC; , If these
services are not installed beware could be
Trojan

Close

1042

Unknown; bla
Trojan

BLA Trojan; If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

1043

boinc

BOINC client control

Close

10441049

unknown

unknown

Close

1050

java-orOTGfileshare

J2EE nameserver, also OTG, also called
Disk/Application extender. Could also be
MiniCommand backdoor OTGlicenseserv

Close

1051

optima-vnet

Optima VNET

Close

1052

ddt

Dynamic DNS tools

Close

1053,
1056,
1057

unknown

unknown

Close

1059

nimreg

Nimreg

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

1061,
10641065

unknown

unknown

Close

1066

fpo-fns

FPO-FNS

Close

1067

instl_boots

Installation bootstrap protocol serv.

Close

10701072,
1077

unknown

unknown

Close

1081

unknown

unknown

Close

1083

ansoft-lm-1

Anasoft license manager

Close

1084

ansoft-lm-2

Anasoft license manager

Close

1087,
1088,
1090,
10971100,
11041107

unknown

unknown

Close

1112

msql

mini-sql server

Close if not required

1114,
1117,
1121,
1122,
1124,
1126,
11301132,
1137,
1147,
1148,
1152,
1163,
1165,
1174

unknown

unknown

Close

1185,
1186,
1192,
1213,
1217

unknown

unknown

Close

1218

aeroflight-ads

AeroFlight-ADs

Close

1234

hotline

If these services are not installed beware could
be Trojan

Close

1248

hermes

hermes

Close

1259,
1271,
1272,
1287,
1301,
1309

unknown

unknown

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

1311

rxmon

RxMon

Close

1322,
1328,
1334

unknown

unknown

Close

1352

lotusnotes

Lotusnotes

Close

1433

ms-sql-s

MS-SQL-Server

Close if not required

1434

ms-sql-m

MS-SQL-Server

Close if not required

1443

Ies-lm

Integrated engineering software

Close

1455

Ies-lm

Integrated engineering software

Close

1461

Ibm_wrless_lan

IBM Wireless LAN

Close

1503

imtc-mcs

Databeam

Close

1521

oracle

oracle

Close

1556,
1580,
1594,
1641,
1658

unknown

unknown

Close

1666

netview-aix-6

netview-aix-6

Close

1700

mps-raft

mps-raft

Close

1718

h323gatedisc

h323gatedisc

Close

1755

wms

Windows media service

Close

1761

landesk-rc

LANDesk Remote Control

Close

1782

hp-hcip

hp-hcip

Close

1783,
1812,
1840

unknown

unknown

Close

1863

MSNP

MSNP

Close

1864

paradym-31

Paradym 31 Port

Close

1935

RTMP

Adobe Flash media server connection port,
Real Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP)

Close

1971,
1972

unknown

unknown

Close

1998

x25-svc-port

cisco X.25 service (XOT)

Close

2000

callbook

"RemoteAnywhere" installs a webserver on
this port. NeWS/OpenWin (Sun's older
variation of X-Windows) uses this port.

Close

2001

dc

dc or nfr20 web queries; If these services are
not installed beware could be Trojan

Close

2003

finger

GNU finger (cfingerd)

Close

2005

deslogin

encrypted symmetric telnet/login

Close

2008

conf

conf

Close

2009

news

news

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

2013

raid-am

raid-am

Close

2020

xinupageserver

Xinupageserver

Close

2021

servexec

Servexec

Close

2040

lam

Lam

Close

2045

cdfunc

Cdfunc

Close

2047

dls

Dls

Close

2048

dls-monitor

Dls-monitor

Close

2103

zephyr-clt

Zephyr serv-hm connection

Close

2105

eklogin

Kerberos (v4) encrypted rlogin

Close

2106

ekshell

Kerberos (v4) encrypted rshell

Close

2111

kx

X over kerberos

Close

2121

ccproxy-ftp

CCProxy FTP Proxy

Close

2160

unknown

unknown

Close

2161

apc-agent

APC 2161

Close

2190,
2191,
2222,
2251,
2260,
2288

unknown

unknown

Close

2301

HTTP

HP Proliant System Management 2.0.1.104
(CompaqHTTPServer 9.9)

Close

2323

unknown

unknown

Close

2381

HTTP

Compaq insight manager HTTP server 5.7

Close

2382

unknown

unknown

Close

2383

ms-olap4

MS OLAP 4

Close

2393,
2394,
2399

unknown

unknown

Close

2601

zebra

zebra vty

Close

2605

bgpod

BGPd vty

Close

2607

unknown

unknown

Close

2701

sms-rcinfo

SMS remote control (control) SMS remote
control agent

Close if not required

2702

sms-xfer

SMS XFER

Close if not required

2710,
2717,
2800

unknown

unknown

Close

2809

corbaloc

CORBA LOC

Close

2869

UPnP Framework

Allows a computer to receive UPnP discovery
requests from other computers and devices.

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

2909,
2910,
2968

unknown

unknown

Close

2998

iss-release

ISS RealSecure IDS Remote Console Admin
port

Close

3001

nessus

Nessus Security Scanner Daemon

Close

3017,
3050,
3071

unknown

unknown

Close

3128

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

3211

unknown

unknown

Close

3260

iscsi

iSCSI port

Close

3261

unknown

unknown

Close

3268

globalcatLDAP

MS global catalogue

Close

3269

globalcatLDAPssl

MS global catalogue with LDAP/SSL

Close

3301,
3323,
3324

unknown

unknown

Close

3333

dec-notes

DEC Notes

Close

3351,
3367,
3371

unknown

unknown

Close

3389

MS-rdp

MS terminal service

Open

3390,
3404,
3476,
3493,
3517,
3527,
3546,
3551,
3659

unknown

unknown

Close

3690

svn

Subversion

Close

3809,
3814,
3851,
3869,
3871,
3889,
3914,
3918

unknown

unknown

Close

3986

mapper-ws-ethd

MAPPER workstation server

Close

3995

unknown

unknown

Close

4000

remoteanything

If these services are not installed beware
could be Trojan

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

4001,
4003,
4005,
4011

unknown

unknown

Close

4125

rww

Remote Web Workplace for MS
Windows Small Business Server

Close

4126

unknown

unknown

Close

4224

xtell

Xtell messenging server

Close

4343

unicall

UNICALL

Close

4446,
4567

unknown

unknown

Close

4899

radmin

RAdmin Port

Close

4900

unknown

unknown

Close

4998

maybe-veritas

maybe-veritas

Close

5000

upnp

Universal plug and play service, If these
services are not installed beware could be
Trojan

Close

5001

complex-link

Yahoo messenger chat, If these services
are not installed beware could be Trojan

Close

5003

filemaker

FileMaker, Inc. - Proprietary transport

Close

5009

airport-admin

Apple AirPort WAP administration

Close

5050

mmcc

multimedia conference control tool

Close

5051

ida-agent

ITA Agent, Symantec Intruder Alert

Close

5054

unknown

unknown

Close

5060

sip

SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)

Close

5080

unknown

unknown

Close

5101

admdog

chili!soft asp

Close

5200,
5222,
5225,
5226,
5280,
5357

unknown

unknown

Close

5431

park-agent

PARK AGENT

Close

5440

unknown

unknown

Close

5500

hotline

Hotline file sharing client/server

Close

5510

secureidprop

secureidprop-ace/server services

Close

5544

unknown

unknown

Close

5550

sdadmind

ACE Server services

Close

5555

freeciv

Freeciv gameplay

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

5560

isqlplus

Oracle web enabled SQL interface
(version 10g+)

Close

5566,
5633,
5730

unknown

unknown

Close

5800

vnc-http

VNC (Virtual Network Computing)
HTTP Access

Close

5801

vnc-http-1

VNC (Virtual Network Computing)
HTTP Access

Close

5802

vnc-http-2

VNC (Virtual Network Computing)
HTTP Access

Close if not required

5811,
5815,
5877

unknown

unknown

Close

5901

vnc-1

VNC display 1

Close

5904,
5907,
5910,
5915,
5922,
5925,
5950,
5962,
5963,
5987,
5988

unknown

unknown

Close

5998

ncd-diag

NCD Diagnostics Telnet

Close

5999

ncd-conf

NCD Configuration Telnet

Close

6000

X11

X Window System

Close

6001

X11:1

X Window Server

Close

6003

X11:3

X Window Server

Close

6004

X11:4

X Window Server

Close

6005

X11:5

X Window Server

Close

6006

X11:6

X Window Server

Close

6059

X11:59

X Window Server

Close

6101

backupexec

Veritas BackupExec

Close

6106

isdninfo

isdninfo

Close

6129

damewaremr

DameWare Mini Remote Control

Open

6156

unknown

unknown

Close

6346

gnutella

gnutella-svc (Gnutella P2P file-sharing
system)

Close

6502

netop-rc

NetOp Remote Control (by Danware Data
A/S)

Open

6547

powerchuteplus

Powerchuteplus

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

6566,
6567,
6580,
6646

unknown

unknown

Close

6666,
6668,
6669

irc

IRC (Internet Relay Chat), many
Trojans/backdoors also use this port

Close

6692

unknown

unknown

Close

6699

napster

Napster File (MP3) sharing software

Close

6788

unknown

unknown

Close

6881

bittorrent-tracker

BitTorrent

Close

6901

unknown

unknown

Close

6969

tcpwrapped

NMAP tcpwrapped

Close

7001

afs3-callback

callbacks to cache managers

Close

7007

afs3-bos

basic overseer process

Close

7025

unknown

unknown

Close

7200

fodms

FODMS FLIP

Close

7443,
7496,
7512,
7676,
7741,
7777,
7778,
7800,
7911,
7921

unknown

unknown

Close

7937

nsrexecd

Legato NetWorker

Close

7999

unknown

unknown

Close

8000

http-alt

HTTP Alternate (official) for Apache

Close if not required

8001

unknown

If these services are not installed beware
could be Trojan

Close

8002

teradataordbms

Teradata ORDBMS

Close

8007

ajp12

Apache JServ Protocol 1.x

Close

8008

HTTP

HTTP alternate (official)

Close

8009

ajp13

Default configuration Tomcat

Close

8010

xmpp

Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP) (formerly named
Jabber) file transfers

Close

8021

ftp-proxy

Common FTP proxy port

Close

8022,
8031,
8042,
8045

unknown

unknown

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

8082

blackice-alerts

Blackice alerts sent to this port

Close

80858090,
8093,
8099,
8181

unknown

unknown

Close

8194

sophos

Sophos Remote Management System

Open

8291,
8292,
8400

unknown

unknown

Close

8443

https-alt

HTTPS alternate (official) for Apache

Close if not required

8600,
8649,
8651,
8654,
8800,
8873,
9003,
9010,
9011

unknown

unknown

Close

9040

tor-tans

Tor TransPort, www.torproject.org

Close

9080,
9081

unknown

unknown

Close

9090

zeus-admin

Zeus admin server

Close

9099

unknown

unknown

Close

9101,
9102

jetdirect

Port numbers 9101 and 9102 are for
parallel ports 2 and 3 on the three-port HP
Jetdirect external print servers

Close

9111

DragonIDSConsole

Dragon IDS Console

Close

9207,
9415,
9418,
9503

unknown

unknown

Close

9594

msgsys

Message system

Close

9595

pds

Ping Discovery Service

Close

9666

unknown

unknown

Close

9876

sd

Session Director

Close

9877,
9878,
9898

unknown

unknown

Close

9900

iua

IUA

Close

9968

unknown

unknown

Close

9999

abyss

Abyss web server remote web
management interface

Close

10000

snet-sensor-mgmt

SecureNet Pro Sensor https management
server or apple airport admin

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

10003,
10004,
10009,
10010,
10012,
10024,
10025,
10215,
10617,
10628,
11111,
12174

unknown

unknown

Close

13783

netbackup

VERITAS NetBackup - One-time
password user authentication daemon

Close if not required

14000,
14238,
14441,
15660,
16000,
16001,
16012,
16992
16993,
18040,
19350,
19780

unknown

unknown

Close

20005

btx

xcept4 (Interacts with German Telekom's
CEPT videotext service)

Close

20031,
20221,
20222,
20828,
25734,
27352

Unknown

unknown

Close

31038,
32768

unknown

unknown

Close

32774

Sometimes-rpc11

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box

Close

32775

Sometimes-rpc13

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box

Close

32776

Sometimes-rpc15

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box

Close

32780

Sometimes-rpc23

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box

Close

3278132783,
34572,
40911,
41511

unknown

unknown

Close

44442,
44443

coldfusion-auth

ColdFusion advanced security/siteminder
authentication port

Close

45100,
48080

unknown

unknown

Close

434
The overall opened TCP service ports (528) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

49153,
49154,
49157,
49158,
49160,
49161,
49163,
4965

unknown

unknown

Close

50000

iiimsf

Internet/Intranet input method server
framework

Close

50003,
50006,
50300,
50389,
50800,
51493,
52822,
52848,
54328,
55056,
55555,
55600,
56737,
56738,
57797,
58080,
60020,
60443,
61532

unknown

unknown

Close

62078

iphone-sync

Apparently used by iPhone while
synchronising

Close

63331,
64623,
64680,
65129,
65389

unknown

unknown

Close

The overall opened UDP service ports (12) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

53

Domain

Domain Name Server

Open

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS Name Service, MS File and
printer sharing

Close if not required

138

NetBIOS-dgm

NetBIOS Datagram Service, MS File and
printer sharing

Close if not required

161

SNMP

Simple Network Management Protocol

Close

445

ms-ds

MS-DS SMB file sharing, MS Common
Internet File System (CIFS) for file sharing

Close if not required

1434

ms-sql-m

MS SQL Server 8.00.194

Close if not required
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The overall opened UDP service ports (12) – CoC-DMZ-Web server (A.B.C.181) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions and products

Recommendations

1719

H323gatestat

H.323 Gatestat

Close

2427

MGCP

Cisco Media Gateway Control Protocol

Close

3456

IISrpc-or-vat

IIS RPC or VAT default data

Close

5060

SIP

Session Initiation Protocol

Close

34125

unknown

unknown

Close
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Appendix C21: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoC-DMZ-CMS server

The overall opened TCP service ports (24) – CoC-DMZ-CMS server (A.B.C.186)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol

Close

80

HTTP

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, MS IIS webserver
6.0

Open

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Wins RPC

Close if not required

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS Session Service

Close if not required

445

ms-ds

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares, MS
Windows 2003

Close if not required

1021,
1077,
1093

unknown

unknown

Close if not required

1433

ms-sql-s

Microsoft-SQL-Server

Close

2161

apc-agent

APC 2161

Close if not required

2500

rtsserv

Resource Tracking System Server

Close if not required

2701

sms-rcinfo

SMS Remote Control (control) SMS Remote
Control Agent

Close if not required

3128

ndl-aas

Active API Server Port, If these services are not
installed beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

3389

microsoft-rdp

MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service

Open

5550

sdadmind

ACE Server services

Close if not required

6129

damewaremr

DameWare Mini Remote Control

Open

6792,
7911,

unknown

unknown

Close if not required

8080

HTTP
alternate

Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) - alternative
ports used for web traffic.

Open

9943

unknown

unknown

Close if not required

10000

snet-sensormgmt

SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or
apple airport admin, If these services are not
installed beware could be Trojan, TCP Door, XHX

Close if not required

12000

cce4x

ClearCommerce Engine 4.x

Close

49155

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call, MS Wins RPC

Close if not required

The overall opened UDP service ports (2) – CoC-DMZ-CMS server (A.B.C.186)
Port no.

Services

Descriptionss, actions and products

Recommendations

53

UDP

domain

Open

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: CMSWORKGROUP)

Close if not required
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Appendix C22: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the CoC-CMS server

The overall opened TCP service ports (13) – CoC-CMS server (10.1.15.184)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol; MS FTP service

Close

80

HTTP

MS HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

Open

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer

Open

Sharing
445

microsoft-ds

Microsoft-DS Active Directory, Windows shares

Open

3128

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

3389

microsoft-rdp

MS WBT Server, MS Terminal Service

Open

6129

damewaremr

DameWare Mini Remote Control

Open

6969

acmsoda

“Backdoor.Assasin.D Trojan - opens a backdoor on
one of the following ports: 5695,6595,6969,27589.
Backdoor.Assasin opens port 27589,
Backdoor.Assasin.B opens port 6969,
Backdoor.Assasin.C opens port 6595, and
Backdoor.Assasin.D opens port 5695 to listen for
commands from the attacker.
Other Trojans that use this port: GateCrasher, IRC
3/IRC Hack, Net Controller, Priority, Danton,
2000Cracks.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-j, p. 1)

Close

8080

http_alt

HTTP alternate

Open

10000

snet-sensormgmt

SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or
apple airport admin

Close if not required

49155

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

The overall opened UDP service port (1) – CoC-CMS server (10.1.15.184)
Port no.

Service

Description, action or product

Recommendation

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: COCGROUP)

Open
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Appendix C23: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the Epathweb server

The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

1

tcpmux

TCP Port Service Multiplexer

Close

3

compressnet

Compression process

Close

9

discard

“Discard server - this protocol is only installed on
machines for test purposes. The service listening at
this port (both TCP and UDP) simply discards any
input.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-a, p. 1)

Close

13

daytime

Daytime service [RFC 867] - responds with the
current time of day. Different machines respond
with slightly different date/time format, so port can
be used to fingerprint machines.

Close

17

qotd

Responds with Quote of the Day. See [RFC 865];
Skun Trojan also uses this port.

Close

19

chargen

“Generates and replies with a stream of characters
(TCP) or a packet containing characters (UDP).
Should be disabled if there is no specific need for
it, source for potential attacks. [RFC 864]; Skun
Trojan also uses this port.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-b,
p. 1)

Close

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol; MS FTP service

Close

24

priv-mail

Any private mail system

Close

30

unknown

unknown

Close

43

whois

WHOIS protocol (official)

Close

79

finger

“Finger protocol (official); Finger Security
Concerns: Provides key host info to attacker;
Trojans that also use this port: ADM worm, Back
Orifice 2000 (BO2K), CDK Trojan (ports 79,
15858), Firehotcker (ports 79, 5321).” (Speed
Guide, n.d.-c, p. 1)

Close

80

HTTP

MS HTTP webserver 6.0

Open

81

hosts2-ns

HOSTS2 Name Server

Close

82

xfer

XFER utility

Close

83

mit-ml-dev

MIT ML device

Close

85

mit-ml-dev

MIT ML device

Close

89

su-mit-tg

SU MIT Telnet gateway

Close

90

metagram

Metagram relay

Close

99

metagram

Metagram relay

Close

100

newacct

unauthorised use

Close

106

POP3pw

Eudora compatible PW changer

Close

109

POP2

Post Office Protocol - version 2

Close

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

119

NNTP

Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) - used
for retrieving newsgroup messages (official)

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Close

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and printer

Close

sharing
146

iso-tp0

ISO-IP0

Close

161

SNMP

SNMP

Close

179

bgp

Border Gateway Protocol

Close

211

914c/g

Texas instruments 914C/G terminal

Close

212

anet

ATEXSSTR

Close

254, 255

unknown

unknown

Close

259

esro-gen

Efficient short remote operations

Close

280

http-mgmt

http-mgmt

Close

301, 306

unknown

Unassigned

Close

311

asip-webadmin

Mac OS X Server admin (officially AppleShare IP
Web administration)

Close

406

imsp

Interactive Mail Support Protocol

Close

416

silverplatter

Silverplatter

Close

417

onmux

Onmux

Close

427

svrloc

Server location

Close

443

HTTPS

Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS/SSL; MS
IIS webserver 6.0

Open

445

MS-ds

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares MS
Windows 2003

Close

458

appleqtc

Apple quick time

Close

464

kpasswd

kpasswd

Close

465

SMTPS

SMTP Secure

Close

481

dvs/ph

Dvs or PH service

Close

500

isakmp

Security Association and Key Management
Protocol

Close

512

exec

Remote execution-- Allows remote execution of
commands without logon.

Close

513

login

Remote login-- Remote term service that operates
via telnet process- but with automatic auth
performed based on trust. If no trust- will prompt
for username/password logon similar to telnet.

Close

514

shell

Used by rsh and (also rcp), interactive shell
without any logging; Some vulnerabilities of this
port: RPC Backdoor, Whacky, ADM worm

Close

515

printer

Printing services, listening for incoming
connections; Trojans using this port: MscanWorm,
lpdw0rm, Ramen.

Close
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Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

543

klogin

Kerberos login

Close

544

kshell

Kerberos remote shell

Close

545

ekshell

Kerberos encrypted remote shell

Close

555

dsf

dsf; Trojans that use this port: 711 Trojan (Seven
Eleven), Ini-Killer, Net Administrator
(NeTadmin), Phase Zero, Stealth Spy

Close

593

http-rpc-epmap

HTTP RPC Ep Map

Close

616

unknown

unknown

Close

617

sco-dtmgr

SCO Desktop Administration Server or Arkeia
(www.akriea.com) backup software

Close

625

apple-xsvradmin

Apple

Close

631

ipp

Internet Printing Protocol

Close

636

ldapssl

ldap protocol over TLS/SSL (was sldap)

Close

646

ldp

Label Distribution Protocol, a routing protocol
used in MPLS networks (official)

Close

648

RRP

Registry Registrar Protocol (RRP)

Close

666

doom

“Used by the game Doom (ID Software),
however, because of the cool connotations, this
port is also used by numerous Trojan
horses/backdoors.
Here is a list: Attack FTP, Back Construction,
BLA Trojan, Cain & Abel, NokNok, Satans Back
Door - SBD, ServU, Shadow Phyre, th3r1pp3rz
(the rippers), lpdw0rm, Backdoor.FTP_Ana.C backdoor Trojan, 03.2003. Affects all current
Windows versions.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-d, p. 1)

Close

667

disclose

Campaign contribution disclosures - SDR
Technologies

Close

668

mecomm

MeComm

Close

683

corba-iiop

Corba-iiop

Close

687,
705, 711

unknown

unknown

Close

714

iris-xpcs

IRIS over XPCS

Close

720,
722, 726

unknown

unknown

Close

749

kerberos-adm

Kerberos administration

Close

777

multiling-http

Multiling HTTP, Trojans that use this port:
AimSpy (AIM trojan), Un-Detected ( a.k.a.
Backdoor.TDS, 4Fuk,
Trojan.Win32.TrojanRunner.Levil, U4 ).

Close

783

spamassasin

Apache SpamAssassin spamd

Close

800

mdbs_daemon

Mdbs_daemon

Close

801

device

Device

Close

808

ccproxy-http

CCProxy HTTP/Gopher/FTP (over HTTP) proxy

Close
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Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

873

rsync

rsync

Close

880

unknown

unknown

Close

898

sunmanageconsole

Solaris Management Console Java listener
(Solaris 8 & 9)

Close

911, 987

unknown

unknown

Close

990

FTPs

FTP protocol, control, over TLS/SSL

Close

992

Telnets

telnet protocol over TLS/SSL

Close

999

garcon

“Port used by ScimoreDB database system;
Trojans that run on this port: DeepThroat (a.k.a.
DTV2, DTV3, BackDoor-J), F0replay (a.k.a.
WiNNUke eXtreame), WinSatan.” (Speed
Guide, n.d.-e, p. 1)

Close

1000

cadlock

cadlock

Close

1001

unknown

unknown

Close

1002

window-icfw

Windows Internet connection firewall or Internet
locator server for NetMeeting.

Close

1009,
1011,
1022

unknown

unknown

Close

1023

netvenuechat

Nortel NetVenue Notification, Chat, Intercom

Close

1026

LSA-or-nterm

Nterm remote_login network_terminal

Close

1027

IIS

IIS

Close

1029

ms-lsa

Ms-lsa

Close

1030

iad1

BBN IAD

Close

1031

iad2

BBN IAD

Close

1032

Iad3

BBN IAD

Close

1035

multidropper

A Multidropper Adware, or PhoneFree

Close

1036,
1037

unknown

unknown

Close

1038

mtqp

Message Tracking Query Protocol

Close

1039

msrpc

MS Windows RPC

Close

1041

danf-ak2,
Trojan

AK2 Product , Dosh, RemoteNC; , If these
services are not installed beware could be Trojan

Close

1042

unknown, bla
Trojan

BLA Trojan; If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

1043

boinc

BOINC Client Control

Close

10441047,
1049

unknown

unknown

Close

1051

optima-vnet

Optima VNET

Close

1053

unknown

unknown

Close

1055

ansyslmd

ANSYS - license manager

Close
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Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

1056,
1057

unknown

unknown

Close

1058

nim

nimreg, IBM AIX Network installation manager
(NIM) (official)

Close

1059

nimreg

1060

polestar

POLESTAR

Close

1062

veracity

Veracity

Close

1064

unknown

unknown

Close

1069

cognex-insight

1070,
1072,
1074,
1075

unknown

unknown

Close

1077

unknown

unknown

Close

1080

socks

“Socks Proxy is an Internet proxy service,
potential spam relay point.
Common programs using this port: Wingate
Trojans/worms that use this port as well:
Bugbear.xx - wide-spread mass-mailing worm,
many variants.
SubSeven - remote access Trojan, 03.2001.
Afects all current Windows versions.
WinHole - remote access Trojan, 01.2000 (a.k.a.
WinGate, Backdoor.WLF, BackGate). Affects
Windows 9x.
Trojan.Webus.C - remote access Trojan,
10.12.2004. Affects all current Windows
versions. Connects to an IRC server (on port
8080) and opens a backdoor on TCP port 10888
or 1080.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-f, p. 1)

Close

1082

unknown

unknown

Close

1083

ansoft-lm-1

Anasoft License Manager

Close

1084

ansoft-lm-2

Anasoft License Manager

Close

10851092,
1095

unknown

unknown

Close

1096,
1099,
1100,
1105,
1108,
1111

unknown

unknown

Close

1112

msql

mini-sql server

Close

1113,
1117,
1119,
1121

Unknown

unknown

Close

Close

Close
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Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products
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1123,
1131,
1132,
1141,
1145,
1147,
1148,
1152,
1154,
1165,
1166,
1169,
1174,
1183,
1185,
1187,
1192

unknown

unknown

Close

1199,
1201,
1216

unknown

unknown

Close

1234

hotline

If these services are not installed beware could
be Trojan

Close

1236,
1244

unknown

unknown

Close

1248

hermes

hermes

Close

1271,
1277,
1287,
1296,
1300,
1309,
1310

unknown

unknown

Close

1311

rxmon

RxMon

Close

1417

timbuktu-srv1

Timbuktu Service 1 Port

Close

1433

ms-sql-s

MS-SQL-Server 2005 9.00.4035; SP3

Close if not required

1434

ms-sql-m

MS-SQL-Server

Close if not required

1443

Ies-lm

Integrated engineering software

Close

1455

Ies-lm

Integrated engineering software

Close

1461

Ibm_wrless_lan

IBM Wireless LAN

Close

1494

citrix-ica

Citrix XenApp Independent Computing
Architecture (ICA) thin client protocol

Close

1500

vlsi-lm

VLSI License Manager

Close

1501

sas-3

Satellite-data Acquisition System 3

Close

1503

imtc-mcs

Databeam

Close

1524

ingreslock

Ingres; If these services are not installed beware
could be Trojan

Close

1533

virtual-places

Virtual Places software

Close
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Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products
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1580,
1583,
1594

unknown

unknown

Close

1600

issd

Issd

Close

1641

unknown

unknown

Close

1658

unknown

unknown

Close

1666

netview-aix-6

netview-aix-6

Close

1717

fj-hdnet

fj-hdnet

Close

1718

h323gatedisc

h323gatedisc

Close

1755

wms

Windows media service

Close

1782

hp-hcip

hp-hcip

Close

1783,
1801,
1839,
1840

unknown

unknown

Close

1864

paradym-31

Paradym 31 Port

Close

1875

unknown

unknown

Close

1900

upnp

“UPnP discovery/SSDP is a service that runs by
default on WinXP, and creates immediately
exploitable security vulnerability for any
network-connected system. Filtering this port
proactively prevents XP systems from being
remotely compromised by malicious worms or
intruders.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-g, p. 1)

Close

1914

unknown

unknown

Close

1935

RTMP

Adobe Flash Media Server connection port, Real
Time Messaging Protocol (RTMP)

Close

1947,
1971,
1972,
1974

unknown

unknown

Close

1998

x25-svc-port

Cisco X.25 over TCP (XOT) service

Close

1999

tcp-id-port

“Cisco identification port.
Some Trojans also use this port: Back Door,
SubSeven, TransScout
Backdoor.Bifrose.C (05.19.2005) - Trojan that
opens a backdoor on port 1999/tcp, and sends
information to a remote server.” (Speed Guide,
n.d.-h, p. 1)

Close

2000

callbook

Callbook; If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

2001

dc

dc or nfr20 web queries; If these services are not
installed beware could be Trojan

Close

2002

globe

Globe; If these services are not installed beware
could be Trojan

Close
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Port no.
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2003

finger

GNU finger (cfingerd)

Close

2005

deslogin

encrypted symmetric telnet/login

Close

2006

invokator

invokator

Close

2007

dectalk

dectalk

Close

2008

conf

conf

Close

2013

raid-am

raid-am

Close

2021

servexec

servexec

Close

2022

down

down

Close

2033

glogger

glogger

Close

2038

objectmanager

objectmanager

Close

2040

lam

lam

Close

2042

isis

isis

Close

2045

cdfunc

Cdfunc

Close

2049

NFS

“Network File System (NFS) - remote filesystem
access. (RFC 1813). A commonly scanned and
exploited attack vector. Normally, access to
portmapper is needed to find which port this
service runs on, but since most installations run
NFS on this port, hackers/crackers can bypass
portmapper and try this port directly.” (Speed
Guide, n.d.-i, p. 1)

Close

2065

dlsrpn

Data Link Switch Read Port Number

Close

2068

advocentkvm

Advocent KVM Server

Close

2100

unknown

unknown

Close

2105

eklogin

Kerberos (v4) encrypted rlogin

Close

2107,
2119

unknown

unknown

Close

2121

ccproxy-ftp

CCProxy FTP Proxy

Close

2144

unknown

unknown

Close

2161

apc-agent

APC 2161

Close

2170,
2190,
2196,
2200,
2222,
2260

unknown

unknown

Close

2301

HTTP

HP Proliant System Management 2.0.1.104
(CompaqHTTPServer 9.9)

Close

2323

unknown

unknown

Close

2381

HTTP

Compaq Insight Manager HTTP server 5.7

Close

2382

unknown

unknown

Close

2383

ms-olap4

MS OLAP 4

Close
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Descriptions, actions or products
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2399

unknown

unknown

Close

2401

cvspserver

CVS network server

Close

2492

unknown

unknown

Close

2500

rtsserv

Resource Tracking system server

Close

2522,
2525

unknown

unknown

Close

2601

zebra

zebra vty

Close

2602

ripd

RIPd vty

Close

2605

bgpod

BGPd vty

Close

2607,
2608

unknown

unknown

Close

2638

sybase

Sybase database

Close

2701

sms-rcinfo

SMS Remote Control (control) SMS Remote
Control Agent

Close

2710,
2717,
2725,
2811,
2875,
2910,
2920

unknown

unknown

Close

2967

symantec-av

Symantec AntiVirus (rtvscan.exe)

Close

2968

unknown

unknown

Close

2998

iss-release

ISS RealSecure IDS Remote Console Admin
port

Close

3000

ppp

User-level ppp daemon, or chili!soft asp

Close

3001

nessus

Nessus Security Scanner Daemon

Close

3005

deslogin

encrypted symmetric telnet/login

Close

3006

deslogind

deslogind

Close

3013,
3017,
3030,
3031,
3050,
3071

unknown

unknown

Close

3128

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

3168,
3211,
3221

unknown

unknown

Close

3260

iscsi

iSCSI port

Close

3261

unknown

unknown

Close

3268

globalcatLDAP

MS Global Catalog

Close

3283

netassistant

Apple Remote Desktop Net Assistant reporting
feature

Close
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33233325

unknown

unknown

Close

3333

dec-notes

DEC Notes

Close

3367,
33693371,
3476,
3493,
3517,
3527,
3546,
3551,
3659

unknown

unknown

Close

3689

rendezvous

Rendezvous Zeroconf (used by Apple/iTunes)

Close

3690

svn

Subversion

Close

3703,
3737,
3766,
3784,
3827,
3828,
3851,
3878,
3880

unknown

unknown

Close

3905

mupdate

Mailbox Update (MUPDATE) protocol

Close

3914,
3918,
3920,
3945,
3971

unknown

unknown

Close

3986

mapper-ws-ethd

MAPPER workstation server

Close

3995

unknown

unknown

Close

4002

mlchat-proxy

mlnet - MLChat P2P chat proxy

Close

4003,
4005,
4006

unknown

unknown

Close

4545

lockd

NFS lock daemon/manager

Close

4125

rww

Remote Web Workplace for MS Windows
Small Business Server

Close

4129

unknown

unknown

Close

4224

xtell

Xtell messenging server

Close

4343

unicall

UNICALL

Close

4443

pharos

Pharos

Close

4445,
4446,
4449

unknown

unknown

Close
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4662

edonkey

eDonkey file sharing (Donkey)

Close

4848

unknown

unknown

Close

4998

maybe-veritas

maybe-veritas

Close

5003

filemaker

FileMaker, Inc. - Proprietary transport

Close

5009

airport-admin

Apple AirPort WAP Administration

Close

5030

unknown

unknown

Close

5051

ida-agent

ITA agent, Symantec intruder alert

Close

5054

unknown

unknown

Close

5060

SIP

SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)

Close

5061

sip-tls

SIP-TLS

Close

5080

unknown

unknown

Close

5100

admd

(ChiliSoft ASP manager for Cobalt RaQ) or
Yahoo pager

Close

5120,
5200,
5221,
5222,
5225,
5269

unknown

unknown

Close

5280,
5298,
5357

unknown

unknown

Close

5405

pcduo

RemCon PC-Duo - new port

Close

5414

unknown

unknown

Close

5432

postgresql

PostgreSQL database server

Close

5440

unknown

unknown

Close

5500

hotline

Hotline file sharing client/server

Close

5550

sdadmind

ACE server services

Close

5555

freeciv

Freeciv gameplay

Close

5631

pcanywheredata

pcANYWHEREdata, Symantec pcAnywhere
(version 7.52 and later)

Close if not required

5633,
5718

unknown

unknown

Close

5800

vnc-http

VNC (Virtual Network Computing) HTTP
access

Close

5810

unknown

unknown

Close

5811,
5815,
5825,
5850,
5859,
5862

unknown

unknown

Close
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5901

vnc-1

VNC display 1

Close

5902

vnc-2

VNC display 2

Close

5903

vnc-3

VNC display 3

Close

5904,
5907,
5910,
5915,
5950,
5952,
5960,
5962,
5963,
5987,
5988,
5989

unknown

unknown

Close

5999

ncd-conf

NCD Configuration Telnet

Close

6003

X11:3

X Window Server

Close

6005

X11:5

X Window Server

Close

6007

X11:7

X Window Server

Close

6025

unknown

unknown

Close

6059

X11:59

X Window Server

Close

6100

unknown

unknown

Close

6112

dtspc

CDE subprocess control

Close

6129

damewaremr

DameWare mini remote control

Open

6156

unknown

unknown

Close

6346

gnutella

gnutella-svc (Gnutella P2P file-sharing
system)

Close

6502

netop-rc

NetOp remote control (by Danware Data A/S)

Open

6510

unknown

unknown

Close

6543

mythtv

Mythtv; If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

6547

powerchuteplus

Powerchuteplus

Close

65656567,
6646

unknown

unknown

Close

6666,
6668,
6669

irc

IRC (Internet Relay Chat), many
Trojans/backdoors also use this port

Close

6689,
6692

unknown

unknown

Close

6699

napster

Napster File (MP3) sharing software

Close

6779

unknown

unknown

Close

6789

ibm-db2-admin

IBM DB2

Close

450
The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

6792,
6839,
6901

unknown

unknown

Close

6969

tcpwrapped

NMAP tcpwrapped

Close

7000

afs3-fileserver

file server itself, msdos; ; If these services are
not installed beware could be Trojan

Close

7001

afs3-callback

callbacks to cache managers

Close

7002

afs3-prserver

users & groups database

Close

7007

afs3-bos

basic overseer process

Close

7100

font-service

X Font Service

Close

7103,
7106

unknown

unknown

Close

7200

fodms

FODMS FLIP

Close

7201

dlip

DLIP

Close

7443,
7625,
7676,
7741,
7777

unknown

unknown

Close

7800,
7911,
7920,
7921

unknown

unknown

Close

7937

nsrexecd

Legato NetWorker

Close

7938

lgtomapper

Legato portmapper

Close

7999

unknown

unknown

Close

8000

http-alt

HTTP Alternate (official) for Apache

Close if not required

8001

unknown

If these services are not installed beware could
be Trojan

Close

8002

teradataordbms

Teradata ORDBMS

Close

8007

ajp12

Apache JServ Protocol 1.x

Close

8008

HTTP

HTTP Alternate (official)

Close if not required

8009

ajp13

Default configuration Tomcat

Close

8011,
8022,
8031,
8042,
8045

unknown

unknown

Close

8081

blackice-icecap

ICECap user console

Close

8082

blackice-alerts

Blackice Alerts sent to this port

Close

80878090,
8093,

unknown

unknown

Close
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8100,
8180,
8181

unknown

unknown

Close

81938194

sophos

Sophos Remote Management System

Close

8200,
8222,
8290,
8291,
8500,
8600,
8649,
8654,
8800,
8873,
8994

unknown

unknown

Close

9000

cslistener

CSlistener; If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

9009,
9011

unknown

unknown

Close

9050

tor-socks

Tor SocksPort

Close

9071,
9080,
9081,
9091

unknown

unknown

Close

91019102

jetdirect

HP JetDirect card

Close

9110

unknown

unknown

Close

9111

DragonIDSCon
sole

Dragon IDS Console

Close

9207,
9290,
9418,
9485,
9500,
9575,
9593

unknown

unknown

Close

9594

msgsys

Message System

Close

9595

pds

Ping Discovery System

Close

9666

unknown

unknown

Close

9876

sd

Session Director, True Image Remote Agent,
Wireshark, NMAP use this port.
Trojans that also use this port: Cyber Attacker,
Rux, Backdoor.Lolok

Close

9898,
9943,
9968

unknown

unknown

Close
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9900

iua

IUA

Close

9999

abyss

Abyss web server remote web management
interface; ; If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

10000

snet-sensormgmt

SecureNet Pro Sensor https management
server or apple airport admin

Close

1000210004,
10010,
10012,
10025,
10215,
10243,
10617,
10621,
10628,
10778,
11110,
11111,
11967,
12265,
13456

unknown

unknown

Close

1378213783

netbackup

VERITAS NetBackup, bpcd client

Close

14442

unknown

unknown

Close

15000

hydap

Hypack Data Aquisition

Close

15003,
15004,
15660,
16001,
16012,
16016,
16018,
16992,
16993,
17877,
17988,
18040,
18988,
19101,
19283,
19315,
19842,
20000

unknown

unknown

Close

20005

btx

xcept4 (Interacts with German Telekom's
CEPT videotext service)

Close

20828,
21571,
22939,
23502,
24800,
25734

unknown

unknown

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

26214,
27352,
27353,
27355,
27356,
27551,
28201,
30000,
30718,
30951

unknown

unknown

Close

31337

Elite

inetd.conf; If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close

32768,
32769

unknown

unknown

Close

32770

sometimes-rpc3

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box

Close

32772

sometimes-rpc7

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box
(status)

Close

32773

sometimes-rpc9

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box
(rquotad)

Close

32774

sometimes-rpc11

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box
(rusersd)

Close

32775

sometimes-rpc13

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box
(status)

Close

32777

sometimes-rpc17

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box
(walld)

Close

32778

sometimes-rpc19

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box
(rstatd)

Close

32779

sometimes-rpc21

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box

Close

32780

sometimes-rpc23

Sometimes an RPC port on Solaris box

Close

3278132785,
33899,
35500

unknown

unknown

Close

38292

landesk-cba

landesk-cba

Close

40193,
41511,
44176

unknown

unknown

Close

44443

coldfusion-auth

ColdFusion Advanced Security/Siteminder
Authentication Port

Close

45100,
48080,
4915249156,
49159,
49160,
49163,
49165,
49175,
49176

unknown

unknown

Close
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The overall opened TCP service ports (653) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

49400

HTTP

Compaq Diagnostics httpd
(CompaqHTTPServer 5.7)

Close

49999

unknown

unknown

Close

50002

iiimsf

Internet/Intranet Input Method Server
Framework

Close

50006,
50500,
50636,
51493,
52673,
52848,
52869,
54045,
55056,
55555,
56737,
56738,
57294,
60020,
60443,
61532,
61900

unknown

unknown

Close

62078

iphone-sync

Apparently used by iPhone while syncing

Close

63331,
64680,
65129,
65389

unknown

unknown

Close

The overall opened UDP service ports (10) – Epathweb server (A.B.C.179)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

53

UDP

domain

Open

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS Name Service MS Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn

Close if not required

138

NetBIOS-dgm

NetBIOS Datagram Service

Close if not required

161

SNMP

SNMP

Close

445

ms-ds

MS-DS SMB file sharing

Close if not required

500

isakmp

Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol

Close if not required

1719

h323gatestat

h323gatestat

Close

4500

nat-t-ike

IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947)

Close if not required

5060

SIP

Session Initiation Protocol

Close
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Appendix C24: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the Epathway server

The overall opened TCP service ports (22) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol; MS FTP service

Close

80

HTTP

MS HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

Open

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

135

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS Session Service for MS file and printer

Open

sharing
445

ms-ds

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares

Open

1025

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

Open/Close if not
required

1079

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

1080

sophos

Sophos message router

Open

1658

MSRPC

MS Windows RPC

Close if not required

3128

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

5800

vnc-http

VNC (Virtual Network Computing) HTTP Access

Close if not required

5900

vnc

Virtual Network Computer display 0

Close if not required

6129

damewaremr

DameWare Mini Remote Control

Open

6502

netop-rc

NetOp Remote Control (by Danware Data A/S)

Open

6969

acmsoda

“Backdoor.Assasin.D Trojan - opens a backdoor on
one of the following ports: 5695,6595,6969,27589.
Backdoor.Assasin opens port 27589,
Backdoor.Assasin.B opens port 6969,
Backdoor.Assasin.C opens port 6595, and
Backdoor.Assasin.D opens port 5695 to listen for
commands from the attacker.
Other Trojans that use this port: GateCrasher, IRC
3/IRC Hack, Net Controller, Priority, Danton,
2000Cracks” (Speed Guide, n.d.-j, p. 1)

Close

8080

http_alt

HTTP alternate

Open

8192

sophos

Sophos message router (Interoperable Object
Reference Service)

Open

8193

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

8194

sophos

Sophos message router

Open

10000

snet-sensormgmt

SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or
apple airport admin

Close if not required

49155

MSRPC

MS Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows RPC

Close if not required
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The overall opened UDP service ports (10) – Epathway server (10.1.15.166) (continued)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS Name Service Microsoft Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: COCWORKGROUP)

Open

138

NetBIOSdgm

NetBIOS Datagram Service

Close if not required

445

ms-ds

MS-DS SMB file sharing

Open/ Close if not
required

500

isakmp

Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol

Close if not required

4500

nat-t-ike

IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947)

Close if not required

457
Appendix C25: The overall opened TCP and UDP service ports, and the possible
mitigation recommendations of the Pathway server

The overall opened TCP service ports (21) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

21

FTP

File Transfer Protocol; MS FTP service

Close

80

HTTP

Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

Open

110

POP3

Post Office Protocol 3

Close

135

MSRPC

Microsoft Remote Procedure Call; MS Windows
RPC

Open

139

NetBIOS-ssn

NetBIOS Session Service for MS File and Printer

Open

Sharing
445

ms-ds

MS-DS Active Directory, Windows shares

Open

1025

MSRPC

Microsoft Windows RPC

Open/Close if not
required

1062

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

1063

sophos

Sophos message router

Open

1433

ms-sql-s

Microsoft SQL Server 2005 9.00. 4035; SP3

Open

3128

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

5800

vnc-http

VNC (Virtual Network Computing) HTTP access

Close if not required

5900

vnc

Virtual Network Computer display 0

Close if not required

6129

damewaremr

DameWare Mini Remote Control

Open

6502

netop-rc

NetOp Remote Control (by Danware Data A/S)

Open

6969

acmsoda

“Backdoor.Assasin.D Trojan - opens a backdoor on
one of the following ports: 5695,6595,6969,27589.
Backdoor.Assasin opens port 27589,
Backdoor.Assasin.B opens port 6969,
Backdoor.Assasin.C opens port 6595, and
Backdoor.Assasin.D opens port 5695 to listen for
commands from the attacker.
Other Trojans that use this port: GateCrasher, IRC
3/IRC Hack, Net Controller, Priority, Danton,
2000Cracks.” (Speed Guide, n.d.-j, p. 1)

Close

8080

http_alt

HTTP alternate

Open

8192

sophos

Sophos message router (Interoperable Object
Reference Service)

Open

8193

tcpwrapped

Proxy/socks, If these services are not installed
beware could be Trojan

Close if not required

8194

sophos

Sophos message router

Open

10000

snet-sensormgmt

SecureNet Pro Sensor https management server or
apple airport admin

Close if not required
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The overall opened UDP service ports (7) – Pathway server (10.1.15.162)
Port no.

Services

Descriptions, actions or products

Recommendations

123

NTP

Network Time Protocol

Close

137

NetBIOS-ns

NetBIOS Name Service Microsoft Windows NT
NetBIOS-ssn (workgroup: COCWORKGROUP)

Open

138

NetBIOSdgm

NetBIOS Datagram Service

Close if not required

445

ms-ds

Microsoft-DS SMB file sharing

Open/close if not
required

500

IPSec isakmp

Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol

Close if not required

1434

ms-sql-m

Microsoft SQL Server 2005 9.00. 4035.00; SP3

Open

4500

nat-t-ike

IPsec NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947)

Close if not required
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Appendix C26: A summary of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web server – the vulnerabilities
and the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web
server
High security vulnerabilities (7)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Backdoors: Open ports commonly used by
Trojans (3): Duddie (2002), Duddie (2004)
and Duddie (2005)

Disable TCP ports 2002, 2004 and 2005

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives.

Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable
to a remote buffer overflow exploit

Disable POP3 service port

Software: APSB07-18: Adobe Acrobat
mailto: vulnerability

It is recommended that affected users update to Adobe
Reader 8.1.1 or Acrobat 8.1.1.

Software: SANS07C1: Multiple
vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader earlier
than 8.0.0

It is recommended that affected users update to Adobe
Reader 8.1.1 or Acrobat 8.1.1 or newer.

Medium security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Low security vulnerabilities (10)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Mail: SMTP server allows relaying

Should be disabled if not required

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Registry: Last logged-on username visible

Should be disabled

Registry: Windows AutoUpdate is enabled
but require user intervention for both patch
download and installation

No further action is required

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: SSH

If this computer is not administered via secure shell, the
SSH service is most likely unnecessary

Services: SMTP

Disable SMTP service port

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Services: HTTPS

No further action is required

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 service port
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The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-Web
server (continued)
Potential vulnerabilities (5)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account

Information: User kris-h never logged on

It is recommended to remove this account if not used

Information: MS SQL server

Uninstall MS SQL server if not used

Information: Some POP3 server banners
providing information to attacker

The service: POP3 service should be turned off

Information: USB devices installed over
time

This check generates a list of all USB devices that have
been connected to the scanned computer
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Appendix C27: A summary of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-CMS server – the
vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-DMZ-CMS
server
High security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Medium security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Low security vulnerabilities (3)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 service port

Potential vulnerabilities (3)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account

Information: User serveradministrator
never logged on

It is recommended to remove this account if not used

Information: User SophosSAUCMSWEB0
never logged

It is recommended to remove this account if not used
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Appendix C28: A summary of Council C’s CoC-CMS server – the vulnerabilities and
the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s CoC-CMS server
High security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Medium security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Low security vulnerabilities (5)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 service port

Potential vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended that the account be renamed
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Appendix C29: A summary of Council C’s Epathweb server – the vulnerabilities and
the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council’s Epathweb server
High security vulnerabilities (8)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives.

Miscellaneous: OVAL:5793: MSXML
Memory Corruption Vulnerability

Patch Security Update for Windows Server 2003
(KB955069)

Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable
to a remote buffer overflow exploit

Disable POP3 service port

Software: OVAL:6237: Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability in Microsoft
DirectShow (CVE-2009-1537)

Patch Security Update for Windows Server 2003 x64
Edition (KB951698)

Software: OVAL:5897: Word Record
Parsing Vulnerability

Check and Patch Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-042,
Vulnerability in Microsoft Word Could Allow Remote
Code Execution (955048)

Software: OVAL:332: Word Count
Vulnerability

Patch Security Update for Word 2003 (KB929057)

Web: OVAL:4582: Uninitialized Memory
Corruption Vulnerability

Check and Patch from Microsoft Security Bulletin MS07057, Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer

Web: OVAL:2109: ActiveX Object
Vulnerability

Check and Patch from Microsoft Security Bulletin MS07045

Medium security vulnerability (1)
Section: Type

Recommendation

WEB: OVAL:4480: Uninitialized Memory
Corruption Vulnerability

Check And Patch from Microsoft Security Bulletin
MS07-069, Cumulative Security Update for IE

Low security vulnerabilities (8)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Registry: Last logged-on username visible

Should be disabled

Registry: Windows AutoUpdate is enabled
but require user intervention for both patch
download and installation

No further action is required

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Services: HTTPS

No further action is required

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 service port
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The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s Epathweb server
(continued)
Potential vulnerabilities (4)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: User opsuser never logged on

It is recommended to remove this account if not used

Information: User
SophosSAUEPATHWEB0 never logged
on

It is recommended to remove this account if not used

Information: User ckbuser never logged on

It is recommended to remove this account if not used

Information: Some POP3 server banners
providing information to attacker

The service: POP3 service should be turned off
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Appendix C30: A summary of Council C’s Epathway server – the vulnerabilities and
the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s Epathway server
High security vulnerabilities (3)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives.

Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable
to a remote buffer overflow exploit

Disable POP3 service port

Software: OVAL:6237: Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability in MS
DirectShow (CVE-2009-1537)

Patch security update for Windows Server 2003 x64
Edition (KB951698)

Medium security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Low security vulnerabilities (7)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Registry: Last logged-on username visible

Should be disabled

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 service port

Web: IIS: Frontpage check

Should be uninstalled if not required

Potential vulnerabilities (2)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account

Information: Some POP3 server banners
providing information to attacker

The service: POP3 service should be turned off
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Appendix C31: A summary of Council C’s Pathway server – the vulnerabilities and
the possible mitigation recommendations

The vulnerabilities and the possible mitigation recommendations of Council C’s Pathway server
High security vulnerabilities (3)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Miscellaneous: AutoRun is enabled

Disable AutoRun both for CD/DVD drives and also other
removable drives.

Services: POP3 server might be vulnerable
to a remote buffer overflow exploit

Disable POP3 service port

Software: OVAL:6237: Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability in Microsoft
DirectShow (CVE-2009-1537)

Patch Security Update for Windows Server 2003 x64
Edition (KB951698)

Medium security vulnerability (0)
Section: Type

Recommendation

None

None

Low security vulnerabilities (6)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Registry: AutoShareServer

Should be turned off

Registry: AutoShareWKS

Should be turned off

Registry: Last logged-on username visible

Should be disabled

Services: HTTP

No further action is required

Services: FTP

Disable FTP service port

Services: POP3

Disable POP3 service port

Potential vulnerabilities (3)
Section: Types

Recommendations

Information: Administrator account exists

It is recommended to rename this account

Information: MS SQL server

No further action is required

Information: Some POP3 server banners
providing information to attacker

The service: POP3 service should be turned off
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Appendix C32: OS and network specification configuration

OS and network specification configuration
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

1.1

Physical security

Place the MS SQL server in an
area where it will be
physically secure.

Satisfactory

H

1.2

Domain
environment

If the MS SQL Server is in a
domain that is trusted by other
domains, document the access
granted by the trust.

Satisfactory; only IT
administrator groups are
allowed to access the
server.

H

1.3

MS SQL servers
accessed via
Internet

If the MS SQL server is being
accessed via the Internet, place
the MS SQL Server inside a
DMZ with the Web Server.

Satisfactory; there is a
frontend web (Epathway)
server located in the
DMZ.

H

1.4

MS SQL servers
accessed via
Internet

Put a firewall between your
server and the Internet.
Block TCP port 1433 and
UDP port 1434 on your
perimeter firewall. If named
instances are listening on
additional ports, block those
too. In a multi-tier
environment, use multiple
firewalls to create more secure
screened subnets

Satisfactory; the MS SQL
server is located be hide
the Internet firewall, and
both TCP port 1433 and
1434 are blocked from
external access.

H

1.5

Encryption

Implement SSL. Use the fullyqualified DNS name of the
server in the certificate to help
prevent masquerading.

Satisfactory; the
Epathway frontend server
uses SSL and fully
qualified DNS name.

H

1.6

Test and
development servers

Maintain test and development
servers on a separate network
segment from the production
servers.

Not satisfactory; the test
and development servers
are on the same class A
network.

H

1.7

Dedicated server

Install the MS SQL server on a
computer that does not provide
additional services, e.g., web
or mail services.

Satisfactory; the MS SQL
server is only for MS
SQL database operation.

M

1.8

OS benchmark
configuration

Configure Windows Server
2003 level I benchmark
settings with the following
modifications:

1.8.1

Windows accounts

Make sure the Windows guest
account is disabled.

Satisfactory

M

1.8.2

Disk subsystem

Use RAID for critical data
files.

Satisfactory; raid level 10:
database and temp drives
RAID level 5: backup
drive.

M
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OS and network specification configuration (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

1.8.3

Separate partitions

Create separate partitions for
OS/SQL program files, SQL
data files, and SQL
transaction logs.

Satisfactory

M

1.8.4

Volume / partition
type

Format all volumes with
NTFS

Satisfactory

H

1.9

Services

Disable the following services
on a SQL server machine

1.9.1

Alerter

Satisfactory

P

1.9.2

Clipbook server

Satisfactory

P

1.9.3

Computer browser

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.4

DHCP client

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.5

Distributed file system

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual.

L

1.9.6

Distributed transaction
coordinator

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.7

Fax service

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.8

Internet connection sharing

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.9

IPSec policy agent

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic.

L

1.9.10

License logging

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.11

Logical disk manager
administrative service

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic
(this service is needed by
the system administrator).

L

1.9.12

Messenger

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.13

NetMeeting remote desktop
sharing

Satisfactory; (disabled).

P

1.9.14

Network DDE

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.15

Network DDE DSDM

Satisfactory; (disabled).

L

1.9.16

Print spooler

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual.

L

1.9.17

Remote access connection
manager

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual

L

1.9.18

Remote registry

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic
(this service is needed by
the system administrator)

L

1.9.19

Removable storage

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual

P
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OS and network specification configuration (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

1.9.20

RunAs service

Satisfactory; (disabled)

M

1.9.21

Smart card

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual

P

1.9.22

Smart card helper

Satisfactory; (disabled)

P

1.9.23

Task scheduler

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic
(this service is needed by
the system administrator)

P

1.9.24

Telephony

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Automatic

P

1.9.25

Telnet

Satisfactory; (disabled)

L

1.9.26

Windows installer

Not satisfactory; currently
set to Started Manual

L

1.10

MS SQL server
service account

Use a low-privileged local or
Domain account for the MS
SQL server service.

Not satisfactory; currently
uses local administrator
(high-privileged).

M

1.11

SQL server agent
service account

Use a low-privileged domain
account for the MS SQL
server agent if replication,
DTS, or other inter-server
connection is required.

Not satisfactory; currently
uses local administrator
(high-privileged).

M

1.12

Local users group
membership

Assign the local service
account as a member of only
the users group.

Not satisfactory; there is
no assigned user in the
“users” group.

M

1.13

Domain service
account group
membership

Make a domain service
account a member of only
non-privileged groups.

N/A; the current
configuration does not use
the domain service account
group.

M

1.14

MS SQL server
service account
rights

Grant the MS SQL server
service account(s) the
following rights:

N/A; there is no MS SQL
service account assigned.

Log on as a service

M

Act as part of the OS.

L

Act as part of the OS.

L

Log on as a batch job

L

Replace a process-level token

L

Bypass traverse checking

M

Adjust memory quotas for a
process

L

Permission to start the MS
SQL server active directory
helper

M

Permission to start the MS
SQL writer

M
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OS and network specification configuration (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

1.15

MS SQL server
agent service
account rights

Grant the MS SQL server
agent service account(s) the
following rights:

N/A; there is no MS SQL
service account assigned.

1.16

Integration service
account rights

Risk
levels

Log on as a service

M

Act as part of the OS

L

Log on as a batch job

L

Replace a process-level token

L

Bypass traverse checking

L

Adjust memory quotas for a
process

M

Grant the integration service
account(s) the following
rights:

N/A; there is no MS SQL
service account assigned.

Log on as a service

M

Permission to write to the
application event log

L

Bypass traverse checking

L

Create global objects

M

Impersonate a client after
authentication

L

1.17

SQL server services
account rights

Deny the service account the
“Log on locally” right.

Satisfactory

M

1.18

SQL server services
account rights

If a service account is a
domain account, configure the
account to have the Windows
permission “Log on To” the
database server only.

Not satisfactory;
currently the
domain/sqladmin account
can log on to all
computers.

M

1.19.1

SQL server proxy
accounts

Create dedicated user accounts
specifically for proxies, and
only use these proxy user
accounts for running job steps.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M

1.19.2

SQL server proxy
accounts

Only grant the necessary
permissions to proxy user
accounts. Grant only those
permissions actually required
to run the job steps that are
assigned to a given proxy
account.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M

1.19.3

SQL server proxy
accounts

Do not run the SQL server
agent service under a MS
Windows account that is a
member of the Windows
administrators group.

N/A; there is no proxy
account assigned.

M
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MS SQL server installation and patches audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

2.1

MS SQL server
install platform

Avoid installing MS SQL
server on a domain
controller.

Satisfactory

M

2.2

Patches and hotfixes

Ensure the current MS SQL
server service pack and
hotfixes are installed.

Satisfactory; currently
updating both service pack
and critical hotfixes every
three months

H

2.3

MS SQL server ports

Change MS SQL server
default ports from 1433 and
1434.

Not satisfactory; the
council uses both default
TCP ports (1433 and 1434).

H

2.4

Naming conventions

In naming MS SQL Server
instances, limit the instance
name to less than 16
characters with no reference
to a version number or other
sensitive information.

Satisfactory; currently the
name is less than 16
characters (11).

L

2.5

MS SQL server
instances

Keep an inventory of all
versions, editions and
languages of MS SQL
Server.

Not satisfactory; there is
no inventory process.

P

2.6

Authentication mode

Select Windows
authentication mode.

Satisfactory

M

2.7

Rename sa account

The “sa” account should be
renamed to something that is
not easily identifiable as the
“sa” account.
ALTER LOGIN sa WITH
NAME = <new name>

Not satisfactory; the
council uses the default
account (sa).

M

2.8

Strong password

Use a strong password for
the “sa” login account.

Not satisfactory;
according to the system
administrator the password
is classified as a medium
level password.

M

2.9

Sample databases

Do not install the sample
databases. Delete all sample
databases if they already
exist.

Satisfactory; there is no
sample database installed.

L

2.10

Initialisation
parameter

C2 Audit Mode– set to 1 if
no custom defined audit trace
is enabled

Not satisfactory; the
current setup is 0.

P

2.11

Initialisation
parameter

Remote Access– set to 0
unless replication is being
used or the requirement is
justified

Not satisfactory; the
current setup is 1.

M

2.12

Initialisation
parameter

Scan for Startup Procedures–
set to 0 unless justified

Satisfactory; the current
setup is 0.

L
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MS SQL server setting audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

3.1

MS SQL server
configuration manager

Disable the “Named Pipes”
network protocol.

Not satisfactory

L

3.2

MS SQL server
properties

The following settings are
recommended:

3.2.1

Auto restart MS SQL
server

Set the MS SQL server service
start mode to “Automatic”

Satisfactory

L

3.2.2

Auto restart MS SQL
server agent

If the MS SQL server agent is
required, set the “MS SQL
server agent” start mode to
“Automatic”.

Satisfactory

L

3.2.3

Distributed transaction
coordinator

Set the “distributed transaction
coordinator” service start mode
to “Disabled” if this service is
not required.

N/A

L

3.2.4

Cross databaseownership chaining

Disable the
cross_db_ownership_chaining
option.

Satisfactory

M

3.2.5

Advanced server
settings

Do not enable direct
modifications to the system
catalogs.

N/A

M

3.2.6

Backup/restore from
tape timeout

Set the backup/restore from tape
timeout period to “Try for 5
minutes”

Satisfactory

L

3.2.7

Media retention

Set the default backup media
retention to the minimum
number of days needed to retain
a full backup of the database.
Ideally, this should be as high as
your resources permit.

Not satisfactory;
currently the setting
has not been
configured.

L

3.3

Data directory

The default data directory should
be a dedicated data partition

Satisfactory;
(e:\mssql\data)

M

3.4

Data directory

The default log directory should
be a dedicated partition separate
from all programs and data

Satisfactory;
(e:\mssql\logs)

M

3.5

Replication

Do not enable replication.

N/A

L

3.6

Other SQL server
configuration options

Set the number of logs retained
based on the maximum number
of restarts and log cyclings
which may occur within your
desired log retention window.
The default value of 6 may be
too low for many installations.

Satisfactory; the
default is 6.

P

473
MS SQL server setting audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

3.7

Database mail

Disable database mail where
messaging is not required.

Satisfactory

L

3.8

Trace messages

Error log/include execution trace
messages = off

Satisfactory

P

3.9

User-defined stored
procedures

Ensure that all user-defined
stored procedures are stored in
encrypted format.

Not satisfactory;
stored in unencrypted
format.

H

3.10

User-defined
extended stored
procedures

Avoid using user-defined
extended stored procedures. If
extended functionality is
required, use Common
Language Runtime (CLR)
assemblies instead.

Not installed

L

3.11

Extended stored
procedures

Disable access to the following
extended stored procedures:

3.11.1

xp_available media

Satisfactory

L

3.11.2

xp_cmdshell

Satisfactory

L

3.11.3

xp_dirtree

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.4

xp_dsninfo

Satisfactory

P

3.11.5

xp_enumdsn

Satisfactory

P

3.11.6

xp_enumerrorlogs

Satisfactory

P

3.11.7

xp_enumgroups

Satisfactory

P

3.11.8

xp_eventlog

Satisfactory

P

3.11.9

xp_fixeddrives

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.10

xp_getfiledetails

Satisfactory

P

3.11.11

xp_getnetname

Satisfactory

P

3.11.12

xp_logevent

Satisfactory

P

3.11.13

xp_loginconfig

Satisfactory

P

3.11.14

xp_msver

Satisfactory

P

3.11.15

xp_readerrorlog

Satisfactory

P

3.11.16

xp_servicecontrol

Satisfactory

P

3.11.17

xp_sprintf

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.18

xp_sscanf

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.11.19

xp_subdirs

Satisfactory

P

Satisfactory

P

3.12

3.12.1

SQL Mail extended
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
SQL Mail extended stored
procedures:
xp_deletemail
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Item
no.

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

3.12.2

xp_findnextmsg

Satisfactory

P

3.12.3

xp_get_mapi_default_profile

Satisfactory

P

3.12.4

xp_get_mapi_profiles

Satisfactory

P

3.12.5

xp_readmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.6

xp_sendmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.7

xp_startmail

Satisfactory

P

3.12.8

xp_stopmail

Satisfactory

P

3.13

Configuration
items

WebTask extended
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
WebTask extended stored
procedures. Delete the
xpweb70.dll file that implements
the following WebTask extended
stored procedures:

3.13.1

xp_cleanupwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.2

xp_convertwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.3

xp_dropwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.4

xp_enumcodepages

Satisfactory

P

3.13.5

xp_makewebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.6

xp_readwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.13.7

xp_runwebtask

Satisfactory

P

3.14

OLE automation
stored procedures

Disable access to the following
OLE automation stored
procedures:

3.14.1

sp_OACreate

Satisfactory

L

3.14.2

sp_OADestroy

Satisfactory

L

3.14.3

sp_OAGetErrorInfo

Satisfactory

L

3.14.4

sp_OAGetProperty

Satisfactory

L

3.14.5

sp_OAMethod

Satisfactory

L

3.14.6

sp_OASetProperty

Satisfactory

L

3.14.7

sp_OAStop

Satisfactory

L

3.15

Registry access
extended stored
procedures

Disable access to the following
registry access extended stored
procedures:

3.15.1

xp_regaddmultistring

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.2

xp_regdeletekey

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.3

xp_regdeletevalue

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.4

xp_regenumvalues

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

3.15.5

xp_regremovemultistring

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.15.6

xp_regwrite

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

P

3.16

Advanced setting

MS SQL server event
forwarding/forward events to a
different server = off

Satisfactory; (off).

L

3.17

MS SQL server
browser service

Disable MS SQL server browser
service

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

L
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MS SQL server access controls audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

4.1

Permissions on OS
tools

Restrict access to the
executables in the System32
directory e.g. Explorer.exe and
cmd.exe.

Satisfactory; remove the
Users group’s
permission to run
executables.

H

4.2

MS SQL server
install directory
permissions

Modify the permissions to the
[Drive]:\Program
Files\Microsoft SQL server
directory.

Satisfactory; remove the
Users group’s
permission to run
executables.

H

4.3

MS SQL server
database instance
directory
permissions

Delete or secure old setup files.
Protect files in the <system
drive>:\Program
Files\Microsoft SQL
Server\MSSQL.X\MSSQL\Inst
all, e.g., sqlstp.log, sqlsp.log
and setup.iss. “X” represents
the installations of various SQL
server installs due to the fact
that multiple instances of SQL
server or SQL express can be
installed.

Satisfactory; access to
the current install folder
is allowed for the system
administrator groups
only.

M

4.4

Assigning system
administrators role

When assigning database
administrators to the System
Administrators role, map their
Windows accounts to SQL
logins, and then assign them to
the role.

Satisfactory

M

4.5

MS SQL logins

Remove the default
BUILTIN\administrators SQL
login.

Not satisfactory; the
BUILTIN\administrators
SQL login is still exits.

M

4.6

MS SQL logins

Ensure that all SQL logins have
strong passwords.

Not satisfactory;
enforce strong password
policy.

M

4.7

OS guests access

Deny database login for the
guests OS group.

Not satisfactory; the
guest user is disabled,
but the guests OS group
is enabled.

H

4.8

Fixed server roles

Only use the fixed server roles
sysadmin, server admin, setup
admin etc, to support a database
administrator activity.

Satisfactory

L

4.9

MS SQL server
database users and
roles

Remove the guest user from all
databases except master and
tempdb.

Satisfactory; disabled the
guest user for all
databases.

M

4.10

Statement
permissions

Grant data definition language
or data description language
statement permissions to only
the database and schema owner,
not individual users.

Not satisfactory

M

477
MS SQL server access controls audit details (continued)
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

4.11

Database owners
permissions

Ensure database owner owns all
user-created database schemas

Not satisfactory

L

4.12

Low-privileged
users

Do not grant object permissions
to PUBLIC or GUEST.

N/A

M

4.13

Stored procedure
permissions

Grant executes permissions on
stored procedures to database
roles (not users).

Satisfactory

M

4.14

Using the GRANT
option

Do not assign the GRANT
option of object permission to a
user or role.

N/A

M

4.15

MS SQL server
agent subsystem
privileges

Restrict proxy access to
required/approved subsystems.

N/A; no proxy access.

M

4.16

User-defined
database roles

Create user-defined database
roles to assign permissions to
objects in the database when a
pre-defined database role does
not supply the appropriate
permissions to a group of users.

N/A; no user defined
database roles.

M

4.17

Database roles

Avoid nesting database roles.

Satisfactory

M

4.18

Users and roles

Ensure that the members of the
roles (users/groups/other roles)
in the target database actually
exist.

Satisfactory

L

4.19

Application roles

Use application roles to limit
access to data to users of
specific applications. Use
encryption to protect the role
name and password in the
connection string. Use
“EXECUTE AS WITH NO
REVERT” or “WITH
COOKIE” to allow individuals
to access the application
without knowing the password.

N/A

M

4.20

Use of predefined
roles

Avoid assigning predefined
roles to PUBLIC or GUEST.

N/A; no predefined roles
created.

L

4.21

Linked or remote
servers

Use linked servers rather than
remote servers where required.
Remove any unused linked
servers or disable this feature.

N/A

L

4.22

Linked or remote
servers

Configure linked or remote
servers to use Windows
authentication where required.
Disable linked servers
otherwise.

Not satisfactory;
currently the sa account
is used instead of
windows authentication
domain user.

M

4.23

Linked server logins

Allow linked server access only
to those logins that need it.
Disable linked servers
otherwise.

Satisfactory

M
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

4.24

Ad Hoc data access

Disable ad hoc data access on
all providers for all users except
members of the sysadmin fixed
role.

N/A

L
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MS SQL server auditing and logging audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

5.1

Auditing – general

Prepare a schedule for
reviewing audit information
regularly.

Not satisfactory; currently
there is no auditing
schedule.

P

5.2

MS SQL server
properties – security
tab

Through the MS SQL server
management studio, enable
auditing for SQL server.

Satisfactory

P

5.3

MS SQL server logs

MS SQL server audit data
must be protected from loss.
The MS SQL server and MS
SQL server agent logs must be
backed up before they are
overwritten.

Satisfactory; the default
setup is 6.

P

5.4

MS SQL profiler

Use MS SQL profiler to
generate and manage audit
trails.

Satisfactory

P

5.5

Profiler events

Capture the following events
using MS SQL profiler

Currently there is no
template created yet.

Event
5.5.1

Audit add database user event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.2

Audit add login to server role

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.3

Audit add member to DB role

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.4

Audit add role event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.5

Audit add login event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.6

Audit app role change
password

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.7

Audit backup/restore

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.8

Audit broker conversation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.9

Audit broker login

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.10

Audit change audit

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.11

Audit change DB owner

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.12

Audit database consistency
check

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.13

Audit database management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.14

Audit database object access

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.15

Audit database object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.16

Audit database object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.17

Audit database object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.18

Audit database operation

Not satisfactory

P
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Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
Levels

5.5.19

Audit database principal
impersonation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.20

Audit database principal
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.21

Audit database scope GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.22

Audit login change password

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.23

Audit login change property

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.24

Audit login

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.25

Audit login failed

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.26

Audit login GDR event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.27

Audit logout

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.28

Audit object derived
permission event

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.29

Audit schema object access

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.30

Audit schema object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.31

Audit schema object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.32

Audit schema object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.33

Audit server alter trace

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.34

Audit server object GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.35

Audit server object
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.36

Audit server object take
ownership

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.37

Audit server operation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.38

Audit server principal
impersonation

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.39

Audit server principal
management

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.40

Audit server scope GDR

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.41

Audit server starts and stops

Not satisfactory

P

5.5.42

Audit statement permission
event

Not satisfactory

P
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MS SQL server backup and disaster recovery procedures audit details
Item
no.

Configuration items

Action / recommended
parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

6.1

Backups – general

Use full database backups
combined with differential or
transaction log backups to
restore the database to a
specific point in time.

Satisfactory; currently the
council’s backup is done
nightly.

M

6.2

System databases

It is important to include the
system databases in your
backup plan i.e. the master,
msdb and model databases.

Satisfactory

M

6.3

Backing up master
database

Backup the master database
when any of the following
events occur:
 A database is created or
deleted
 Login accounts are created,
deleted or modified
Server-wide or database
settings are modified

Satisfactory

M

6.4

Backing up MSDB
database

Backup the msdb database
when any of the following
events occur:
Alerts, jobs, schedules or
operators are created, deleted
or modified

Satisfactory

M

6.5

Backup media

Password protects the backup
media.

Not satisfactory; there is
no password protect.

H

6.6

Access to backup files

Restrict access to the backup
files to system administrators.

Not satisfactory; currently
all domain users can access
the backup files. Access
should be granted only to
the system administrator
group.

H

6.7

Access to backup files

Restrict restore permissions to
database administrators

Satisfactory; currently,
only the system
administrator group can
restore the backup files.

H

6.8

Recommended
periodic
administrative
procedures

Run the MS baseline security
analyser weekly and follow
the security recommendations
as closely as possible to
secure the OS.

Not satisfactory; the MS
baseline security analyser
not in use.

L

6.9

Recommended
periodic
administrative
procedures

Run the MS SQL best
practices analyser regularly
and note any changes to the
environment.

Not satisfactory; the MS
SQL best practices
analyser not in use.

L
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Item
no.

Configuration items

Action / recommended
Parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

6.10

Enable password
policy enforcement

When a password change
mechanism is introduced into
clients and applications;
enable password expiration.
Always specify
MUST_CHANGE when
specifying a password on
behalf of another principal.

Not satisfactory; no
enforce password policy

M

6.11

Periodic scan of role
members

Periodically scan fixed server
and database roles to ensure
that only trusted individuals
are members.

Not satisfactory;
currently, there are only a
few users. Periodic scan
may is recommended when
number of users increases.

L

6.12

Periodic scan of
stored procedures

Verify stored procedures that
have been set to AutoStart are
secure.

Not satisfactory; no
AutoStart enabled.

P
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Surface area configuration tool audit details
Item
no.

Configuration
items

Action/recommended parameters

Council C

Risk
levels

9.1

Ad Hoc Remote
Queries

Disable Ad Hoc Remote Queries
where not required.

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

L

9.2

CLR integration

Disable CLR integration where not
required..

Satisfactory

L

9.3

DAC

Disable the remote dedicated
administrator connection where not
required.

Satisfactory

L

9.4

Database mail

Disable database mail where
messaging is not required.

Not satisfactory;
(enabled).

L

9.5

Native XML web
services

Do not configure XML web services
endpoints where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.6

OLE automation

Disable OLE automation where not
required.

Satisfactory

L

9.7

Service broker

Do not configure service broker
endpoints where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.8

SQL Mail

Do not enable SQL Mail where not
required or where database mail
could be used instead.

Satisfactory

L

9.9

Web assistant

Disable web assistant where not
required.

Satisfactory

P

9.10

xp_cmdshell

Disable the xp_cmdshell stored
procedure where not required.

Satisfactory

L

9.11

Ad Hoc data
mining

Disable ad hoc data mining queries
where not required.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

L

9.12

Anonymous
connections

Disable anonymous connections to
the analysis services where not
required.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

M

9.13

Linked objects

“Enable links to other instances”
should be disabled where not
required.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

L

9.14

Linked objects

“Enable links from other instances”
should be disabled where not
required.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

L

9.15

User-defined
functions

Disable loading of user-defined
COM functions where not required.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

L

9.16

Scheduled events
and report delivery

Disable scheduled events and report
delivery where not required.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

P

9.17

Web service and
HTTP access

Disable web service and HTTP
access where not required.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

L

9.18

Windows integrated
security

Enable Windows integrated security
for report data source connections.

N/A; no analysis
services installed.

M
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Acceptable Use of Computing and Communications Facilities
Council C: COMPUTING SERVICES
POLICY: POL-M-019

1 Purpose
1.1

The purpose of this policy is to establish a Council C position concerning the
proper use of the City’s computing and communication resources.

1.2

The policy is intended to cover City staff use of the following facilities:


All computer hardware, network and communications equipment;



All computer software and applications, including all Internet
applications; and



Telephones and fax machines.

2 Policy
2.1

Council C encourages its staff to enhance customer service, productivity and
increase knowledge through the use of available computing and electronic
communications resources (including the use of the Internet) within the bounds of
their employment and relevant legal and ethical requirements. These resources
belong to the City and its suppliers and can only be used in the manner authorised.
City staff should treat the resources with respect, always be courteous and
professional in their use and represent the City in the best possible way.

2.2

Use of City computing or communication resources by a staff member should be
restricted to employment related purposes and associated behaviour must be in
keeping with the City’s Code of Conduct for employees and legislation applying
within the State of Western Australia.

2.3

Limited personal use of facilities is also permitted provided:


It does not unduly affect or interfere with the proper performance of the
duties and responsibilities of the staff member with the City;

485


It does not unduly affect or interfere with the ability of other City staff
members to perform their duties and responsibilities; or



2.4

It does not involve illegal or unethical behaviour.

Common sense should dictate what is and is not employment related, and also
what constitutes illegal and unethical behaviour in this regard. Notwithstanding
this general comment, however, the following are specifically prohibited:


Private commercial activities for the purpose of personal gain;



Accessing, distributing or disclosing material prohibited by policy or
law;

2.5



Breaching confidentiality;



Unauthorised copy or transmission of copyrighted material;



Transmitting threatening, abusive, defamatory or offensive material;



Distributing chain letters;



False representation;



Unauthorised access to, use or release of Council C information; and



Unauthorised access to or use of computers and software programmes.

When using the City’s computing and communications resources and facilities,
staff members are expected to be aware of their responsibilities to:


Comply with all policy, legislative and administrative arrangements;



Ensure any action taken serves to enhance the services provided by the
City;



Not bring the City into disrepute;



Be informed of all security arrangements related to the use of computer
facilities;



In particular the security risks involved of using the Internet and ensure
that this is not compromised by their actions; and
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2.6

Seek advice if they are unsure about the status of their actions.

While it is the individual City staff member’s responsibility to use the resources
appropriately, the City’s Managers also have a responsibility to deal with
deliberate and inadvertent breaches of this policy.

Systems are routinely monitored to ensure satisfactory levels of service.
Monitoring may also be carried out upon the direction of the Chief Executive
Officer or as a result of inquiries, investigations or Freedom of Information
requests. In these circumstances, information may be scrutinised or made public.

2.7

City staff who breach this policy may be dealt with under relevant industrial
award or general industrial law provisions or any relevant legislation.

I have read the Council C policy on Acceptable Use of Computing and Communications
Facilities and hereby agree to the terms and conditions.

Applicant’s Name: _____________________________________________________
Applicant’s Signature: __________________________________________________
Date: ________________________________________________________________

